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LECTURES

ON

GREEK PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS

OF THE LATE

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AN INTRODUCTION

TO THE

PHILOSOPHY OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

Among the fables of the East there is a story which runs thus: A certain young man inherited from his forefathers a very wonderful lamp, which for generations had been the ornament of his family, and from which he now derived his livelihood, as they, in former times, had done. Its virtues were of such a nature that, while by its means all his reasonable wants were supplied, a check was, at the same time, imposed upon any extravagant exercise of its beneficence. Once a-day, and no oftener, might its services be called into requisition. It consisted of twelve branches, and as soon as these were lighted, twelve dervishes appeared, each of whom, after performing

sundry circumvolutions, threw him a small piece of money, and vanished. Thus was the young man provided every day with means sufficient for his daily subsistence; and his desires being moderate, he for a long time considered this a bountiful provision, and remained satisfied with the good which he enjoyed upon such easy terms.

By degrees, however, when he reflected upon his situation, his heart became disturbed by the stirrings of avarice and ambition, and a restless desire to know more of the extraordinary source from whence his comforts flowed. He was unwilling to die, like his ancestors, and transmit the lamp to his posterity, without at least making the attempt to probe his way into its profounder mysteries. He suspected that he was merely skimming the surface of a sea of inexhaustible riches, the depths of which he was sure the lamp might be made to open up to him, if he but understood and could give full effect to the secret of its working. And then, if this discovery were made, what earthly potentate would be able to vie with him in magnificence and power!

Accordingly, being filled with these aspiring thoughts, and eager to learn, if possible, the whole secret of the lamp, he repaired with it to the abode of a magician, who was famous for all kinds of recondite knowledge. The old man, when he beheld the lamp, perceived at a glance its surprising virtues, and his eyes sparkled at the sight. But when again he turned to the young man, his looks became sud-

denly overcast, and he thus cautioned him in the words of long experienced wisdom. "Be contented with thy lot, my son," said he, "and with the good thou now enjoyest. The ordinary favours of the lamp enable thee to live in comfort, and to discharge correctly all the duties of thy station. What more wouldst thou have? Take it, therefore, home with thee again, and employ it as heretofore. But seek not to call forth, or pry into its more extraordinary properties, lest some evil befall thee, and the attempt be for ever fatal to thy peace."

But the young man would not be thwarted in his project. The counsel of the magician only served to whet his curiosity by showing it to be not unfounded, and to confirm him in his determination to unravel, if possible, and at whatever hazard, the mysterious powers of his treasure. The old man, therefore, finding that he would not be gainsaid, at length yielded to his entreaties, and by his art compelled the lamp to render up the deeper secrets of its nature. The twelve branches being lighted, the twelve dervishes made their appearance, and commenced their usual gyrations, which, however, were speedily cut short by the magician, who, seizing his staff, smote them to the earth, where they instantly became transformed into heaps of gold and silver, and rubies and diamonds. The young man gazed on the spectacle with bewilderment, which soon settled into delight. Now, thought he, I am rich beyond the wealth of kings; there is not a desire of my heart which may not

now be gratified. Eager, therefore, to experiment at home, he hastily seized the lamp, and bade adieu to the magician, who, turning from him with the simple word "beware," left him to his fate.

No sooner was he alone, than he lighted the lamp, and repeated what he believed to be the other steps of the process he had just witnessed; but, lo! with what a different result. He had not remarked that the magician held his staff *in his left hand* when he smote the genii; and as he naturally made use of his right, the effect produced was by no means the same. On the contrary, instead of being changed into heaps of treasure beneath his strokes, the dervishes became transformed into vindictive demons, and handled the incautious experimenter so roughly, that they left him lying half dead on the ground, with the lamp in fragments by his side.

Reader! this lamp is typical of thy natural understanding. Thou hast a light within thee sufficient to enlighten thy path in all the avocations of thy daily life, and to supply thee with everything needful to thy welfare and success upon earth. Therefore be not too inquisitive about it. Whatever thy calling be, whether lofty or low, tend thy lamp with care and moderation, and it will never fail thee. It is a sacred thing; and perhaps thy wisest part is to let it shine unquestioned.

Take example from the tranquil ongoings of creation. There is no self-interrogation here: and yet how glorious and manifold are the results! There

is no reflex process passing within the trees of the forest, when, drinking in life at their hidden roots, they dazzle thine eyes with beauty elaborated in darkness. Is this because there is no reason spread abroad through the kingdoms of nature? If thou thinkest so, go and be convinced of the contrary by beholding the geometry of the bee when she builds her honeyed cells. Here is reason, but reason going at once to its point, reason working out its end in a natural and straightforward line. It turns not back to question, and ask the meaning of itself. It entangles its employer in no perplexities, it weaves for him no web of matted sophistries; but how peaceful are its operations, and how perfect are its effects! Go thou, and do likewise.

Next turn to those who, thwarting the natural evolution of their powers, have turned round upon themselves, and questioned the light by which their spirits saw, and what a different spectacle is presented to thee here! What ravelled crossings, and what a breaking-up of the easy and natural mechanism of thought! For them the holy fire of their early inspiration is burnt out; and what is on the altar in its place? Perhaps a fire holier and more precious than the first; the light of an unconsuming and unlimited freedom, self-achieved, and higher than that which man was born to. But more probably the altar is overthrown, and the phantoms of scepticism, fatalism, materialism, or idealism, are haunting the ground whereon it stood, while the man lies prostrate be-

neath their blows. Wilt thou not take warning from his fate?

Thou, like other created things, wert born a child of nature, and for long her inevitable instincts were thy only guides. Art thou willing to remain still under her fostering care; wilt thou, for ever, derive all thy inspiration from her; and be quickened by her breath, as the budding woods are quickened by the breath of spring? Be so, and in thy choice be active, be contented, and be happy.

But art thou one who believes that thy true strength consists, in every instance, in being a rebel against the bondage of nature; that all her fetters, however flowery, must be broken asunder; and that all her lessons, however pleasing, must be scattered to the winds, if man would be emphatically man? Then thou art already a philosopher indeed, and all these words are vain as addressed to thee. Thou hast now found thy true self, where alone it is to be found, in opposition to the dominion and the dictates of nature, and thou wilt own her guardianship no more. Her laws and thy laws now no longer agree, but stand opposed to each other in direct and irreconcilable hostility. Nature works beautifully, but blindly and without reflection. Thou must work, it may be with pain and difficulty, but, at the same time, with a seeing soul, and a full consciousness of what thou art about. Nature fills thy heart with passions, and tells it to find its happiness in giving way to them. But, out of consciousness, conscience

has germinated; and thou sayest unto thyself, that passion is to be trodden under foot. In the midst of thy afflictions, nature lends thee no support, no comfort except the advice that thou shouldst yield to them. Obey her dictates, and thou shalt sink into the dust; but listen to thyself, and even in the heart of suffering, thou shalt rise up into higher action. Further, art thou determined to follow out this opposition between nature and thyself, and, for practical as well as speculative ends, to look down into the foundations on which it rests? Then it will be idle to seek any longer to deter thee from penetrating into the "holy cave, the haunt obscure of old philosophy," to have thine eyes unscaled, and the innermost mysteries of thy "lamp" revealed to thee. Thou hast chosen thy part; and, for the chance of freedom and enlightenment, art willing to run the risk of having thy soul shaken, and thy peace overthrown, by the creations of thy own understanding, which may possibly be transmuted into phantom demons to bewilder and confound thee. Still pause for a moment at the threshold, and before entering carry with thee this reflection: that thy only chance of safety lies in the *faithfulness and completeness* of thy observations. Think of the fate of the young man who observed imperfectly, and, dreading an analogous doom, pass over no fact which philosophy may set before thee, however trivial and insignificant it may, at first sight, appear. Do thou note well and remember *in which hand* the magician holds his staff.

CHAPTER II.

In resorting to philosophy, therefore, there is no safety except in the closeness and completeness of our observations; and let it be added, that there is no danger except in the reverse. Push speculation to its uttermost limits, and error is impossible, if we have attended rigidly to the facts which philosophy reveals to us: overlook perhaps but a single fact, and our reason, otherwise our faithful minister, and truly a heap of untold treasure, may be converted into a brood of fiends to baffle and destroy us.

The whole history of science shows that it is inattention to the phenomena manifested, and nothing else, which, in all ages, has been the fruitful mother of errors in the philosophy of man. Entirely in consequence of this kind of neglect have philosophical systems become vitiated. A taint enters into them by reason of the exclusion of certain essential particulars: and when the peccant humour breaks out, as it is sure to do sooner or later, it is strange that this incipient symptom of a cure is often mistaken for the worst form of the disease. Never was such a taint

more conspicuously brought to light, never was such a mistake as to its nature more strikingly illustrated, than in the instances of Locke and Hume. Locke, founding on the partial principle of an older philosophy, "*Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*," banished all original notions from the mind. Hume, following in the footsteps of the approved doctrine, took up the notion of cause and effect, and demonstrated that this relation could not be perceived by sense, that it never was in sense, and that consequently the notion of it could not possibly have any place in intelligence. In fact, he proved the notion of cause and effect to be a nonentity. But all moral reasoning, or reasoning respecting matters of fact, rests upon the notion of cause and effect: therefore all moral reasoning rests upon a notion which is a nonentity; and by the same consequence is a nonentity itself. Thus Hume, following fairly out the premises of Locke, struck a blow which paralysed man's nature in its most vital function. Like Samson carrying the gates of Gaza, he lifted human reason absolutely off its hinges; and who is there that shall put it on again upon the principles of the then dominant philosophy?

But what was the issue of all this? what was the good consequence that ensued from it? Was it that the conclusion of Hume was true? Far from it. Hume himself never dreamt it to be so, never wished that it should be thought so. Such an intention would have been at variance with the whole spirit of

his philosophy—the object of which was to expose, in all its magnitude, the vice of the prevailing doctrines of his times. Is this, says he, your boasted philosophy? Behold, then, what its consequences amount to! And his *reductio*, designed, as it was, to act back upon this philosophy, and to confound it, was certainly most triumphant. If Hume did not rectify the errors of his predecessors, he at any rate brought them clearly to light; and these errors consisted in the omission of certain phenomena, by which man was curtailed of his real proportions, and emptied of his true self. Take another instance. What has involved the doctrine of perception in so much perplexity, except the uncertainty and fluctuation which prevail respecting its *facts?* Without speculating one word on the subject, let us look for a moment to the *facts* of the question, let us see in what a state they stand, and how they have been dealt with by two of our most illustrious philosophers. At the time of Hume three facts were admitted in the prevailing doctrine of perception, and understood to stand exactly upon the same level with regard to their certainty. First, the object (*i.e.*, the external world perceived). Second, the image, impression, representation, or whatever else it may be called, of this. Third, the subject (*i.e.*, the mind of man perceiving). Hume embraced the second of these as a fact immediately given; but displaced the other two as mediate and hypothetical. Reid, on the other hand, rejected the second as mediate and hypothetical,

and maintained the first and third to be facts immediately given. So that between the two philosophers the whole three were at once admitted as facts, and rejected as hypotheses. Which is right and which is wrong cannot be decided here. Probably Hume is not so much in the wrong, nor Reid so much in the right, as they are generally imagined to be; for it is certain that common sense repudiates the conclusion of the latter, just as much as it does that of the former. The subject and object, mind and matter, supposing them to exist, are certainly given in one indivisible simultaneous fact constituting immediate perception. This is what the natural understanding maintains. This is the fact of representation, the second in our series: a synthesis perhaps of the other two facts; but nevertheless, according to the testimony of common sense, a distinct and undeniable fact, just as much as they are distinct and undeniable facts. This is the fact which Hume admits, and which Reid, however, rejects—his rejection of it being indeed the very lever by which he imagines himself at once to have replaced the other two facts in their original position, and to have displaced the conclusions by means of which Hume was supposed to have dislodged them. Common sense, therefore, is not more enlisted on the side of Reid, than on the side of Hume; and the truth is, the question remains as much open to question as ever. But the issue to which these philosophers have brought it, proves that there must have been some flaw in the original ob-

servation of the facts of perception. The great discrepancy between them, and the fact that neither of them has brought the question to any satisfactory termination, notwithstanding the thorough and sifting manner in which they have discussed and exhausted all the materials before them, can only be accounted for upon this ground. They have certainly made it apparent that the phenomena of perception have never been correctly observed, or faithfully stated: and that is the good which they have done.

But the danger accruing from inattention on the part of man, to the facts revealed to him in the study of himself, is to be seen in its strongest light when reflected from the surface of his moral and practical life. Man takes to pieces only to reconstruct; and he can only reconstruct a thing out of the materials into which he has analysed it. When, therefore, after having analysed himself, he seeks to build himself up again (such a task is self-education), he can only work with the divided elements which he has found. He has nothing else under his hand. Therefore, when any element has escaped him in the analysis, it will also escape him, and not be combined, in the synthesis: and so far he will go forth into the world again shorn of a portion of himself; and if the neglect has involved any important ingredient of his constitution, he will go forth a mutilated skeleton. Such things have often happened in the history of mankind. Speculative inquirers, who, in analysing man (*i.e.*, themselves), or man's actions

(*i.e.*, their own), have found no morality, no honour, no religion therein, have seldom, in putting the same together again, placed any of these elements in their own breasts as practical men. And after a time it is the tendency of these omissions, and of this influence of theory upon practice, to operate on a wider scale, and pervade the heart of the whole people among whom such things occur, particularly among its well-educated ranks—witness France towards the end of the last century, with its host of economists, calculators, and atheists, who emptied the universe of morality, and set up expediency in its stead.

"Arouse man," says Schelling, "to the consciousness of what he *is*, and he will soon learn to be what he *ought*." It may be added, teach him to think himself something which he is *not*, and no power in heaven or in earth will long keep him from framing himself practically in conformity with his theoretical pattern, or from becoming that which he ought *not to be*. Speculative opinion always acts vitally upon practical character, particularly when it acts upon masses of men and long generations. Theory is the source out of which practice flows. The Hindoo beholds himself, as he conceives, whirling, with all other things, within the eddies of a gigantic fatalism. So far he is a speculator merely. But trace out his philosophy into his actual life, and see how supine he is in conduct and in soul. All his activities are dead. His very personality is really gone, because he looks upon it as gone. He has really

no freedom of action, because he believes himself to have none. He views himself but as "dust in the wind," and viewing himself thus, he becomes, in practice, the worthless thing which in theory he dreams himself to be. Fatalism, too, has ever been the creed of usurpers; and they have ever made it their apology also in their strivings after more tyrannical rule. Did conscience for a moment cross the path of these scourges of the earth, it was brushed aside with the salving dogma that man is but a machine in the hands of a higher power. Napoleon, in his own eyes, was but a phantom of terror shaped on the battle-field, by the winds of circumstance, out of the thunder-smoke of his own desolating wars; and, with this reflection, his enslaving arm was loosed more fiercely than before. Finally, through inattention to the true phenomena of man, we may be misled into all the errors of Rochefoucauld. And here our errors will not stop at their theoretical stage. In order to prove our creed to be correct, we must, and will ere long, make our own characters correspond with his model of man, believing it to be the true one.

Such and so great is the peril to which we are exposed in our practical characters, as well as in our speculative beliefs, from any oversight committed in studying the phenomena of ourselves. There is no call upon any man to observe these phenomena. Sufficient in general for his day are the troubles thereof, without this additional source of perplexity.

But if he must study them, let him study them faithfully, and without curtailment. If he will bring himself before the judgment-seat of his own soul, he is bound to bring himself thither unmutilated and entire, in order that he may depart from thence greater and better, and not less perfect than he came. He is not entitled to pass over without notice any fact which may be exhibited to him there, for he cannot tell how much may depend upon it, and whether consequences, mighty to change the whole aspect of his future self, may not be slumbering unsuspected in this insignificant germ. Let him note all things faithfully; for although, like the young man in the fable of the lamp, he may be unable to divine at first the great results which are dependent on the minutest facts, he may at any rate take a lesson from his fate, and, when studying at the feet of philosophy, may observe correctly in which hand that magician holds his staff.

CHAPTER III.

But, inasmuch as our observation must not be put forth vaguely or at random, but must be directed by some principle of method, the question comes to be, In what way are the true facts of man's being to be sought for and obtained? There is a science called the "science of the human mind," the object of which is to collect and systematise the phenomena of man's moral and intellectual nature. If this science accomplishes the end proposed, its method must be the very one which we ought to make use of. But if it should appear that this science carries in its very conception such a radical defect that all the true and distinctive phenomena of man necessarily elude its grasp, and that it is for ever doomed to fall short of the end it designs to compass, then our adoption of its method could only lead us to the poorest and most unsatisfactory results. That such is its real character will, it is believed, become apparent as we proceed.

The human mind, not to speak it profanely, is like the goose that laid golden eggs. The metaphysician

resembles the analytic poulterer who slew it to get at them in a lump, and found *nothing* for his pains. Leave the mind to its own natural workings, as manifested in the imagination of the poet, the fire and rapid combinations of the orator, the memory of the mathematician, the gigantic activities and never-failing resources of the warrior and statesman, or even the manifold powers put forth in everyday life by the most ordinary of men; and what can be more wonderful and precious than its productions? Cut into it metaphysically, with a view of grasping the embryo truth, and of ascertaining the process by which all these bright results are elaborated in the womb, and every trace of "what has been" vanishes beneath the knife; the breathing realities are dead, and lifeless abstractions are in their place; the divinity has left its shrine, and the devotee worships at a deserted altar; the fire from heaven is lost in chaotic darkness, and the godlike is nothing but an empty name. Look at thought, and feeling, and passion, as they glow on the pages of Shakespeare. Golden eggs, indeed! Look at the same as they stagnate on the dissecting-table of Dr Brown, and marvel at the change. Behold how shapeless and extinct they have become!

Man is a "living soul;" but science has been trained among the *dead*. Man is a free agent; but science has taken her lessons from dependent things, the inheritors and transmitters of an activity, gigantic indeed, but which is not their own. What then will

she do when brought face to face with such a novelty, such an anomaly as he? Instead of conforming herself to him, she will naturally seek to bend him down in obedience to the early principles she has imbibed. She has subdued all things to herself; and now she will endeavour to end by putting man, too, under her feet. Like a treacherous warrior, who, after having conquered the whole world in his country's cause, returns to enslave the land that gave him birth, Science, coming home laden with the spoils of the universe, will turn her arms against him whose banner she bore, and in whose service she fought and triumphed. By benumbing a vitality she cannot grasp, and by denying or passing by, blindly or in perplexity, a freedom she can neither realise nor explain, she will do her best to bring him under the dominion of the well-known laws which the rest of the universe obeys. But all her efforts ever have been, and ever shall be, unavailing. She may indeed play with words, and pass before us a plausible rotation of "faculties." She may introduce the causal *nexus* into thought, and call the result "association." But the man himself is not to be found in this "calculating machine." He, with all his true phenomena, has burst alive from under her petrific hand, and leaves her grasping "airy nothings," not even the shadow of that which she is striving to comprehend; for, though she can soar the solar height, and gaze unblinded on the stars, man soars higher still, and, in his lofty region, she

has got waxen wings, that fall to pieces in the blaze of the brighter sun of human freedom.

These things are spoken of physical science; but they apply equally to the science of the human mind, because this science is truly and strictly physical in its method and conditions, and, to express it in general terms, in the tone it assumes, and the position it occupies, when looking at the phenomena of man. As has been already hinted, it is not wonderful that man, when endeavouring to comprehend and take the measure of himself, should, in the first instance at least, have adopted the tone and method of the physical sciences, and occupied a position analogous to that in which they stand. The great spectacle of the universe is the first to attract the awakening intelligence of man; and hence the earliest speculators were naturalists merely. And what is here true in the history of the race, is true also in the history of the individual. Every man looks at nature, and, consciously or unconsciously, registers her appearances long before he turns his eyes upon himself. Thus a certain method, and certain conditions, of inquiry, are fixed; what is considered the proper and pertinent business of science is determined, before man turns his attention to himself. And when he does thus turn it, nothing can be more natural, or indeed inevitable, than that he should look at the new object altogether by the light of the old method, and of his previously-acquired conception of science. But man not having been taken into account when these con-

ceptions were first formed, and when this method was fixed, the question comes to be, How does this application of them answer when *man* forms the object of research? For it is at least possible that, in his case, the usual mode of scientific procedure may misgive.

It is unfair to condemn anything unheard. It is idle and unreasonable to charge any science with futility without at least endeavouring to substantiate the charge, and to point out the causes of its failure. Let us, then, run a parallel between the procedure of science as applied to nature, and the procedure of science as applied to man, and see whether, in the latter case, science does not occupy a position of such a nature, that if she maintains it, all the true phenomena for which she is looking necessarily become invisible; and if she deserts it, she forgoes her own existence. For, be it observed, that the "science of the human mind" claims to be a science only in so far as it can follow the analogy of the natural sciences, and, consequently, if its inability to do this to any real purpose be proved, it must relinquish all pretensions to the name.

In the first place, then, what is the proper business and procedure of the natural sciences? This may be stated almost in one word. It is to mark, register, and classify the changes which take place among the objects constituting the material universe. These objects *change*, and they do *nothing more*.

In the second place, what is the proper business and procedure of science in its application to man?

Here science adopts precisely the same views, and follows precisely the same method. Man *objectises* himself as "the human mind," and declares that the *only* fact, or at least that the sum total of *all* the facts appertaining to this object, is that it is visited by certain changes constituting its varieties of "feeling," "passion," "states of mind," or by whatever other name they may be called, and that the only legitimate business of science here is to observe these changes and classify them.

This makes the matter very simple. The analogy between mind and matter seems to be as complete as could be wished, and nothing appears to stand in the way of the establishment of kindred sciences of the two founded upon this analogy. But let us look into the subject a little more closely; and not to rush hastily into any difficulties without a clue, let us commence with certain curious verbal or grammatical considerations which lie on the very surface of the exposition given of the usual scientific procedure, as applied both to nature and to man. A phenomenon breaking through the surface of language, and startling our opinions out of their very slumbers, makes its appearance, we may be sure, not without authentic credentials from some deeper source; and if we attend to them we may be assisted in rectifying our hasty views of truth, or in correcting errors that we may have overlooked by reason of the very obviousness and boldness with which they came before us. First, however, it is to be premised that the reader must

suppose himself in the situation of one who can extract no more from language than what the words, of themselves—that is, taken irrespectively of any previously acquired knowledge on his part—afford to him. He must bring no supplementary thought of his own to eke out explanations which the words do not supply him with. He must not bridge or fill up with a sense born of his own mind, hiatuses which the language leaves gaping. It is only upon such conditions as these that the question upon which we are entering can be fairly canvassed; it is only upon these conditions that we can fairly test the "science of the human mind," and ascertain, as we are about to do from its verbal bearings, whether it be a valid or a nugatory research.

CHAPTER IV.

In order, therefore, to make sure that the requisitions demanded in the preceding chapter are complied with, let us suppose the following dialogue to take place between an "inquirer" into "the human mind," and an inhabitant of some planet different from ours; a person who can bring to the discussion neither ignorant prejudices nor learned prepossessions, and whose information respecting the subject in hand does not outrun the language in which it is conveyed.

The universe, commences the metaphysician,[1] is

[1] In order to show that the accompanying dialogue is not directed against imaginary errors in science, and also with the view of rendering the scope of our observations more obvious and clear, we will quote one or two specimens of the current metaphysical language of the day. The whole substance of Dr Brown's philosophy and scientific method is contained in the following passage:—"That which perceives," says he (namely, mind), "is a part of nature as truly as the objects of perception which act on it, and as a part of nature is itself an *object* of investigation purely physical. It is known to us *only* in the successive changes which constitute the variety of our feelings; but the regular sequence of these changes admits of being traced, like the regularity which we are capable of discovering in the successive organic changes of our *bodily* frame." —(Physiology of the Mind, p. 1, 2.) "There is," says Dr Cook of

divided into two distinct orders of existence, mind and matter. Matter is known by its changes alone, mind also is known *only* by its changes. Thus, continues he, for all scientific purposes, the analogy between the two is complete, and science in both cases is practicable only by noting these changes and the order in which they recur.

"But may I ask," interposes the foreign interlocutor, "to *whom* these changes are known?"

"To me, the inquirer, to be sure!" answers the metaphysician.

"Then," rejoins the other, "ought you not, logically speaking, to say that your universe resolves itself into *three* distinct orders of existence: 1st, Mind; 2d, Matter; and 3d, This which you call 'me,' to whom the *changes* of the other two are known; and when sciences of the first and second are complete,

St Andrews, "*a mental constitution*, through which WE communicate with the world around us."—(Synopsis of Lectures, p. 4.) We could quote a hundred other instances of this kind of language, but these two are sufficient for our purpose. Now, what is the obvious and irresistible inference which such language as this forces upon us? or, rather, what is the plain meaning of the words we have quoted? It is this, that we possess a mind just as we possess a body; that is to say, that man consists of *three* elements, mind, body, and *himself* possessing both. This view of the subject may be disclaimed and protested against in words, but still it continues virtually to form the leading idea of the whole of our popular psychology. We may, indeed, be told that "mind" and ourselves are identical, but this statement is never acted upon to any real purpose, this fact is never sifted with any degree of attention. If it were, then "mind" would be altogether annihilated as an *object* of investigation. This is what we have endeavoured to make out in the chapter which this note accompanies.

does not a science, or some knowledge, at least, of the third still remain a *desideratum?*"

"Not at all," replies the inquirer, "for 'I' and 'mind' are identical. The observed and the observer, the knowing subject and the known object, are here one and the same: and whatever is a science of the one is a science of the other also."

"Then you get out of one error only to be convicted of another. You set out with saying that mind, like matter, was visited by various changes, and that this *was all;* you said that changing was its *only* fact, or was, at least, the general complementary expression of the *whole* of its facts. So far I perfectly understood the analogy between mind and matter, and considered it complete. I also saw plainly that any principles of science applicable to the one object would likewise be applicable to the other. But when you are questioned as to *whom* these changes are known, you answer 'to me.' When further interrogated, you will not admit this 'me' to be a third existence different from the other two, but you identify it with mind; that is to say, you make mind take cognisance of its own changes. And in doing this, you depart entirely from your first position, which was, that mind did *nothing more* than change. You now, in contradiction to your first statement, tell me that this is *not all.* You tell me that moreover it is *aware* of its own changes; and in telling me this, you bring forward a fact connected with mind altogether new. For to change and to be cognisant of change; for a

thing to *be* in a particular state, and to be *aware* that it is in this state, is surely not one and the same fact, but two totally distinct and separate facts. In proof of which witness the case of matter; or perhaps matter also does something *more* than change; perhaps matter too has a 'me,' which is identical with *it*, and cognisant of *its* changes. Has it so? Do you identify your 'me' with matter likewise, and do you make matter take notice of its own changes? And do you thus still preserve entire the analogy between mind and matter?"

"No."

"Then the parallel is at an end. So far as the mere fact of change in either case is concerned, this parallel remains perfect, and if you confine your attention to this fact, it is not to be denied that analogous sciences of the two objects may be established upon exactly the same principles. But when you depart from this fact, as you have been forced to do by a criticism which goes no deeper than the mere surface of the language you make use of; and when you take your stand upon *another* fact which is to be found in the one object, while the opposite of it is to be found in the other object; the analogy between them becomes, in that point, completely violated. And this violation carries along with it, as shall be shown, the total subversion of any similarity between the two methods of inquiry which might have resulted from it, supposing it to have been preserved unbroken. You have been brought, by the very lan-

guage you employ, to signalise a most important distinction between mind and matter. You inform me that both of them change; but that while one of them takes *no* cognisance of its changes, the other does. You tell me that in the case of matter the object known is *different* from the subject knowing, but that in the case of mind the object known is the *same* as the subject knowing. Disregarding, then, the fact of change as it takes place in either object, let us attend a little more minutely to this latter fact. It is carelessly slurred over in ordinary metaphysics; but it is certain, that our attention as psychologists ought to be chiefly directed, if not exclusively confined to it, inasmuch as a true knowledge of any object is to be obtained by marking the point in which it differs from other things, and not the point in which it agrees with them. We have found in mind a fact which is *peculiar* to it; and this is, not that it changes, but that it *takes cognisance* of its changes. It now remains to be seen what effect this new fact will have upon your 'science of the human mind.'"

"First of all," says the metaphysical inquirer, "allow me to make one remark. I neglected to mention that mind is essentially rational. It is endowed with reason or intelligence. Now, does not this endowment necessarily imply that mind must be conscious of its various changes, and may not the matter in this way be relieved of every difficulty?"

"To expose fully," replies the other disputant, "the

insufficiency of this view, would require a separate discussion, involving the real, and not the mere logical bearings of the question. This is what we are not at liberty to go into at present. We are confining ourselves as much as possible to the mere language of metaphysical inquiry; I, therefore, content myself with answering, that if by reason is meant conscious or reflective reason, and if this is held to be identical with mind, of course, in that case, mind is necessarily conscious of its own changes. But such reason is not one phenomenon but two phenomena, which admit of very easy discrimination, and which are often to be found actually discriminated both in ourselves and in the universe around us. Reason, taken singly, and viewed by its own light, is a mere 'state of mind' in which there is nothing, any more than there is in the 'states of matter,' to countenance the presumption that it should take cognisance of its own operation; *a priori*, there is no more ground for supposing that 'reason,' 'feeling,' 'passion,' and 'states of mind' whatsoever, should be conscious of themselves, than that thunder and lightning, and all the changes of the atmosphere should. Mind, endow it with as much reason as you please, is still perfectly conceivable as existing in all its varying moods, without being, at the same time, at all conscious of them. Many creatures are rational without being conscious; therefore human consciousness can never be explained out of human reason."

"All I suppose, then, that can be said about the

matter," replies the inquirer, "is, that human consciousness is a fact known from experience."

"Exactly so," rejoins the other; "and now we have reached the point of the question, and I wish you to observe particularly the effect which this *fact* has upon 'the human mind,' and the 'science of the human mind.' The results of our arguments shall be summed up and concluded in a few words."

"Matter is not 'I.' I know it only by its changes. It is an object to me, *Objicitur mihi.* This is intelligible enough, or is at least known from experience, and a science of it is perfectly practicable, because it is *really* an object to me. Suppose, then, that 'mind' also is not I, but that I have some mode of becoming acquainted with its phenomena or changes just as I have of becoming acquainted with those of matter. This, too, is perfectly conceivable. Here, also, I have an object. *Aliquod objicitur mihi:* and of this I can frame a science upon intelligible grounds. But I can attribute no consciousness to this object. The consciousness is in myself. But suppose I vest myself in this object. I thus identify myself with mind, and realise consciousness as a fact of mind, but in the meantime what becomes of mind as an *object?*[1] It has vanished in the process. An object can be conceived only as that which may possibly become an object *to* something else. Now what can mind become

[1] Of course it is not merely meant that mind is not an object of sense. Far more than this: it is altogether inconceivable as an object of thought.

an object *to?* Not to me, for I am it, and not something else. Not to something else without being again denuded of consciousness; for this other being could only mark its changes as I did, and not endow it with consciousness without vesting in it its own personality, as I had done. Perhaps you imagine that the synthesis of 'I' and 'mind' may be resolved; and that thus the latter may again be made the *object* of your research. Do you maintain that the synthesis may be resolved in the first place *really?* Then you adopt our first supposition when we supposed that 'mind' was not 'I.' In this case 'mind' is left with all its changing phenomena, its emotions, passions, &c., and the consciousness of them remains vested in that which is called 'I,' and thus 'mind' is divested of its most important fact. Or, in the second place, do you suppose the synthesis resolved *ideally?* But, in this case too, it will be found that the fact of consciousness clings on the one side of the inquiring subject ('I'), and cannot be conceived on the side of the object inquired into ('mind'), unless the synthesis of the subject and object which was ideally resolved be again ideally restored. The conclusion of this is, that if the synthesis of 'I' and 'mind' be resolved either really or ideally, consciousness vanishes from 'mind,' and if it be maintained entire, 'mind' becomes inconceivable as an *object* of research. Finally, are you driven to the admission that mind is an object, only in a fictitious sense; then here indeed you speak the truth. That

which is called 'I' is a living reality, and though mind were annihilated, it would remain a repository of given facts. But that which is called mind is truly an object only in a fictitious sense, and being so, is, therefore, only a fictitious object, and consequently the science of it is also a fiction and an imposture."

"How, then, do you propose to establish a science of ourselves?"

"In the first place, by brushing away the human mind, with all its rubbish of states, faculties, &c., for ever from between ourselves and the universe around us: and then by confining our attention exclusively to the given fact of consciousness. Dr Reid was supposed to have done philosophy considerable service by exploding the old doctrine of ideas. By removing them he cut down an hypothesis, and brought 'mind' into immediate contact with external things. But he left the roots of the evil flourishing as vigorously as ever. He indeed lopped no more than a very insignificant twig from a tree of ignorance and error, which darkened, and still darkens, both the heavens and the earth. Until the same office which he performed towards ideas be performed towards 'mind' itself, there can be neither truth, soundness, nor satisfaction in psychological research. For 'the human mind' stands between *the man himself* and the universe around him, playing precisely, only to a greater and more detrimental extent, the part of that hypothetical medium which ideas before the time of Dr Reid played between *it* and outward objects.

And the writer who could make this apparent, and succeed in getting it banished from the vocabulary of philosophy, and confined to common language as the word *ideas* now is, would render the greatest possible service to the cause of truth. Is it not enough for a man that he is *himself?* There can be no dispute about that. *I* am; what more would I have? what more would I be? why would I be 'mind'? what do I know about it? what is it to me, or I to it? I am *myself,* therefore let it perish."

CHAPTER V.

In the foregoing dialogue it was shown that language itself, and consequently that the very nature of thought, render impracticable anything like a true and real science of the human mind. It appeared that if mind be conceived of as an *object* of research, its vital distinguishing and fundamental phenomenon, namely, consciousness, necessarily becomes invisible, inasmuch as it adheres tenaciously to the side of the inquiring subject; and that if it be again invested with this phenomenon, it becomes from that moment inconceivable as an *object*. In the first case, a science of it is nugatory, because it cannot see or lay hold of its principal and peculiar phenomenon. In the second case, it is impossible, because it has no *object* to work upon. We are now going to tread still more deeply into the *realities* of the subject.

In the preceding chapter the question was put, whether reason or intelligence, considered as the essential endowment of mind, was not sufficient to explain away every difficulty involved in the consideration,

that while one kind of existence (matter) changed, without being aware of its changes, another kind of existence (mind) also changed; and, moreover, took account to itself of its changes, or was cognisant of them. In virtue of what does this difference exist between them? In virtue of what does this cognisance take place in the one case and not in the other? It is answered, in virtue of reason present in the one instance, and absent in the other. But this is not so plain, so simple, or so sure as it appears. We now address ourselves to the examination of this question and answer, as the subject we had in hand in the foregoing chapter did not permit us to discuss them fully in that place.

Leaving man out of the survey, let us look abroad into the universe around us, and consider what is presented to us there. In mineral, in vegetable, and in animal nature, we behold life in the greatest possible vigour and variety. Active processes are everywhere going on; and throughout the length and breadth of creation there is a constant succession of changes. The whole earth is, indeed, teeming with every form and every colour of existence; and that enjoyment is there too, who can doubt when spring is in the air, and the lark singing in the cloud?

Here, then, we have a creation brimful of activity and life, and no pause in all its vigorous and multifarious ongoings. What is there, then, in man which is not to be found here also, and even in greater and more perfect abundance? Is it intelli-

gence? Is it reason? You answer that it is. But if by reason is meant (and nothing else can be meant by it) the power of adapting means to the production of ends, skill and success in scientific contrivances, or in the beautiful creations of art, then the exclusive appropriation of reason to man is at once negatived and put to shame by the facts which nature displays. For how far is human intelligence left behind in many things by the sagacity of brutes, and by the works which they accomplish! What human geometer can build like a bird its airy cradle, or like the bee her waxen cells? And in exquisite workmanship, how much do natures still more inanimate than these transcend all that can be accomplished even by the *wisest* of men? "Behold the lilies of the field, they toil not, neither do they spin; yet *Solomon in all his glory* was not arrayed like one of these." Perhaps you may say that these things are entirely passive and unintelligent in themselves, and that in reality it is not they, but the Creator, who brings about all the wonders we behold; that the presiding and directing reason is not in them, but in Him. And this may readily be admitted; but, in return, it may be asked *home,* Is man's reason vested in the Creator too?

Do you answer Yes? Then look what the consequences are. You still leave man a being fearfully and wonderfully made. He may still be something more than what many of his species at this moment are, mere hewers of wood and drawers of water. He

may still be a scientific builder of houses and of ships, a builder and a destroyer of cities. He may still subdue to his dominion the beasts of the field, and raise himself to be a ruler over his fellow-men. The reason within him is not his own, yet in virtue of it he may perform works inconceivably wonderful and great. But, with all this, what is he, and what sort of activity is his? Truly the activity of a spoke in an unresting wheel. Nothing connected with him is really his. His actions are not his own. Another power lives and works within him, and he is its machine. You have placed man completely within nature's domain, and embraced him under the law of causality. Hence his freedom is gone, together with all the works of freedom; and, in freedom's train, morality and responsibility are also fled.

Do you answer No to the question just put? Do you say that man's reason is his own, and is not to be referred to any other being? Then I ask you *why*, and *on what grounds*, do you make this answer? Why, in one instance, do you sign away the reason from the immediate agent, the animal, and fix it upon the Creator, and why in another instance do you confine and attribute it to the immediate agent, the man? Why should the engineer have the absolute credit of his work? and why should not the beaver and the bee? Do you answer that man exhibits reason in a higher, and animals in a lower degree; and that *therefore* his reason is really his

own? But what sort of an answer, what sort of an inference, is this? Is it more intelligible that the reason of any being should be its own absolutely, when manifested in a high degree, than when manifested in a low degree? or is the converse not much the more intelligible proposition? If one man has a hundred thousand pounds in his coffers, and another a hundred pence, would you conclude that the former sum was the man's own, because it was so large, and that the latter sum was not the man's own, because it was so small; or would you not be disposed to draw the very opposite conclusion? Besides, the question is not one of degree at all. We ask, Why is the reason of man said to belong to him absolutely as his own, and why is the reason put forth by animals not said to belong to them in the least?

As it is vain, then, to attempt to answer this question by attending to the manifestations of reason itself, as displayed either in man or in the other objects of the universe, we must leave the fact of reason altogether, it being a property possessed in common, both by him and by them, and one which carries in it intrinsically no evidence to proclaim the very different tenures by which it is held in the one case and in the other; and we must look out for some other fact which is the peculiar possession of man; some fact which may be shown to fall in with his reason, and give it a different turn from the course which it takes in its progress through the

other creatures of the universe, thus making it attributable to himself, and thereby rendering him a free, a moral, and an accountable agent. If we can discover such a fact as this, we shall be able, out of it, to answer the question with which we are engaged. Let us, then, look abroad into the universe once more, and there, throughout "all that it inherit," mark, if we can, the *absence* of some fact which is to be found conspicuously present in man.

Continuing, then, our survey of the universe, we behold works of all kinds, and of surpassing beauty, carried on. Mighty machinery is everywhere at work; and on all sides we witness marvellous manifestations of life, of power, and of reason. The sun performs his revolution in the sky, and keeps his appointed pathway with unwearied and unerring foot, while the seasons depend upon his shining. The ant builds her populous cities among the fallen forest-leaves, collects her stores, and fills her granaries with incomparable foresight. Each living creature guards itself from danger, and provides for its wants with infallible certainty and skill. They can foresee the very secrets of the heavens, and betake themselves to places of shelter with the thunder in their quaking hearts long before the bolt falls which shatters the green palaces of the woods. But still verily "there is a path which no fowl knoweth, and which the vulture's eye hath not seen: the lion's whelps have not trodden it, nor the fierce lion passed by it. The depth saith, It is not in me;

and the sea saith, It is not with me."[1] And this path which is "kept close from the fowls of the air," and, with one exception, from the "eyes of all living," is no other than the path of *consciousness.*

What effect has the absence of consciousness upon the universe? Does it empty the universe of existence? Far from it. Nature is still thriving, and overflowing with life throughout all her kingdoms. Does it empty the universe of intelligence? Far from it. The same exquisite adaptation of means to ends is to be witnessed as heretofore, the same well-regulated processes, the same infallible results, and the same unerring sagacities. But still, with all this, it is what may be termed but a one-sided universe. Under one view it is filled to the brim with life and light; under another view it is lying within the very blackest shadow of darkness and of death. The first view is a true one, because all the creatures it contains are, indeed, alive, and, revelling in existence, put forth the most wonderful manifestations of reason. The second view is also a true one, because none of these creatures (man excepted) *know* that they exist; no notion of themselves accompanies their existence and its various changes, neither do they take any account to themselves of the reason which is operating within them: it is reserved for man to live this *double* life. To exist, and to be *conscious* of existence; to be rational, and to *know* that he is so.

But what do we mean precisely by the word con-

[1] Job xxviii. 7, 8, 14.

sciousness, and upon what ground do we refuse to attribute consciousness to the animal creation? In the first place, by consciousness we mean the notion of self; that notion of self, and that self-reference, which in man generally, though by no means invariably, accompanies his sensations, passions, emotions, play of reason, or states of mind whatsoever. In the second place, how is it known that animals do not possess this consciousness? This is chiefly known from the fact that certain results or effects in man may be distinctly observed and traced growing out of this consciousness or self-reference on his part; and these results not making their appearance in the animal creation, it is fairly to be inferred that the root out of which they spring is wanting in the animal creation too. The most important of these are conscience, morality, and responsibility, which may be shown to be based in consciousness, and necessary sequents thereof. It will be admitted that animals have no conscience or moral sense, therefore if it can be shown that this has its distinct origin in consciousness — that consciousness in its simplest act contains the seeds of a nascent morality, which must come to maturity—it must also be concluded that animals have no consciousness either. Or if they have, deep and dreadful indeed is the condemnation they merit, having the foundation laid, and yet no superstructure erected thereupon; the seed sown, and yet the field altogether barren. Wherever we behold corn growing, we conclude that

corn has been planted; and wherever we behold none, we are entitled to infer that the conditions upon which corn grows have been awanting—namely, that the sowing of it has never taken place. There are other reasons besides these; but as it will probably be universally admitted that animals do not possess the notion of self, and are incapable of any sort of self-reference, it seems unnecessary to argue this point at any greater length.

We have found, then, the fact of consciousness prominently visible in man, and nowhere apparent in any other being inhabiting the universe around him. Let us now pause upon this fact, and, availing ourselves of its assistance, let us sum up very shortly the results to which it has conducted us. The first question put was, whether man, being endowed with reason, is not, on that account, necessarily cognisant of his powers; whether in virtue of it he does not necessarily form the notion of self, and become capable of self-reference; and, in short, whether reason ought not to be regarded as the essential and characteristic property by which he may be best discriminated from the other occupants of the earth. A review of the universe around us then showed us that other creatures besides man were endowed with copious stores of reason, and that their works were as rational and as wonderful as his. So far, therefore, as mere reason on either side was concerned, they and he were found to stand exactly upon the same footing. The facts themselves forbade that he

should appropriate it exclusively to himself. But here the argument was interrupted by the statement that the reason of animals is not their own. This was rebutted by the question: Is man's reason, then, his own? Was the answer No? then freedom, morality, and responsibility were struck dead, and other consequences followed, too appalling to be thought of. Was the answer Yes? then some reason for this answer was demanded, and must be given, for it contradicts the other statement with regard to the reason of animals, in which it was declared that this power was *not* their own. To find, then, a satisfactory reason *of fact* for this answer, we again looked forth over the life-fraught fields of creation. We there still beheld reason operating on a great and marvellous scale, and yet at the same time we found no consciousness thereof. This, then, plainly proved that the presence of reason by no means necessarily implied a cognisance of reason in the creature manifesting it. It proved that man, like other beings, might easily have been endowed with reason, without at the same time becoming aware of his endowment, or blending with it the notion of himself. The first question, then, is completely answered. It does not follow that man must necessarily take cognisance of his operations, and refer his actions to himself *because* he is rational, for all the other creatures around are also rational, without taking any such cognisance, or making any such reference; neither can reason be pointed out as his peculiar or distinguishing charac-

teristic, for it is manifested by all other beings as well as by him.

But when we turned from the universe to man, we found in him, besides reason, another fact, a phenomenon *peculiarly* his own—namely, the fact of consciousness. This, and this alone, is the fact which marks man off from all other things with a line of distinct and deep-drawn demarcation. This is the fact, out of which the second question which occupied us is to be answered. This is the fact, which reason falling in with, and doubling upon in man, becomes from that moment absolutely his own. This is the fact which bears us out in attributing our reason and all our actions to ourselves. By means of it we absolutely create for ourselves a personality to which we justly refer, and for which we lawfully claim, all our faculties, and all our doings. It is upon this fact, and not upon the fact of his reason, that civilised man has built himself up to be all that we now know and behold him to be. Freedom, law, morality, and religion have all their origin in this fact. In a word, it is in virtue of it that we are free, moral, social, and responsible beings.

On the other hand, look at the effect which the absence of this fact has upon the animal creation. Reason enters into the creatures there, just as it does into man, but not meeting with this fact, it merely impels them to accomplish their ends under the law of causality, and then running out, it leaves them just as it found them. They cannot detain it, or

profit by its presence, or claim it as their own; indeed their reason cannot be their own, because, wanting this fact, they also necessarily want, and cannot create for themselves, a personality to which to refer it. In fine, because the fact of consciousness is not present within them, they continue for ever to be the mere machines they were born, without freedom, without morality, without law, and without responsibility.

Our present limits compel us to be satisfied with having briefly indicated these consequences, which result from the fact of consciousness; but we shall treat more fully of them hereafter. Our first and great aim has been to signalise and bring prominently forward this fact, as *κατ' ἐξοχὴν, the* psychological fact, *the human* phenomenon, neglecting the *objects* of it, namely, the passions, emotions, and all the other paraphernalia of "the human mind," which, if they are psychological facts at all, are so only in a very secondary and indirect manner. And now, to round this part of our discussion back to the allegory with which we commenced it, let us remark, in conclusion, that this is the fact, upon an attentive observation of which our whole safety and success as philosophers hinge; and from a neglect of which, consequences most fatal to our intellectual peace may ensue. This is that minute and apparently unimportant fact upon which the most awful and momentous results are dependent. To pass it by carelessly (and thus it is too frequently passed by),

is to mistake the left hand of the magician for the right, and to bring down upon our heads evils analogous to those which befell the unfortunate experimentalist who committed this error. To note it well is to observe faithfully in which hand the staff of the magician is held, and to realise glorious consequences similar to those which would have been the fortune of the young man, had his observations of the facts connected with his lamp been correct and complete. Let us, therefore, confine our attention to this fact, and examine it with care. Thus we shall be led into extensive fields of novelty and truth; and shall escape from the censorious imputation of the Roman satirist, who exclaims, in words that at once point out the true method of psychological research, and stigmatise the dreary and intolerable *mill-round* monotony of customary metaphysics,

> "Ut nemo in sese tentat descendere, nemo!
> Sed præcedenti spectatur mantica tergo."

PART II.

CHAPTER I.

We intended at the outset that these papers should be as little of a controversial character as possible. But a mature consideration of the state in which psychology, or the science of man, stands throughout Europe generally, and in this country in particular, leads us to deviate considerably from our original plan. We find, too, that we cannot clear out a way for the introduction of our own doctrines, without displacing, or at least endeavouring to displace, to a very great extent, the opinions usually held on the subject we are treating of. And, besides all this, we are sensible that, without having gone far enough, or completely made good our point, we have yet committed ourselves so far already in our previous strictures on the prevailing doctrine of "Mind," that there is no drawing back for us now. We must either be prepared to corroborate and illustrate our

argument by many additional explanatory statements, or to incur the stigma of leaving it very incomplete, and, as many may think, very inconclusive. In order, therefore, to escape the latter of these alternatives, we will do our best to embrace and comply with the former of them. Such being our reasons, we now *nail our colours to the mast,* and prepare ourselves for a good deal of polemical discussion on the subject of "the human mind." And the first point to be determined is: What is the exact question at issue?

That man is a creature who displays many manifestations of reason, adapting means to the production of ends in a vast variety of ways; that he is also susceptible of a great diversity of sensations, emotions, passions, &c., which, in one form or another, keep appearing, disappearing, and reappearing within him, with few intermissions, during his transit from the cradle to the grave, is a fact which no one will dispute. This, then, is admitted equally by the ordinary metaphysician and by us. Further, the metaphysician postulates, or lays down, "mind," and not "body," as the substance in which these phenomena inhere; and this may readily enough be admitted to him. "Mind," no doubt, is merely an hypothesis, and violates one of the fundamental axioms of science, that, namely, which has been called the principle of philosophical parsimony: *Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem.*[1]

[1] That is, *Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity;* or,

The necessity in this case has certainly never been made manifest. Nevertheless the hypothesis may be admitted, inasmuch as neither the admission nor

in other words, unless it should appear that the phenomena observed cannot possibly inhere in any *already admitted* entity. Dugald Stewart's reasoning on this subject is curious, not because the argument, or that which it regards, is of the smallest interest or importance in itself, but as exhibiting the grossest misconception of the question that ever was palmed off upon an unwary reader. "Matter" must be owned to be the *first in the field.* We are conversant and intimate with it long before we know anything about "mind." When the immaterialist or mentalist, then, comes forward, it is his business either to displace matter entirely, substituting "mind" in the place of it; or else to rear up alongside of it, this, the antagonist entity for which he contends. If he attempts the former, he involves himself in a mere play of words. If he maintains that all the *material* phenomena are in fact *mental* phenomena, he does nothing but quibble. The author of the 'Natural History of Enthusiasm' has grievously mistaken the potency of this position. [See The *physical* (!) theory of another life, p. 14.] It is plain, we say, that in this case the immaterialist resolves himself into a mere innovator upon the ordinary language of men. He merely gives the name of "mental" to that which other people have chosen to call "material." The *thing* remains precisely what it was. If, on the other hand, he embraces the latter of the alternatives offered to him, and, without supplanting matter, maintains "mind" to be co-ordinate with it, then he is bound to show *a necessity* for his "multiplication of entities." He is bound to prove that the phenomena with which he is dealing are incompatible with, or cannot possibly inhere in, the entity already in the field. But how is such a proof possible or even conceivable? Let us see what the immaterialist makes of it. It is his object to prove by reasoning that a certain series of phenomena cannot inhere in a certain admitted substance "matter," and must therefore be referred to a different substance "mind." Now all reasoning is either *a priori* or *a posteriori.* If he reasons in the former of these ways, he forms *a priori* such a conception of matter that it would involve a contradiction to suppose that the phenomena occasioning the dispute should inhere in it; he first of all fixes for himself a notion of matter, as of something with which certain phenomena are incompatible, something in which they cannot inhere; and then from this conception

the rejection of it is of the smallest conceivable importance. Like Dugald Stewart, we reject the question as to the entity in which the admitted pheno-

he deduces the inference that these phenomena are incompatible with matter, or cannot inhere in it—a *petitio principii* almost too glaring to require notice. Or does he reason upon this question *a posteriori?* In this case he professes to found upon no *a priori* conception of matter, but to be guided entirely by experience. But experience can only inform us what phenomena do or do not inhere in any particular substance; and can tell us nothing about their abstract compatibility or incompatibility with it. We may afterwards infer such compatibility or incompatibility if we please, but we must first of all know what *the fact is*, or else we may be abstractly arguing a point one way, while the facts go to establish it in the opposite way. In reasoning, therefore, from experience, the question is not, *Can* certain phenomena inhere in a particular substance, or can they *not?* but we must first of all ask and determine this: *Do* they inhere in it, or do they *not?* And this, then, now comes to be the question with which the immaterialist, reasoning *a posteriori*, has to busy himself. Is the negative side of this question to be admitted to him without proof? Are we to permit him to take for granted that these phenomena *do not* inhere in matter? Most assuredly not. He must prove this to be the case, or else he accomplishes nothing; and yet how is it possible for him to prove it? He can only prove it by showing the phenomena to be incompatible with matter; for if he once admits the phenomena to be compatible with matter, then his *postulatum* of mind is at once disqualified from being advanced. He has given up the attempt to make manifest that *necessity* for "mind," which it was incumbent upon him to show.

It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to the very life of his argument that he should stickle for the incompatibility of these phenomena with matter. To prove that these phenomena *do not* inhere in matter, he must show that they *cannot* inhere in it. This is the only line of argument which is open to him. But then how is he to make good this latter point? We have already seen the inevitable and powerless perplexity in which he lands himself in attempting it. He must, as before, adopt one of two courses. He must either recur to his old *a priori* trick of framing for himself, first of all, such a conception of matter, that it would be contradictory to suppose the phenomena capable of inhering in it, and then of de-

mena inhere, as altogether unphilosophical; but he and we reject it upon very different grounds. He, indeed, rejected it because he did not consider it at

ducing their incompatibility or contradictoriness from this conception—a mode of proof which certainly shows that the phenomena cannot inhere in his conception of matter, but which by no means proves that they cannot inhere in matter itself. Or he may follow, as before, an *a posteriori* course. But here, too, we have already shown that such a procedure is impossible, without his taking for granted the very point in dispute. We have already shown that, in adhering to experience, the immaterialist must first of all go and ascertain *the fact* respecting these phenomena—*do* they inhere in matter, or do they *not*—before he is entitled to predicate that they *cannot* inhere in it, lest while he is steering his argument in one direction, *the fact* should be giving him the lie in another. We sum up our statement thus: He wishes to prove that certain phenomena *cannot* inhere in matter. In proving this he is brought to postulate the fact that these phenomena *do not* inhere in matter; and then, when pressed for a proof of this latter fact, he can only make it good by reasserting that they *cannot* inhere in matter, in support of which he is again forced to recur to his old statement that they *do not* inhere in matter, an instance of circular reasoning of the most perfect kind imaginable. Thus the immaterialist has not given us, and cannot possibly give us, any argument at all upon the subject. He has not given us the proof which the "necessity" of the case called for, and which, in admitting the principle of parsimony, he pledged himself to give as the only ground upon which his postulation of a new substance could be justified. He has, after all, merely supplied us with the statement that certain phenomena *do not* inhere in matter, which is quite sufficiently met on the part of the materialist, by the counter statement that these phenomena *do* inhere in matter. In struggling to supply us with more than this, his reason is strangled in the trammels of an inexorable *petitio principii*, from which it cannot shake itself loose: while the materialist looks on perfectly quiescent. All this, however, Mr Stewart totally misconceives. He speaks as if the materialist (of course we mean such as understand and represent the argument rightly) took, or were called upon to take, an *active* part in this discussion. He imagines that the *onus probandi*, the task of *proving* the phenomena to inhere in matter, and of *dis*proving "mind," lay upon his shoul-

all a true psychological question; and we do the same. But further than this, we now give, what he never gave or dreamt of giving, the *reason* why it

ders. He talks of the "scheme of materialism" ('Elements,' p. 4), as if the scheme of materialism, supposing that there is one, did not exist, merely *because* the scheme of immaterialism cannot, as we have seen, bring itself into existence. If the immaterialist cannot (as we have proved he cannot, logically) set up the entity of mind as a habitation for certain houseless phenomena, will he not permit the materialist charitably to give them shelter in the existing entity of matter? Surely this is a stretch of philosophical intolerance, on the part of the immaterialist, not to be endured. He cannot house these phenomena himself, nor will he permit others to house them. Before concluding this note, which has already run too far, we may point out to the logical student another instance of Mr Stewart's vicious logic contained in the paragraph referred to. We will be short. "Mind and matter," says he, "considered as objects of human study, are *essentially* different," that is, are *different in their essence.* Now turn to the last line of this paragraph, and read: "We are totally *ignorant* of the *essence of either.*" That is to say, being totally ignorant of the essence of two things, we are yet authorised in saying that these two things are essentially different, or different in their essence. Now, difference being in the opinion of most people the condition of knowledge, or, in other words, our knowledge of a thing being based upon the difference observed between it and other things, and our ignorance of a thing being generally the consequence of its real or apparent identity with other things, it appears to us that our ignorance of the essence of these two things (if it did not altogether disqualify us from speaking) should rather have induced us to say that they were essentially the same; or, at any rate, could never justify us in predicating their *essential* DIFFERENCE as Mr Stewart has done. If we know nothing at all about their essence, how can we either affirm or deny anything with respect to that essence?

From all that we have here said, it will not be inferred by any rational thinker that we are a materialist, and just as little that we are an immaterialist. In point of fact we are neither; and if the reader does not understand how this can be, we can only explain it by repeating that we regard the whole question in itself as silly and frivolous in the extreme, and only worthy of notice as marking certain curious windings of thought in the history of logic.

cannot be viewed as a psychological question; which reason is this, that the very phenomena themselves, inherent, or supposed to be inherent, in this entity, do not, properly speaking, or otherwise than in the most indirect manner possible, constitute any part of the *facts* of psychology, and therefore any discussion connected with them, or with the subject in which they may inhere, is a discussion extraneous and irrelevant to the real and proper science. Further, he rejected the question as one which was *above* the powers of man: we scout it as one which is immeasurably *beneath* them. He refused to acknowledge it because he considered the human faculties weakly incompetent to *it:* we scorn it, because, knowing what the true business and aim of psychology is, we consider *it* miserably incompetent to *them.* In short, we pass it by with the most supreme indifference. Let the metaphysician, then, retain "the human mind" if he will, and let him make the most of it. Let him regard it as the general complement of all the phenomena alluded to. Let him consider it their subject of inherence if he pleases, and he will find that there is no danger of our quarrelling with him about *that.* We will even grant it to be a convenient generic term expressing the sum-total of the sensations, passions, intellectual states, &c., by which the human being is visited.

But the metaphysician does not stop here. He will not be satisfied with this admission. He goes much further, and demands a much greater conces-

sion. By "mind" he does not mean merely to express the aggregate of the "states;" that is, of the sensations, feelings, &c., which the human being may or may not be conscious of; but, somehow or other, he blends and intertwines consciousness (or the notion of self, self-reference) with these "states," and considers this fact as their necessary, essential, invariable, or inextricable accompaniment. He thus vests in mind, besides its own states, passions, sensations, &c., the fact of the consciousness of these, and the being to whom that consciousness belongs; thus constituting "mind" into *the man*, and making the one of these terms convertible with the other.

Now here it is that we beg leave to enter our protest. We object most strongly to this doctrine as one which introduces into psychology a "confusion worse confounded;" as one which, if allowed to prevail, must end in obliterating everything like science, morality, and even man himself, as far as his true and peculiar character is concerned; substituting in place of him a machine, an automaton, of which the law of causality composes and regulates the puppet-strings.

This, then, is the precise point at issue between us: The metaphysician wishes to make "mind" constitute and monopolise *the whole man;* we refuse to admit that "mind" constitutes any part of the *true and real* man whatsoever. The metaphysician confounds the *consciousness of* a "state of mind," and the being to whom this consciousness belongs, with

the "state of mind" itself. Our great object is to keep these two distinctly and vividly asunder. This distinction is one which, as shall soon be shown, is constantly made both by common sense and by common language, a consideration which throws the presumption of truth strongly in our favour. It is one which appears to us to constitute the great leading principle upon which the whole of psychology hinges, one without the strict observance of which any science of ourselves is altogether impossible or null.

We are still, then, quite willing to vest in "mind" all the "states" of mind. But the fact of the consciousness of these states, the notion of himself as the person to whom this consciousness belongs, we insist in vesting in *the man*, or in that being who calls himself "I;" and in this little word expresses compendiously *all* the facts which really and truly belong to him. The question in dispute, and which has to be decided between the metaphysician and ourselves, may be thus worded: He wishes to give everything unto "mind," while we wish to give unto mind the things which are mind's, and unto man the things which are man's. If we can succeed in making good our point, psychology will be considerably lightened—lightened of a useless and unmarketable cargo which has kept her almost *lockfast* for many generations, and which she ought never to have taken on board; for our very first act will be to fling "mind" with all its lumber overboard, and, busying

ourselves exclusively with *the man* and *his* facts, we shall see whether the science will not *float* them. But our first problem is to vindicate and make good the distinction we have pointed out.

Before going further, let us make use of an illustration, which will, perhaps, be of some preliminary assistance in rendering our meaning, together with the point at issue, still more distinct and manifest to the reader. The mountains, let us say, which the eye beholds are the *objects* of its vision. In the same way the passions, sensations, "states of mind," &c., which the man is, or may be, conscious of, are the *objects* of his consciousness, of his conscious self. But no one ever supposes that the *fact* of vision is the same as the *objects* of vision. The former appertains to the eye; the latter constitute the mountains seen. The *objects* of vision may exist and do exist without the *fact* of vision, and do not create or enforce this fact as their necessary and invariable accompaniment. To make no discrimination between these two things would be confessedly in the highest degree absurd. It is just the same with regard to the *fact* of consciousness and the *objects* of consciousness. The *fact* of consciousness belongs to the man himself, to that being which calls itself "I;" and this, truly speaking, is all that belongs to him. The *objects* of consciousness, namely, man's passions, sensations, &c., are not, properly speaking, his at all. The fact and notion of self do not necessarily or always accompany them. They may be referred to "mind," or to what you

please. They are indeed within the man's control, and it is his duty to control them. But this is not because they *are* himself, but only because they are *not* himself; because they are *obscurations* of himself. You may call them the *false* man if you choose; but if they were the *true* man, where would be the truthfulness of that mighty truth which says that the man waxes just in proportion as he makes his passions and his sensual feelings wane? How could this be the case if the man himself were identical with his passions and his desires? Can a creature live and thrive by suspending its own animation? Is it conceivable that a being should increase and strengthen in proportion as it is weakened and diminished? To return to our illustration: the point of it is this—the *objects* of consciousness, namely, the passions, emotions, &c., and Reason itself, might perfectly well exist (and in animals do exist) without any one being conscious of them, or combining with them the notion of self, just as the objects of vision exist without any eye perceiving them: and the *fact* of consciousness, or the fact that a being is conscious of these states, is just as distinct from the states themselves as the fact that the eye *does* behold mountains is distinct from the mountains which it beholds. These two things, then, the fact and the object, are in both cases distinctly separate. In the case of the eye and its objects they are never confounded; but in the case of consciousness and its objects we venture to affirm that the metaphysician has invariably con-

founded them. Our great primary aim is to remedy this confusion; to establish the fact of consciousness (and the being to whom it belongs) as something quite aloof from, and transcending, the objects of consciousness, namely, mind and all its states, and then to confine our science entirely to the elucidation of this fact, which will be found to be pregnant with many other facts, and with many mighty results, neglecting the *objects* of it as of little importance or of none.

There is one ground, however, still left open to the metaphysician, which he may consider his impregnable stronghold or inner fortress, and which, if he can maintain it, will certainly enable him to set our strictures at defiance, and successfully to defend his tenets against all our objections. We are quite willing that he should intrench himself in this strong citadel, and, with his permission, we will place him fairly within it with our own hands, to stand or to fall. The metaphysician, fully admitting the distinction we have been insisting on, may say, "But this discrimination is itself a mere analysis of mind. The 'state' of which the being is conscious is mind; and the *fact* of consciousness, with the being to whom it belongs, is also mind. In a word, both terms or factors of the analysis are mind. Mind in a state of dualism perhaps; *two* minds, if you choose to call them so; but still susceptible of synthesis, still capable of having the one of them added to the other of them; and hence, though *two*, still capable of being

united, and of being viewed in the amalgamation of *one*. Therefore," continues he, "mind, view it as you please, analyse it, or make what discriminations within it you like, is still rightly to be regarded as constituting the real and complete man, and as monopolising the whole of that which is truly he."

If this argument be valid, we must own ourselves completely foiled, and the fight is done. For if it be true that the distinction we are contending for be merely a dead analytical discrimination, and not a real and wonder-working antithesis, a vital antagonism in human nature which, practically operating, brings about all the good and evil of man and of society; and which, working ceaselessly throughout all time, as well as in the individual breast, increases in energy the longer it maintains itself, marking distinctly the progress of the species, and advancing it on and on from that which it once was to that which it now is, and to that which it shall yet be: if it be not, we say, a distinction of this kind, but merely an inoperative "analysis of mind," then we give it up as virtually void, as altogether insignificant, and unworthy of a further thought.

But our whole system proceeds upon the reality and vitality of this distinction. It founds itself not upon any principle arising out of an analysis of mind; not upon any distinction made *within* mind; but upon a real antithesis to be established between what belongs, or may be admitted to belong to mind, and what does not and cannot belong to it; and

therefore we will not yield up this distinction by owning it to be analytical at all. We allow the metaphysician to take all man's passions, sensations, emotions, states, or whatever else he may choose to call them, and refer them to "mind," making this the *object* of his research. But when he attempts to lay hands on the fact of consciousness, and to make "mind" usurp this fact together with the being to whom this fact belongs, we exclaim, "Hold! hitherto shalt thou come, and no farther; here shall thy weak hypothesis be stayed." If he resists, the question must be put to the proof. Can the fact of consciousness, together with the man himself, be conceived of as vested in the *object* called "mind," as well as the sensations, passions, &c., which have been admitted to be vested therein? or must not this fact and the man himself be held *transcendent* to this object, and incapable of being objectified, or conceived of as an object at all? Unless we can make out this latter point, we shall fail in realising, in its truth and purity, the only fact with which, in our opinion, as we have already said, psychology ought to busy itself, namely, the fact of consciousness.

We have now, then, brought the question to its narrowest possible point. Can the fact of consciousness, together with our conscious selves, be conceived of as vested in the *object* called "the human mind"? It was to prove the negative side of this question, and thereby to support a conclusion which forms the very life and keystone of our system, that the

argument contained in a former part of this discussion was intended; and the reader may, perhaps, be now placed in a situation which will enable him to perceive its drift more clearly. We will recapitulate it very shortly, and in somewhat different words from those formerly used.

An *object* is that which is either *really* or *ideally* different from ourselves; or in other words, is either different in itself, or is conceived of as different by us. Suppose, now, that the metaphysician makes use of the expression of common sense and ordinary language, "my mind." He here certainly appears, at first sight, to lay down a *real* discrimination between himself and his mind. Whatever he may *intend* to say, he clearly *says* that there are *two* of them, namely, his mind and himself, the "I" (call it the *ego*), possessing it. In this case, "mind" may contain what it likes, but the *consciousness* of what it contains certainly remains with the *ego*. In this case mind is *really* destitute of consciousness. Does the metaphysician disclaim this view of the matter? Does he say that mind is really himself, and is only *ideally* an object to him. Then we answer, that in this case mind is *ideally* divested of consciousness, and if the metaphysician thinks otherwise, he imposes upon himself. For how can he make it contain consciousness without first of all ideally replacing within it himself, the *ego* which he had ideally severed from it. But if he does make this reinvestment, mind (his object) at once vanishes from the

scene; for none of us can attribute consciousness *directly* to another; we can only attribute it directly to another by becoming it, and if we become it, it ceases to be another; it becomes we, that is to say, nothing but the *ego* is left, and we have no *object* either ideally or really before us. The dilemma to which the philosophers of mind are reduced is this: *unless* they attribute consciousness to mind, they leave out of view the most important and characteristic phenomenon of man; and *if* they attribute consciousness to mind, they annihilate the *object* of their research, in so far as the whole extent of this fact is concerned.

So much in the shape of mere abstract reasoning upon this question. It appears to us that our point is now in a fair way of being completely made out. We think that, as far as mere reasoning can do it, we have succeeded in extricating the fact of consciousness from the oppressive and obscuring envelopment of "the human mind." But our views, their correctness, and their application, still require to be brought out and enforced by many explanations and observations *of fact*. We now, then, descend to various statements, illustrations, and practical considerations which will probably be still more plain and convincing than anything we have yet said. These, however, we reserve for the following chapter.

CHAPTER II.

One of the fundamental and soundest canons of philosophy is this: never violently to subvert, but to follow gently through all its windings, any fact submitted to us by common sense, and never harshly to obliterate the language in which any such fact is expressed, or precipitately to substitute in place of it another expression drawn probably from some mushroom theory, and more consonant, as we may think, with truth, because apparently of a more cultivated cast. The presumption is, that the first expressions are right, and truly denote the fact; and that the secondary language, if much opposed to these, is the offspring of a philosophy erroneously reflective. In short, if we neglect the canon pointed out, the risk of our missing the real facts and running into false speculation is extreme. For common sense, being instinctive or nearly so, rarely errs; and its expressions, not being matured by reflection, generally contain within them, though under very obscure forms, much of the deep truth and wisdom of revelations. What though its facts and its language may often be

to us, like the mirage to travellers in the desert, for a time an illusive and disappointing thing? Still let us persevere in the pursuit. The natural mirage is often the most benign provision which Heaven, in its mercy, could call up before the eyes of the wanderers through barren wastes. Ceaselessly holding out to them the promise of blessed gratification, it thus attracts onwards and onwards, till at length they really reach the true and water-flowing oasis, those steps which, but for this timely and continual attraction, would have sunk down and perished in despair amid the unmeasurable sands. And spread over the surface of common life there is a moral mirage analogous to this, and equally attractive to the philosopher thirsting after truth. In pursuing it we may be often disappointed and at fault, but let us follow it in faithful hope, and it will lead us on and on unto the true and living waters at last. If we accept in a sincere and faithful spirit the facts and expressions of common sense, and refrain from tampering unduly with their simplicity, we shall perhaps find, like those fortunate ones of old who, opening hospitable doors to poor wearied wayfarers, unwittingly entertained angels, that we are harbouring the divinest truths of philosophy in the guise of these homely symbols.

It is comparatively an easy task to exclude such facts and such expressions from our consideration, and then within closed doors to arrive at conclusions at variance with common sense. But this is not the true business of philosophy. True philosophy, medi-

tating a far higher aim and a far more difficult task than this, throws wide her portals to the entrance of all comers, come disguised and unpromising as they may. In other words, she accepts, as given, the great and indestructible convictions of our race, and the language in which these are expressed: and in place of denying or obliterating them, she endeavours rationally to explain and justify them; recovering by reflection steps taken in the spontaneous strength of nature by powers little more than instinctive, and seeing in clear light the operation of principles which, in their primary acts, work in almost total darkness.

Common sense, then, is the problem of philosophy, and is plainly not to be solved by being set aside, but just as little is it to be solved by being taken for granted, or in other words, by being allowed to remain in the primary forms in which it is presented to our notice. A problem and its solution are evidently not one and the same thing; and hence, common sense, the problem of philosophy, is by no means identical, in the first instance at least, with the solution which philosophy has to supply (a consideration which those would do well to remember who talk of the "philosophy of common sense," thus confounding together the problem and the solution). It is only after the solution has been effected that they can be looked upon as identical with each other. How then is this solution to be realised? How is the conversion of common sense into philosophy to be brought about? We answer, by accepting completely and

faithfully the facts and expressions of common sense as given in their primitive obscurity, and then by construing them without violence, without addition, and without diminution into clearer and more intelligible forms.

In observance and exemplification, then, of this rule, let us now take up an expression frequently made use of by common sense, and which, in the preceding chapter, we had occasion to bring forward, that expression, to wit, constantly in the mouth of every one, "my mind," or let it be "my emotion," "my sensation," or any similar mode of speech; and let us ask, What does a man, thus talking the ordinary language of common life, precisely mean when he employs these expressions? The metaphysician will tell us that he does *not* mean what he says. We affirm that he *does* mean what he says. The metaphysician will tell us that he does not really make, or intend to make, any discrimination or sundering between *himself* and his "mind;" or we should rather say his "state of mind." We affirm that he both intends to make such a separation, and does make it. The metaphysician declares that by the expression "my emotion" the man merely means that there is *one* of them, namely, "emotion," that this is himself (the being he calls "I"), and contains and expresses every fact which this latter word denotes; and in making this averment the metaphysician roughly subverts and obliterates the language of the man. We, however, reverencing the canon we have just laid

down, refrain from doing this gross violence to his expressions, because, if we were guilty of it, we should consider ourselves upon the point of falling into great errors, and of confounding a most essential distinction which has not escaped the primitive and almost instinctive good sense of all mankind, the *genus metaphysicorum* excepted. This tribe will not admit that in using the expression, for instance, "my sensations," the man regards himself as standing aloof from his sensations: or at any rate they hold that such a view on the part of the man is an erroneous one. They will not allow that the man himself and the fact of consciousness stand on the *outside* of the sphere of the "states of mind" experienced: but they fetter him down *within* the circle of these states, and make him and consciousness identical with them.

In opposition to this, the ordinary psychological doctrine, we, for our part, prefer to adhere to the language of common sense; believing that this represents the facts faithfully and truly, while the formulas of metaphysics misrepresent them grievously. We affirm that the natural man, in using the words "my mind," expresses and intends to express what is, and what he feels to be, *the fact*—namely, that his conscious self, that which he calls "I" (*ego*), is not to be confounded, and cannot be confounded, with his "mind," or the "states of mind," which are its objects. Let us observe, he merely views "mind," and uses this word, as a term expressing the aggregate or general assemblage of these states, and connects with

it no hypothesis respecting its substance. On the other hand, to the *ego* he never thinks of applying the epithet "my." And why not? Simply because it *is* he; and if mind also was he, he never would dream of applying the word "my" to it either. The *ego* is he, not something which he possesses. He therefore never attempts to *objectify* it, because it will not admit of this. But he can talk rightly and intelligibly of "my sensations;" that is to say, he can tell us that this *ego* is visited by various sensations, because he feels that the *ego*, that is, himself, is different from these sensations. At any rate, he never, of his own accord, confounds himself and his sensations or states of mind together. He never, in his natural state, uses the word "mind" as convertible with the word "I;" and if he did so, he would not be intelligible to his species. They would never know that he meant himself; and simply for this reason, that the fact of self-reference or consciousness is not contained or expressed in the word "mind," and cannot, indeed, be denoted by any word in the *third* person. It has been reserved for the "metaphysics of mind" to introduce into thought and language a confusion which man's natural understanding has always steered clear of.

We have found, then, that this distinction between the man himself (that called *ego*) and the states of mind which he is conscious of, obtains in the language of common sense, and we do not feel ourselves entitled to subvert or to neglect it. But to leave it

precisely as we found it, would be to turn it to no account whatsoever, and would allow the metaphysician still to triumph in our failure to accomplish what we have declared to be the true end and business of philosophy. The distinction is espoused by common sense, and is thrown out on the very surface of ordinary language: therefore the presumption that it is correct is in its favour; but it still remains to be philosophically vindicated and made good. Let us, then, accept it faithfully as given; and gently construing it into a clearer form, let us see whether every fact connected with it under its philosophic aspect will not prove it to be the most important and valid of all possible discriminations.

To mark this distinction, this conviction and expression of common sense, by a philosophical formula, let us suppose a line terminating in two opposite poles. In the one of these we will vest "mind," that is, the whole assemblage of the various states or changes experienced—all the feelings, passions, sensations, &c., of man; and in the other of them we will vest the fact of consciousness, and the man himself calling himself "I." Now we admit, in the first instance, that these two poles are mere postulates, and that our postulation of them can only be justified and made good that they are mutually repulsive; by the fact that there is a reciprocal antithesis or antagonism between them, and between all that each of them contains: or, in other words, we must be borne out by the fact, that an increase of

intensity at the one pole is always compensated by a corresponding decrease of intensity at the other pole, and *vice versa*. For if, on the contrary, it should appear that these two poles agree and act so harmoniously together, that the vividness experienced at the one pole (say that in which sensation, &c., reside) is answered by a proportional vividness at the opposite pole of consciousness; and that a depression at this latter pole again takes place in accordance with a diminished intensity at the former pole: in short, if it should appear that these two poles, instead of mutually extinguishing, mutually strengthen each other's light, then we must own that the antithesis we are endeavouring to establish is virtually void and erroneous; that sensation and consciousness are really identical, and that the *two* poles are in fact not *two*, but only *one*. In a word, we will own that the distinction we have been all along fighting for does not exist, and that the ordinary doctrine of psychology upon this head is faultless, and beyond dispute.

This point, however, is not to be settled by speculation, or by abstract reasoning. What says *the fact?* The fact is notorious to every one except metaphysicians, who have seldom paid much attention to this or any other fact, that the degree of our consciousness or self-reference always exists in an inverse ratio to the degree of intensity of any of our sensations, passions, emotions, &c.; and that consciousness is never so effectually depressed, or, perhaps, we

may say, never so totally obliterated within us, as when we are highly transported by the vividness of any sensation, or absorbed in the violence of any passion. While, on the other hand, returning consciousness, or increasing self-reference, has always the effect of deadening the sensation and suspending the passion, until at length, when it reaches its *ultimatum*, the sensation or passion becomes totally extinct. This is decidedly the fact, and there is no denying it. Look at a human being immersed in the swinish gratifications of sense. See here how completely the man is lost in the animal. Swallowed up in the pleasurable sensations of his palate, he is oblivious of everything else, and consciousness sinks into abeyance for a time. The sensation at the one pole monopolises him, and therefore the consciousness at the other pole does not come into play. He does not think of himself; he does not combine the notion of himself with the sensation, the enjoyment of which is enslaving him. Again, look at another man shaken by wrath, as a tree is shaken by the wind. Here, too, the passion reigns paramount, and everything else is forgotten. Consciousness is extinguished; and hence the expression of the poet, *Ira brevis furor est*—"Rage is a brief insanity"—is strictly and pathologically true; because consciousness, the condition upon which all sanity depends, is for the time absent from the man. Hence, too, the ordinary phrase, that rage transports

a man *out of himself*, is closely and philosophically correct. Properly interpreted, it means that the man is taken completely out of the pole where consciousness abides, and vested entirely in the opposite pole where passion dwells; or rather we should say that *as a man* he is extinct, and lives only *as a machine*. In both of these cases the men lose their personality. They are played upon by a foreign agency.

"Infortunati nimium sua si *mala* norint!"

But as yet they know not how mean and how miserable they are. Consciousness must return to them first, and only they themselves can bring it back; and when it does return, the effect of its very first approach is to lower the temperature of the sensation and of the passion. The men are not now wholly absorbed in the state that prevailed at the sensual and passionate pole. The balance is beginning to right itself. They have originated an act of their own, which has given them some degree of freedom; and they now begin to look down upon their former state as upon a state of intolerable slavery; and ever as this self-reference of theirs waxes, they look down upon that state as more and more slavish still, until at length, the balance being completely reversed and lying over on the other side, consciousness is again enthroned, the passion and the sensation are extinguished, and the men feel themselves to be completely free.

The first general expression, then, of this great law (which, however, may require much minute attention to calculate all its subordinate forces and their precise balances) is this: When passion, or any state of mind at the one pole, is at its *maximum*, consciousness is at its *minimum*, this *maximum* being sometimes so great as absolutely to extinguish consciousness while it continues; and, *vice versa*, when consciousness is at its *maximum*, the passion, or whatever the state of mind at the opposite pole may be, is at its *minimum*, the *maximum* being in this case, too, sometimes so great as to amount to a total suspension of the passion, &c. What important consequences does the mere enunciation of this great law suggest! In particular, what a firm and intelligible basis does it afford to the great superstructure of morality! What light does it carry down into the profoundest recesses of duty! Man's passions may be said to be the origin of all human wickedness. What more important fact, then, can there be than this, that the very act of consciousness, simple as it may seem, brings along with it, to a considerable extent, the suspension of any passion which may be tyrannising over us; and that, as the origination of this act is our own, so is it in our own power to heighten and increase its lustre as we please, even up to the highest degree of self-reflection, where it triumphs over passion completely? These matters, however, shall be more fully unfolded when we come

to speak of the *consequences* of the fact of consciousness.[1]

[1] Dr Chalmers has a long chapter in his Moral Philosophy (Chap. II.) on the effect which consciousness has in obliterating the state of mind upon which it turns its eye. But to what account does he turn his observation of this fact? He merely notices it as attaching a *peculiar* difficulty to the study of the phenomena of mind. It does indeed. It attaches *so* peculiar a difficulty to the study of these phenomena, that we wonder the Doctor was not led by this consideration to perceive that these phenomena were no longer the real and important facts of the science; but that the fact of consciousness, together with the consequences it brought along with it, and nothing else, truly was so. Again, on the other hand, this fact attaches so peculiar *a facility* to the study of morality, that we are surprised the Doctor did not avail himself of its assistance in explaining the laws and character of duty. But how does Dr Chalmers "get quit of this difficulty"? If the phenomena of mind disappear as soon as consciousness looks at them, how do you think he obviates the obstacle in the way of science? Why, by emptying human nature of consciousness altogether; or, as he informs us, "by adopting Dr Thomas Brown's view of consciousness, who makes this act to be," as Dr Chalmers says, "a brief act of memory." Whether this means that consciousness is a short act of memory, or an act of memory following shortly after the "state" remembered, we are at a loss to say; but, at any rate, we here have consciousness converted into memory. For we presume that there is no difference in kind, no distinction at all between an act of memory which is brief, and an act of memory which is not brief. Thus consciousness is obliterated. Man is deprived of the notion of himself. He no longer is a self at all, or capable of any self-reference. From having been a person, he becomes a mere thing; and is left existing and going through various acts of intelligence, just like the animals around him, which exist and perform many intelligent acts without being aware of their existence, without possessing any personality, or taking any account to themselves of their accomplishments.

CHAPTER III.

WHAT then is the precise effect of our argument against the prevailing doctrine of the "human mind"? If the word "mind" be used merely to express the general group or assemblage of passions, emotions, intellectual states, and other modifications of being, which both man and the animal creation are subject to, we have no objections whatever to the use of the term. If it should further please the metaphysician to lay down "mind" as a distinct entity to which these various states or changes are to be referred, we shall not trouble ourselves with quarrelling with this hypothesis either. All we say is, that *the man himself*, and the true and proper facts of the man's nature, are not to be found here. In the case of animals, we shall admit that "mind," that is, some particular modification of passion, sensation, reason, and so forth, constitutes, and is convertible while it lasts with the true and proper being of the animal subject to that change; because here there is nothing *over and above* the ruling passion of the time. There is no distinction made be-

tween it (the state) experienced, and itself (the animal) experiencing. The animal is wholly monopolised by the passion. The two are identical. The animal does not stand aloof in any degree from the influence to which it is subject. There is not in addition to the passion, or whatever the state of mind may be, a consciousness or reference to self of that particular state. In short, there is no *self* at all in the case. There is nothing but a machine, or thing agitated and usurped by a kind of tyrannous agency, just as a reed is shaken by the wind. The study, then, of the laws and facts of passion, sensation, reason, &c., *in animals* might be a rational and legitimate enough pursuit; because, in their case, there is no fact of a more important and peculiar character for us to attend to. These phenomena might be said to constitute the proper facts of *animal* psychology.

The total absorption of the creature in the particular change or "state" experienced, which we have just noticed as the great fact occurring in the animal creation, sometimes occurs in the case of man also; and when it does take place in him, he and they are to be considered exactly upon a par. But it is the characteristic peculiarity of man's nature that this monopolisation of him by some prevailing "state of mind" does not always, or indeed often, happen. In his case there is generally something over and above the change by which he is visited, and this unabsorbed something is the fact of consciousness, the

notion and the reality of himself as the person experiencing the change. This fact is that which controls and makes him independent of the state experienced; and in the event of the state running into excess, it leaves him not the excuse or apology (which animals have) that he was its victim and its slave. This phenomenon stands conspicuously aloof, and beside it stands man conspicuously aloof from all the various modifications of being by which he may be visited. This phenomenon is the great and leading fact of *human* psychology. And we now affirm that the inquirer who should neglect it after it had been brought up before him, and should still keep studying "the human mind," would be guilty of the grossest dereliction of his duty as a philosopher, and would follow a course altogether irrelevant; inasmuch as, passing by the phenomenon *peculiar* to man, he would be busying himself at the best (supposing "mind" to be something more than hypothesis) with facts which man possesses *in common* with other creatures, and which must of course be, therefore, far inferior in importance and scientific value to the anomalous fact *exclusively* his. In studying "the human mind," we encounter, whichever way we turn, mere counterfeit, or else irrelevant phenomena, instead of falling in with the true and peculiar phenomena of man; or shall we say that consciousness, like the apples in the gardens of the Hesperides, grows on the boughs of humanity, and grows nowhere else, and that while it is the practical

duty of all men, as well as the great aim of philosophy, to grasp and realise this rare and precious fact, it has ever been the practice of "the human mind," like the dragon of old, to guard this phenomena from the scrutiny of mankind; to keep them ignorant or oblivious of its existence; to beat them back from its avenues into the mazes of practical as well as speculative error, by raising its blinding and deceitful aspect against any hand that would pluck the golden fruitage.

Does the reader still desire to be informed with the most precisc distinctness *why* the fact of consciousness, and we ourselves, cannot be conceived of as properly and entirely vested in "mind"? Then let him attend once more to *the fact*, when we repeat what we have already stated: perilling our whole doctrine upon the truth of our statement *as fact*, and renouncing *speculation* altogether. In a former part of this discussion we illustrated the distinction between the *objects* of consciousness (the passions, namely, and all the other changes or modifications we experience) and the *fact* of consciousness, by the analogous distinction subsisting between the objects of vision and the fact of vision. It was plain that the objects of vision might exist, and did exist, without giving birth to, or being in any way accompanied by, the fact of vision; and in the same way it was apparent that the objects of consciousness by no means brought along with them the fact of consciousness as their necessary and invariable accom-

paniment. But we have now to observe that this illustration is not strong enough, and that the two terms of it are not sufficiently contrasted for our purpose. Or, in other words, we now remark that in the case of consciousness and its objects, the rupture or antagonism between the two is far stronger and more striking than in the case of vision and its objects. It is not the tendency of the objects of vision, on the one hand, to quench the vision which regards them; it is not, on the other hand, the tendency of the fact of vision to obliterate the objects at which it looks. Therefore, though the fact of vision and the objects of vision are distinctly separate, yet their disunion is not so complete as that of the fact of consciousness and the objects of consciousness, the natural tendency of which is, on both sides, to act precisely in the manner spoken of, and between which a struggle of the kind pointed out constantly subsists. This, then, we proclaim to be *the fact* (and upon this fact we ground the essential distinction or antithesis between mind, *i.e.*, the complement of the objects of consciousness, and the fact of consciousness itself), that mind, in all its states, without a single exception, so far from facilitating or bringing about the development of consciousness, actually exerts itself unceasingly and powerfully to *prevent* consciousness from coming into existence, and to extinguish it when it has come into operation. The fact, as we have said before, is notorious, that the *more* any state of mind (a sensation or whatever

else it may be) is developed, the *less* is there a consciousness or reference to self of that state of mind; and this fact proves how essentially the two are opposed to each other; because if they agreed, or acted in concert with one another, it would necessarily follow that an increase in the one of them would be attended by a corresponding increase in the other of them. How, then, can we possibly include, or conceive of as included, under "mind," a fact or act which it is the tendency of "mind" in *all* its states to suppress?

Is it here objected that unless these states of mind existed, consciousness would never come into operation, and that therefore it falls to be considered as *dependent* upon them? In this objection the premises are perfectly true, but the inference is altogether false. It is true that man's consciousness would not develop itself unless certain varieties of sensation, reason, &c., became manifest within him; but it does not by any means follow from this that consciousness is the natural sequent or harmonious accompaniment of these. The fact is, that consciousness does not come into operation *in consequence* of these states, but *in spite* of them: it does not come into play to increase and foster these states, but only actively to suspend, control, or put a stop to them. This, then, is the reason why consciousness cannot develop itself without their previous manifestation; namely, because unless they existed there would be nothing for it to combat, to weaken,

or to destroy. Its occupation or office would be gone. There would be nothing for it to exert itself against. Its antagonist force not having been given, there would be no occasion for its existence. This force (the power existing at what we have called the mental pole) does not create consciousness, but as soon as this force comes into play, consciousness creates itself, and, by creating itself, suspends or diminishes the energy existing at that pole. This fact, showing that consciousness is in nothing *passive*, but is *ab origine* essentially active, places us upon the strongest position which, as philosophers fighting for human freedom, we can possibly occupy; and it is only by the maintenance of this position that man's liberty can ever be philosophically vindicated and made good. In truth, possessing this fact, we hold in our hands the profoundest truth in all psychology, the most awful and sublime truth connected with the nature of man. Our present mention of it is necessarily very brief and obscure: but we will do our best to clear it up and expound it fully when we come to discuss the problem: *How* does consciousness come into operation? We will then *start* man free. We will show that he brings himself into existence, not indeed as a being, but as a *human* being; not as an existence, but as an existence *calling itself* "I," by an act of absolute and essential freedom. We will empty his true and real being of all *passivity* whatsoever, in opposition to those doctrines of a false, inert, and contradictory

philosophy, which, making him at first, and in his earliest stage, the passive recipient of the natural effluences of things, the involuntary effect of some foreign cause, seeks afterwards to *engraft* freedom upon him; a vain, impracticable, and necessarily unsuccessful endeavour, as the whole history of philosophy, from first to last, has shown.

We are now able to render a distinct answer to the question: What is the precise effect of our argument on the subject of the human mind? Its precise effect and bearing is to turn us to the study of *fact*—of a clear and a *peculiar fact*—from the contemplation of an object which is either an hypothesis, or else no object at all (not even an hypothesis but a contradiction), or else an irrelevant object of research, and one which cannot by any conceivability contain the fact which it is our business to investigate. Even granting the human mind to be a real object, still we affirm that our argument, and the state of the fact, show the necessity of our realising and viewing consciousness as something altogether distinct from and independent of it, inasmuch as it is the tendency of every modification of mind to keep this fact or act in abeyance under their supremacy so long as that supremacy continues; and, therefore, it never can be the true and relevant business of philosophy to attend to this object (however real) when engaged in the study of man; because in doing so, philosophy would necessarily miss and overlook the leading, proper, and peculiar phenomenon of his being. The fact of

consciousness, expressed in the word "I," and its accompanying facts, such as the direct and vital antithesis subsisting between it and passion, sensation, &c., these are the only facts which psychology ought to regard. This science ought to discard from its direct consideration every fact which is not *peculiarly* man's. It ought to turn away its attention from the facts subsisting at what we have called the sensitive, passionate, and rational pole of humanity; because these facts are not, properly speaking, the true and absolute property of humanity at all; and it ought to confine its regards exclusively to the pole in which consciousness is vested; and, above all things, it ought to have nothing to do with speculations concerning any transcendent substance (mind, for instance) in which these phenomena may be imagined to inhere.

Let us conclude this chapter by shortly summing up our whole argument and its results, dividing our conclusions into two distinct heads: 1st, concerning the "science of the human mind;" and 2d, concerning the "human mind" itself.

In the first place, does the science of the human mind profess to follow the analogy of the natural sciences? It does. Then it must conform itself to the conditions upon which they depend. Now, the primary condition upon which the natural sciences depend and proceed, is the distinction between a subject and an object; or, in other words, between a Being inquiring, and a Being inquired into. With-

out such a discrimination they could not move a step. Very well: man in studying himself follows the same method. He divides himself into subject and object. There is *himself*, the subject inquiring, and there is "the human mind," the object inquired into. There is here then, at the outset, distinctly *two*. The principal condition of the inquiry demands that there *shall* be two. We will suppose then the science of the "object inquired into" to be complete. And now we turn to the man, and say, "Give us a science of the *subject inquiring*." He answers that he has already done so; that, in this case, the subject and object are identical; and in saying this is it not plain that he violates the very condition upon which his science professed to proceed and to depend, namely, the distinction between subject and object? He now gives up this distinction. He confounds the *two* together. He makes *one* of them: and the total confusion and obliteration of his science is the consequence. Does he again recur to the distinction? then we keep probing him with one or other horn of our dilemma, which we will thus express for the behoof of the "philosophers of mind." Do you, in your science of man, profess to lay down and to found upon the distinction between the subject (yourselves) and the object (the human mind), or do you not? If you do, then we affirm that while studying the object you necessarily keep back in the subject the most important fact connected with man, namely, the fact of consciousness; and that you cannot place

this fact in the object of your research without doing away the distinction upon which you founded. But if you do away this distinction, you renounce and disregard the vital and indispensable condition upon which physical science depends: and what, then, becomes of your science as a research conducted, as you profess it to be, upon the principles of physical investigation? You may, indeed, still endeavour to accommodate your research to the spirit of physical inquiry by talking of a *subject-object;* but this is a wretched subterfuge, and the word you here make use of must ever carry a contradiction upon its very front. You talk of what is just as inconceivable to physical science as a square circle or a circular square. By "subject," physical science understands that which is *not* an "object," but something opposed to an object, and by "object," that which is *not* a "subject," but something opposed to a subject: and can form no conception of these two as identical. But by "subject-object" you mean a subject which becomes an object—*i.e.*, its own object. But this is inconceivable, or, at any rate, is only conceivable on this ground, that the subject keeps back in itself, *itself* and the consciousness of what is passing in the object; because if it invests itself, and the fact of consciousness in the object, the object from that moment ceases to be an object, and becomes reconverted into a subject, that is, into *one's self without* an object. This, at least, is quite plain: that in talking of a subject-object, you abandon the essential distinction

upon which the physical sciences found: and the ruin of your science as a physical research (that is, as a legitimate research in the only sense in which you have declared a research can be legitimate) is the result.

The difficulties, then, in the way of the establishment of a science of "the human mind," are insuperable. Its weakness and futility are of a twofold character. It starts with an hypothesis, and yet cannot maintain this hypothesis, or remain consistent with it for a single moment. Man makes a hypothetical object of himself, and calls this "the human mind;" and then, in order to invest it with a certain essential phenomenon, he is compelled every instant to *un*make it as an object, and to convert back again into a subject, that is, into himself—a confusion of the most perplexing kind — a confusion which, so long as it is persisted in, must render everything like a science of man altogether hopeless. Such being the state of things, it is indeed no wonder that despair should have settled down upon the present condition, the prospect, and the retrospect of psychological research.

In the second place, let us say one or two words on the subject of "the human mind" itself, before we have done with it. Let us suppose it to be not an hypothesis, but a *reality*. We will further suppose that all the forms, states, or modifications of this real substance have been separately enumerated and classified in distinct orders; and now we will imagine

the question put, Would not a science of this kind, and of this substance, be still worth something? Would it not, in fact, be the true science of human nature? We answer, No. Whatever might be its value in other respects, we aver that, as a science *of man*, it would be altogether worthless and false. And for this reason, because the object of our research here not only does not contain the proper and peculiar fact of man, namely, the fact of consciousness, but it contains, as we have seen, an order of phenomena which tend unceasingly to overcloud, keep down, and extinguish this fact. In studying this object, therefore, with the view of constructing a science of man out of our examination of it, we should be following a course doubly vicious and misleading. We should not only be studying facts among which consciousness is not to be found, but we should be studying and attaching a scientific value to facts—esteeming them, too, to be characteristic of man's proper nature, facts which actually rise up as obstacles to prevent consciousness (that is, his proper nature and peculiar fact) from coming into manifestation. If, then, we would establish a true science of man, there is no other course open to us than this, to abandon, in the first instance, every consideration of "the human mind," whether it be an hypothesis and a reality, together with all its phenomena, and then to confine our attention closely and devoutly to the examination of the great and anomalous fact of human consciousness.

And truly this fact is well worthy of our regard, and one which will worthily reward our pains. It is a fact of most surpassing wonder; a fact prolific in sublime results. Standing aloof as much as possible from our acquired and inveterate habits of thought; divesting ourselves as much as possible of our natural prepossessions, and of that familiarity which has blunted the edge of astonishment, let us consider what we know to be the fact; namely, that existence, combined with intelligence and passion in many instances, but unaccompanied by any other fact, is the general rule of creation. Knowing this, would it not be but an easy step for us to conclude that it is also the *universal* rule of creation? and would not such a conclusion be a step naturally taken? Finding this, and nothing more than this, to be the great fact "in heaven and on earth, and in the waters under the earth," would it not be rational to conclude that it admitted of no exception? Such, certainly, would be the natural inference, and in it there would be nothing at all surprising. But suppose that when it was on the point of being drawn, there suddenly, and for the first time, started up *in a single Being*, a fact at variance with this whole analogy of creation, and contradicting this otherwise universal rule; we ask, would not this be a fact attractive and wonderful indeed? Would not every attempt to bring this Being under the great general rule of the universe be at once, and most properly, abandoned? Would not this new fact be held exclusively worthy of scientific

consideration, as the feature which distinguished its possessor with the utmost clearness from all other creatures, and as that which would be sure to lead the observer to a knowledge of the true and essential character of the being manifesting it? Would not, in fine, a world entirely new be here opened up to research? And now, if we would really behold such a fact, we have but to turn to ourselves, and ponder over the fact of consciousness; for consciousness is precisely that marvellous, that unexampled fact which we have been here supposing and shadowing forth.

"I never could content my contemplation," says Sir Thomas Browne, "with those general pieces of wonder, the flux and reflux of the sea, the increase of the Nile, the conversion of the needle to the north, and have studied to match and parallel those in the more obvious and neglected pieces of nature which, without farther travel, I can do, in the cosmography *of myself*. *We* carry *with us* the wonders we seek *without us*. There is all Africa and her prodigies in us. We are that bold and adventurous piece of nature, which he that studies wisely learns in a compendium, what others labour at in a divided piece or endless volume."[1] Let us observe, however, that in studying man it is our duty, as philosophers, and if we would perceive and understand his real wonders, to study him in his sound and normal state, and not in any of the eccentricities or aberrations of his nature. Next to physiological metaphysics, pathological meta-

[1] 'Religio Medici,' § 15.

physics, or the study of man as he appears when divested of his usual intellectual health, are the most profitless and false. In preference to such things, it were better for us to go at once and study what Sir Thomas Browne so unceremoniously condemns as far less worthy of admiration than the great wonders of ourselves; "the increase of Nile," "the magnetic needle," "Africa and her prodigies," her magicians, and her impostures. Let us then turn to better things — to the contemplation of a fact in human nature, common indeed, but *really miraculous;* common, inasmuch as it is the universal privilege of man to evolve it; but miraculous, inasmuch as it directly violates (as shall be shown) the great and otherwise universal law which regulates the whole universe besides: we mean of the law of causality. Oh ye admirers of somnambulism, and other depraved and anomalous conditions of humanity! ye worshippers at the shrine of a morbid and deluded wonder! ye seers of marvels where there are none, and ye blindmen to the miracles which really are! tell us no more of powers put forth, and processes *unconsciously* carried on within the dreaming soul, as if these were one-millionth part so extraordinary and inexplicable as even the simplest conscious ongoings of our waking life. In the wonders ye tell us of, there is comparatively no mystery at all. That man should feel and act, and bring about all his operations *without* consciousness, is just what we would naturally and at once expect from the whole

analogy of creation, and the wide dominion of the law of cause and effect. And wherever he is observed to act thus, he is just to be looked upon as having fallen back under the general rule. But come ye forward and explain to us the true miracle of man's being, how he ever, first of all, escaped therefrom, and how he acts, and feels, and goes through intelligent processes *with* consciousness, and thus stands alone, a contradiction in nature, the free master and maker of himself, in a world where everything else is revolved, blind and unconscious, in the inexorable mechanism of fate.

PART III.

CHAPTER I.

WHAT is philosophy? Look at man struggling against the fatalistic logic of physics, and thou shalt best know what philosophy is. In the hands of physical science man lies bound hand and foot, and the iron of necessity is driven into the innermost recesses of his being; but philosophy proclaims him to be free, and rends away the fetters from his limbs like stubble-withs. Physical science, placing man entirely under the dominion of the law of causality, engulfs his moral being in the tomb; but philosophy bursts his scientific cerements, and brings him forth out of "the house of bondage" into the land of perfect liberty.

If we look into the realities of our own condition, and of nature as it operates around us, we shall be convinced of the justness of this view. We shall see that the essential character of philosophy is best

to be caught in contrast with the character of physics; just as man is best read in the antagonism which prevails between him and nature as she exists both without him and within him; this strife conducing in the former case to his natural, and in the latter to his moral aggrandisement.

Without a figure, the whole universe may be said to be *inspired*. A power not its own drives its throbbing pulses. All things are dependent on one another; each of them *is* because something else *has been*. Nowhere is there to be found an original, but everywhere an inherited activity. Nature throughout all her vicissitudes is the true type of hereditary and inviolable succession. The oak dies in the forest-solitudes, having deposited the insignia of its strength in an acorn, from which springs a new oak that neither exceeds nor falls short of the stated measure of its birthright. The whole present world is but a vast tradition. All the effects composing the universe now before us were slumbering, ages ago, in their embryo causes. And now, amid the derivative movements of this unpausing machinery, what becomes of man? Is he too the mere creature of traditionary forces?

Yes; man in his earlier stages violates not the universal analogy, but lives and breathes in the general inspiration of nature. At his birth he is indeed wholly nature's child; for no living creature is *born* an alien from the jurisdiction of that mighty mother. Powerless and passive, he floats entranced

amid her teeming floods. She shapes his passions and desires, and he, disputing not her guardianship, puts his neck beneath their yoke. All that he is, he is without his own co-operation: his reason and his appetites come to him from her hand, he accepts them unconsciously, and goes forth in quest of his gratifications in blind obedience to the force that drives him. All the germs that nature has planted in his breast owe their growth to her breath, and, unfolding themselves beneath it, they flourish in blessedness—*for a time.*

Hence this view of human life being the first to present itself to observation, the genius of physical science has ever been foremost to attempt to fix the position of man in the scale of the universe, and to read to him his doom. She tells thee, O man! that thou art but an animal of a higher and more intelligent class; a mere link, though perhaps a bright one, in the uninterrupted chain of creation. No clog art thou, she says, in the revolutions of the blind and mighty wheel. She lays her hand upon thee, and thou, falling into her ranks, goest to swell the legions of dependent things, the leader, it may be, but not the antagonist of nature. She bends thee down under the law of causality, and, standing in her muster-roll, thou art forced to acknowledge that law as the sovereign of thy soul. The stars obey it in their whirling courses, why shouldst not thou? She either makes thee a mere *tabula rasa,* to be written upon by the pens of external things—an educt of

their impressions; or else, endowing thee with certain innate capacities, she teaches thee that all thy peculiar developments are merely evolved under a necessary law out of germs that were born within thee, are but the fruits of seeds thou broughtest into the world with thee already sown. But whatever she makes of thee, thou art no more thine own master, according to her report, than the woods that burst into bud beneath an influence they cannot control, or than the sea rolling in the wind.

Such is the award of physical science with respect to man; and, confined to his birth and the earliest periods of his life, her estimate of him is true. When contemplated during the first stages of his existence, Hamlet's pipe breathed upon by another's breath, and fingered by another's touch, and giving out sounds of discord or of harmony according to the will of the blower, is not merely a type, but is the actual reality of man.

But these are remote and visionary contemplations. Turning from man in his cradle, let us observe the actual condition of our living selves.

We are all born, as we have said, both in our external and our internal fittings up, within the domain and jurisdiction of nature; and nature, to our opening life, is a paradise of sweets.

"Heaven lies about us in our infancy."

But the nascent fierceness which adds but new graces to the sportive beauty of the tiger-cub, condemns

the monster of maturer years to the savage solitudes of his forest-lair, and the graceful passions of childhood naturally grow up in the man into demons of misery and blood. As life advances, the garden of nature becomes more and more a howling wilderness, and nature's passions and indulgences blacken her own shining skies: and before our course is run, life, under her guidance, has become a spectacle of greater ghastliness than death itself.

Nature prompts a purely epicurean creed, and the logic of physical science binds it down upon the understandings of men; for suppose that we should turn and fight against the force that drives us. But how can we? says the logic of physics. We are in everything at the mercy of a foreign causality, and how can we resist its sway? We are drifting before the breath of nature, and can the wave turn against the gale that is impelling it, and refuse to flow? Drift on, then, thou epicurean, thou child of nature, passive in thy theory and thy practice, and sheathed in what appears to be an irrefragable logic, and see where thy creed will land thee!

But perhaps man has been armed by nature with weapons wherewith to fight against the natural powers that are seeking to enslave him. As if nature would give man arms to be employed against herself; as if she would lift with her own hands the yoke of bondage from his neck. And even supposing that nature were thus to assist him, would she not be merely removing him from the conduct of one

blind and faithless guide, to place him under that of another equally blind, and probably equally faithless? Having been misled in so many instances in obeying nature, we may well be suspicious of all her dictates.

We have also been prated to about a moral sense *born* within us, and this, too, by physical science—by the science that founds its whole procedure upon the law of causality, as if this law did not obliterate the very life of duty, and render it an unmeaning word. This moral sense, it is said, impels us to virtue, if its sanctions be listened to, or lets us run to crime if they be disregarded. But what impels us to listen to the voice of this monitor, or to turn away from it with a deaf ear? Still, according to physical science, it can be nothing but the force of a natural and foreign causality. Nowhere, O man! throughout the whole range of thy moral and intellectual being can physical science allow thee a single point whereon to rest the lever of thy own free co-operation. The moral power which she allows thee is at the same time a natural endowment; and being so, must of course, like other natural growths, wax or wane under laws immutable and independent of thy control. Thou art still, then, a dependent thing, entirely at the mercy of foreign causes, and having no security against any power that may make thee its instrument.

What, then, is to be done? This: Let us spurn from us the creed of nature, together with the fatalistic logic by which it is upheld. If we admit the

logic we must admit the creed, and if we admit the creed we must admit the logic; but let us tear both of them in pieces, and scatter their fragments to the winds. The creed of nature concludes simply for enjoyment; but the truer creed of human life, a creed which says little about happiness, was uttered soon after the foundations of the world were laid, and has been proved and perpetuated by the experience of six thousand years. "In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou cultivate the earth;" and, it may be added, in a bitterer sweat shalt thou till, oh man! as long as life lasts, the harsher soil of thy own tumultuous and almost ungovernable heart.

This creed is none of nature's prompting, but is the issue of a veritable contest now set on foot between man and her. But how is this creed to be supported? How can we rationally make good the fact that we are fighting all life long more or less against the powers of nature? We have flung aside the logic of physics; where shall we look for props?

Here it is that philosophy comes in. "The flowers of thy happiness," says she, "are withered. They could not last; they gilded but for a day the opening portals of life. But in their place I will give thee freedom's flowers. To act *according* to thy inclinations may be enjoyment; but know that to act *against* them is liberty, and thou only actest thus because thou art really free. For thy freedom does not merely consist in the power to follow a certain course,

or to leave it unfollowed, but it properly consists in the *single* course of originating a new movement running counter to all the biases which nature gives thee, and in rising superior to the bondage thou wert born in. I will unwind from around thee, fold after fold, the coils of the inert logic of causality; and if thou wilt stand forth practically as nature's victorious foe, and speculatively as the assertor of the absolute liberty of man against the dogmas of physics, breaking the chain of causality, disclaiming the inspiration which is thy birthright, and working thyself out of the slough of sensualism, then shalt thou be one of my true disciples."

CHAPTER II.

But at what point shall Philosophy commence unwinding the coils of fatalism from around man? At the very outermost folds. To redeem man's moral being from slavery, and to circulate through it the air of liberty by which alone it lives, is the great end of philosophy; but it were vain to attempt the accomplishment of this end, unless the folds of necessity be first of all loosened at the very circumference or surface of his ordinary character as a simply percipient being. Make man, *ab origine*, like wax beneath the seal, the passive recipient of the impressions of external things, and a slave he must remain for ever in all the phenomena he may manifest throughout the whole course of his career. If there be bondage in his common consciousness, it must necessarily pass into his moral conscience. Unless our first and simplest consciousness be an act of freedom, our moral being is a bondsman all its life. True philosophy will accept of no half measures, no compromise between the passivity and the activity of man. We must commence, then, by liberating our ordinary

consciousness from the control or domineering action of outward objects. Thus commencing at the very circumference of man, we shall clear out an enlarged atmosphere of freedom around that true and sacred centre of his personality—his character, namely, as a moral and accountable agent.

In returning, then, to the fact of consciousness, we may remark that hitherto we have been chiefly occupied in opening out a way for ourselves, and have hardly advanced beyond the mere threshold or outworks of psychology. Regarding this fact as the great, and indeed, properly speaking, as the only fact of our science, we have done our best to separate it from any admixture of foreign elements, and, in particular, to free it from that huge encumbrance which, since the commencement of science, has kept it weighed down in obscure and vaporous abysses—the human mind, with all its facts, which are elements of a fatalistic, and therefore of an unphilosophical character. Imperfectly, indeed, but to the best of our ability, we have raised it up out of the depths where it has lain so long, and, blowing aside from it the mist of ages, we have endeavoured to realise it in all its purity and independence, and to make it stand forth as the most prominent, signal, and distinguishing phenomenon of humanity. But in doing this we have done little more than establish the fact that consciousness *does* come into operation. We still expect to be able to make its character and significance more and more plain as we advance, and now

beg to call the attention of the reader to three other problems, which may be said to constitute the very vitals of the science of ourselves. These are, first, *When* does consciousness come into operation? Second, *How* does consciousness come into operation? And third, What are *the consequences* of its coming into operation? The discussion of these three problems will, it is thought, sufficiently exhaust this Introduction to the Philosophy of Consciousness.

First, however, let us remark that it was not possible that these problems could ever have been distinctly propounded, much less resolved, by the "philosophy of the human mind." This false science regards as its proper facts the states or phenomena of mind, or, in other words, the objects of the act of consciousness, degrading this act itself into the mere medium or instrument through which these objects are known. Thus researches concerning the nature and origin of the objects of consciousness (of sensation, for instance), and not concerning the genesis of the act itself of consciousness, constituted the problems of the science of mind. Our very familiarity with this latter fact has blunted our perception of its importance, and has turned us aside from the observation of it. Metaphysicians have been so much in the habit of considering all the mental phenomena as so evidently and indissolubly accompanied by consciousness, that the fact that they are thus accompanied being taken for granted, as a matter of course, as a necessity of nature, has been allowed to fall

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out of notice as unworthy of any further consideration. Yet we have all along seen that these phenomena might perfectly well have *existed*, and in animals and children of a certain age actually do exist, without consciousness; or, in other words, without being accompanied by the fact of personality, the notion and the reality expressed by the word "I." In short, we have seen that the presence of consciousness forms the exception, and that the absence of consciousness forms the great rule of creation: inspired though that creation is, throughout, by intelligence, sensation, and desire. In devoting our attention, therefore (as the philosophers of mind have hitherto done), to such phenomena as intelligence, sensation, and desire, we should virtually be philosophising concerning unconscious creatures, and not concerning man in his true and distinctive character; we should, moreover, as has been shown, be studying an order of phenomena, which not only do not assist the manifestation of consciousness, but which naturally tend to prevent it from coming into operation; and finally, we should, at any rate, be merely contemplating attributes which man possesses *in common* with the rest of creation. But the true science of every being proceeds upon the discovery and examination of facts, or a fact *peculiar* to the Being in question. But the phenomenon peculiar to man, the only fact which accurately and completely contradistinguishes him from all other creatures, is no other than this very fact of consciousness; this very fact,

that he does take cognisance of his intelligent and rational states, blending with them, or realising in conjunction with them, his own personality—a realisation which animals, endowed though they are like man with reason and with passion, never accomplish. And thus it is that the fact of consciousness, from having occupied the obscurest and most neglected position in all psychology, rises up into paramount importance, and instead of submitting to be treated with slight and cursory notice, and then passed from, as the mere medium through which the proper facts of psychology are known to us, becomes itself the leading, and, properly speaking, the only fact of the science; while, at the same time, questions as to its nature and origin, the time, manner, and consequences of its manifestation, come to form the highest problems that can challenge our attention when engaged in the study of ourselves. All the other facts connected with us are fatalistic; it is in this phenomenon alone, as we shall see, that the elements of our freedom are to be found.

CHAPTER III.

THE first question with which we are to be engaged is this: When does consciousness come into operation? And we ask, first of all, Is man *born* conscious, or is he conscious during several (be their number greater or less) of the earlier months, we may say years, of his existence? We answer, No: for if he were, then he would remember, or at least some individuals of the species would remember, the day of their birth and the first year or years of their infancy. People in general recollect that of which they were conscious. But perhaps it may be objected that a man, or that many men, may forget, and often do forget, events of which they were conscious. True; but it is absolutely impossible, and at variance with universal experience, that *everybody* should forget that of which *everybody* was conscious. If the whole human race were conscious at the day of their birth, and during their earliest childhood, it is altogether inconceivable but that *some of them* at least should remember those days and their events. But *no one* possesses any such remembrance; and therefore the inference is irresis-

tible that man is not born conscious, and does not become conscious until some considerable period after his birth. Let this conclusion then be noted, for we may require to make some use of it hereafter.

If, then, man is not conscious at his birth, or until some time after it has elapsed, at what period of his life does consciousness manifest itself? To ascertain this period we must seek for some vital sign of the existence of consciousness. It is possible that, before the true and real consciousness of the human being displays itself, there are within him certain obscure prefigurations or anticipations of the dawning phenomenon; and therefore it may not be practicable to fix in the precisest and strictest manner its absolute point of commencement. Still, compared with the actual rise and development of consciousness, these dim and uncertain preludes of it are even more faint and indistinct than are the first feeble rays which the sun sends up before him, compared with the glory which fills heaven and earth when the great luminary himself bursts above the sea. This parallel is certainly not perfect, because the sun, though below the horizon, nevertheless exists; but an unapparent consciousness is zero, or no consciousness at all. Consciousness, no doubt, keeps ever gaining in distinctness, but there is certainly a period when it is an absolute blank, and then there is an epoch at which it exists and comes forth distinctly into the light; an epoch so remarkable that it may be assumed and fixed as the definite period when the true existence

and vital manifestation of consciousness commences. Our business now is to point out and illustrate this epoch.

It is a well-known fact that children, for some time after they acquire the use of language, speak of themselves *in the third person*, calling themselves John, Tom, or whatever else their names may be. Some speak thus for a longer, others for a shorter period; but all of them invariably speak for a certain time after this fashion. What does this prove, and how is it to be accounted for?

In the first place, it proves that they have not yet acquired the notion of their own personality. Whatever their intellectual or rational state may in other respects be, they have not combined with it the conception of *self*. In other words, it proves that as yet they are unconscious. They as yet exist merely *for others*, not *for themselves*.

In the second place, how is the origin of the language, such as it is, which the child makes use of, to be explained? It is to be accounted for upon exactly the same principle, whatever this may be, as that which enables the parrot to be taught to speak. This principle may be called imitation, which may be viewed as a modification of the great law of association, which again is to be considered as an illustration of the still greater law of cause and effect; and under any or all of these views it is not to be conceived that intelligence is by any means absent from the process. The child and the parrot hear those

around them applying various names to different objects, and, being imitative animals, acting under the law of causality, they apply these names in the same manner: and now mark most particularly the curious part of the process, how they follow the same rule when speaking of themselves. They hear people calling them by their own names in the third person, and not having any notion of themselves, not having realised their own personality, they have nothing else for it than to adhere, in this case too, to their old principle of imitation, and to do towards themselves just what others do towards them; that is to say, when speaking of themselves they are unavoidably forced to designate themselves by a word in the third person; or, in other words, to speak of themselves as if they were *not* themselves.

So long, then, as this state of things continues, the human being is to be regarded as leading altogether mere animal life, as living completely under the dominion and within the domain of nature. The law of its whole being is the law of causality. Its sensations, feelings of every kind, and all its exercises of reason, are mere effects, which again in their turn are capable of becoming causes. It cannot be said to be without "mind," if by the attribution of "mind" to it we mean that it is subject to various sensations, passions, desires, &c.; but it certainly is without consciousness, or that notion of self, that realisation of its own personality, which, in the subsequent stages of its existence, accompanies these modifications of

its being. It is still entirely the creature of instinct, which may be exactly and completely defined as *unconscious reason.*

It is true that the child at this stage of its existence often puts on the semblance of the intensest selfishness; but to call it selfish, in the proper sense of the word, would be to apply to it a complete misnomer. This would imply that it stood upon moral ground, whereas its being rests as yet upon no moral foundations at all. *We* indeed have a moral soil beneath our feet. And this is the origin of our mistake. In us, conduct similar to the child's would be really selfish, *because* we occupy a moral ground, and have realised our own personality; and hence, forgetting the different grounds upon which we and it stand, we transfer over upon it, through a mistaken analogy, or rather upon a false hypothesis, language which would serve to characterise its conduct, only provided it stood in the same situation with us, and like us possessed the notion and reality of itself. The child is driven to the gratification of its desires (prior to consciousness) at whatever cost, and whatever the consequences may be, just as an animal or a machine is impelled to accomplish the work for which it was designed; and the desire dies only when gratified, or when its natural force is spent, or when supplanted by some other desire equally blind and equally out of its control. How can we affix the epithet selfish, or any other term indicating either blame or praise, to a creature which as

yet is not *a self* at all, either in thought, in word, or deed? For let it be particularly noted that the notion of self is a great deal more than a mere notion, —that is to say, it possesses far more than a mere logical value and contents—it is absolutely genetic or creative. *Thinking* oneself "I" *makes* oneself "I;" and it is only *by thinking* himself "I" that a man *can* make himself "I;" or, in other words, change an unconscious thing into that which is now a conscious self. Nothing else will or can do it. So long as a Being does *not* think itself "I," it does not and cannot become "I." No other being, no being except itself, can make it "I." More, however, of this hereafter.

But now mark the moment when the child pronounces the word "I," and knows what this expression means. Here is a new and most important step taken. Let no one regard this step as insignificant, or treat our mention of it lightly and superciliously; for, to say the least of it, it is a step the like of which in magnitude and wonder the human being never yet took, and never shall take again, throughout the whole course of his rational and immortal career. We have read in fable of Circæan charms, which changed men into brutes; but here in this little monosyllable is contained a truer and more potent charm, the spell of an inverted and unfabulous enchantment, which converts the *feral* into the *human* being. The origination of this little monosyllable lifts man out of the natural into the moral universe.

It places him, indeed, upon a perilous pre-eminence, being the assertion of nothing less than his own absolute independence. He is now no longer a paradisiacal creature of blind and unconscious good. He has fallen from that estate by this very assertion of his independence; but, in compensation for this, he is now a conscious and a moral creature, knowing evil from good, and able to choose the latter even when he embraces the former; and this small word of one letter, and it alone, is the talisman which has effected these mighty changes—which has struck from his being the fetters of the law of causality, and given him to breathe the spacious atmosphere of absolute freedom; thus rendering him a moral and accountable agent, by making him the first cause or complete originator of all his actions.

If we reflect for a moment upon the origin and application of the word "I," as used by the child, we shall see what a remarkable contrast exists between this term and any other expression which he employs; and how strikingly different its origin is from that of all these expressions. We have already stated that the child's employment of language previous to his use of the word "I," may be accounted for upon the principle of imitation, or that at any rate it falls to be considered as a mere illustration of the general law of cause and effect. He hears other people applying certain sounds to designate certain objects; and when these objects or similar ones are presented, or in any way recalled, to him, the conse-

quence is, that he utters the same sounds in connection with their presence. All this takes place, very naturally, under the common law of association. But neither association, nor the principle of imitation, nor any conceivable modification of the law of cause and effect, will account for the child's use of the word "I." In originating and using this term, he reverses, or runs counter to all these laws, and more particularly performs a process diametrically opposed to any act of imitation. Take an illustration of this: A child hears another person call a certain object "a table;" well, the power of imitation naturally leads him to call the same thing, and any similar thing, "a table." Suppose, next, that the child hears this person apply to himself the word "I:" In this case, too, the power of imitation would naturally (that is to say, letting it operate here in the same way as it did in the case of the table) lead the child to call that man "I." But is this what the child does? No. As soon as he becomes conscious, he ceases, so far at least as the word "I" is concerned, to be an imitator. He still applies the word "table" to the objects to which other people apply that term; and in this he imitates them. But with regard to the word "I," he applies this expression to a thing totally different from that which he hears all other people applying it to. They apply it to themselves, but he does not apply it *to them*, but *to himself;* and in this he is not an imitator, but the absolute originator of a new notion, upon which he now, and henceforth, takes up

his stand, and which leads him on in the career of a destiny most momentous, and altogether anomalous and new.

In opposition to this view is it objected that in the use of the word "I" the child may still be considered an imitative creature, inasmuch as he merely applies to himself a word which he hears other people applying to themselves, having borrowed this application of it from them? Oh! vain and short-sighted objection! As if this very fact did not necessarily imply and prove that he has first of all originated within himself the notion expressed by the word "I" (namely, the notion of his conscious self), and thereby, and thereby only, has become capable of comprehending what *they* mean by it. In the use and understanding of this word every man must be altogether *original*. No person can *teach* to another its true meaning and right application; for this reason, that no two human beings ever use it, or ever can use it, in the same sense or apply it to the same being: a true but astounding paradox, which may be thus forcibly expressed. Every one rightly calls himself by a name which no other person can call him by without being convicted of the most outrageous and almost inconceivable insanity. The word "I" in *my* mouth as applied to *you* would prove me to be a madman. The word "I" in *your* mouth as applied to *me* would prove you to be the same. Therefore, I cannot by any conceivability teach you what it means, nor can you teach me. We must

both of us originate it first of all independently for ourselves, and then we can understand one another. This may be put to the actual test if any one is curious to prove it. Let any man teach a parrot to say "I" (it meaning thereby itself), and we pledge ourselves to unwrite all that we have written upon this topic.[1]

We have now, then, brought this question to a conclusion; besides having opened up slightly and incidentally a few collateral views connected with other problems, we have returned a distinct answer to the question, When does consciousness come into operation? Sensation, passion, reason, &c., all exist as soon as the human being is born, but *consciousness*

[1] It will not do to say that man is capable of forming the notion expressed by the word "I," in consequence of the reason with which he has been endowed, and that the parrot and other animals are not thus capable of forming it in consequence of their inferior degree of intelligence. We have treated of this point at some length in the first part of our discussion. Let us now, however, make one remark on the subject. It is plain that an increase or a deficiency of reason can only cause the creature in which it operates to accomplish its ends with greater or less exactness and perfection. Reason in itself runs straight, however much its volume may be augmented. Is it said that this consciousness, this self-reference, this reflex fact denoted by the word "I," is merely a peculiar inflection which reason takes in man, and which it does not take in animals? True; but the smallest attention shows us that reason only takes this peculiar inflection in consequence of falling in with the fact of consciousness: so that instead of reason accounting for consciousness, instead of consciousness being the derivative of reason, we find that it is consciousness which meets reason, and gives it that peculiar turn we have spoken of, rendering it and all its works referable to ourselves. It is not, then, reason which gives rise to consciousness, but it is the prior existence of consciousness which makes reason *human* reason.

only comes into existence when he has originated within him the notion and the reality denoted by the word "I." Then only does he begin to exist *for himself.* In our next paper we shall proceed to the discussion of the most important, but at the same time most difficult, question in all psychology, *How* does consciousness come into operation?

PART IV.

CHAPTER I.

To enter at length into a discussion concerning the multifarious theories that have been propounded respecting the fact of perception would be an endless and unnecessary labour. But as the problem we are about to be engaged with has much in common with these speculations, and as its solution has been retarded by the assumption of various false facts which have invariably been permitted to mingle with them, we must, in a few words, strike at the root of these spurious facts, and, employing a more accurate observation, we will then bring forward, purified from all irrelevant admixture, that great question of psychology, How, or in what circumstances, does Consciousness come into operation?

"Perception," says Dr Brown, "is a state of mind which is induced directly or indirectly by its external cause, as any other feeling is induced by its

particular antecedent. If the external cause or object be absent, the consequent feeling, direct or indirect, which we term perception, will not be induced, precisely as any other feeling will not arise without its peculiar antecedent. The relation of cause and effect, in short, is exactly the same in perception as in all the other mental phenomena, a relation of invariable sequence of one change after another change."[1]

This doctrine, which explains the phenomena of perception by placing them under the law of causality, is maintained, we believe, in one form or another, by every philosopher who has theorised on the subject,[2] from Aristotle, down through his scholastic followers, past the occasionalists and pre-established harmonists, and onwards to Dr Brown, who is merely to be considered as one of its most explicit expounders. One and all of them assume that the

[1] 'Physiology of the Mind,' p. 125-6.

[2] We are aware that Dr Brown and others have endeavoured to teach the doctrine of causation as a simple relation of antecedence and consequence, emptying our notion of cause of the idea of efficiency, that is, of the element which constitutes its very essence. But, unlike Hume, who adopted the same views and never swerved from them, but carried them forth into all their consequences, they never remain consistent with themselves for ten consecutive pages. They keep constantly resuming the idea they profess to have abjured; as, for instance, in their admission with respect to the efficiency or power of the Divine will. Therefore, their doctrine, whatever it may be, does not in any degree affect the line of argument followed out in the text, addressed though that argument is to those who entertain the common notion of causation, as, no doubt, Dr Brown himself did, however different a one he may have *professed*.

great law of cause and effect is as little violated in the intercourse which takes place between the external universe and man, as it is in the catenation of the objects themselves constituting that universe. Have we, then, any fault to find with this doctrine, supported as it is by such a host of authorities? and if we have, what is it? We answer that, in our apprehension, it places Dr Brown and all the philosophers who embrace it in a very extraordinary dilemma, which we now proceed to point out.

If by "perception" Dr Brown understands "sensation," and nothing more than sensation, then we admit his statement of the fact to be correct, and his doctrine to be without a flaw. Sensation (the smell of a rose, for example) is certainly "a state" which is "induced by its external cause," namely, by the rose. This is certainly a simple and ordinary instance of sequence, a mere illustration of the common law of cause and effect, and not a whit more extraordinary than any other exemplification of that great law. We admit, then, that here the phenomenon is correctly observed and stated, that the law of causality embraces sensation, and adequately accounts for its origin. Where, then, does our objection lie? It lies in this, that the origin of sensation is not the true and pertinent problem requiring solution, but is a most frivolous and irrelevant question. We thus, then, fix for Dr Brown and many other philosophers the first horn of our dilemma. If by "perception" they understand "sensation" merely,

they no doubt hit the true facts and their true explanation, but then they entirely miss, as we shall see, the question properly at issue, and, instead of grappling with it, they explain to us that which stands in need of no explanation.

But by "perception" Dr Brown and other philosophers probably understand something more than "sensation." If so, what is the additional fact they understand by it? When we have found it, we will then fix for them the other horn of our dilemma.

When animals and young children are sentient, there is in them, as we have all along seen, nothing more than sensation. The state of being into which they are cast is simple and single. It is merely a certain effect following a certain cause. There is in it nothing whatsoever of a reflex character. A particular sensation is, in their case, given or induced by its particular external cause, and nothing more is given. Indeed, what more could we rationally expect the fragrant particles of a rose to give than the sensation of the smell of a rose? Here, then, the state into which the sentient creature is thrown begins, continues, and ends, in simple and mixed sensation, and that is all that can be said about it.

But when we ourselves are sentient, we find the state of the fact to be widely different from this. We find that our sentient condition is not, as is the case in children and animals, a monopoly of sensation, but that here a new fact is evolved, over and above the sensation, which makes the phenomenon

a much more complicated and extraordinary one. This new and anomalous phenomenon which accompanies our sensations, but which is, at the same time, completely distinct from them, is the fact of our own personality, the fact and the notion denoted by the word "I." Surely no one will maintain that this realisation of self, in conjunction with our sensations, and as distinguished from the objects causing them, is the same fact as these sensations themselves. In man, then, there is the notion and the reality of himself, as well as the sensation that passes through him. In other words, he is not only sentient, like other animals, but, unlike them, he is sentient with a *consciousness*, or reference *to self*, of sensation; two very different, and, as we have already seen, and shall see still further, mutually repugnant and antithetical states of existence.

This *consciousness* of sensation, then, is the other fact contained in perception; and it is an inquiry into the nature and origin of this fact, and of it alone, that forms the true and proper problem of psychology when we are busied with the phenomena of perception; because it is this fact, and not the fact of sensation, which constitutes man's peculiar and distinctive characteristic, and lies as the foundation-stone of all the grander structures of his moral and intellectual being.

We now then ask: Have Dr Brown and other philosophers entertained the problem as to the origin and import of this fact—the fact, namely, of con-

sciousness as distinguished from the fact of sensation, passion, &c.; and have they thus grappled with the true question at issue? We answer: That if they have, then have they grossly falsified the facts of the case. For it is *not the fact* that the consciousness of sensation is "induced, either directly or indirectly, by its external cause," or by any cause whatsoever. Sensation, no doubt, is induced by its external cause, but consciousness is altogether exempt from the law of causality, as we shall very shortly prove by a reference to experience itself. In fine, then, the dilemma to which Dr Brown, and, we believe, all other theorists on the subject of perception, may be reduced, stands thus: Are they, *primo loco*, right in their facts? then they are wrong in the question they take up. Or, *secundo loco*, do they hit the right question? then they falsify, *ab initio*, the facts upon which its solution depends. In other words, in so far as their statement of facts is true, they take up a wrong question, inasmuch as they explain to us the origin of our sensations when they ought to be explaining to us the origin of our *consciousness* of sensations, or the notion of self which accompanies them. Or, again, supposing that they take up the right question; then their statement of facts is false, inasmuch as their assumption that our consciousness of sensation falls under the law of causality is totally unfounded, and may be disproved by an appeal to a stricter and more accurate observation.

The erection of this dilemma places us on a van-

tage-ground from which we may perceive at a glance both what we ought to avoid and what we ought to follow. On the one hand, realising the true facts, we can avoid the fate of those who expended their labour on a wrong question; and, on the other hand, hitting the right question, we can also avoid the fate of those who wrecked its solution upon false facts. We can now steer equally clear of the Scylla of an irrelevant problem, and the Charybdis of fictitious facts. Perception is, as we have seen, a synthesis of two facts, sensation, namely, and consciousness, or the realisation of self in conjunction with the sensation experienced. The former of these is possessed in common by men and by animals; but the latter is peculiar to man, and constitutes his differential quality, and is, therefore, the sole and proper fact to which our attention ought to direct itself when contemplating the phenomena of perception.

CHAPTER II.

We have already[1] had occasion to establish and illustrate the radical distinction between consciousness on the one hand, and sensation on the other, or any other of those "states of mind," as they are called, of which we are cognisant. We showed that consciousness is not only distinct from any of these states, but is diametrically opposed, or placed in a direct antithesis, to them all. Thus, taking for an example, as we have hitherto done, the smell of a rose, it appears that so long as the sensation occasioned by this object remains moderate, consciousness, or the realisation of self in union with the feeling, comes into play without any violent effort. But, suppose the sensation is increased until we almost

"Die of a rose, in aromatic pain,"

then we affirm that the natural tendency of this augmentation is to weaken or obliterate consciousness, which, at any rate, cannot now maintain its place without a much stronger exertion. We do not say that this loss of self-possession, or possession *of self*,

[1] P. 69.

always happens even when human sensations are most immoderate; but we affirm that in such circumstances there is a natural tendency in man to lose his consciousness or to have it weakened; and that when he retains it, he does so by the counteracting exercise of an *unnatural*, that is, of a free and moral power; and we further maintain that this tendency or law, or fact of humanity, which is fully brought to light when our sensations, emotions, &c., are rendered very violent, clearly proves that there is at bottom a vital and ceaseless repugnancy between consciousness and all these "states of mind," even in their ordinary and more moderate degrees of manifestation, although the equipoise then preserved on both sides may render it difficult for us to observe it. Had man been visited by much keener sensations, and hurried along by much stronger passions, and endowed with a much more perfect reason, the realisation of his own personality, together with the consequences it involves, would then have been a matter of much greater difficulty to him than it now is; perhaps it would have amounted to an impossibility. Even as it is, nothing can be more wonderful than that he should evolve this antagonist power in the very heart of the floods of sensation which, pouring in upon all sides, are incessantly striving to overwhelm it; and secure in its strength, should ride, as in a lifeboat, amid all the whirlpools of blind and fatalistic passion, which make the life of every man here below a sea of roaring troubles.

We now avail ourselves of the assistance of this antagonism, which has thus been established *as fact* by experience, in order to displace the false fact generally, we might say universally, assumed in our current metaphysics—namely, that consciousness, or the fact and notion denoted by the word "I," comes into manifestation at the bidding, and under the influence, of the objects which induce the sensations accompanying it.

One fact admitted on all hands is, that our sensations are caused by certain objects presented to our senses; another fact *assumed* on all hands is, that our *consciousness of* sensations falls under the same law, and is likewise induced by the presence of these objects. But consciousness and sensation are each other's opposites, and exist as thesis and antithesis; therefore, according to this doctrine, we find two contradictory effects attributed at the same moment to the same cause, and referred to the same origin, just as if we were to affirm that the same object is at the same moment and in the same place the cause at once of light and of the *absence* of light, or that the sun at one and the same instant both ripens fruit and *prevents* it from ripening. To illustrate this by our former example (for a variety of illustrations adds nothing to the clearness of an exposition), let us suppose a sentient being to experience the smell of a rose. So long as this being's state is simply sentient, its sensation is absorbing, effective, and complete; but as soon as consciousness, or the realisation of self,

blends with this feeling, it from that moment becomes weaker and less perfect. It is no longer pure and unalloyed, and consequently its integrity is violated, and its strength in some degree impaired; yet, according to our ordinary psychologists, the same object, namely, the rose, which induces the strength of the sensation, also brings along with it that suspension or weakening of the sensation which consciousness is. We are called upon to believe that the same cause at the same moment both produces and destroys a particular effect, a creed too contradictory and unintelligible to be easily embraced when thus plainly exposed. If a particular object induce a particular sensation, surely the suspension of that sensation, or, in other words, the consciousness which impairs it, and prevents it from being all-absorbing, cannot be induced by the same cause. And, besides, if our consciousness depended on our sensations, passions, or any other of our "states of mind," would not its light kindle, and its energy wax in proportion as these were brightened and increased? We have seen, however, that the reverse of this is the case, and that consciousness never burns more faintly than during man's most vivid paroxysms of sensation and of passion.

This argument, which is, however, rather a fact presented to us by experience than an inference, entirely disproves the dependency of man's consciousness upon the external objects which give birth to his sensations. It thus radically uproots that false

fact by which man is made the creature and thrall of causality in his intercourse with the outward world, and the passive recipient of its impressions. At the same time, the displacement of this false fact opens up to us a glimpse of that great truth, the view and realisation of which it has hitherto obstructed, the liberty of man. In order to get a nearer and clearer prospect of this grand reality, let us extirpate still more radically the spurious fact we have been dealing with, until not a fibre of it remains to shoot forth anew into sprouts of error.

CHAPTER III.

THE earliest speculators among mankind were, as we have before remarked, mere naturalists or *physici*. They looked at everything and conceived everything under the law of cause and effect. After a time, when speculation began to be directed upon man, or became what is now termed "metaphysical," this law still continued to be regarded as supreme, and the spirit of the old method was carried on into the new research. But as no instance of causality could be conceived without the existence of a thing *operated on*, as well as of a thing *operating*, they were forced to postulate something in man (either physical or hyperphysical) for the objects of external nature to act upon. Thus, in order to allow the law of causality an intelligible sphere of operation, and at the same time to lift man out of the mire of a gross materialism, they devised or assumed a certain spiritualised or attenuated substance called "mind," endowed with certain passive susceptibilities as well as with various active powers; and this hypothetical substance, together with all the false facts and foolish problems it brings along with it, has been

permitted to maintain its place, almost without challenge, in all our schools of philosophy down to the present hour; so completely has psychological science in general taken the colour and imbibed the spirit of physical research.

> "Ut multis nota est naturæ causa latentis;
> At sua qui noscat pectora rarus adest."

It is time, however, that this substance, and the doctrines and facts taught in connection with it, were tested in a more rigorous and critical spirit, not, indeed, upon their own account, but on account of those greater and more important truths whose places they have usurped. How, then, do we propose testing this substance? In this way. The word "mind" is exceedingly remote and ambiguous, and denotes—nobody knows what. Let us then substitute in place of it that much plainer expression which everybody makes use of, and in some degree, at least, understands—the expression "I" or "me;" and let us see how mind, with its facts and doctrines, will fare when this simple, unpretending, and unhypothetical word is employed in its place.

"External objects take effect upon mind, and perception is the result." This doctrine lies at the very threshold of our ordinary metaphysics, and forms the foundation-stone upon which their whole superstructure is erected. But is it true? Let us come to a more distinct understanding of it by changing it into the following statement, and we shall see what gross though deep-lurking falsities are brought to light by

the alteration. Let us say "external objects take effect upon *me*, and perception is the result." We now then ask, To what period of our life is this proposition meant to have reference? Does the philosopher of "mind" answer that it may be applied to us during any period, from first to last, of our existence? Then we tell him in return that, in that case, the doctrine is certainly false, for it is not the fact that things take effect upon "me" at the birth or during the earlier years of that particular Being which *afterwards* becomes "I," there being at that time no "me" at all in the case; no "me" *for* things to take effect upon, as was proved in the preceding problem, where it was shown that no man is born conscious, or, in other words, that no man is born "I." It is true that things take effect, from the very first, upon that particular Being which, *after a time and after a certain process*, becomes "I." But this particular Being was not "I" at its birth, or until a considerable time after it had elapsed; and, therefore, the proposition, "things take effect upon *me*," is seen to be untrue when applied to one period of human life at least, and thus the *ego*, or that which, in the case of each individual man, is "I;" or, in other words, his true Being is liberated from the control of the law of causality, during the earlier stages at least of his existence, in the most conclusive and effectual way possible, namely, by showing that at that time this "I" has no manner of existence or manifestation whatsoever.

Does the philosopher of mind, giving up this point, maintain that the proposition quoted has, at any rate, a true and intelligible application to us in our grown or advanced condition? Then we tell him that, in that case, the affirmation or dogma is altogether *premature;* because, before it can be admitted, he is bound to explain to us how the particular Being given and contemplated, which was not "I" or "me" at first, became converted into "me." Before any subsequent averment connected with this "me" can be listened to, it is first of all incumbent upon him, we say, to point out to us how this conversion is brought about; to explain to us the origin and significance of this "I," the circumstances out of which it arose; for, as we have already said, the particular Being which now appropriates it was certainly not sent into the world a born or ready-made "I."

Suppose, then, that the metaphysician should say that this Being becomes "I" under the law of causality, and beneath the action of the external objects which produce impressions upon it, then we would like to know how it happened that these outward objects, which induced the human Being's sensations at the very first, did not cause him to become "I" *then.* When he was first born he was just as sensitive as he ever was afterwards, no doubt more so, but for long his sensations continued pure and unalloyed. After a time, however, they were found to be combined with the notion and reality of self, a

new notion and reality altogether. The human Being has now become *ego;* from a *thing* he has become a *person.* But what new circumstances were there in his sensations, or their exciting causes, by which they brought about this new fact and phasis of existence? The metaphysician cannot answer us. He must admit that the sensations and their causes remain, after the manifestation of the *ego,* precisely what they were before it came into existence, and, therefore, that they can never account for its origin.

But we have already, in the preceding chapter, disproved still more effectually the fact that the *ego* comes into existence in consequence of the influence of external objects. We there showed that consciousness not only does not manifest itself in obedience to their action, but that it actually tends to be suppressed and obliterated thereby. Now consciousness is the very essence and origin of the *ego;* consciousness creates the *ego;* without consciousness no man would be "I." Therefore the *ego* is also exempt from the influence of outward objects, and manifests itself, and maintains its place, not *in consequence,* but *in spite* of them. Consciousness develops and preserves itself by refusing to take part or identify itself with the sensation, passion, or whatever it may be that is striving to enslave the man; and the *ego,* which is but the more personal and vital expression of consciousness, exists merely by refusing to imbibe the impressions of external things. Thus, so far is it from being true that outward objects take effect

upon *me*, that "I," in truth, only *am* by resisting and refusing to be impressed by their action.

When an effect or impression is produced on any substance, whether it be motion, as in the case of a struck billiard-ball, or sensation, as in the case of animals and men, the substance impressed is either conscious of the impression, as is the case with men, or unconscious of it, as is the case with animals and billiard-balls. If it be unconscious of the impression, then, being filled and monopolised by the same, it never rises above it, but, yielding to its influence, it becomes altogether the slave of the law of causality, or of the force that is working on it. But if this substance be conscious of the impression made upon it, then it is absolutely necessary, in the eye of reason, that a portion of this being should stand aloof from the impression, should be exempt from the action of the object causing it; in short, should resist, repel, and deny it in the exercise of a free activity; otherwise, like animals and inferior things, being completely absorbed and monopolised by the influence present to it, it would no more be able to become conscious of it than a leaf can comprehend the gale in which it is drifting along, or the tiger the passion which impels him to slake his burning heart in blood. It is obvious that the point in man at which he becomes aware of his impressions must be free from these impressions, and must stand out of their sphere, otherwise it would be swallowed up by them, and nothing save the impressions would re-

main. But man is not made up of mere impressions —passions, sensations, "states of mind," or whatever they may be. He is not engulfed and borne along in their vortices. There is a point from which he looks down upon them all, and knows himself to be free. He stands within a circle more impregnable than enchanter's ring; a circle which, however much they may assault it, they cannot overpass: and this point or circle of freedom, this true life of humanity, is that which, in the case of each man, is "I."

This view disposes of a question which has been ever regarded as forming the *opprobrium* of metaphysics. We allude to the problem respecting the mode and nature of the intercourse which takes place between the external universe and man, or, as metaphysicians say, "Mind." This question is now given up, not because it has been solved, not because it is regarded as too contemptible and irrelevant to be entertained by speculative philosophy, but (pro pudor!) because it is considered insoluble, inscrutable, and beyond the limits of the human faculties. Oh, ye metaphysicians! ye blind leaders of the blind! How long will ye be of seeing and understanding that there is no communication at all between man in his true Being and the universe that surrounds him, or that, if there be any, it is the communication of *non*-communication? Know ye not that ye are what ye are only on account of the antagonism between you and it; that ye perceive things only by resisting their impressions, by denying them, not in

word only, but also in vital deed; that your refusal to be acted upon by them constitutes your very personality and your very perception of them; that this perception arises not in consequence of the union, but in consequence of the *dis*union between yourselves and matter; and, in fine, that your consciousness, even in its simplest acts, so far from being in harmony and keeping with the constitution of nature, is the commencement of that grand disruption between yourselves and the world, which perhaps ye will know more about before ye die?

Of all difficult entails to be broken through, the most difficult is the entail of false facts and erroneous opinions. If, however, the foregoing observations be attended to, we trust we have done something to cut off speculators yet unborn from their inheritances of error. Of all the false facts involved in the "science of the human mind," the greatest is this, that, starting from the assumption of "mind" as a given substance, we are thereby led to believe that the *ego* or central and peculiar point of humanity comes into the world *ready-made*. In opposition to this belief, the true fact is that the *ego* does *not* thus come into the world, but that the being which is now "I" was *not* "I" at first, but became "I" after a time and after a process, which it is the business of the philosopher to explain. Various other fictitious facts spring out of this tap-root of error. Thus, if we start from mind as a given substance, we, of course, are compelled to make this, in the first in-

stance, passive, and only active through a species of reaction. But the *ego* is never passive. Its being is pure act. To hold it passive is to hold it annihilated. It is for ever acting against the fatalistic forces of nature. Its free and antagonist power shows itself equally to the eye of reflection in our simplest perceptive as in our highest moral acts. It lives and has a being only in so far as it refuses to bow under the yoke of causality; and whenever it bends beneath that yoke, its life and all its results are gone.[1]

One word to those who imagine that the *ego* is merely a variety of expression signifying nothing more than the proper name of the person employing it. There cannot be a greater philosophical error than to conceive that the non-manifestation of the *ego* is merely a verbal or logical defect, and that the reality of it may exist in a being where the notion of it is wanting. Yet this appears to us to be one of the commonest errors in psychology. Metaphysicians undisciplined by reflection, when contemplating the condition of a young child, and observing its various sensitive, passionate, or rational states, are prone, in the exercise of an unwarranted imagination, also to invest it with a personality, with conscious-

1 "The false facts of metaphysics" ought to form no inconsiderable chapter in the history of philosophy. Those specified are but a few of them; but they are all that we have room for at present. To state, almost in one word, the fundamental error we have noticed in the text, we should say, that the whole perversion and falsity of the philosophy of man are owing to our commencing with a *substance*, "mind," and not with an *act*, the act or fact of consciousness.

ness; in short, with that which, in their own case, they call "I," transferring over upon it this notion and reality which exist only for them. For the child all this while does not think itself "I," and therefore it does not in reality become "I." It never can become "I" through *their* thinking. The "I" they think for it is a spurious and non-existent "I." To become "I" in reality, it must think itself "I," which it has not yet done. But what do we mean precisely by saying that the *notion* of "I" creates the *reality* of "I"? This we can best explain by a digression into the history of philosophy, and by rescuing a once famous dogma from the undeserved contempt into which it has generally fallen.

CHAPTER IV.

THE Cartesian philosophy is said to commence by inculcating a species of wide and deep-searching scepticism; and its fundamental and favourite tenet is that *Cogito, ergo sum*, which is now so universally decried. But abandoning altogether its written dogmas and formulas, let us only return upon them after we have looked forth for ourselves into the realities of things.

When a man sees and thinks a mountain, it is obvious that his thought does not create the mountain. Here, then, the thought and the reality are not identical; nor does the one grow out of the other. The two can be separated, and, in point of fact, stand apart, and are quite distinct. In this case, then, it requires some degree of faith to believe that the notion and the reality correspond. It is evident that there is a sort of flaw between them which nothing but the cement of Faith can solder; a gap which no scientific ingenuity has ever been able to bridge; in short, that here there is a chink in the armour of reason which scepticism may take advantage of if it

chooses; for the reality of the mountain being independent of the notion of the mountain, the notion may also be independent of the reality, and, for anything that can be shown to the contrary, may have been induced by some other cause. In short, the notion, even when the mountain appears present before us, may possibly exist without any corresponding reality, for it clearly does not create that reality.

In looking out, then, for a sure and certain foundation for science, we must not build upon any tenet in which a distinction between our thought and its corresponding reality is set forth (as, for example, upon any proposition expressing the real existence of an external world), for here scepticism might assail us, possibly with success; but we must seek for some subject of experience, between the notion of which and the reality of which there is no flaw, distinction, or interval whatsoever. We must seek for some instance in which the thought of a certain reality actually creates that reality; and if we can find such an instance, we shall then possess an *inconcussum quid* which will resist for ever all the assaults of scepticism.

But no instance of this kind is to be found, as we have seen, by attaching our thoughts to the objects of the universe around us. Our *thinking* them does not *make* them realities. If they are realities, they are not so in consequence of our thoughts; and if they are not realities, unreal they will remain in

spite of our thoughts. Let us turn from the universe, then, and look to ourselves, "I." Now here is an instance in which there is no distinction or sundering between the notion and the reality. The two are coincident and identical, or rather, we should say, the one (that is, the notion "I") creates and enforces the other (that is, the reality "I"); or, at any rate, this appears to be the best way of logically exhibiting the two. Between the notion and the reality in this case scepticism can find no conceivable entrance for the minutest point of its spear. Let any man consult his own experience whether, the notion "I" being given, the reality "I" must not also necessarily be present; and also whether, the reality being present, the notion must not also accompany it. Let him try to destroy or maintain the one without also destroying or maintaining the other, and see whether he can succeed. Succeed he easily may in the case of any other notion and reality. The word mountain, for instance, denotes both a notion and a reality. But the notion may exist perfectly well without the reality, and the reality without the notion. The notion "I," however, cannot exist without the reality "I," and the reality cannot exist without the notion "I," as any one may satisfy himself by the slightest reflection.

Here, then, we have found the instance we were seeking for. What is the notion "I"? It is consciousness or the notion of self. What is the reality "I"? It is simply "I." Connect the two together

in a genesis which makes the one arise out of the other, and you have the famous fundamental position of the Cartesian philosophy, *Cogito, ergo sum*, a formula which is worthy of respect, for this reason, if for no other, that by it the attention of psychologists was first distinctly directed to the only known instance in which a notion and a reality are identical and coincident, in which *a thought* is the same as *a thing*.

But, by means of the dogma, *Cogito, ergo sum*, was it not the design of Descartes to prove his own existence? Take our word for it, no such miserable intention ever entered into his head. His great object, in the first place, was emphatically to signalise the very singular and altogether anomalous phenomenon we have spoken of, namely, the identity in man of thought and reality, and then to found upon this point as on a rock which no conceivable scepticism could shake; and, in the second place, he attempted to point out the genesis of the *ego*, in so far as it admitted of logical exposition. *Cogito, ergo sum*, I am conscious, therefore I am; that is, consciousness, or the *notion* of "I," takes place in a particular Being, and the *reality* of "I" is the immediate result. The *ergo* here does not denote a mere logical inference from the fact of consciousness, but it points to a genetic or creative power in that act.

"Consciousness created you, that is to say, you created yourself; did you?" we may here imagine an opponent of Descartes to interpose.

"No," replies Descartes; "I did not create myself, in so far as my mere existence is concerned. But, in so far as I am an *ego*, or an existence *as a self*, I certainly did create myself. By becoming conscious, I, in one sense, actually created myself."

"But," says the other, "must you not have existed before you could become conscious, and in order to become conscious?"

"Certainly," answers Descartes, "some sort of being must have existed *before* my consciousness, but it was only *after* consciousness that that being became *I*."

"Do you then cease to be whenever you cease to be conscious?"

To this question Descartes answers both yes and no. "As an existing being," says he, "fulfilling many purposes of creation, I certainly do not cease to exist when I cease to be conscious; but as an 'I' (ego), I certainly am no more the moment consciousness leaves me. Consciousness made me from a *thing*, a *self;* that is, it lifted me up from existing merely *for others*, and taught me to exist also *for myself*. My being as an *ego* depends upon, and results from my consciousness, and therefore, as soon as my consciousness is taken away, my existence as an *ego* or self vanishes. The being heretofore called 'I' still exists, but not as 'I.' It lives only for others, not for itself; not as a self at all, either in thought or in deed."

CHAPTER V.

But though we have seen that consciousness is the genesis or origin of the *ego*, and that without the former the latter has no existence, we have yet to throw somewhat more light on consciousness itself, and the circumstances in which it arises.

Let thyself float back, oh reader! as far as thou canst in obscure memory into thy golden days of infancy, when the light of thy young life, rising out of unknown depths, scattered away death from before its path, beyond the very limits of thought; even as the sun beats off the darkness of night into regions lying out of the visible boundaries of space. In those days thy light was single and without reflection. Thou wert one with nature, and, blending with her bosom, thou didst drink in inspiration from her thousand breasts. Thy consciousness was faint in the extreme, for as yet thou hadst but slightly awakened *to thyself;* and thy sensations and desires were nearly all-absorbing. Carry thyself back still farther into days yet more "dark with excess of light," and thou shalt behold, through the visionary

mists, an earlier time, when thy consciousness was altogether null; a time when the discrimination of thy sensations into *subject* and *object*, which seems so ordinary and inevitable a process to thee *now*, had not taken place, but when thyself and nature were enveloped and fused together in a glowing and indiscriminate synthesis. In these days thy state was indeed blessed, but it was the blessedness of bondage. The earth flattered thee, and the smiling heavens flattered thee into forgetfulness. Thou wert nature's favourite, but at the same time her fettered slave.

But thy destiny was to be free; to free thyself, to break asunder the chains of nature, to oppose thy will and thy strength to the universe, both without thee and within thee, to tread earth and the passions of earth beneath thy feet; and thy first step towards this great consummation was to dissolve the strong, primary, and natural synthesis of sensation. In the course of time, then, that which was originally *one* in the great unity of nature, became *two* beneath the first exercise of a reflective analysis. Thy sensation was now divided into *subject* and *object;* that is, thyself and the universe around thee. Now, for the first time, wert thou "I."

Wouldst thou re-examine thy sensation as it exists in its primary synthetic state? Then look at it; what is it but a pure unmixed sensation, a sensation, and *nothing more?* Wouldst thou behold it, in thy own secondary analysis of it? then, lo! how a new element, altogether transcending mere sensation, is

presented to thee, the element or act of negation; that is, as we shall show, of freedom.

Sensation in man is found to be, first of all, a unity, and at this time there is no *ego* or *non-ego* at all in the case; but afterwards it becomes a duality, and then there is an *ego* and a *non-ego*. But, in the latter case, it is obvious that very different circumstances are connected with sensation, and very different elements are found along with it, than are found in it when it is a unity: there is, for instance, the fact of negation, the *non* which is interposed between the subject and the object; and there are also, of course, any other facts into which this one may resolve itself.

Moreover, it is evident that, but for this act of negation or division, there would be no *ego*, or *non-ego*. Take away this element, and the sensation is restored to its first unity, in which these, being undiscriminated, were virtually non-existent. For it is obvious that, unless a man discriminates himself as "I" from other things, he does not exist as "I." The *ego* and the *non-ego*, then, only are by being discriminated, or by the one of them being denied (not in thought or word only, but in a primary and vital act) of the other. But consciousness also is the discrimination between the *ego* and the *non-ego;* or, in other words, consciousness resolves itself, in its clearest form, into an act of negation.

In order, then, to throw the strongest light we can on consciousness, we must ascertain the value and

import, and, if possible, the origin of this act of negation, this fundamental energy and vital condition upon which the peculiar being of humanity depends. And, first of all, we must beg the reader (a point we have had occasion to press upon him before) to banish from his mind the notion that this negation is a mere logical power, or form, consisting of a thought and a word. Let him endeavour to realise such a conception of it as will exhibit it to him as a vital and energetic deed by which he brings himself into existence, not indeed as a Being, but as that which he calls "I." Let him consider that, unless this deed of negation were practised by him he *himself* would not be here; a particular Being would, indeed, be here: but it is only by denying or distinguishing itself from other things that that being becomes a self—*himself*. Unless this discrimination took place, the Being would remain lost and swallowed up in the identity or uniformity of the universe. It would be only *for others*, not *for itself*. Self, in its case, would not emerge.

Am I, then, to say that "I" have been endowed by some other Being with this power of sundering myself, during sensation, from the objects causing it; am I to say that this capability has been given "me"? *Given me!* Why, I was not "I" until *after* this power was exerted; how then could it have been given "me"? There was no "me" to give it to. I became "I" only by exercising it; and *after* it had been exerted, what would be the advantage of sup-

posing it given to me *then*, I having it already? If, then, I suppose this power given to "me" *before* it is exerted, I suppose it given to that which does not as yet exist to receive it; and if I suppose it given to me *after* it is exerted, *after* I have become "I," I make myself the receiver of a very superfluous and unnecessary gift.

But suppose it should be said that this power, though not, properly speaking, given to "me," is yet given to that particular Being which afterwards, in consequence of exercising it, becomes "I," then we answer, that in this case it is altogether a mistake to suppose that this particular Being exercises the power. The power is, truly speaking, exercised by the Being which infused it, and which itself here becomes "I;" while the particular Being supposed to become "I" in consequence of the endowment, remains precisely what it was, and does not, by any conceivability, become "I." One Being may, indeed, divide and sunder another Being from other objects; but this does not make the latter Being "I." In order to become "I" it must sunder *itself* from other things by *its own* act. Finally, this act of negation, or, in other words, consciousness, is either derived or underived. If it is derived, then it is the consciousness of the Being from whom it is derived, and not mine. But I am supposing it, and it is admitted to be, *mine*, and not another Being's, therefore it must be underived; that is to say, self-originated and free.

A particular Being becomes "I" in consequence of exercising this act of negation. But this act must be that Being's own; otherwise, supposing it to be the act of another Being, it would be that other Being which would become I, and not the particular Being spoken of. But it was this particular Being, and no other, which was supposed to become I, and therefore the act by which it became so must have been its own; that is, it must have been an act of pure and absolute freedom.

In this self-originated act there is no passivity. Now every pure and underived act, of course, implies and involves the presence of will of the agent. If the act were evolved without his will it would be the act of another Being. In this act of negation, then, or, in other words, in perception and consciousness, Will has place. Thus, though man is a sentient and passionate creature, without his will, he is not a conscious, or percipient being, not an *ego*, even in the slightest degree, without the concurrence and energy of his volition. Thus early does human will come into play; thus profoundly down in the lowest foundations of the *ego* is its presence and operation to be found.

PART V.

CHAPTER I.

THE question of Liberty and Necessity has been more perplexed and impeded in its solution by the confounding of a peculiar and very important distinction, than by all the other mistakes and oversights burdened upon it besides. The distinction to which we allude is one which ought to be constantly kept in mind, and followed out as a clue throughout the whole philosophy of man; the distinction, namely, between one's existence *for others*, and one's existence *for oneself;* or, in other words, the distinction between unconscious and conscious existence. This distinction, we remark, is very commonly confounded; that is to say, the separate species of existence specified, instead of being regarded as *two*, are generally regarded as only *one;* and the consequence is, that all the subsequent conclusions of psychology are more or less perplexed and vitiated by this radical

entanglement, and more particularly is the great question just mentioned involved in obscurity thereby, and, to all appearance, doomed to revolve in the weary rounds of endless and barren speculation. We have already, in various parts of this discussion, endeavoured to establish a complete distinction between these two kinds of being; and now, with a view of throwing some light on the intricate question of Liberty and Necessity, not derived from *reasoning*, but from immediate *fact*, we proceed to illustrate and enforce this discrimination more strenuously than ever.

What, then, is our existence *for others;* and in what respect is it to be taken into account in a scientific estimate of ourselves? A little reflection will explain to us what it is, together with all its actual or possible accompaniments.

It will be admitted that except in man there is no consciousness anywhere throughout the universe. If, therefore, man were deprived of consciousness, the whole universe, and all that dwell therein, would be destitute of that act. Let us suppose, then, that this deprivation actually takes place, and let us ask, What difference would it make in the general aspect and condition of things? As far as the objects of the external universe, animals and so forth, are concerned, it would confessedly make none; for all these are without consciousness at any rate, and therefore cannot be affected by its absence. The stupendous machinery of nature would move round precisely as

heretofore. But what difference would the absence of consciousness make in the condition of man? Little or none, we reply, in the eyes of a *spectator ab extra*. In the eyes of a Being *different* from man, and who regards him, we shall suppose, from some other sphere, man's ongoings *without* consciousness would be the same, or nearly the same, as they were *with* consciousness. Such a Being would occupy precisely the same position towards the unconscious man as the conscious man at present holds towards the unconscious objects of creation; that is to say, man would still exist for this Being, and for him would evolve all his varied phenomena. We are not to suppose that man in this case would be cut off from any of those sources of inspiration which make him a rational, a passionate, a sentient, and an imaginative creature. On the contrary, by reason of the very absence of consciousness, the flood-gates of his being would stand wider than before, and let in upon him stronger and deeper currents of inspiration. He would still be visited by all his manifold sensations, and by all the effects they bring along with them; he would still be the creature of pleasure and of pain; his emotions and desires would be the same as ever, or even more overwhelming; he would still be the inspired slave of all his soft and all his sanguinary passions; for, observe, we are not supposing him deprived of any of these states of being, but only of the consciousness, or reference to self, of them—only of that notion and reality of self which generally accompanies them; a partial curtailment perfectly conceiv-

able, and one which sometimes actually takes place; for instance, in that abnormal condition of humanity denominated somnambulism. In the case we are supposing, then, man's reason or intelligence would still be left to him. He would still be a mathematician like the bee, and like the beaver a builder of cities. He might still, too, have a language and a literature of a certain kind, though destitute, of course, of all allusions and expressions of a conscious or personal character. But the "Goddess" or the "Muse" might and would still infuse into his heart the gift of song; and then an unconscious Homer, blind in soul as well as blind in sight, filled by the transmitted power of some foreign *afflatus*, might have sung the wrath of an unconscious Achilles, and the war waged against Troy by heroic somnambulists from Greece. For poetry represents the derivative and unconscious, just as philosophy represents the free and conscious, elements of humanity; and is itself, according to every notion of it entertained and expressed from the earliest times down to the present, an inspired or fatalistic development, as is evident from the fact, that all great poets, in the exercise of their art, have ever referred away their power from themselves to the "God," the "Goddess," the "Muse," or some similar source of inspiration always foreign to themselves.[1] "*Est Deus*," says the poet,

"Est Deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo."

[1] Hence the truth of the common saying, *Poeta nascitur, non fit;* an adage which is directly reversed in the case of the philosopher, *Philosophus fit, non nascitur.*

Listen also to the testimony of our own Milton, who, in one of his elegies, gives voice to the belief that he owed his genius to the spring, and, like a tree in the budding woods, was wont to blossom into song beneath the vivifying spirit of that genial time. "*Fallor?*" he asks,

> "Fallor? an et nobis redeunt in carmina vires,
> Ingeniumque mihi *munere veris* adest?"[1]

The sublimest works of intelligence, then, are quite possible, and may be easily conceived to be executed without any consciousness of them on the part of the apparent and immediate agent. Suppose man to be actuated throughout his whole nature by the might of some foreign agency; and he may realise the most stupendous operations, and yet remain in darkness, and incognisant of them all the while. A cognisance of these operations certainly does not necessarily go hand in hand with their performance. What is there in the workings of human passion that consciousness should necessarily accompany it, any more than it does the tossings of the stormy sea? What is there in the radiant emotions which issue forth in song, that consciousness should naturally and necessarily accompany them, any more than it does the warblings and the dazzling verdure of the sun-lit woods? What is there in the exercise of reason, that consciousness should inevitably go along with it, any more than it accompanies the mechanic skill with which the spider spreads his claggy snares? There

[1] Miltoni Poemata. Elegia quinta. In adventum Veris.

is obviously nothing. The divorce, then, between consciousness, and all these powers and operations, may be conceived as perfectly complete; and this conception is all that is here necessary for the purposes of our coming argument.

Existence, then, together with all the powers and operations just indicated, might be truly predicated of man, even in his unconscious state. And even more than this might be affirmed of him. We could not, indeed, with propriety, say (the reason of which will appear by-and-by) that man, without consciousness, would be invested in any degree with a moral character. Yet even here, according to the moral philosophy of Paley and his school, in which morality is expounded as the mere adaptation of means to ends in the production of the social welfare, which adaptation might be perfectly well effected without any consciousness on the part of man, just as bees and other animals adapt means to ends without being aware of what they are about; according to this view, man, although unconscious, would still be a moral creature. Neither, without consciousness, would man possess laws in the proper sense of the word; but here, too, according to the Hobbesian doctrines which make law to consist in the domination or supremacy of force, and the power of a supreme magistrate all that is necessary to constitute it, man might, in every respect, be considered a finished legislator, and a creature living under laws.

But it is time to turn these preliminary observa-

tions to some account. Let us now, then, ask, depriving man of consciousness, What is it we actually leave him, and what is it we actually deprive him of? We leave him all that we have said. We leave him existence, and the performance of many operations, the greatest, as well as the most insignificant. But the existence thus left to him, together with all its phenomena, is, we beg it may be observed, only *one* species of existence. It is a peculiar kind of existence which must be noted well, and discriminated from existence of *another* species which we are about to mention. In a word, it is existence merely *for others*. This is what we leave man when we suppose him divested of consciousness.

And now we again ask, depriving man of consciousness, What do we really deprive him of? and we answer, that we totally deprive him of existence *for himself;* that is, we deprive him of that kind of existence in which alone *he* has any share, interest, or concern; or, in other words, by emptying him of consciousness, we take away from him altogether his personality, or his true and proper being. For of what importance is it to *him* that he should exist *for others*, and, for them, should evolve the most marvellous phenomena, if he exists not *for himself*, and takes no account of the various manifestations he displays? What reality can such a species of existence have for him? Obviously none. What can it avail a man to be and to act, if he remains all the while without consciousness of his Being and

his actions? In short, divested of consciousness, is it not plain that a man is no longer "I," or self, and, in such circumstances, must not his existence, together with all its ongoings, be, in so far as *he* is concerned, absolutely zero, or a blank?

Thus existence becomes discriminated into two distinct species, which, though they may be found together, as they usually are in man, are yet perfectly separate and distinguishable; existence, namely, for others, and existence for oneself. Recapitulating what we have said, this distinction may be established and explained thus, in a very few words: Deprive man of consciousness, and in one sense you do *not* deprive him of existence, or of any of the vigorous manifestations and operations of existence. In one sense, that is, *for others*, he exists just as much as ever. But in another sense, you *do* deprive him of existence as soon as you divest him of consciousness. In this latter sense he now ceases to exist; that is, he exists no longer *for himself*. He is no longer that which was "I," or self. He has lost his personality. He takes no account of his existence, and therefore his existence, as far as he is concerned, is virtually and actually null. But if there were only one species, and one notion of existence, it is impossible that man, when denuded of consciousness, should both exist and not exist, as we have shown he does. If existence were of one kind only, it would be impossible to reconcile this contradiction, which is yet seen to be perfectly true,

and an undeniable matter of fact. The conclusion, therefore, is inevitable and irresistible, that existence is not of one, but of two kinds; existence, to wit, for others, and existence for ourselves; and that a creature may possess the former without possessing the latter, and that, though it should lose the latter by losing consciousness, it may yet retain the former, and "live and breathe and have a being in the eyes of others."

Does some one here remark that consciousness is not our existence, but is merely the *knowledge of* our existence? Then we beg such a person to consider what would become of his existence, *with respect to him*, if he were deprived of the knowledge of it. Would it not be, in so far as he was concerned, precisely on the footing of a nonentity? One's knowledge, therefore, or consciousness of existence, is far more than *mere* consciousness of existence. It is the actual ground of a species of existence itself. It constitutes existence for oneself, or personal existence; for without this consciousness a man would possess no personality, and each man's personality is his true and proper being.

Having divided existence, then, into two distinct kinds, the next question is, To what account do we propose turning the discrimination? If it is of no practical use in removing difficulties and in throwing light upon the obscurer phenomena of man, it is worthless, and must be discarded as a barren and mere hair-splitting refinement. What application,

then, has it to the subjects we are engaged in discussing; and, in particular, what assistance does it afford us in clearing up the great fact of Human Liberty, that key-stone in the arch of humanity, without which all our peculiar attributes, morality, responsibility, law, and justice, loosened from their mighty span would fall from their places, and disappear for ever in the blind abysses of Necessity?

In availing ourselves, then, of the assistance of this distinction, and in applying it to our purposes, the first circumstance connected with it which attracts our attention is the following *fact*, deserving, we may be permitted to say, of very emphatic notice; that while the one of these species of existence precedes the act of consciousness, the other of them *follows* that act. Our existence for others is antecedent, but our existence for ourselves is *subsequent* to the act of consciousness. Before a child is conscious, it exists for others; but it exists for itself only *after* it is conscious. Prior to consciousness, or in the absence of that act, man is a one-sided phantasmagoria; vivid on the side *towards others* with all the colours, the vigorous ongoings, the accomplishments, and the reality of existence; but on the other side, the side where he himself should be, but is not yet, what is there? a blank; utter nothingness. But, *posterior* to consciousness, and in consequence of it, this vacuity is filled up, new scenery is unfolded, and a new reality is erected on the blank side behind the radiant pageant. The man himself is now there.

The one-sided existence has become doubled. He no longer exists merely for others; he exists also for himself, a very different, and, for him, a much more important matter.

Existence for oneself, then, personal existence, or, in other words, that species of Being which alone properly concerns man, is found not to precede, but to follow the act of consciousness; therefore the next *fact* of humanity to which we beg to call very particular attention is this: that man, properly speaking, *acts* before he *exists;* for consciousness is, as we have already shown, and will show still further, a pure act, and partakes in no degree of the nature of a passion. At the same time, the proof that consciousness is of this character will convince us that it cannot have its origin in the first-mentioned and given species of existence, which we have called existence for others, or existence without consciousness. But this is not the place for that proof. It will be attempted by-and-by.

This fact, that man *acts* before he truly and properly *exists,* may perhaps at first sight appear rather startling, and may be conceived to be at direct variance with what are called "the laws of human thought;" for it may be said that these laws compel us to conceive man *in Being* before we can conceive him *in act.* But if it should be really found to be thus at variance with these laws, our only answer is, that facts are "stubborn things," and that we do not care one straw for the laws of human thought when

they contradict the facts of experience; and a fact of experience we maintain it to be (let people conceive or not as they please or can), that man's true *Being* follows and arises out of man's *act*, that man, properly speaking, cannot be said to *be* until he *acts;* that consciousness is an act, and that our proper existence, being identical and convertible with our personality, which results from consciousness, is not the antecedent but the consequent of that act.

Need we say anything further in enforcement and illustration of this very extraordinary fact? Every man will admit that his true Being is that which for him is "I." Now suppose no man had ever thought himself "I," would he ever have become "I," or possessed a proper personal Being? Certainly not. It is only after thinking oneself "I," and in consequence of thinking oneself "I," that one becomes "I." But thinking oneself "I" is an act, the act of consciousness. Therefore the act of consciousness is anterior to the existence of man, therefore man is in Act before he is truly and properly in Being; or, in other words, he performs an act before he has an existence (i.e., *a standing out*) for himself.

But how can man *act* before he *is?* Perhaps we cannot perfectly explain the *How*, but we can state, and have stated the *That*, namely, that the fact is so. But at the same time we beg it to be understood that it is only in one sense that this is true. We would not be misunderstood. We here guard ourselves from the imputation of saying that in every sense

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man is absolutely a nonentity before he acts, or that he actually creates his Being. This we are very far indeed from affirming. Prior to the act of consciousness, he possesses, as we have said, an existence in the eyes of others; and this species of existence is undoubtedly *given*. Anterior to this act, the foundations of his Being are wonderfully and inscrutably laid. He is a mighty machine, testifying his Creator's power. But at this time being destitute of consciousness, we again maintain that he is destitute of personality, and that therefore he wants that which constitutes the true reality and proper life of humanity. We maintain, further, that this personality, realised by consciousness, is a new kind of existence reared up upon the ground of that act; that, further, there was no provision made in the old *substratum* of unconscious Being for the evolution of this new act; but that, like the fall of man (with which perhaps it is in some way connected), it is an absolutely free and underived deed, self-originated, and entirely exempt from the law of causality; and, moreover, in its very essence, the antagonist of that law. This we shall endeavour to make out in the following chapters; and if we can succeed in showing this act to be primary original and free, of course it will follow that the Being which results from it must be free likewise. But, whether we succeed or not, we at any rate think that, having shown fully that the thought "I" precedes and brings along with it the reality or existence "I," and

that this thought "I" is an act, we have now said enough to establish this important truth in psychology, that man, when philosophising concerning himself, does not do well to commence with the contemplation, or with any consideration of himself *as a Being* (we say this with an especial eye to the substance and doctrine of "Mind"), for his proper Being is but a secondary articulation in his actual development, and therefore ought to form but a secondary step in his scientific study of himself, and ought to hold but a subordinate place in his regard. But he ought to commence with the contemplation of himself *as an act* (the act of consciousness), for this is, in reality, his true and radical beginning; and, therefore, in speculation he ought to follow the same order; and, copying the living truth of things in his methodical exposition of himself, should take this act as the primary commencement or starting-point of his philosophical researches. Such, in our opinion, is the only true method of psychological science.

CHAPTER II.

MAN'S existence for others, his unconscious existence, is immediately *given;* his existence for himself, his conscious personal existence, the reality *ego,* is not immediately given, but is realised through an act. Thus a radical distinction between these two sorts of existence is established, the one being found to precede, and the other to follow that act. The Necessitarian, however, takes no note of this distinction. He breaks down the line of demarcation between them. He runs the two species of existence into one; and the Libertarian, usually acquiescing in this want of discrimination, places in his adversary's hand the only weapon with which he might successfully have combated him. Disagreeing widely in their conclusions, they yet agree so far in their premises, that both of them postulate, in an unqualified manner, man's existence, as a *substratum* for his actions. On this account, therefore, it must be confessed that the victory, in point of logic, has always been on the side of the Necessitarian, however much common sense and moral principle may have rebelled

against his conclusions. For a given or compulsatory existence can never be free in any of its acts. It can merely serve to *conduct* the activity transmitted to it from other quarters; and the peculiar inflections, whatever these may be, whether to evil or to good, which it may appear to give to that activity, cannot be owing to any original or underived power it possesses, but must depend upon its natural construction, just as a prism has no power in itself to refract this way or that the rays of light which pass through it, but is determined to this refraction by the particular angles into which, without being consulted, it was at first cut by the hand of its artificer. In point of fact, the activity of such a being is no activity at all, but pure passivity; for a derivative act is not properly *action*, but *passion*. In merely receiving and passing on an act, a creature is not an agent, but a patient. Such a creature, bringing nothing original into the field, cannot, in any sense, be said either to operate or co-operate. All its doings being derivative, are done for it or necessitated; therefore it is free in nothing, and, by the same consequence, must remain devoid of morality and responsibility.

The usual reasoning on this subject, therefore, being utterly fatal to the cause of Human Liberty, we have endeavoured, in the foregoing chapter, to lay the groundwork of a new line of argument; the only argument by which, in our opinion, the conclusions of the Necessitarian can be met and disproved.

In clearing away the weeds by which the premises of the question were overgrown, and in bringing them under our close and immediate inspection, we found that these premises, when viewed and tested *as facts* (as all premises ought to be, if we would ascertain their exact truth and value), are directly the reverse of those usually laid down, and allowed to pass current. We found, in a word, that an act is the *substratum* of man's proper existence, and not *vice versâ*.

But this draws the controversy respecting Liberty and Necessity to its extremest or narrowest point. For it may here be asked, and indeed must be asked, Whence comes this act? We have divided man's existence into two distinct species, one of which—that, namely, which we may now call his natural existence—was found to be given and to precede the act of consciousness. Now, does not this act naturally spring out of that existence? Is it not dependent upon it? Is it not a mere development from a seed sown in man's natural being; and does it not unfold itself, after a time, like any other natural germ or faculty of humanity? We answer, No. It comes into operation after a very different fashion. It is an act of pure will; for precisely between the two species of existence we have indicated, Human Will comes into play, and has its proper place of abode; and this new phenomenon, lying in the very roots of the act of Consciousness, dislocates the whole natural machinery of man, gives a new and underived

turn to his development, and completely overthrows, with regard to him, the whole law and doctrine of causality; for Will (as contradistinguished from, and opposed to, wish or desire) is either a word of no meaning and intelligibility at all, or else it betokens a primary absolute commencement, an underivative act. But as the Necessitarian may admit the former of these alternatives, and may hold Will, when applied to man, to be an unmeaning word, it will be proper to postpone any discussion on that subject at present; and, without involving ourselves in what, after all, might be a mere skirmish of words, to do our best to go more simply and clearly to work, by addressing ourselves as much as possible to facts, or the realities of things.

But lest it should be urged that man, although perhaps really free, is yet incompetent to form a true and adequate conception of Liberty, and that, therefore, his freedom must, in any event, be for him as though it were not; lest this should be urged, we deem it incumbent upon us, before proceeding to establish Human Freedom as fact, to endeavour to delineate a faithful and correct representation of it; in short, to place before our readers such a conception as *would be* Liberty if it were actualised or realised in fact. Before showing that Liberty is *actual*, we must show on what grounds it is *possible*.

The ordinary conception of liberty, as a capacity bestowed upon a given or created being, of choosing and following any one of two or more courses of action,

is no conception at all, but is an inconceivability. It is, in truth, so worthless and shallow as hardly to be worthy of mention. On account, however, of the place which it holds in ordinary philosophical discourse, we must contribute a few words to its exposure. It arises out of a miserable attempt to effect a compromise between liberty and necessity; and the result is a direct and glaring contradiction. This doctrine endeavours to hold forth an act, as at once original and yet derived, as given and yet not compulsatory or necessitated, as free and yet caused. No wonder that human liberty, embodied in an act of this kind, should halt upon both feet, and harbour in the dingiest lurking-places of a perplexed and vacillating metaphysic, a thing not to be scrutinised too narrowly.

But since we are examining it, let us do so as closely and narrowly as possible. What, then, does this conception of liberty amount to, and what does it set forth? There is, in the first place, the being in question—man—a derivative creature, we are told, from the alpha to the omega of his existence. In the next place, there is the power with which he is said to be invested, of choosing between two or more lines of conduct. In virtue of this power, he is at first indifferent, or equally open to all these courses. He must follow one of them, but is not constrained to follow any one of them in particular, and precisely in this indetermination it is said that human liberty consists. In the third place, when the choice

is made, there is the practical following out of the course fixed upon. Such are the three elements usually noted in the process. But, allowing the dust occasioned by this language to subside, let us see whether nothing has escaped us in the confusion. We observe, then, that the power of choice said to be given is, at first, undetermined; that, indeed, it is on this openness or want of determination that the essence of the liberty here described is placed. But while this indetermination continues, the power of choice of course remains inoperative. Before any of the courses laid down can be followed, this power must be determined to the particular course fixed on; that is to say, an act of determination (the choice itself) must intervene between the undetermined *power* of choice, and the course chosen. Here, then, we have a new element, an element seldom specifically or rigidly noted in the usual analysis of the process. The statement now stands thus: 1st, The given being; 2d, The undetermined power to choose, the power as yet open to several courses of conduct; 3d, The act of determinate choice, the power now adstricted to one course; 4th, The actual performance itself. Now the third element of this statement, the one usually passed over without notice, is the only step which we would raise any question about. We ask, What adstricted the power to the course selected? Whence comes this act of determination? Is it, too, given, or is it not? If it is, then what becomes of human freedom? The act

of determination being given or derivative, the being in question was of course determined to the conduct adopted, not by an original act, but was determined thereto out of the source from whence his act of determination proceeded. It was therefore absurd to talk, as we at first did, of several courses having been open to him. In truth, his act of determination being derived, or compulsatory, no course was ever open to him except the one which he followed, and was necessitated to follow in obedience to that act. On the other hand, is this act of determination not given or enforced? Then here has a new and underived act started into light, one which plays an important part, and forms an essential ingredient in his composition; and what now becomes of the assumption upon which this modified conception of liberty proceeded, namely, that man is *throughout* a derivative creature? The conclusion is, that human liberty is impossible and inconceivable if we start with the assumption that man is, in everything, a given or derivative being; just as, on the other hand, the conception that man is altogether a derivative being is impossible if we start with the assumption that he is free.

But our present object is to realise, if possible, a correct notion of human liberty. Nothing, then, we remark, can be more ineffectual than the attempt to conceive liberty as a power of choice, resting in a state of indetermination to two or more actions; because this state would continue for ever, and nothing

would be the result, unless an act of determination took place in favour of some one of these actions; so that, between the undetermined power and the action itself, an act of determination always intervenes; and therefore the question comes to be, not, Whence comes man's undetermined power of choosing? but, Whence comes his act of particular choice or determination? Is it derivative? can it be traced out of him up into some foreign source? Then of course his liberty vanishes. Is it not derivative? Then his liberty stands good, but is no longer found to consist in a state of indetermination to several courses of action. It must be conceived of as an underived or absolutely self-grounded act of determination in favour of one.

Thus, then, the conception of liberty is reduced to some degree of distinctness and tangibility. If there be such a thing as human liberty it must be identical with an absolutely original or underived act; and the conception of the one of these must be the same as the conception of the other of them. But it is still our business to show in what way the conception of such an act is possible.

It is palpably impossible to conceive liberty, or an underived act, as arising out of man's natural or given existence. According to our very conception of this species of existence, all the activity put forth out of it is of a derivative or transmitted character. As we have already said, such kind of activity is not activity at all, but passivity. Not being originated

absolutely by the creature who *apparently* exerts it, every particle of it falls to be refunded back out of this creature into the source from whence it *really* comes; and this clearly leaves the being in question a mere passive creature throughout, and, at any rate, incapable of putting forth a primary and underived act.

But though it is impossible for us to conceive an underived act put forth *out* of man's natural existence, there is yet nothing to prevent us from conceiving an act of this kind put forth *against* man's natural or given existence. If we consider it well, we shall be satisfied that it is only on this ground that the conception of an underived act is possible; and, moreover, we shall see that, on this ground, the conception of such an act is inevitable.

For if we suppose an act of antagonism to take place against the whole of man's given existence, against all that man is born, it is impossible that this act itself can be given or derivative; for the supposition is, that this act is opposed to *all* the given or derivative in man, and is nothing, except in so far as it is thus opposed. If, therefore, it were itself derivative, being no longer *the opposite* of the derivative, it would be a nonentity; or it would be a suicidal act exterminating itself. Therefore, if we are to form a conception at all of such an antagonist act, we *must* conceive it as absolutely primary and underived; and, on the other hand, if we would frame a true conception of human liberty, or an

underived act, we can only conceive it as the antagonist act we have been describing; we *must* conceive it is an act opposing or resisting everything in man which is given, passive, natural, or born.

Thus, then, we have now shown in what way a correct conception of human liberty is to be framed; or, in other words, we have pointed out the grounds upon which man's freedom is possible. It is possible, because the particular act described as identical and convertible with it, namely, an act of determinate antagonism against the natural or unconscious man, can, at any rate, be conceived. But admitting that it may be conceived, we must now ask, Is it also practised? Is Human Liberty actual as well as possible? Besides finding its realisation in thought, does it also find its realisation in fact?

CHAPTER III.

For an answer to this question we must refer ourselves to observation and experience. But observation and experience have already decided the point. Consciousness itself is the actualisation of the conception we have been describing. Lying *between* the two species of human existence discriminated at the commencement of this paper, consciousness is an act of antagonism against the one of them, and has the other of them for its result. A glance at the very surface of man showed it to be a matter of general notoriety, that sensation and the consciousness of sensation, passion and the consciousness of passion, never coexist in an equal degree of intensity. We found the great law connected with them to be this; not that they grew with each other's growth and strengthened with each other's strength, but, on the contrary, that each of them gained just in proportion as the other lost. Wherever a passion was observed to be carried to its greatest excess, a total absence or cessation of consciousness was noticed to be the result, and the man lost his personality. When

consciousness began to reassert itself, and to regain its place, the passion, in its turn, began to give way, and, becoming diminished or suspended, the man recovered his personality. The same was observed to be the case with regard to sensation. A sensation is notoriously *most* absorbing when the *least* consciousness of it has place; and, therefore, is not the conclusion legitimate that it would be still more effective, that it would be *all*-absorbing, provided *no* consciousness of it interfered to dissolve the charm? And does not all this prove that consciousness is an act of antagonism against the modifications of man's natural being, and that, indeed, it has no office, character, or conceivability at all, unless of this antagonist and negative description?

But this act has, as it were, two sides, and although single, it fulfils a double office. We have still to show, more clearly than we have yet done, how this act, breaking up the great natural unities of sensation and of passion, at once *displaces* the various modifications of man's given existence, and, by a necessary consequence, *places* the being which was not given, namely, the "I" of humanity, the true and proper being of every man "who cometh into the world." This discussion will lead us into more minute and practical details than any we have yet encountered.

The earliest modifications of man's natural being are termed "sensations." These sensations are, like all the other changes of man's given existence, purely passive in their character. They are states of suffer-

ing, whether the suffering be of pleasure or of pain, or of an indifferent cast. There is obviously nothing original or active connected with them. There is nothing in them except their own given contents, and these are entirely derivative. In the smell of a rose, for instance, there is nothing present except the smell of a rose. In a word, let us turn and twist, increase or diminish any sensation as we please, we can twist and turn it into nothing except the particular sensation which it is.

Let us suppose, then, a particular sensation to be impressed upon any of man's organs of sense; let us suppose it propagated forward along the nerves; let us trace it forth unto the brain; let us admit Hartley's or any other philosopher's "vibrations," "elastic medium," or "animal spirits," *to be facts;* and finally, let us suppose it, through the intervention of the one or other of these, landed and safely lodged in what metaphysicians are pleased to term the "mind;" still we maintain that, in spite of this circuitous operation, the man would remain utterly unconscious, and would not, in consequence of it, have any existence as "I" (the only kind of existence which properly concerns him), nor would the external object have any existence *as an object* for him. He would not *perceive* it, although *sentient* of it; the reason of which is, that perception implies an "I" and a "not I," a subject and object; and a subject and object involve a duality; and a duality presupposes an act of discrimination. But no act of dis-

crimination, no act of any kind, is involved in sensation; therefore man might continue to undergo sensations until doomsday without ever becoming "I," and without ever perceiving an external[1] universe.

How then *does* man become "I"? how *does* he become percipient of an external universe? We answer, Not through sensation, but by and through an act of discrimination, or virtual negation. This negation is not, and need not be, expressed in words. It is a silent but deep deed, making each man an individual person; and it is enough if the reality of it be present, even although the expression and distinct conception of it should be absent. But if the reality were actually absent, then there would be a difference indeed. If "no," in thought and in deed, were taken out of the world, man would never become "I," and, for him, the external universe would remain a nonentity. Sensation, passion, &c., would continue as strong and violent as ever, but consciousness would depart; man and nature, "I" and "not I,"

[1] The statement that we become acquainted with the existence of an external world through, and in consequence of, our sensations, besides its falsehood, embodies perhaps the boldest *petitio principii* upon record. How are we assured of the reality of an external world? asks the philosophy of scepticism. Through the senses, answers the philosophy of faith. But are not the senses themselves *a part* of the external universe? and is not this answer, therefore, equivalent to saying that we become assured of the reality of the external universe through the external universe? or, in other words, is not this solution of the question a direct taking-for-granted of the very matter in dispute? It may be frivolous to raise such a question, but it is certainly far more frivolous to resolve it in this manner, the manner usually practised by our Scottish philosophers.

subject and object, lapsing into one, and everything merging in a great unity, would be as though they were not. Indeed, the consequences of the disappearance of this small and apparently insignificant element are altogether incalculable.

An illustrative view will help to render our meaning more distinct, and our statement more convincing. Let us suppose man to be visited by particular sensations of sight, of smell, of touch; and let us suppose these induced by the presence of a rose. Now, it is evident that in this process the rose contributes nothing except the particular sensations mentioned. It does not contribute the element of negation. Yet without the element of negation the rose could never be an object to the man (and unless it were an object to him, he of course would never perceive it); neither without this element could the man ever become "I." For let us suppose this element to be absolutely withdrawn, to have no place in the process, then "I" and the rose, the subject and object, being undiscriminated, a virtual identification of them would prevail. But an identification of the subject and object, of the Being knowing and the Being known, would render perception, consciousness, knowledge inconceivable; for these depend upon a setting asunder of subject and object, of "I" and "not I." But a setting asunder of subject and object depends upon a discrimination laid down between them. But a discrimination laid down between them implies the presence of the element of

negation; that is to say, knowledge, consciousness, perception, depend upon the restoration of the element we supposed withdrawn, and are inconceivable and impossible without it. It is therefore evident that if man, in sensation, were virtually identified with the object, were the same as it, he would never perceive it; it would never be an object to him, and just as little would he be "I." But the only way in which this virtual identification is to be avoided is by and through an implied discrimination. Then only do the "I" and "not I" emerge, and become the "I" and the "not I." But an implied discrimination involves an act of negation, either implicitly or explicitly. Therefore an act of negation, actual or virtual, is the fundamental act of humanity, is the condition upon which consciousness and knowledge depend, is the act which makes the universe an object to us, is the ground and the placer of the "I" and the "not I."

Do metaphysicians still desire information with respect to the "nature of the connection," the "mode of communication," which subsists between matter and what they term "mind"? or do they continue to regard this question as altogether insoluble? About "mind" we profess to know nothing. But if they will discard this hypothetical substance, and consent to put up with the simple word and reality "I" instead of it, we think we can throw some light on what takes place between matter and "me," and that the foregoing observations have already done so.

The point at which all preceding philosophers have confessed the hiatus to be insurmountable, the hitch to be inscrutably perplexing, was not the point at which the impression was communicated to the organ of sense, was not the point where the organ communicated the impression to the nerves, was not the point where the nerves transmitted it to the brain, but was the point where the brain, or ultimate corporeal tissue, conveyed it to the "mind." Here lay the gap which no philosophy ever yet intelligibly cleared; here brooded the mist which no breath of science ever yet succeeded in dispersing. But, repudiating the hypothesis of "mind," let us use the word, and attend to the reality "I," and we shall see how the vapours will vanish, how the prospect will brighten, and how the hiatus will be spanned by the bridge of a comprehensible fact. In the first place, in order to render this fact the more palpable, let us suppose, what is not the case, that the "I" is immediately given, comes into the world ready-made, and that a sensation, after being duly impressed upon its appropriate organ of sense, and carried along the nerves into the brain, is thence conveyed into this "I." But we have just seen that, along with this transmission of sensation, there is no negation conveyed to this "I." There is nothing transmitted to it except the sensation. But we have also just seen that without a negation, virtually present at least, there could be no "I" in the case. This supposed "I," therefore, could not be a true and real "I." Its

ground is yet wanting. In point of fact it may be considered to lapse into "mind," and to be as worthless and unphilosophical as that spurious substance which we have been labouring to get rid of. Throwing this "I," therefore, aside, let us turn back, and supposing, what *is* the case, that the "I" is *not* immediately given, let us follow forth the progress of a sensation once more. A particular impression is made upon an organ of sense in man, and what is the result? Sensation. Carry it on into the nerves, into the brain, what is the result? Mere sensation. Is there no consciousness? As yet there is none. But have we traced the sensation through its whole course? No: if we follow it onwards we find that somewhere or other it encounters an act of negation, a "no" gets implicated in the process, and then, and then only, does consciousness arise, then only does man start into being as "I," then only do subject and object stand asunder. We have already proved, we trust with sufficient distinctness, that this act *must* be present, either actually or virtually, before man can be "I," and before the external universe can be an object to him, that is, before he can perceive it, and therefore we need not say anything more upon this point. But does "the philosopher of mind" now ask us to redeem our pledge, and to inform him distinctly what it is that takes place between "matter" and "me" (matter presenting itself, as it always does, in the shape of a sensation)? then we beg to inform him that *all that takes place* between them is

an act of negation, in virtue of which they are what they are; and that this act constitutes that link (or rather *unlink*) between body and mind, if we must call the "I" by that name, which many philosophers have sought for, and which many more have declined the search of out of despair of ever finding it.

We must here guard our readers against a delusive view of this subject which may be easily taken up. It may still, perhaps, be conceived that "mind," or the "I," is immediately given, is sent into the world, as we have said, *ready-made*, and that it puts forth this act of negation out of the resources of its natural being. Such a doctrine borrows its support, as we have already hinted, from what are called "the laws of human thoughts," but is utterly discountenanced by facts; that is to say, by the sources themselves from whence these laws are professedly, although, as it appears, incorrectly deduced. This doctrine directly reverses the truth of facts and the real order of things. It furnishes us with a notable instance of that species of misconception and logical transposition technically called a *husteron-proteron;*[1] in vulgar language, it places the cart before the horse. For, as we have all along seen, the being "I" arises out of this act of negation, and therefore this act of negation cannot arise out of the being "I." All the evidence we can collect on the subject, every ray of light that falls upon it, proves and reveals it to be a fact, that the act of negation precedes the being "I," is the

[1] ὕστερον πρότερον—a last-first.

very condition or constituent ground upon which it rests, and therefore the being "I" cannot possibly precede or be given anterior to this act of negation. We may say, if we please, that this act of negation is the *act "I,"* but not that it arises out of the being "I," because the whole testimony of facts discountenances such a conclusion, and goes to establish the very reverse. The perfect truth is, that man *acts I* before he *is I*, that is to say, he acts before he truly is; his act precedes and realises his being—a direct reversal of the ordinary doctrine, but a most important one, as far as the establishment of human liberty is concerned; because, in making man's existence to depend upon his act, and in showing his act to be absolutely original and underived, an act of antagonism against the derivative modifications of his given nature, we encircle him with an atmosphere of liberty, and invest him with a moral character and the dread attribute of responsibility, which of course would disappear if man, at every step, moved in the preordained footprints of fate, and were not, in some respect or other, unconditionally free. And move in these footprints he must, the bondsman of necessity in all things, if it be true that his real and proper substantive existence precedes and gives rise to his acts.

If this act of negation never took place, the sphere of sensation would be enlarged. The sensation would reign absorbing, undisputed, and supreme; or, in other words, man would, in every case, be

monopolised by the passive state into which he had been cast. The whole of his being would be usurped by the passive modification into which circumstances had moulded it. But the act of negation or consciousness puts an end to this monopoly. Its presence displaces the sensation to a certain extent, however small that extent may be. An antagonism is now commenced against passion (for all sensation is passion), and who can say where this antagonism is to stop? (We shall show, in its proper place, that all morality centres in this antagonism.) The great unity of sensation, that is, the state which prevailed anterior to the dualisation of subject and object, is broken up, and man's sensations and other passive states of existence never again possess the entireness of their first unalloyed condition, that entireness which they possessed in his infantine years, that wholeness and singleness which was theirs before the act of negation broke the universe asunder into the world of man and the world of nature.

This, then, proves that consciousness, or the act of negation, is not the harmonious accompaniment and dependent, but is the antagonist and the violator of sensation. Let us endeavour once more to show that this act, from its very character, must be underived and free. The proof is as follows. Sensation is a given or derivative state. It has, therefore, from the first a particular positive character. But this act is nothing in itself; it has no positive character; it is merely the opposite, the entire opposite of sensation.

But if it were given and derived as well as sensation, it would *not* be the entire opposite of sensation. It would agree with sensation in this, that both of them would be given. But it agrees with the sensation in nothing. It is thoroughly opposed to it. It is pure action, while the sensation is pure passion. The sensation is passive, and is opposed to consciousness *because* it is derivative. Consciousness is action, and is opposed to sensation *because* it is not derivative. If consciousness were a given state it would not be action at all; it would be nothing but passion. It would be merely one passion contending with another passion. But it is impossible to conceive any passion or given state of Being without some positive character besides its antagonist character. But this act of negation has no positive character, has no character at all except of this antagonist description. Besides, it is opposed to *every* passion. If consciousness coexist with *any* passion, we have seen that it displaces it to a certain degree. Therefore, if consciousness were itself a passive or derivative state it would be suicidal, it would *prevent itself* from coming into manifestation. But passing by this *reductio ad absurdum*, we maintain that consciousness meets the given, the derivative in man, at every point, that it only manifests itself by doing so; and therefore we must conclude that it is not itself derivative, but is an absolutely original act; or, in other words, an act of perfect freedom.

Let us here note, in a very few words, the conclusions we have got to. At our first step we noticed

the given, the natural, the unconscious man, a passive creature throughout all the modifications of his Being. At our second step we observed an act of antagonism or freedom taking place against sensation, and the other passive conditions of his nature, as we have yet more fully to see: and at our third step we found that man in virtue of this antagonism had become "I." These three great moments of humanity may be thus expressed. 1st, The natural or given man is man in passion, in enslaved Being. 2d, The conscious man, the man working into freedom against passion, is man in action. 3d, The "I" is man in free, that is, in real personal Being.

CHAPTER IV.

ARE we then to hold that man does not become "I" *by compulsion*, that he is not constrained to become "I"? We must hold this doctrine. No man is forced or necessitated to become "I." All the necessitated part of his Being leans the other way, and tends to prevent him from becoming "I." He becomes "I" by fighting against the necessitated part of his nature. "I" embraces and expresses the sum and substance of his freedom, of his resistance. He becomes "I" with his own consent, through the concurrence and operation of his own will.

We have as yet said little about Human Will, because "Will" is but a word; and we have all along been anxious to avoid that very common, though most fatal, error in philosophy—the error, namely, of supposing that words can ever do the business of thoughts, or can, of themselves, put us in possession of the realities which they denote. If, in philosophy, we commence with the word "Will," or with any other word denoting what is called "a faculty" of man, and keep harping on the same,

without having first of all come round the reality *without* the assistance of the word, if we seek to educe the reality out of the word, the chances are a thousand to one that we shall end where we began, and never get beyond the region of mere words. It makes a mighty difference in all kinds of composition, whether the reality suggests the word, or whether the word suggests the reality. The former kind of suggestion alone possesses any value; it alone gives truth and life both to philosophy and to poetry. The latter kind is worthless altogether, either in philosopher or poet; and the probability is, that the reality which the word suggests to him, is not the true reality at all.[1]

[1] Some curious considerations present themselves in connection with this subject. Human compositions may be divided into two great classes. In the first, the commencement is made from feelings, ideas, or realities. These beget and clothe themselves in words. These precede the words. The workers in this order are, in poetry, the true poets. But the words having been employed and established, it is found that these of themselves give birth to feelings and ideas which may be extracted out of them without recourse being had to any other source. Hence a second class of composers arises, in whom words precede ideas—a class who, instead of construing ideas into words, construe words into ideas, and these again into other words. This class commences with words, making these feel and think for them. Of this class are the poetasters, the authors of odes to "Imagination," "Hope," &c., which are merely written because such words as "hope," "imagination," &c., have been established. These are the employers of the hereditary language of poetry. In philosophy the case is precisely the same. An Aristotle, a Leibnitz, or a Kant, having come by certain realities of humanity, through an original exertion, and not through the instrumentality of words, makes use of a certain kind of phraseology to denote these realities. An inferior generation of philosophers, finding this phraseology made to their

Without employing the word "will," then, let us look forth into the realities of man, and perhaps we shall fall in with the reality of it when we are never thinking of the word, or troubling ourselves about it; perhaps we shall encounter the phenomenon itself, when the expression of it is the last thing in our thoughts; perhaps we shall find it to be something very different from what we suspected; perhaps we shall find that it exists in deeper regions, presides over a wider sphere, and comes into earlier play than we had any notion of.

The law of causality is the great law of nature. Now, what do we precisely understand by the law of causality? We understand by it the keeping up of an uninterrupted dependency throughout the various links of creation; or the fact that one Being assumes, without resistance or challenge, the state, modification, or whatever we may choose to call it, imposed upon it by another Being. Hence the law of causality is emphatically the law of virtual surrender or assent.

hand, adopt it; and, without looking for the realities themselves independently of the words, they endeavour to lay hold of the realities solely through the words; they seek to extract the realities out of the words, and, consequently, their labours are in a different subject-matter, as dead and worthless as those of the poetaster. Both classes of imitators work in an inverted order. They seek the living among the dead: that is, they seek it where it never can be found. Let us ask whether one inevitable result, one disadvantage of the possession of a highly cultivated language, is not this: that, being fraught with numberless associations, it enables poetasters and false philosophers to abound, inasmuch as it enables them to make *words* stand in place of *things* and do the business of thoughts?

Now the natural man, man as he is born, is clearly placed entirely under the dominion of this law. He is, as we have often said, a mere passive creature throughout. He dons the sensations and the passions that come to him, and bends before them like a sapling in the wind. But it is by no means so obvious that the conscious man, the man become "I," is also placed under jurisdiction of this law.

The "I" stands in a direct antithesis to the natural man; it is realised through consciousness, an act of antagonism against his passive modifications. Are we then to suppose that this "I" stands completely under the law of causality, or of virtual surrender, that the man entirely assents, and offers no resistance to the passive states into which he may be cast? then, in this case, no act of antagonism taking place, consciousness, of course, disappears, and the "I" becomes extinct. If, therefore, consciousness and the "I" become extinct beneath the law of causality, their appearance and realisation cannot depend upon that law, but must be brought about by a direct violation of the law of causality. If the "I" disappears in consequence of the law of causality, it must manifest itself (if it manifests itself at all) in spite of that law. If the law of virtual assent is its death, nothing but the law of actual dissent (the opposite of causality) can give it life.

Here, then, in the realisation of the "I," we find a counter-law established to the law of causality. The law of causality is the law of assent, and upon this

law man's natural being and all its modifications depend. But the life of the "I" depends upon the law of dissent, of resistance to all his natural or derivative states. And if the one of these laws, the law of assent, is known by the name of causality, the other of them, the law of dissent, which, in man, clashes with the law of causality at every point, is, or ought to be, known by the designation of will; and this will, this law of dissent, which embodies itself in an act of antagonism against the states which depend upon the law of causality, and which may therefore be called the law of freedom, as the other is the law of bondage, is the ground-law of humanity, and lies at the bottom of the whole operation of consciousness, at the roots of the existence of the "I." Much more might be said concerning these two great laws, which may be best studied and understood in their opposition or conflict with one another.

But we have dug sufficiently deep *downwards.* It is now time that we should begin to dig *upwards,* and escape out of these mines of humanity, in which we have been working hard, although, we know, with most imperfect hands. We have trod, we trust with no unhallowed step, but with a foot venturous after truth, on the confines of those dread abysses which, in all ages, have shaken beneath the feet of the greatest thinkers among men. We have seen and handled the dark ore of humanity in its pure and elemental state. It will be a comparatively

easy task to trace it forth in its general currency through the ranks of ordinary superficial life. In our next and concluding discussion, we will endeavour to point out the consequences of the act of consciousness; and we trust that the navigation through which we shall then have to steer will be less intricate and perplexing than that through which our present course has lain.

PART VI.

CHAPTER I.

PHILOSOPHY has long ceased to be considered a valid and practical discipline of life. And why? Simply because she commences by assuming that man, like other natural things, is a passive creature, ready-made to her hand; and thus she catches from her object the same inertness which she attributes to him. But why does philosophy found on the assumption that man is a being who comes before her ready shaped, hewn out of the quarries of nature, fashioned into form, and with all his lineaments made distinct, by other hands than his own? She does so in imitation of the physical sciences; and thus the inert and lifeless character of modern philosophy is ultimately attributable to her having degenerated into the status of a physical science.

But is there no method by which vigour may yet be propelled into the moribund limbs of philosophy;

and by which, from being a dead system of theory, she may be renovated into a living discipline of practice? There is, if we will but reflect and understand that the course of procedure proper to the physical sciences—namely, the assumption that their objects and the facts appertaining to these objects lie before them *ready-made* — is utterly inadmissible in true philosophy, is totally at variance with the scope and spirit of a science which professes to deal *fairly* with the phenomena of Man. Let us endeavour to point out and illustrate the deep-seated contradistinction between philosophical and physical science, for the purpose, more particularly, of getting light thrown upon the moral character of our species.

When an inquirer is engaged in the scientific study of any natural object, let us say, for instance, of water and its phenomena, his contemplation of this object does not add any new phenomenon to the facts and qualities already belonging to it. These phenomena remain the same, without addition or diminution, whether he studies them or not. Water flows downwards, rushes into a vacuum under the atmospheric pressure, and evolves all its other phenomena, whether man be attending to them or not. His looking on makes no difference as far as the nature of the water is concerned. In short, the number and character of its facts continue altogether uninfluenced by his study of them. His science merely enables him to classify them, and to bring them more clearly and steadily before him.

But when man is occupied in the study of the phenomena of his own natural being, or, in other words, is philosophising, the case is very materially altered. Here his contemplation of these phenomena *does* add a new phenomenon to the list already under his inspection: it adds, namely, the new and anomalous phenomenon that he *is* contemplating these phenomena. To the old phenomena presented to him in his given or ready-made being, for instance, his sensations, passions, rational and other states, which he is regarding, there is added the supervision of these states; and this is itself a new phenomenon belonging to him. The very fact that man contemplates or makes a study of the facts of his being, is itself a fact which must be taken into account; for it is one of his phenomena just as much as any other fact connected with him is. In carrying forth the physical sciences, man very properly takes no note of his contemplation of their objects; because this contemplation does not add, as we have said, any new fact to the complement of phenomena connected with these objects. Therefore, in sinking this fact, he does not suppress any fact to which they can lay claim. But in philosophising, that is, in constructing a science of himself, man cannot suppress this fact without obliterating one of his own phenomena; because man's contemplation of his own phenomena is itself a new and separate phenomenon added to the given phenomena which he is contemplating.

Here, then, we have a most radical distinction laid

down between physics and philosophy. In ourselves, as well as in nature, a certain given series of phenomena is presented to our observation, but in studying the objects of nature, we add no new phenomenon to the phenomena already there; whereas, on the contrary, in studying ourselves we *do add* a new phenomenon to the other phenomena of our being; we add, to wit, the fact that we are thus studying ourselves. Be this new phenomenon important or unimportant, it is, at any rate, evident that in it is violated the analogy between physics and philosophy, between the study of man and the study of nature. For what can be a greater or more vital distinction between two sciences or disciplines than this; that while the one contributes nothing to the making of its own facts, but finds them all (to use a very familiar colloquism) *cut and dried* beneath its hand, the other creates, in part at least, its own facts, supplies to a certain extent, and by its own free efforts, as we shall see, the very materials out of which it is constructed?

But the parallel between physics and philosophy, although radically violated by this new fact, is not totally subverted; and our popular philosophy has preferred to follow out the track where the parallel partially holds good. It is obvious that two courses of procedure are open to her choice. Either, following the analogy of the natural sciences, which of themselves add no new fact to their objects, she may attend exclusively to the phenomena which she finds in man, but which she has no hand in contributing;

or else, breaking loose from that analogy, she may direct her attention to the novel and unparalleled phenomenon which she, of herself, has added to her object, and which we have already described. Of these two courses, philosophy has chosen to adopt the former—and what has been the result? Surely all the ready-made phenomena of man have been, by this time, sufficiently explored. Philosophers, undisturbed, have pondered over his passions; unmoved they have watched and weighed his emotions. His affections, his rational states, his sensations, and all the other ingredients and modifications of his natural framework have been rigidly scrutinised and classified by them; and, after all, what have they made of it? what sort of a picture have their researches presented to our observation? Not the picture of a man; but the representation of an automaton, that is what it cannot help being; a phantom dreaming what it cannot but dream; an engine performing what it *must* perform; an incarnate reverie; a weathercock shifting helplessly in the winds of sensibility; a wretched association machine, through which ideas pass linked together by laws over which the machine has no control; anything, in short, except that free and self-sustained centre of underived, and therefore responsible activity, which we call *Man*.

If such, therefore, be the false representation of man which philosophy invariably and inevitably pictures forth whenever she makes common cause with the natural sciences, we have plainly no other course

left than to turn philosophy aside from following their analogy, and to guide her footsteps upon a new line and different method of inquiry. Let us, then, turn away the attention of philosophy from the facts which she does *not* contribute to her object (viz., the ready-made phenomena of man); and let us direct it upon the new fact which she *does* contribute thereto, and let us see whether greater truth and a more practical satisfaction will not now attend her investigations.

The great and only fact which philosophy, of herself, adds to the other phenomena of man, and which nothing but philosophy can add, is, as we have said, the fact that man *does* philosophise. The fact that man philosophises is (so often as it takes place) as much a human phenomenon as the phenomenon, for instance, of passion is, and therefore cannot legitimately be overlooked by an impartial and true philosophy. At the same time, it is plain that philosophy creates and brings along with her this fact of man; in other words, does not find it in him ready made to her hand; because, if man did not philosophise, the fact that he philosophises would, it is evident, have no manner of existence whatsoever. What, then, does this fact which philosophy herself contributes to philosophy and to man, contain, embody, and set forth, and what are the consequences resulting from it?

The act of philosophising is the act of systematically contemplating our own natural or given phe-

nomena. But the act of contemplating our own phenomena *unsystematically*, is no other than our old friend, the act of consciousness; therefore the only distinction between philosophy and consciousness is, that the former is with system, and the latter without it. Thus, in attending to the fact which philosophy brings along with her, we find that consciousness and philosophy become identified; that philosophy is a systematic or studied consciousness, and that consciousness is an unsystematic or unstudied philosophy. But what do we here mean by the words *systematic* and *unsystematic?* These words signify only a greater and a less degree of clearness, expansion, strength, and exaltation. Philosophy possesses these in the higher degree, our ordinary consciousness in the lower degree. Thus philosophy is but a clear, an expanded, a strong, and an exalted consciousness; while, on the other hand, consciousness is an obscurer, a narrower, a weaker, and a less exalted philosophy. Consciousness is philosophy nascent; philosophy is consciousness in full bloom and blow. The difference between them is only one of degree, and not one of kind; and thus all conscious men are to a certain extent philosophers, although they may not know it.

But what comes of this? Whither do these observations tend? With what purport do we point out, thus particularly, the identity in kind between philosophy and the act of consciousness? Reader! if thou hast eyes to see, thou canst not fail to perceive (and

we pray thee mark it well) that it is precisely in this identity of philosophy and consciousness that the merely *theoretical* character of philosophy disappears, while, at this very point, her ever-living character, as a *practical* disciplinarian of life, bursts forth into the strongest light. For consciousness is no dream, no theory; it is no lesson taught in the schools, and confined within their walls; it is not a system remote from the practical pursuits and interests of humanity; but it has its proper place of abode upon the working theatre of living men. It is a real, and often a bitter struggle on the part of each of us against the fatalistic forces of our nature, which are at all times seeking to enslave us. The causality of nature, both without us, and especially within us, strikes deep roots, and works with a deep intent. The whole scheme and intention of nature, as evolved in the causal nexus of creation, tend to *prevent* one and all of us from becoming conscious, or, in other words, from realising our own personality. First come our sensations, and these monopolise the infant man; that is to say, they so fill him that there is no room left for his personality to stand beside them; and if it does attempt to rise, they tend to overbear it, and certainly for a time they succeed. Next come the passions, a train of even more overwhelming sway, and of still more flattering aspect; and now there is even less chance than before of our ever becoming personal beings. The causal, or enslaving powers of nature, are multiplying upon us. These passions, like our sensations, mono-

polise the man, and cannot endure that anything should infringe their dominion. So far from helping to realise our personality, they do everything in their power to keep it aloof or in abeyance, and to lull man into oblivion—*of himself*. So far from coming into life, our personality tends to disappear, and, like water torn and beaten into invisible mist by the force of a whirlwind, it often entirely vanishes beneath the tread of the passions. Then comes reason; and perhaps you imagine that reason elevates us to the rank of personal beings. But looking at reason *in itself*, that is, considering it as a straight, and not as a reflex act,[1] what has reason done, or what can reason do for man (we speak of kind, and not of degree, for man may have a higher degree of it than animals), which she has not also done for beavers and for bees, creatures which, though rational, are yet not personal beings? Without some other power to act as supervisor of reason, this faculty would have worked in man just as it works in animals: that is to say, it would have operated within him merely as a power of adapting means to ends, without lending him any assistance towards the realisation of his own personality. Indeed, being, like our other natural modifications, a state of monopoly of the man, it would, like them, have tended to keep down the establishment of his personal being.

Such are the chief powers that enter into league to enslave us, and to bind us down under the causal

[1] Above, p. 113.

nexus, the moment we are born. By imposing *their* agency upon us, they prevent us from exercising *our own*. By filling us with *them*, they prevent us from becoming *ourselves*. They do all they can to withhold each of us from becoming "I." They throw every obstacle they can in the way of our becoming conscious beings; they strive, by every possible contrivance, to keep down our personality. They would fain have each of us to take all our activity from them, instead of becoming, each man for himself, a new centre of free and independent action.

But, strong as these powers are, and actively as they exert themselves to fulfil their tendencies with respect to man, they do not succeed for ever in rendering human personality a non-existent thing. After a time man proves too strong for them; he rises up against them, and shakes their shackles from his hands and feet. He puts forth (obscurely and unsystematically, no doubt), but still he puts forth a particular kind of act, which thwarts and sets at nought the whole causal domination of nature. Out of the working of this act is evolved man in his character of a free, personal, and moral being. This act is itself man; it is man acting, and man *in act* precedes, as we have seen, man *in being*, that is, in true and proper being. Nature and her powers have now no constraining hold over him; he stands out of her jurisdiction. In this act he has taken himself out of her hands into his own; he has made himself his own master. In this act he has displaced his sensations,

and his sensations no longer monopolise him; they have no longer the complete mastery over him. In this act he has thrust his passions from their place, and his passions have lost their supreme ascendancy. And now what is this particular kind of act? What is it but the act of consciousness, the act of becoming "I," the act of placing *ourselves* in the room which sensation and passion have been made to vacate? This act may be obscure in the extreme, but still it is an act of the most *practical* kind, both in itself and in its results; and this is what we are here particularly desirous of having noted. For what act can be more vitally practical than the act by which we realise our existence as free personal beings? and what act can be attended by a more practical result than the act by which we look our passions in the face, and, in the very act of looking at them, *look them down?*

Now, if consciousness be an act of such mighty and practical efficiency in real life, what must not the practical might and authority of philosophy be? Philosophy is consciousness *sublimed.* If, therefore, the lower and obscurer form of this act can work such real wonders and such great results, what may we not expect from it in its highest and clearest potence? If our unsystematic and undisciplined consciousness be thus practical in its results (and practical to a most momentous extent it is), how much more vitally and effectively practical must not our systematic and tutored consciousness, namely, philosophy, be? Con-

sciousness when enlightened and expanded is identical with philosophy. And what is consciousness enlightened and expanded? It is, as we have already seen, an act of practical antagonism put forth against the modifications of the whole natural man: and what then is philosophy but an act of practical antagonism put forth against the modifications of the whole natural man? But further, what is this act of antagonism, when it, too, is enlightened and explained? What is it but an act of freedom—an act of resistance, by which we free ourselves from the causal bondage of nature—from all the natural laws and conditions under which we were born; and what then is philosophy but an act of the highest, the most essential, and the most practical freedom? But further, what is this act of freedom when it also is cleared up and explained? It turns out to be Human Will; for the refusal to submit to the modifications of the whole natural man must be grounded on a law opposed to the law under which these modifications develop themselves, namely, the causal law, and this opposing law is the law called human will: and what then is philosophy but pure and indomitable will? or, in other words, the most practical of all conceivable acts, inasmuch as will is the absolute source and fountainhead of all real activity. And, finally, let us ask again, what is this act of antagonism against the natural states of humanity? what is this act in which we sacrifice our sensations, passions, and desires, that is, our *false selves,* upon the shrine of our *true selves?*

what is this act in which Freedom and Will are embodied to defeat all the enslaving powers of darkness that are incessantly beleaguering us? what is it but morality of the highest, noblest, and most active kind? and, therefore, what is human philosophy, ultimately, but another name for human virtue of the most practical and exalted character?

Such are the steps by which we vindicate the title of philosophy to the rank of a real and practical discipline of humanity. To sum up: we commenced by noticing, what cannot fail to present itself to the observation of every one, the inert and unreal character of our modern philosophy, metaphysical philosophy as it is called; and we suspected, indeed we felt assured, that this character arose from our adopting, in philosophy, the method of the physical sciences. We, therefore, tore philosophy away from the analogy of physics, and in direct violation of their procedure we made her contemplate a fact which she herself created, and contributed to her object, a fact which she did not *find* there; the fact, namely, that an act of philosophising was taking place. But the consideration of this fact or act brought us to perceive the identity between consciousness and philosophy, and then the perception of this identity led us at once to note the truly practical character of philosophy. For consciousness is an act of the most vitally real and practical character (we have yet to see more fully how it makes us *moral* beings). It is κατ' ἐξοχὴν the great practical act of humanity—the

act by which man becomes man in the first instance, and by the incessant performance of which he preserves his moral status, and prevents himself from falling back into the causal bondage of nature, which is at all times too ready to reclaim him; and, therefore, philosophy, which is but a higher phase of consciousness, is seen to be an act of a still higher practical character. Now, the whole of this vindication of the practical character of philosophy is evidently based upon her abandonment of the physical method, upon her turning away from the *given* facts of man to the contemplation of a fact which is *not* given in his natural being, but which philosophy herself contributes to her own construction and to man, namely, the act itself of philosophising, or, in simple language, the act of consciousness. This fact cannot possibly be given: for we have seen that all the given facts of man's being necessarily tend to suppress it; and therefore (as we have also seen) it is, and must be a free and underived, and not in any conceivable sense a ready-made fact of humanity.

Thus, then, we see that philosophy, when she gets her due—when she deals fairly with man, and when man deals fairly by her—in short, when she is rightly represented and understood, loses her merely theoretical complexion, and becomes identified with all the best practical interests of our living selves. She no longer stands aloof from humanity, but, descending into this world's arena, she takes an active part in the ongoings of busy life. Her dead symbols

burst forth into living realities; the dry rustling twigs of science become clothed with all the verdure of the spring. Her inert tutorage is transformed into an actual life. Her dead lessons grow into man's active wisdom and practical virtue. Her sleeping waters become the bursting fountainhead from whence flows all the activity which sets in motion the currents of human practice and of human progression. Truly, γνῶθι σεαυτὸν was the sublimest, the most comprehensive, and the most practical oracle of ancient wisdom. *Know thyself*, and, in knowing thyself, thou shalt see that this self is not thy *true* self; but, in the very act of knowing this, thou shalt at once displace this false self, and establish thy true self in its room.

CHAPTER II.

PHILOSOPHY, then, has a practical as well as a theoretical side; besides being a system of speculative truth, it is a real and effective discipline of humanity. It is the point of conciliation in which life, knowledge, and virtue meet. In it, fact and duty,[1] or, that which *is*, and that *which ought to be*, are blended into one identity. But the practical character of philosophy, the active part which it plays throughout human concerns, has yet to be more fully and distinctly elucidated.

The great principle which we have all along been

[1] Sir James Mackintosh, and others, have attempted to establish a distinction between "mental" and "moral" science, founded on an alleged difference between fact and duty. They state, that it is the office of the former science to teach us *what is* (quid est), and that it is the office of the latter to teach us *what ought to be* (quid oportet). But this discrimination vanishes into nought upon the slightest reflection; it either incessantly confounds and obliterates itself, or else it renders moral science an unreal and nugatory pursuit. For, let us ask, does the *quid oportet* ever become the *quid est?* does *what ought to be* ever pass into *what is*, or, in other words, is duty ever realised as fact? If it is, then the distinction is at an end. The *oportet* has taken upon itself the character of the *est*. Duty, in becoming practical, has become a fact. It no

labouring to bring out — namely, that human consciousness is, in every instance, an act of antagonism against some one or other of the given modifications of our natural existence—finds its strongest confirmation when we turn to the contemplation of the *moral* character of man. We have hitherto been considering consciousness chiefly in its relation to those modifications of our nature which are impressed upon us *from without.* We here found, that consciousness, when deeply scrutinised, is an act of opposition put forth against our sensations; that our sensations are invaded and impaired by an act of resistance which breaks up their monopolising dominion, and in the room of the sensation thus partially displaced, realises man's personality, a new centre of activity known to each individual by the name "I," a word which, when rightly construed, stands as the exponent of our violation of the causal nexus of nature, and of our consequent emancipation therefrom. The complex antithetical phenomenon in which this opposition

longer merely points out something which *ought to be,* it also embodies something which *is.* And thus it is transformed into the very other member of the discrimination from which it was originally contradistinguished; and thus the distinction is rendered utterly void; while "mental" and "moral" science, if we must affix these epithets to philosophy, lapse into one. On the other hand, does the *quid oportet* never, in any degree, become the *quid est,* does duty never pass into fact? Then is the science of morals a visionary, a baseless, and an aimless science, a mere querulous hankering after what can never be. In this case, there is plainly no real or substantial science, except the science of facts, the science which teaches us the *quid est.* To talk now of a science of the *quid oportet,* would be to make use of unmeaning words.

manifests itself, we found to be the fact of perception. We have now to consider consciousness in its relation to those modifications of our nature which assail us *from within;* and here it will be found, that just as all perception originates in the antagonism between consciousness and our sensations, so all morality originates in the antagonism between consciousness and the passions, desires, or inclinations of the natural man.

We shall see that, precisely as we become *percipient* beings, in consequence of the strife between consciousness and sensation, so do we become *moral* beings in consequence of the same act of consciousness exercised against our passions, and the other imperious wishes or tendencies of our nature. There is no difference in the mode of antagonism, as it operates in these two cases; only, in the one case, it is directed against what we may call our external, and, in the other, against what we may call our internal, modifications. In virtue of the displacement or sacrifice of our sensations by consciousness, each of us becomes "I;" the *ego* is, to a certain extent, evolved; and even here, something of a nascent morality is displayed; for every counteraction of the causality of nature is more or less the development of a free and moral force. In virtue of the sacrifice of our passions by the same act, morality is more fully unfolded; this "I," that is, our personality, is more clearly and powerfully realised, is advanced to a higher potence; is exhibited in a brighter phase and more expanded condition.

Thus we shall follow out a clue which has been too often, if not always, lost hold of in the labyrinths of philosophy, a clue, the loss of which has made inquirers represent man as if he lived in distinct[1] sections, and were an inorganic agglutination of several natures, the percipient, the intellectual, and the moral, with separate principles regulating each. This clue consists in our tracing the principle of our moral agency back into the very principle in virtue of which we become percipient beings; and in showing that in both cases it is the same act which is exerted—an act, namely, of freedom or antagonism against the caused or derivative modifications of our nature. Thus, to use the language of a foreign writer, we shall at least make the attempt to cut our scientific system *out of one piece*, and to marshal the frittered divisions of philosophy into that organic wholeness which belongs to the great original of which they profess, and of which they ought to be the faithful copy; we mean man himself. In particular, we trust that the discovery (if such it may be called) of the principle we have just mentioned, may lead the reflective reader to perceive the inseparable connection between psychology and moral philosophy (we should rather say their essential sameness), together with the futility of all those mistaken attempts which have been often made to break down

[1] "You may understand," says S. T. Coleridge, "by *insect*, life *in sections*." By this he means that each insect has several centres of vitality, and not merely one; or that it has no organic unity, or at least no such decided organic unity as that which man possesses.

their organic unity into the two distinct departments of "intellectual" and "moral" science.

Another consideration connected with this principle is, that instead of being led by it to do what many philosophers, in order to preserve their consistency, have done—instead of being led by it to observe in morality nothing but the features of a higher self-love, and a more refined sensuality, together with the absence of free-will; we are, on the contrary, led by it to note, even in the simplest act of perception, an incipient self-sacrifice, the presence of a dawning will struggling to break forth, and the aspect of an infant morality beginning to develop itself. This consideration we can only indicate thus briefly; for we must now hurry on to our point.

We are aware of the attempts which have been made to invest our emotions with the stamp and attribute of morality; but, in addition to the testimony of our own experience, we have the highest authority for holding that none of the natural feelings or modifications of the human heart partake in any degree of a moral character. We are told by revelation, and the eye of reason recognises the truth of the averment, that love itself, that is, *natural* love, a feeling which certainly must bear the impress of morality if any of our emotions do so—we are told by revelation in emphatic terms that such love has no moral value or significance whatsoever. "If ye love them," says our Saviour, "which love you, what reward have ye? do not even the publicans the

same?" To love those who love us is natural love; and can any words quash and confound the claim of such love to rank as a moral excellence or as a moral development more effectually than these?

"But," continues the same Divine Teacher, "I say unto you, *Love your enemies;*" obviously meaning, that in this kind of love, as contradistinguished from the other, a new and higher element is to be found, the element of morality, and that this kind of love is a state worthy of approbation and reward, which the other is not. Here, then, we find a discrimination laid down between two kinds of love—love of friends and love of enemies; and the hinge upon which this discrimination turns is, that the character of morality is denied to the former of these, while it is acceded to the latter. But now comes the question, *Why* is the one of these kinds of love said to be a moral state or act, and why is the other not admitted to be so? To answer this question we must look into the respective characters and ingredients of these two kinds of love.

Natural love, that is, our love of our friends, is a mere affair of temperament, and in entertaining it, we are just as passive as our bodies are when exposed to the warmth of a cheerful fire. It lies completely under the causal law; and precisely as any other natural effect is produced by its cause, it is generated and entailed upon us by the love which our friends bear towards us. It comes upon us unsought. It costs us nothing. No thanks to us for

entertaining it. It is, in every sense of the word, *a passion;* that is to say, nothing of an *active* character mingles with the modification into which we have been moulded. And hence, in harbouring such love, we make no approach towards rising into the dignity of free and moral beings.

But the character and groundwork of the other species of love—of our love, namely, of our enemies—is widely different from this. Let us ask what is the exact meaning of the precept, "Love your enemies?" Does it mean, love them with a *natural* love, love them *as* you love your friends? Does it mean, make your love spring up towards those that hate you, just in the same way, and by the same natural process as it springs up towards those that love you? If it means this, then we are bold enough to say, that it plainly and palpably inculcates an impracticability; for we are sure that no man *can* love his enemies with the same direct natural love as he loves his friends withal; if he ever does love them, it can only be after he has passed himself through some intermediate act which is not to be found in the natural emotion of love. Besides, in reducing this kind of love to the level of a natural feeling, it would be left as completely stripped of its character of morality as the other species is. But Christianity does not degrade this kind of love to the level of a passion, neither does it in this, or in any other case, inculcate an impracticable act or condition of humanity. What, then,

is the meaning of the precept, Love your enemies? What sort of practice or discipline does this text, in the first instance at least, enforce? What but this? *act against your natural hatred of them*, resist the anger you naturally entertain towards them, quell and subjugate the boiling indignation of your heart. Whatever subsequent progress a man may make, under the assistance of divine grace, towards entertaining a *positive* love of his enemies, this *negative* step must unquestionably take the precedence; and most assuredly such assistance will not be vouchsafed to him, unless he first of all take the initiative by putting forth this act of resistance against that derivative modification of his heart, which, in the shape of hatred, springs up within him under the breath of injury and injustice, just as naturally as noxious reptiles are generated amid the foul air of a charnel-house.

The groundwork, then, of our love of our enemies, the feature which principally characterises it, and the condition which renders it practicable, is an act of resistance exerted against our natural hatred of them; and this it is which gives to that kind of love its moral complexion. Thus, we see that this kind of love, so far from arising out of the cherishing or entertaining of a natural passion, does, on the contrary, owe its being to the sacrifice of one of the strongest passive modifications of our nature; and we will venture to affirm that, without this sacrificial act, the love of our enemies is neither practicable nor

conceivable; and if this act does not embody the whole of such love, it at any rate forms a very important element in its composition. In virtue of the tone and active character given to it by this element, the love of our enemies may be called *moral* love, in contradistinction to the love of our friends, which, on account of its purely passive character, we have called natural love.

And let it not be thought that this act is one of inconsiderable moment. It is, indeed, a mighty act, in the putting forth of which man is in nowise passive. In this act he directly thwarts, mortifies, and sacrifices one of the strongest susceptibilities of his nature. He transacts it in the freedom of an original activity, and, most assuredly, nature lends him no helping hand towards its performance. On the contrary, she endeavours to obstruct it by every means in her power. The voice of human nature cries, "By all means, trample your enemies beneath your feet." "No," says the Gospel of Christ, "rather tread down into the dust that hatred which impels you to crush them."

But now comes another question, What is it that, in this instance, gives a supreme and irreversible sanction to the voice of the Gospel, rendering this resistance of our natural hatred of our enemies *right*, and our non-resistance of that hatred *wrong*?

We have but to admit that freedom, or, in other words, emancipation from the thraldom of a foreign causality, a causality which, ever since the Fall of

Man, must be admitted to unfold itself in each individual's case, in a dark tissue of unqualified evil; we have but to admit that the working out of this freedom is the great end of man, and constitutes his true self; and we have also but to admit that whatever conduces to the accomplishment of this end *is right;* and the question just broached easily resolves itself. For, supposing man not to be originally free, let us ask how is the end of human liberty to be attained? Is it to be attained by passively imbibing the various impressions forced upon us from without? Is it to be attained by yielding ourselves up in pliant obedience to the manifold modifications which stamp their moulds upon us from within? Unquestionably not. All these impressions and modifications constitute the very badges of our slavery. They are the very trophies of the causal conquests of nature planted by her on the ground where the true man ought to have stood, but where he fell. Now, since human freedom, the great end of man, is thus contravened by these passive conditions and susceptibilities of his nature, therefore it is that they are wrong. And, by the same rule, an act of resistance put forth against them is right, inasmuch as an act of this kind contributes, every time it is exerted, to the accomplishment of that great end.

Now, looking to our hatred of our enemies, we see that this is a natural passion which is most strongly forced upon us by the tyranny of the causal law; therefore it tends to obliterate and counteract our

freedom. But our freedom constitutes our true and moral selves; it is the very essence of our proper personality: therefore, to entertain, to yield to this passion, is wrong, is moral death, is the extinction of our freedom, of our moral being, however much it may give life to the natural man. And, by the same consequence, to resist this passion, to act against it, to sacrifice it, is right, is free and moral life, however much this act may give the death-stroke to our natural feelings and desires.

But how shall we, or how do we, or how can we, act against our hatred of our enemies? We answer, simply by becoming conscious of it. By turning upon it a reflective eye (a process by no means agreeable to our natural heart), we force it to faint and fade away before our glance. In this act we turn the tables (so to speak) upon the passion, whatever it may be, that is possessing us. Instead of its possessing us, we now possess it. Instead of our being in its hands, it is now in our hands. Instead of its being our master, we have now become its; and thus is the first step of our moral advancement taken; thus is enacted the first act of that great drama in which demons are transformed into men. In this act of consciousness, founded, as we have elsewhere seen, upon will, and by which man becomes transmuted from a natural into a moral being, we perceive the prelude or dawning of that still higher regeneration which Christianity imparts, and which advances man onwards from the precincts of

morality into the purer and loftier regions of religion. We will venture to affirm that this consciousness, or act of antagonism, is the ground or condition, in virtue of which that still higher dispensation is enabled to take effect upon us, and this we shall endeavour to make out in its proper place. In the meantime to return to our point:—

In the absence of consciousness, the passion (of hatred, for instance) reigns and ranges unalloyed, and goes forth to the fulfilment of its natural issues, unbridled and supreme. But the moment consciousness comes into play against it, the colours of the passion become less vivid, and its sway less despotic. It is to a certain extent dethroned and sacrificed even upon the first appearance of consciousness; and if this antagonist manfully maintain its place, the sceptre of passion is at length completely wrested from her hands: and thus consciousness is a moral act, is the foundation-stone of our moral character and existence.

If the reader should be doubtful of the truth and soundness of this doctrine, namely, that consciousness (whether viewed in its own unsystematic form, or in the systematic shape which it assumes when it becomes philosophy) is an act which of itself tends to put down the passions, these great, if not sole, sources of human wickedness; perhaps he will be willing to embrace it when he finds it enforced by the powerful authority of Dr Chalmers.

"Let there be an attempt," says he, "on the part

of the mind to study the phenomena of anger, and its attention is thereby transferred from the cause of the affection to the affection itself; and, so soon as its thoughts are withdrawn from the cause, the affection, *as if deprived of its needful aliment*, dies away from the field of observation. There might be heat and indignancy enough in the spirit, so long as it broods over the affront by which they have originated. But whenever it proposes, instead of looking outwardly at the injustice, to look inwardly at the consequent irritation, it instantly becomes cool."[1]

We have marked certain of these words in italics, because in them Dr Chalmers appears to account for the disappearance of anger before the eye of consciousness in a way somewhat different from ours. He seems to say that it dies away because "deprived of its needful aliment," whereas we hold that it dies away in consequence of the antagonist act of consciousness which comes against it, displacing and sacrificing it. But, whatever our respective theories may be, and whichever of us may be in the right, we agree in the main point, namely, as to the *fact* that anger *does* vanish away in the presence of consciousness; and therefore this act acquires (whatever theory we may hold respecting it) a moral character and significance, and the exercise of it becomes an imperative duty; for what passion presides over a wider field of human evil and of human wickedness than the passion of human wrath? and, therefore,

[1] 'Moral Philosophy,' pp. 62, 63.

what act can be of greater importance than the act which overthrows and puts an end to its domineering tyranny?

The process by which man becomes metamorphosed from a natural into a moral being, is precisely the same in every other case: it is invariably founded on a sacrifice or mortification of some one or other of his natural desires, a sacrifice which is involved in his very consciousness of them whenever that consciousness is real and clear. We have seen that moral love is based on the sacrifice of natural hatred. In the same way, generosity, if it would embody any morality at all, must be founded on the mortification of avarice or some other selfish passion. Frugality, likewise, to deserve the name of a virtue, must be founded on the sacrifice of our natural passion of extravagance or ostentatious profusion. Temperance, too, if it would claim for itself a moral title, must found on the restraint imposed upon our gross and gluttonous sensualities. In short, before any condition of humanity can be admitted to rank as a moral state, it must be based on the suppression, in whole or in part, of its opposite. And, finally, courage, if it would come before us invested with a moral grandeur, must have its origin in the unremitting and watchful suppression of fear. Let us speak more particularly of Courage and Fear.

What is natural courage? It is a passion or endowment possessed in common by men and by animals. It is a mere quality of temperament. It

urges men and animals into the teeth of danger. But the bravest animals and the bravest men (we mean such as are emboldened by mere natural courage) are still liable to *panic*. The game-cock, when he has once turned tail, cannot be induced to renew the fight; and the hearts of men, inspired by mere animal courage, have at times quailed and sunk within them, and, in the hour of need, this kind of courage has been found to be a treacherous passion.

But what is *moral* courage? What is it but the consciousness of Fear? Here it is that the struggle and the triumph of humanity are to be found. Natural courage faces danger, and perhaps carries itself triumphantly through it, perhaps not. But moral courage faces fear, and in the very act of facing it puts it down: and this is the kind of courage in which we would have men put their trust; for if fear be vanquished, what becomes of danger? It dwindles into the very shadow of a shade. It is a historical fact (to mention which will not be out of place here), that nothing but the intense consciousness of his own natural cowardice made the great Duke of Marlborough the irresistible hero that he was. This morally brave man was always greatly agitated upon going into action, and used to say, "This little body trembles at what this great soul is about to perform." About this great soul we know nothing, and therefore pass it over as a mere figure of speech. But the trembling of "this little body," that is, the cowardice of the natural man, or, in other

words, his want of courage, in so far as courage is a mere affair of nerves, was a fact conspicuous to all. Equally conspicuous and undeniable was the antagonism put forth against this nervous bodily trepidation. And what was this antagonism? What but the struggle between consciousness and cowardice? a struggle by and through which the latter was dragged into light and vanquished; and then the hero went forth into the thickest ranks of danger, strong in the consciousness of his own weakness, and as if *out of very spite* of the natural coward that wished to hold him back, and who rode shaking in his saddle as he drove into the hottest of the fight. Natural courage, depending upon temperament, will quail at times, and prove faithless to its trust; the strongest nerves will often shake, in the hour of danger, like an aspen in the gale; but what conceivable terrors can daunt that fortitude (though merely of a negative character), that indomitable discipline, wherewith a man, by a stern and deliberate consciousness of his own heart's frailty, meets, crushes, and subjugates, at every turn, and in its remotest hold, the entire passion of fear?

Human strength, then, has no positive character of its own; it is nothing but the clear consciousness of human weakness. Neither has human morality any positive character of its own; it is nothing but the clear consciousness of human wickedness. The whole rudiments of morality are laid before us, if we will but admit the fact (for which we have Scripture

warrant) that all the given modifications of humanity are dark and evil, and that consciousness (which is not a given phenomenon, but a free act) is itself, in every instance, an acting against these states. Out of this strife morality is breathed up like a rainbow between the sun and storm. Moreover, by adopting these views, we get rid of the necessity of postulating a moral sense, and of all the other hypothetical subsidies to which an erroneous philosophy has recourse in explaining the phenomena of man. Our limits at present prevent us from illustrating this subject more fully; but in our next number we shall show how closely our views are connected with the approved doctrine of man's natural depravity. In order to penetrate still deeper into the secrets of consciousness, we shall discuss the history of the Fall of Man, and shall show what mighty and essential parts are respectively played by the elements of good and evil in the realisation of human liberty; and we shall conclude our whole discussion by showing how consonant our speculations are with the great scheme of Christian Revelation.

PART VII.

CHAPTER I.

THE argument, in the foregoing part of our discussion (in which we showed that morality is grounded in an antagonism carried on between our nature and our consciousness), is obviously founded on the assumption that man is born in weakness and depravity. We need hardly, nowadays, insist on the natural sinfulness of the human heart, which we are told by our own, and by all recorded experience, as well as by a higher authority than that of man, is desperately wicked, and runneth to evil continually. Deplorable as this fact is, deplorably also and profusely has it been lamented. We are not now, therefore, going to swell this deluge of lamentations. Instead of doing so, let us rather endeavour to review dispassionately the fact of our naturally depraved condition, in order to ascertain, if possible, the precise bearing which it has on the development and

destiny of our species, and at the same time to carry ourselves still deeper into the philosophy of human consciousness.

To do good and sin not, is the great end of man; and, accordingly, we find him at his first creation stored with every provision for well-doing. But that this is his great end can only be admitted with the qualification that it is to do good *freely;* for every being which *is forced* to perform its allotted task is a mere tool or machine, whether the work it performs be a work of good or a work of evil. If, therefore, man does good by the compulsion of others, or under the constraining force of his own natural biases, he is but an automaton, and deserves no more credit for his actings than a machine of this kind does; just as he is also an automaton if he be driven into courses of evil by outward forces which he cannot resist, or by the uncontrollable springs of his own natural framework. But man will be admitted, by all right thinkers, to be not a mere automaton. But then, according to the same thinkers, man is a *created* being; and, therefore, the question comes to be, how can a created being be other than an automaton? Creation implies predetermination, and predetermination implies that all the springs and biases of the created being tend *one* way (the way predetermined), and that it has no power of its own to turn them into any other than this one channel, whatever it may be. How, then, is it possible for such a being to do either good or evil *freely*, or to act other-

wise than it was born and predetermined to act? In other words, the great problem to be worked out is, How is man to come to accomplish *voluntarily* the great end (of doing good, of well-doing) which he originally accomplished *under compulsion*, or in obedience to the springs of his natural constitution?

We undertake to show that the living demonstration of this great problem is to be found in the actual history of our race; that the whole circuit of humanity, from the creation of the world until the day when man's final account shall be closed, revolves for no other purpose than to bring human nature to do *freely* the very same work which it originally performed *without freedom;* and that this problem could not possibly have been worked out by any other steps than those actually taken to resolve it. This shall be made apparent, by our showing, that in the actual development of the consciousness of our species, two distinct practical stages or articulations are to be noted: the first being an act of antagonism put forth by man against his paradisiacal or perfect nature, bringing along with it the Fall (this is consciousness in its antagonism against good); the second being an act of antagonism put forth by man against his present or fallen nature, issuing in the Redemption of the world through our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, and the restoration of man to the primitive condition of perfection which he had abjured (this is consciousness in its antagonism against evil). The practical solution of the problem of Human

Liberty, will be seen to be given in the development of these two grand epochs of consciousness.

In the first place, then, let us contemplate man in his paradisiacal state. Here we find him created perfect by an all-perfect God, and living in the garden of Eden, surrounded by everything that can minister to his comfort and delight. Truly the lines are fallen to him in pleasant places; and, following his natural biases, his whole being runs along these lines in channels of pure happiness and unalloyed good; good nameless, indeed, and inconceivable, because as yet uncontrasted with evil, but therefore, on that very account, all the more perfect and complete. He lies absorbed and entranced in his own happiness and perfection; and no consciousness, be it observed, interferes to break up their blessed monopoly of him. He lives, indeed, under the strictest command that this jarring act be kept aloof. He has no personality: the personality of the paradisiacal man is in the bosom of his Creator.

Now, however enviable this state of things may have been, it is obvious that, so long as it continued, no conceivable advance could be made towards the realisation of human liberty. Without a personality, without a *self*, to which his conduct might be referred, it is plain that man could not possess any real or intelligible freedom. All his doings must, in this case, fall to be refunded back out of him into the great Being who created him, and out of whom they really proceeded: and thus man must be left a mere

machine, inspired and actuated throughout by the divine energies.

But, upon the slightest reflection, it is equally obvious that man could not possibly realise his own personality without being guilty of an evil act, an act not referable unto God, a Being out of whom no evil thing can come; an act in which the injunctions of the Creator must be disobeyed and set at nought: He could not, we say, realise his own personality without sinning; because his personality is realised through the act of consciousness; and the act of consciousness is, as we have all along seen, an act of antagonism put forth against whatsoever state or modification of humanity it comes in contact with. Man's paradisiacal condition, therefore, being one of supreme goodness and perfection, could not but be deteriorated by the presence of consciousness. Consciousness, if it is to come into play here, must be an act of antagonism against this state of perfect holiness, an act displacing it, and breaking up its monopoly, in order to make room for the independent and rebellious "I." In other words, it must be an act curtailing and subverting good, and therefore, of necessity, an evil act. Let us say, then, that this act was really performed, that man thereby realised his own personality: and what do we record in such a statement but the fact of man's "first disobedience" and his Fall?

The realisation of the first man's personality being thus identical with his fall, and his fall being brought

about by a free act, an act not *out of*, but *against* God; let us now ask how man stands in relation to the great problem, the working out of which we are superintending, Human Liberty. Has the Fall brought along with it the complete realisation of his freedom? By no means. He has certainly realised his own personality by becoming conscious of good. He has thus opposed himself to good, and performed an act which he was not forced or predetermined by his Maker to perform. He has thus taken one step towards the attainment of Liberty: one step, and that is all. The paradisiacal man has evolved one epoch in the development of human consciousness; and has thus carried us on one stage in the practical solution of the problem we are speaking of. Being born good and perfect, he has developed the antagonism of consciousness against goodness and perfection; and thus he has emancipated the human race from the causality of goodness and perfection.

But this antagonism against good, though it freed the human race from the causality of holiness, laid it at the same time under the subjection of a new and far bitterer causality, the causality of sin. For the consciousness of good, or, in other words, an act of antagonism against good, is itself but another name for sin or evil: and thus evil is evolved out of the very act in which man becomes conscious of good. And this is the causality under which we, the children of Adam, find ourselves placed. As he was born the child of goodness and of God, so are we,

through his act, born children of sin and of the devil.

Therefore the evolution of the second epoch in the practical development of consciousness devolves upon *us*, the fallen children of Humanity. Just as the paradisiacal man advanced us one stage towards liberty, by developing in a free act the antagonism of consciousness against the good under which he was born; so is it incumbent upon us to complete the process by developing the practical antagonism of consciousness against the evil of our natural condition. As Adam, in the first epoch of consciousness, worked himself out of good into evil by a free act, so have we, who live in the second epoch of consciousness, to work ourselves back out of evil into good by another act of the same kind; repeating precisely the same process which he went through, only repeating it in an inverted order. He, being born under the causality of good, transferred himself over by a free act (the antagonism of consciousness against good) to the causality of evil, and thus proved that he was not *forced* to the performance of good. We, on the other hand, who are born under the causality of evil, have to transfer ourselves back by another free act, the antagonism of consciousness against evil, into the old causality of good; and thus prove that we are not *forced* to the commission of evil. Adam broke up the first causality—the causality of good; and emancipated our humanity therefrom, in making it thus violate the natural laws and condi-

tions of its birth. But in doing so he laid it under a second and dire causality, the causality of sin; and this is the causality under which we are born. Whenever, therefore, we too have trampled on the laws and conditions of our natural selves; have striven, by an act of resistance against evil, to return into the bosom of good, to replace ourselves under the old causality of holiness, to take up such a position that the influences of Christianity may be enabled to tell upon our hearts, in short, have violated *our* causality just as Adam violated *his;* then may the problem of human liberty be said to be practically resolved, for there are no conceivable kinds of causality except those of evil and of good, and both of these shall have then been broken through in the historical development of our species.

And here, let it be observed, that although, in putting forth this act of resistance against evil, we return under the old causality of good, and thus make ourselves obedient to its influences, yet the relation in which *we* stand towards that causality is very different from the relation in which *the first man* stood towards it. He had good forced upon him; *we* have forced ourselves upon it by a *voluntary* submission; and in this kind of submission true freedom consists; because, in making it, the initiative movement originates in our own wills, in an act of resistance put forth against the evil that encounters us in our natural selves, whichever way we turn; and thus, instead of this kind of causality exercising a strictly causal force

upon us, we, properly speaking, are the cause by which it is induced to visit and operate upon us at all. "From the days of John the Baptist until now, the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and *the violent take it by force:*" that is to say, it does not take *them* by force; it does not force itself causally upon us. On the contrary, we must force ourselves upon it by *our own* efforts, and, as it were, wring from an All-merciful God that grace which even He cannot and will not grant, except to *our own* most earnest importunities.

Would we now look back into the history of our kind, in order to gather instances of that real operation of consciousness which we have been speaking of? Then what was the whole of the enlightened jurisprudence, and all the high philosophy of antiquity, but so many indications of consciousness in its practical antagonism against human depravity? What is justice, that source and concentration of all law? Is it a natural growth or endowment of humanity? Has it, in its first origin, a *positive* character of its own? No; there is no such thing as natural or born justice among men. Justice is nothing but the consciousness of our own natural injustice, this consciousness being, in its very essence, an act of resistance against the same. Do the promptings of nature teach us to give every man his due? No; the promptings of nature teach us to keep to ourselves all that we can lay our hands upon; therefore it is only by acting against the promptings of nature

that we can deal justly towards our fellow-men. But we cannot act against these promptings without being conscious of them, neither can we be conscious of them without acting against them to a greater or a less extent; and thus consciousness, or an act of antagonism put forth against our natural selfishness, lies at the root of the great principle upon which all justice depends, the principle *suum cuique tribuendi.* Therefore, in every nation of antiquity in which wise and righteous laws prevailed, they prevailed not in consequence of any natural sense or principle of justice among men, but solely in consequence of the act of consciousness, which exposed to them the injustice and selfish passions of their own hearts, and, in the very exposure, got the better of them.

If we look, too, to the highest sects of ancient philosophy, what do we behold but the development of consciousness in its antagonism against evil, and an earnest striving after something better than anything that is born within us? What was the whole theoretical and practical Stoicism of antiquity? Was it *apathy*, in the modern sense of that word, that this high philosophy inculcated? Great philosophers have told us that it was so. But oh! doctrine lamentably inverted, traduced, and misunderstood! The "apathy" of ancient Stoicism was no *apathy* in our sense of the word; it was no inertness, no sluggish insensibility, no avoidance of passion, and no folding of the hands to sleep. But it was the direct reverse of all this. It was, and it inculcated, an eternal war

to be waged by the sleepless consciousness of every man against the indestructible demon passions of his own heart. The ἀπάθεια of Stoicism was an energetic *acting against* passion; and, if our word *apathy* means this, let us make use of it in characterising that philosophy. But we apprehend that our word *apathy* signifies an indifference, a passiveness, a listless torpidity of character, which either avoids the presence of the passions, or feels it not; in short, an *unconsciousness* of passion, a state diametrically opposed to the apathy of Stoicism, which consists in the most vital consciousness of the passions, and their consequent subjugation thereby. It has been thought, too, that Stoicism aimed at the annihilation of the passions; but it is much truer to say, that it took the strife between them and consciousness, as the focus of its philosophy; it found true manhood concentrated in this strife, and it merely placed true manhood where it found it, for it saw clearly that the only real moral life of humanity is breathed up out of that seething and tempestuous struggle.

The passions are sure to be ever with us. Do what we will,

> "They pitch their tents before us as we move,
> Our hourly neighbours."

Therefore, the only question comes to be, Are we to yield to them, or are we to give them battle and resist them? And Stoicism is of opinion that we should give them battle. Her voice is all for war; because, in yielding to them, our consciousness, or the act

which constitutes our peculiar attribute, and brings along with it our proper and personal existence, is obliterated or curtailed.

The Epicureans sailed upon another tack. The Stoics sought to reproduce good, by first overthrowing evil; the only method, certainly, by which such a reproduction is practicable. They sought to build the Virtues upon the suppression of the Vices, the only foundation which experience tells us is not liable to be swept away. But their opponents in philosophy went more directly to work. They aimed at the same end, the reproduction of good, without, however, adopting the same means of securing it; that is to say, without ever troubling themselves about evil at all. They sought to give birth to Love without having first laid strong bonds upon Hatred. They strove to establish Justice on her throne, without having first deposed and overthrown Injustice. They sought to call forth Charity and Generosity, without having first of all beaten down the hydra-heads of Selfishness. In short, they endeavoured to bring forward, in a direct manner, all the amiable qualities (as they were supposed to be) of the human heart, without having gone through the intermediate process of displacing and vanquishing their opposites through the act of consciousness. And the consequence was just what might have been expected. These amiable children of nature, so long as all things went as they wished, were angels; but, in the hour of trial, they became the

worst of fiends. Long as the sun shone, their love basked beautiful beneath it, and wore smiles of eternal constancy; but when the storm arose, then Hatred, which had been overlooked by Consciousness, arose also, and the place of Love knew it no more. Justice worked well so long as every one got what he himself wanted. But no sooner were the desires of any man thwarted, than Injustice, which Consciousness had laid no restraint upon, stretched out her hand and snatched the gratification of them; while Justice (to employ Lord Bacon's[1] metaphor) went back into the wilderness, and put forth nothing but the blood-red blossoms of Revenge. Generosity and Charity, so long as they were uncrossed and put to no real sacrifice, played their parts to perfection; but so soon as any unpleasant occasion for their exercise arose, then the selfish passions, of which Consciousness had taken no note, broke loose, and Charity and Generosity were swept away by an avalanche of demons.

Such has invariably been the fate of all those Epicurean attempts to bring forward and cultivate Good as a natural growth of the human heart, instead of first of all endeavouring to realise it as the mere extirpation of evil; and hence we see the necessity of adopting the latter method of procedure. Every attempt to establish or lay hold of good by leaving evil out of our account, by avoiding it, by remaining unconscious of it, by not bringing it home to ourselves,

[1] Lord Bacon calls revenge a species of *wild justice.*

must necessarily be a failure; and, sooner or later, a day of fearful retribution is sure to come, for the passions are real madmen, and consciousness is their only keeper; but man's born amiabilities are but painted masks, which (if consciousness has never occupied its post) are liable to be torn away from the face of his natural corruption, in any dark hour in which the passions may choose to break up from the dungeons of the heart.

The true philosopher is well aware that the gates of paradise are closed against him for ever upon earth. He does not, therefore, expend himself in a vain endeavour to force them, or to cultivate into a false Eden the fictitious flowers of his own deceitful heart; but he seeks to compensate for this loss, and to restore to himself in some degree the perfected image of his Creator, by sternly laying waste, through consciousness, the wilderness of his own natural desires; for he well knows, that wherever he has extirpated a weed, there, and only there, will God plant a flower, or suffer it to grow. But the Epicurean, or false philosopher, makes a direct assault upon the gates of paradise itself. He seeks to return straight into the arms of good, without fighting his way through the strong and innumerable forces of evil. He would reproduce the golden age, without directly confronting and resisting the ages of iron and of brass. By following the footsteps of nature, he imagines that he may be carried back into the paradise from which his forefather was cast forth. But, alas! it is not thus

that the happy garden is to be won; for, "at the east of the garden of Eden," hath not God placed "cherubims, and a flaming sword which turns every way, to keep the way of the tree of life"? and, therefore, the Epicurean is compelled, at last, to sink down, outside the trenches of paradise, into an inert and dreaming sensualist.

CHAPTER II.

NEITHER overrating nor underrating the pretensions of philosophy, let us now, as our final task, demonstrate the entire harmony between her and the scheme of Christian revelation. Philosophy has done much for man, but she cannot do everything for him; she cannot convert a struggling act (consciousness in its antagonism against evil)—she cannot convert this act into a permanent and glorified substance. She can give the strife, but she cannot give the repose. This Christianity alone can give. But neither can Christianity do everything for man. She, too, demands her prerequisites; she demands a true consciousness on the part of man of the condition in which he stands. In other words, she demands, on man's own part, a perception of his own want or need of her divine support. This support she can give him, but she cannot give him a sense of his own need of it. This philosophy must supply. Here, therefore, Christianity accepts the assistance of philosophy; true though it be, that the latter, even in her highest and most exhaustive flight, only brings man up to the

point at which religion spreads her wings, and carries him on to a higher and more transcendent elevation. Her apex is the basis of Christianity. The highest round in the ladder of philosophy is the lowest in the scale of Christian grace. All that true philosophy can do, or professes to do, is merely to pass man through the preparatory discipline of rendering him conscious of evil, that is, of the only thing of which he can be *really* conscious on this earth; and thus to place him in such a position as may enable the influences of loftier truth, and of more substantial good, to take due effect upon his heart. The discipline of philosophy is essentially destructive, that of Christianity is essentially constructive. The latter busies herself in the positive reproduction of good; but only after philosophy has, to a certain extent, prepared the ground for her, by putting forth the act of consciousness, and by thus executing her own negative task, which consists in the resistance of evil. Christianity re-impresses us with the positive image of God which we had lost through the Fall; but philosophy, in the act of consciousness, must first, to a greater or a less extent, have commenced a defacement of the features of the devil stamped upon our natural hearts, before we can take on, in the least degree, the impress of that divine signature.

Such, we do not fear to say, is the preliminary discipline of man, which Christianity demands at the hands of philosophy. But there are people who imagine that the foundation-stone of the whole Chris-

tian scheme consists in this: that man can, and must, do *nothing for himself*. Therefore, let us speak a few words in refutation of this paralysing doctrine.

Do not the Scriptures themselves say, "*Ask*, and it shall be given unto you"? Here, then, we find *asking* made the condition of our receiving; and hence it is plain that we are not to receive this asking; for supposing that we do receive it, then this can only be because we have complied with the condition annexed to our receiving it; or, in other words, it can only be because we have practised an anterior asking in order to obtain the asking which has been vouchsafed to us. Therefore this asking must ultimately, according to the very first requisitions of Christianity, fall to be considered as our own act; and now, then, we put the question to those who maintain the doctrine just stated: Must we not "ask," must not this "asking" be our own deed, and do you call this *doing nothing for ourselves?* In the same way does not the Gospel say, "*Seek*, and ye shall find; *knock*, and it shall be opened unto you"? evidently holding forth *seeking* as the condition of our finding, and *knocking* as the condition upon which "it shall be opened." And, now, must not this "seeking" and this "knocking" be done by ourselves? and if they must, what becomes of the doctrine that man can do nothing, and must attempt to do nothing, for himself?

This doctrine that we can do nothing for ourselves is based upon an evident oversight and confusion of thought in the mind of the espousers of it. "Attempt

no toil of your own," say these inert disciplinarians of humanity, "but seek ye the kingdom of heaven in the revealed word of God, and there ye shall find it with all its blessings." True; but these teachers overlook the fact that there are two distinct questions, and two distinct tasks, involved in this precept of "seeking the kingdom of heaven." To some people, the injunction, "Seek for it faithfully, and ye shall find it in the Scriptures," may be sufficient. But others, again (and we believe the generality of men are in this predicament), may require, first of all, to be informed about a very different matter, and may be unable to rest satisfied until they have obtained this information: they may demand, namely, an answer to a new question, But where shall we find the *seeking of* the kingdom of heaven? Before finding itself, we must know how, and where, and in what way, we are *to find the seeking* of it; for that is the great secret which eludes and baffles our researches.

The only answer that can be given to these querists is, You must find the seeking of it *in yourselves.* The Bible reveals to us the kingdom of heaven itself; but philosophy it is that leads us to the discovery of our own search after it. To this discovery philosophy leads us, by teaching us *to know ourselves,* by teaching us what we really are. And what does philosophy teach us respecting ourselves? Does she teach us that we stand in a harmonious relation towards the universe around us; towards the universe

within us; towards the world of our own passions and desires; towards the strength or the weaknesses (be they which they may) of our own flesh and blood? And does she thus show us that the life of man here below is a life of blessedness and repose? No! on the contrary, she shows us that our very act of consciousness, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, all the natural laws and conditions under which we are born, stand in a relation of diametrical discord towards each other: that we are made up of passions and susceptibilities, every one of which is thwarted and condemned in our very consciousness of it: that "there is a law in our members" (the causal law) "warring against the law in our minds" (the law of will, of freedom, of consciousness); and that the war between these two laws is one which no truce, brought about by human diplomacy, can ever still. For though consciousness may act against evil, yet it can never change the mere resistance of evil into a positive body of good. Consciousness may resist wrath, but it cannot convert this resistance of wrath into a positive peaceful-mindedness. Consciousness may resist hatred, but this act cannot transmute the resistance of hatred into positive and substantial love. Consciousness may resist selfishness, but it cannot convert this resistance of selfishness into a decided and abiding spirit of charity. This conversion cannot be effected by consciousness or by philosophy, it must be effected by the intervention of a higher power, building, how-

ever, on the groundwork which consciousness lays in its antagonism against evil; and this is what philosophy herself teaches unto man. She shows him, that so long as our consciousness and our passions merely are in the field, although it is true that our regeneration must commence in their strife, yet that these elements meet together only in a bitter and interminable struggle, and do not embody of themselves any positive issues of good. Thus is he led by the very strife which philosophy reveals to him, tearing his being asunder, to feel the necessity under which he lies of obtaining strength, support, and repose, from a higher source: thus is he led by philosophy to discover, in the bitter strife between consciousness and his passions, his own importunate seeking of the kingdom of heaven, as the only means through whose intervention his struggling and toilsome acts may be embodied and perpetuated in glorious and triumphant substances his resistance of hatred changed by Divine grace into Christian love, and all his other resistances of evil (mere negative qualities) transmuted by the power of a celestial alchemy into positive and substantial virtues.

Thus philosophy brings man up to the points which Christianity postulates, as the conditions on which her blessings are to be bestowed. In revealing to man the strife, which, in the very act of consciousness, exists between himself and his whole natural man, philosophy, of course, brings him to entertain the desire that this strife should be com-

posed. But the desire that this strife should be composed, is itself nothing but a seeking of the kingdom of heaven. It is no desire on man's part to give up the fight, to abandon the resistance of evil, but it is a determination to carry this resistance to its uttermost issues, and then, through Divine assistance, to get this resistance embodied in positive and enduring good. Thus philosophy having brought man up to the points so forcibly insisted on by Christianity, having taught him to "knock," to "ask," and to "seek," having explained the grounds of these prerequisites (which Scripture postulates, but does not explain), she then leaves him in the hands of that more effective discipline, to be carried forward in the career of a brighter and constantly increasing perfectibility.

CHAPTER III.

We will now conclude, by recapitulating very shortly the chief points of our whole discussion.

I. Our first inquiry regarded the method to be adopted, and the proper position to be occupied when contemplating the phenomena of man, and, out of that contemplation, endeavouring to construct a science of ourselves. The method hitherto employed in psychological research we found to be in the highest degree objectionable. It is this: the fact, or act of consciousness, was regarded as the mere medium *through* which the phenomena, or "states of mind," the proper facts of psychology, as they were thought to be, were observed. Thus consciousness was the point which was looked *from*, and not the point which was looked *at*. The phenomena *looked at* were our sensations, passions, emotions, intellectual states, &c., which might certainly have *existed* without consciousness, although, indeed, they could not have been *known* except through that act. The phenomenon *looked from*, although tacitly recognised, was in reality passed over without obser-

vation; and thus consciousness, the great fact of humanity, together with all its grounds and consequences, has been altogether overlooked in the study of man; while, in consequence of this oversight, his freedom, will, morality, in short, all his peculiar attributes, have invariably crumbled into pieces whenever he has attempted to handle them scientifically.

We trace this erroneous method, this false position, this neglect of the fact of consciousness, entirely to the attempts of our scientific men to establish a complete analogy between psychological and physical research; and, to follow the error to its fountain-head, we boldly trace it up to a latitude of interpretation given to the fundamental canon of the Baconian philosophy: "Homo, naturæ minister et interpres, tantum facit et intelligit quantum de naturæ ordine re vel mente observaverit, nec amplius scit aut potest."

As far as this great rule is held applicable to the study and science of nature, we admit it to be unexceptionable; but when we find it so extended in its application as to include man indiscriminately with nature, we must pause; and although this extension of its meaning should be shown to be in perfect accordance with the whole spirit of Bacon's writings, we must venture, in the name of philosophy, and backed by a more rigorous observation than that which he or any of his followers contend for, to challenge its validity, venerable and authoritative though it be.

We do not, indeed, assert that this maxim, even when taken in its utmost latitude, contains anything which is absolutely false; but we hope to show that, in its application to the science of man, and as a fundamental rule of psychology, it falls very far short of the whole truth, and is of a very misleading tendency. If it has acted like fanners upon the physical sciences, it has certainly fallen like an extinguisher upon philosophy.

The method laid down in this canon as the only true foundation of science, is the method of observation. The question then comes to be: Can this method be properly applied to the phenomena of man, in exactly the same sense as it is applied to the phenomena of nature? The disciples of Lord Bacon tell us that it can, and must, if we would construct a true science of ourselves; but, in opposition to their opinion, we undertake to show that, in the case of man, circumstances are evolved, which render his observation of his own phenomena of a totally different character from his observation of the phenomena of nature. Let us, then, illustrate the method of observation, first, in its application to nature; and, secondly, in its application to man.

We will call nature and her phenomena B, and we will call the observer A. Now, it is first to be remarked, that in A there is developed the fact of A's observation of B: but the proper and sole business of A being to observe the phenomena of B, and A's observation of the phenomena of B not being a

fact belonging to B, it, of course, does not call for any notice whatsoever from A. It would be altogether irrelevant for A, when observing the phenomena of B, to observe the fact of his own observation of these phenomena. Therefore, in the natural sciences, the fact of A's observation of B is the point looked *from*, and cannot become the point looked *at*, without a departure being made from the proper procedure of physics. These sciences, then, are founded entirely on the method of *simple* observation. *Observatio simplex* is all that is here practised, and is all that is here necessary; and, whenever it shall have been put forth in its fullest extent, the science of B, or nature, may be considered complete.

Let us now try how the same method of simple or physical observation works in its application to psychology. We will call man and his phenomena A; and, as man is here the observer as well as the observed, we must call the observer A too. Now, it is obvious that in A (man observed) there are plenty of phenomena present, his sensations, "states of mind," &c., and that A (man observing) may construct a sort of science out of these by simply observing them, just as he constructed the natural sciences by observing the phenomena of B. And this is precisely what our ordinary psychologists have done, adhering to the Baconian canon. But the slightest reflection will show us that such a science of man must necessarily be a false one,

inasmuch as it leaves out of view one of his most important phenomena. For, as the preceding case of A and B, so now in the case of A and A, there is developed the fact of A's observation of A. But this fact, which in the case of A and B was very properly overlooked, and was merely considered as the point to be looked *from*, cannot here be legitimately overlooked, but insists most peremptorily upon being made the point to be looked *at;* for the two A's are not really two, but one and the same; and, therefore, A's observation of the phenomena of A is itself a new phenomenon of A, calling for a new observation. Thus, while physical observation is simple, philosophical or psychological observation is double. It is *observatio duplex:* the observation of observation, *observatio observationis.*

Now, we maintain that the disciples of the Baconian school have never recognised this distinction, or rather have never employed any other than the method of *single* observation, in studying the phenomena of man. They have been too eager to observe everything ever to have thought of duly observing the fact of observation itself. This phenomenon, by which everything else was brought under observation, was itself allowed an immunity from observation; and entirely to this laxness or neglect are, in our opinion, to be attributed all the errors that have vitiated, and all the obstructions that have retarded the science of ourselves.

The distinction which we have just pointed out

between these two kinds of observation, the single and the double, the physical and the psychological, is radical and profound. The method to be pursued in studying nature, and the method to be pursued in studying man, can now no longer be regarded as the same. The physical method observes, but the psychological method swings itself higher than this, and observes observation. Thus psychology, or philosophy properly so called, commences precisely at the point where physical science ends. When the phenomena of nature have been observed and classified, the science of nature is ended. But when the phenomena of man, his feelings, intellectual, and other states, have been observed and classified, true psychology has yet to begin; we have yet to observe our observation of these phenomena, this fact constituting, in our opinion, the only true and all-comprehensive fact which the science of man has to deal with; and only after it has been taken up and faithfully observed, can philosophy be said to have commenced.

Further, the divergence which, in consequence of this distinction, takes place at their very first step, between psychological and physical science, is prodigious. In constructing the physical sciences, man occupies the position of a *mere* observer. It is true that his observation of the phenomena of nature is an act, and that so far he is an agent as well as an observer; but as this act belongs to himself, and as he has here no business with any phenomena except

those belonging to nature, he cannot legitimately take any notice of this agency. But in constructing a science of himself man occupies more than the position of a mere observer, for his observation of his own phenomena is an act, and as this act belongs to himself whom he is studying, he is bound to notice it; and, moreover, as this act of observation must be *performed* before it can be observed, man is thus compelled to be an agent before he is an observer; or, in other words, must himself *act* or *create* the great phenomenon which he is to observe. This is what he never does in the case of the physical sciences; the phenomena here observed are entirely attributable to nature. Man has nothing to do with their creation. In physics, therefore, man is, as we have said, a mere observer. But in philosophy he has first of all to observe his own phenomena (this he does in the free act of his ordinary consciousness): he thus creates by his own agency a new fact, the fact, namely, of his observation of these phenomena; and then he has to subject this new fact to a new and systematic observation, which may be called the reflective or philosophic consciousness.

The observation of our own natural phenomena (*observatio simplex*) is the act of consciousness; the observation of the observation of our own phenomena (*observatio duplex*), or, in other words, the observation of consciousness, is philosophy. Such are our leading views on the subject of the method

of psychology, as contradistinguished from the method of physical science.

II. The act of consciousness, or the fact of our observation of our own natural modifications, having been thus pointed out as the great phenomena to be observed in psychology, we next turned our attention to the contents and origin of this act, subdividing our inquiry into three distinct questions: *When* does consciousness come into manifestation? *How* does it come into manifestation? and, What are *the consequences* of its coming into manifestation?

III. In discussing the question, When does consciousness come into manifestation? we found that man is not *born* conscious; and that therefore consciousness is not a given or *ready-made* fact of humanity. In looking for some sign of its manifestation, we found that it has come into operation whenever the human being has pronounced the word "I," knowing what this expression means. This word is a highly curious one, and quite an anomaly, inasmuch as its true meaning is utterly incommunicable by one being to another, endow the latter with as high a degree of intelligence as you please. Its origin cannot be explained by imitation or association. Its meaning cannot be *taught* by any conceivable process; but must be originated absolutely by the being using it. This is not the case with any other form of speech. For instance, if it be asked what is a table? a person may point to one and say,

"that is a table." But if it be asked, what does "I" mean? and if the same person were to point to himself and say, "this is 'I,'" this would convey quite a wrong meaning, unless the inquirer, before putting the question, had originated within himself the notion "I," for it would lead him to suppose, and to call that other person "I." This is a strange paradox, but a true one; that a person would be considered mad, unless he applied to himself a particular name, which if any other person were to apply to him, *he* would be considered mad.

Neither are we to suppose that this word "I" is a generic word, equally applicable to us all, like the word "man"; for, if it were, then we should all be able to call each other "I," just as we can all call each other with propriety "man."

Further, the consideration of this question, by conducting us to inquiries of a higher interest, and of a real significance, enables us to get rid of most or all of the absurd and unsatisfactory speculations connected with that unreal substance which nobody knows anything about, called "mind." If mind exists at all, it exists as much when man is born as it ever does afterwards; therefore, in the development of mind, no new form of humanity is evolved. But no man is born "I"; yet, after a time, every man becomes "I." Here, then, is a new form of humanity displayed; and, therefore, the great question is, What is the genesis of this new form of man? What are the facts of its origin? How does it come

into manifestation? Leave "mind" alone, ye metaphysicians, and answer us *that*.

IV. It is obvious that the new form of humanity, called "I," is evolved out of the act of consciousness; and this brings us to the second problem of our inquiry, How is the act itself of consciousness evolved? A severe scrutiny of the act of consciousness showed us, that this act, or, in other words, that our observation of our own phenomena, is to a certain extent a displacement or suspension of them; that these phenomena (our sensations, passions, and other modifications) are naturally of a monopolising tendency; that is to say, they tend to keep us *un*conscious, to engross us with themselves: while, on the contrary, consciousness or our observation of them, is of a contrary tendency, and operates to render us *un*sentient, *un*passionate, &c. We found, from considering facts, that consciousness on the one hand, and all our natural modifications on the other, existed in an inverse ratio to one another; that wherever the natural modification is *plus*, the consciousness of it is *minus*, and *vice versa*. We thus found that the great law regulating the relationship between the conscious man (the "I") and the natural man was the law of antagonism;[1] and thus consciousness

[1] Our leading tenet may be thus contrasted with those of some other systems in a very few words. The Lockian School teaches, that man becomes conscious, or "I," *in consequence* of his sensations, passions, and other modifications; the Platonic and Kantian Schools teach that man becomes "I," not in consequence, but *by occasion*, of his sensations, passions, &c.; and this is true, but not

was found to be an act of antagonism; or (in order to render our deduction more distinct) we shall rather say was found to be evolved out of an act of antagonism put forth against the modifications of the natural man.

But out of what is this act of antagonism evolved? What are its grounds? Let us consider what it is put forth against. All man's natural modifications are derivative, and this act is put forth against all these natural modifications, there is not one of them which is not more or less impaired by its presence. It cannot, therefore, be itself derivative, for if it were, it would be an acting against itself, which is absurd. Being, therefore, an act which opposes all that is derivative in man, it cannot be itself derivative, but must be underived; that is, must be an absolutely original, primary, and free act. This act of antagonism, therefore, is an act of freedom; or, we shall rather say, is evolved out of freedom. Its ground and origin is freedom.

But what are the explanatory grounds of freedom? We have but to ascertain what is the great law of bondage throughout the universe, and, in its opposite, we shall find the law or grounds of freedom. The law of bondage throughout the universe is the law of cause and effect. In the violation, then, of this

the *whole* truth. According to our doctrine, man becomes "I," or a conscious Being, *in spite* of his sensations, passions, &c. Sensation, &c., exist for the purpose of keeping down consciousness, and consciousness exists for the purpose of keeping down sensation, &c. &c.

law, true freedom must consist. In virtue of what, then, do we violate this law of bondage or causality? In virtue of our human will, which refuses to submit to the modifications which it would impose upon us. Human will thus forms the ground of freedom, and deeper than this we cannot sink. We sum up our deduction thus: The "I" is evolved out of the act of consciousness, the act of consciousness is evolved out of an act of antagonism put forth against all the derivative modifications of our being: This act of antagonism is evolved out of freedom; and freedom is evolved out of will; and thus we make will the lowest foundation-stone of humanity.

Thus have we resolved, though we fear very imperfectly, the great problem, How does Consciousness come into operation? the law of antagonism, established by facts, between the *natural* and the *conscious* man, being the principle upon which the whole solution rests.

V. In discussing the consequences of the act of consciousness, we endeavoured to show how this act at once displaces our sensations, and, in the vacant room, places the reality called "I," which, but for this active displacement of the sensations, would have had no sort of existence. We showed that the complex phenomenon in which this displacing and placing is embodied, is perception. The "I," therefore, is a consequence of the act of consciousness; and a brighter phase of it is presented when the state which the act of consciousness encounters and dis-

places is a passion instead of being a sensation. We showed that morality originates in the antagonism here put forth. But we have already expressed ourselves as succinctly and clearly as we are able on these points; and, therefore, we now desist from adding any more touches to this very imperfect Outline of the Philosophy of Human Consciousness.

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CRISIS OF MODERN SPECULATION

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THE great endeavour of philosophy, in all ages, has been to explain the nature of the connection which subsists between the mind of man and the external universe; but it is to speculation of a very late date that we owe the only approach that has been made to a satisfactory solution of this problem. In the following remarks on the state of modern speculation, we shall attempt to unfold this explanation, for it forms, we think, the very pith of the highest philosophy of recent times.

It will be seen that the question is resolved, not so much by having any positive answer given to it, as by being itself made to assume a totally new aspect. We shall find, upon reflection, that it is not what, at first sight, and on a superficial view, we imagined it to be. A change will come over the whole spirit of the question. Facts will arise, forcing it into a new form, even in spite of our efforts to keep it in its old

shape. The very understanding of it will alter it from what it was. It will not be annihilated—it will not be violently supplanted — but it will be gradually transformed; and this transformation will be seen to arise out of the very nature of thought, out of the very exercise of reason upon the question. It will be granted that, before a question can become a question, it must first of all be conceived. Therefore, before the question respecting the intercourse between mind and matter can be asked, it must be thought. Now, the whole drift of our coming argument is to show that this question, in the very thinking of it, necessarily passes into a new question. And then, perhaps, the difficulty of answering this new question will be found to be not very great.

This consideration may, perhaps, conciliate forbearance at the outset of our inquiry at least. Any objections levelled against the question as it now stands, would evidently be premature. For the present question is but the mask of another question; and unless it be known what that other question is, why should its shell be thrown aside as an unprofitable husk? Reader! spare the chrysalis for the sake of the living butterfly which perhaps may yet spring from its folds. The transformation we are going to attempt to describe, forms the most vital crisis in the whole history of speculation.

It must be kept in mind that our perception of an external universe is a phenomenon of a profounder and more vital character than is generally supposed.

Besides having perceptions, the mind, it is said, is modified in a hundred other ways: by desires, passions, and emotions; and these, it is thought, contribute to form its reality, just as much as the perception of outward things does. But this is a mistake. Perception, the perception of an external universe, is the groundwork and condition of all other mental phenomena. It is the basis of the reality of mind. It is this reality itself. Through it, mind is what it is; and without it, mind could not be conceived to exist. Since, therefore, perception is the very life of man, when we use the word *mind* in this discussion we shall understand thereby the percipient being, or the perceiver. The word *mind* and the word *percipient* we shall conside· convertible terms.

The earliest, and, in France and this country, the still dominant philosophy explains the connection between mind and matter by means of the relation of cause and effect. Outward things present to the senses are the causes of our perceptions, our perceptions are the effects of their proximity. "The presence of an external body," says Dr Brown, "an organic change immediately consequent on its presence, and a mental affection;" these, according to him, form three terms of a sequence, the statement of which is thought sufficiently to explain the phenomenon of perception, and to illustrate the intercourse which takes place between ourselves and outward objects.

This doctrine is obviously founded on a distinction laid down between objects as they are in themselves

and objects as they are in our perceptions of them; in other words, between real objects and our perceptions of objects. For, unless we made a discrimination between these two classes, we could have no ground for saying that the former were the causes of the latter.

Now, when any distinction is established, the tendency of the understanding is to render it as definite, complete, and absolute as it admits of being made. And, with regard to the present distinction, the understanding was certainly not idle. It took especial pains to render this distinction real and precise; and, by doing so, it prepared a building-ground for the various philosophical fabrics that were to follow for many generations. It taught that the object in itself must be considered something which stood quite aloof from our perception of it, that our perception of the object must be considered something of which the real object formed no part. Had it been otherwise, the understanding would have pronounced the discrimination illogical, and consequently null and void.

It was this procedure of the understanding with respect to the above-mentioned distinction which led to the universal adoption of a representative theory of perception. We are far from thinking that any of its authors adopted or promulgated this doctrine under that gross form of it against which Dr Reid and other philosophers have directed their shafts; under the form, namely, which holds that outward

things are represented by little images in the mind. Unquestionably, that view is a gross exaggeration of the real opinion. All that philosophers meant was, that we had perceptions of objects, and that these perceptions were not the objects themselves. Yet even this, the least exceptionable form of the theory that can be maintained, was found sufficient to subvert the foundations of all human certainty.

Here, then, it was that doubts and difficulties began to break in upon philosophical inquiry. It was at this juncture that the schism between common sense and philosophy, which has not yet terminated, began. People had hitherto believed that they possessed an immediate or intuitive knowledge of an external universe; but now philosophers assured them that no such immediate knowledge was possible. All that man could immediately know was either the object itself, *or* his perception of it. It could not be both of these *in one*, for this explanation of perception was founded on the admitted assumption that these two were distinct, and were to be kept distinct. Now, it could not be the object itself, for man knows the object only by knowing that he perceives it — in other words, by knowing his own perception of it; and the object and his perception being different, he could know the former only through his knowledge of the latter. Hence, knowing it through this vicarious phenomenon, namely, his own perception of it, he could only know it mediately; and therefore it was merely his own perceptions of an external uni-

verse, and not an external universe itself, that he was immediately cognisant of.

The immediate knowledge of an external universe being disproved, its reality was straightway called in question. For the existence of that which is not known immediately, or as it is in itself, requires to be established by an inference of reason. Instead, therefore, of asking, How is the intercourse carried on between man's mind and the external world? the question came to be this, Is there any real external world at all?

Three several systems undertook to answer this question: Hypothetical Realism, which defended the reality of the universe; Idealism, which denied its reality; and Scepticism, which maintained that if there were an external universe, it must be something very different from what it appears to us to be.

Hypothetical Realism was the orthodox creed, and became a great favourite with philosophers. It admitted that an outward world could not be immediately known; that we could be immediately and directly cognisant of nothing but our own subjective states—in other words, of nothing but our perceptions of this outward world; but, at the same time, it held that it must be postulated as a ground whereby to account for these impressions. This system was designed to reconcile common sense with philosophy, but it certainly had not the desired effect. The convictions of common sense repudiated the decrees of so hollow a philosophy. The belief which this sys-

tem aimed at creating was not the belief in which common sense rejoiced. To the man who thought and felt with the mass, the universe was no hypothesis, no inference of reason, but a direct reality which he had immediately before him. His perception of the universe, that is, the universe as he was cognisant of it in perception, was, he felt convinced, the very universe as it was in itself.

Idealism did not care to conciliate common sense; but it maintained that if we must have recourse to an hypothesis to explain the origin of our perceptions, it would be a simpler one to say that they arose in conformity with the original laws of our constitution, or simply because it was the will of our Creator that they should arise in the way they do. Thus, a real external world called into existence by hypothetical Realism (no other Realism was at present possible), merely to account for our perceptions, was easily dispensed with as a very unnecessary encumbrance.

Scepticism assumed various modifications, but the chief guise in which it sought to outrage the convictions of mankind was, by first admitting the reality of an external world, and then by proving that this world could not correspond with our perceptions of it. Because, in producing these perceptions, its effects were, of necessity, modified by the nature of the percipient principle on which it operated; and hence our perceptions being the joint result of external nature and our own nature, they could not possibly

be true and faithful representatives of the former alone. They could not but convey a false and perverted information. Thus, man's primary convictions, which taught him that the universe *was* what it appeared to be, were placed in direct opposition to the conclusions of his reason, which now informed him that it must be something very different from what he took it for.

Thus, in consequence of one fatal and fundamental oversight, the earlier philosophy was involved in inextricable perplexities in its efforts to unravel the mysteries of perception. But we are now approaching times in which this oversight was retrieved, and in which, under the scrutiny of genuine speculation, the whole character and bearings of the question became altered. Its old features were obliterated, and out of the crucible of thought it came forth in a new form, a form which carries its solution on its very front. How has this change been brought about?

We have remarked that all preceding systems were founded on a distinction laid down between objects themselves and our perception of objects. And we have been thus particular in stating this principle, and in enumerating a few of its consequences, because it is by the discovery of a law directly opposed to it that the great thinkers of modern times have revolutionised the whole of philosophy, and escaped the calamitous conclusions into which former systems were precipitated.

In the olden days of speculation, this distinction was rendered real and absolute by the logical understanding. The objective and the subjective of human knowledge (*i. e.*, the reality and our perception of it) were permanently severed from one another; and while all philosophers were disputing as to the mode in which these two could again intelligibly coalesce, not one of them thought of questioning the validity of the original distinction—the truth of the alleged and admitted separation. Not one of them dreamt of asking whether it was possible for human thought really to make and maintain this discrimination. It was reserved for the genius of modern thought to disprove the distinction in question, or at least to qualify it most materially by the introduction of a directly antagonist principle. By a more rigorous observation of facts, modern inquirers have been led to discover the radical identity of the subjective and the objective of human consciousness, and the impossibility of thinking them asunder. In our present inquiry, we shall restrict ourselves to the consideration of the great change which the question regarding man's intercourse with the external world has undergone, in consequence of this discovery; but its consequences are incalculable, and we know not where they are to end.

In attempting, then, to interpret the spirit of this new philosophy, we commence by remarking that the distinction which lay at the foundation of all the older philosophies is not to be rejected and set aside

altogether. Unless we made some sort of discrimination between our perceptions and outward objects, no consciousness or knowledge would be possible. This principle is one of the laws of human thought, one of the first conditions of intelligence. But we allow it only a relative validity. It gives us but one-half of the truth. We deny that it is an absolute, final, and permanent distinction; and we shall show that, if by one law of intelligence we constantly separate the subject and the object, so by another law we as constantly blend them into one. If by one principle of our nature we are continually forced to make this separation, we are just as continually forced, by another principle of our nature, to repair it. It is this latter principle which is now to engage our research. But here we must have recourse to facts and illustrations; for it is only by the aid of these that we can hope to move in an intelligible course through so abstruse an investigation.

We shall illustrate our point by first appealing to the sense of sight. Light or colour is the proper object of this perception. That which is called, in the technical language of philosophy, *the objective*, is the light; that which is called, in the same phraseology, *the subjective*, is the seeing. We shall frequently make use of these words in the sense thus indicated. Now, admitting, in a certain sense, this discrimination between the objective and subjective in the case of vision, we shall make it our business to show that it undoes itself, by *each* of these terms

or extremes necessarily becoming, when thought, *both* the subjective and the objective in one.

Let us begin with the consideration of the objective—light. It is very easy to *say* that light is not seeing. But, good reader, we imagine you will be considerably puzzled to *think* light without allowing the thought of seeing to enter into the thinking of it. Just try to do so. Think of light without thinking of seeing; think the pure object without permitting any part of your subjective nature to be blended with it in that thought. Attempt to conjure up the thought of light without conjuring up along with it in indissoluble union the thought of seeing. Attempt this in every possible way, then reflect for a moment; and as sure as you are a living and percipient being, you will find that, in all your efforts to think of light, you invariably begin and end in thinking of *the seeing* of light. You think of light by and through the thought of seeing, and you can think of it in no other way. By no exertion of the mind can you separate these two. They are not two, but one. The objective light, therefore, when thought, ceases to be purely objective; it becomes both subjective and objective, both light and seeing in one. And the same truth holds good with regard to all lighted or coloured objects, such as trees, houses, &c.; we can think of these only by thinking of our seeing of them.

But you will perhaps say that, by leaving the sunshine, and going into a dark room, you are able

to effect an actual and practical separation between these two things, light and seeing. By taking this step, you put an end to your perception; but you do not put an end, you say, to the real objective light which excited it. The perception has vanished, but the light remains, a permanent existence outside of your dark chamber. Now here we must beware of dogmatising, that is, of speaking either affirmatively or negatively, about anything, without first of all having thought about it. Before we can be entitled to speak of what *is*, we must ascertain what we *can think*. When, therefore, you talk of light as an outward permanent existence, we neither affirm nor deny it to be so. We give no opinion at all upon the matter. All that we request and expect of both of us is, that we shall think it before we talk of it. But we shall find that, the moment we think this outward permanent existence, we are forced, by the most stringent law of our intelligence, to think sight along with it; and it is only by thinking these two in inseparable unity, that light can become a conceivability at all, or a comprehensible thought.

Perhaps you will here remind us that light exists in many inaccessible regions, where it is neither seen nor was ever thought of as seen. It may be so; we do not deny it. But we answer that, before this light can be spoken of, it must be thought; and that it cannot be thought unless it be thought of *as seen*, unless we think an ideal spectator of it; in other words, unless a subjective be inseparably added unto

it. Perhaps, again, in order to show that the objective may be conceived as existing apart from the subjective, you will quote the lines of the poet—

> "Full many a flower is born to *blush unseen*,
> And waste its sweetness on the desert air."

We reply that it may be very true that many a flower is born so to do. We rather admit the fact. But we maintain that, in order to speak of the fact, you must think of it; and in order to think of the fact, you must think of the flower; and in order to think of the flower, and of its blushing unseen, you must think of the seeing of the flower, and of the seeing of its blushing. All of which shows that here, as in every other supposable case, it is impossible to think the objective without thinking the subjective as its inseparable concomitant, which is the only point we are at present endeavouring to establish.

It will not do to say that this light *may be* something which *may* exist, outwardly, and independently of all perception of it, though, in consequence of the limitation of our faculties, it may not be possible for us to conceive how, or in what way, its existence is maintained. Reader! put no faith in those who preach to you about the limited nature of the human faculties, and of the things which lie beyond their bounds. For one instance in which this kind of modesty keeps people right in speculative matters, there are a thousand in which it puts them wrong; and the present case is one of those in which it endeavours to prevail upon us to practise a gross

imposition upon ourselves. For this light, which is modestly talked of as something which lies, or may lie, altogether out of the sphere of the subjective, will be found, upon reflection, to be conceived only by thinking back, and blending inseparably with it the very subjective (*i. e.*, the seeing) from which it had been supposed possible for thought to divorce it.

Precisely the same thing holds good in the case of sound and hearing. Sound is here the objective, and hearing the subjective; but the objective cannot be conceived, unless we comprehend both the subjective and it in one and the same conception. It is true that sounds may occur (thunder, for instance, in lofty regions of the sky) which are never heard; but we maintain that, in thinking such sounds, we necessarily think the hearing of them; in other words, we think that we *would have* heard them, had we been near enough to the spot where they occurred, which is exactly the same thing as imagining ourselves, or some other percipient being, present at that spot. We establish an ideal union between them and hearing. In respect to thought, they are as nothing unless thought of *as heard*. Thus only do we, or can we, conceive them. Whenever, therefore, the objective is here thought of, the same ideal and indissoluble union ensues between it and the subjective, which we endeavoured to show took place between light and vision, whenever the objective of that perception was thought of.

The consideration of these two senses, sight and

hearing, with their appropriate objects, light and sound, sufficiently explains and illustrates our point. For what holds good with regard to them, holds equally good with regard to all our other perceptions. The moment the objective part of any one of them is thought, we are immediately constrained by a law of our nature which we cannot transgress, to conceive as one with it the subjective part of the perception. We think objective weight only by thinking the feeling of weight. We think hardness, solidity, and resistance, in one and the same thought with touch or some subjective effort. But it would be tedious to multiply illustrations; and our doing so would keep us back too long from the important conclusion towards which we are hastening. Every illustration, however, that we could instance would only help to establish more and more firmly the great truth, that no species or form of the objective, throughout the wide universe, can be conceived of at all, unless we blend with it in one thought its appropriate subjective—that every objective, when construed to the intellect, is found to have a subjective clinging to it, and forming one with it, even when pursued in imagination unto the uttermost boundaries of creation.

Having seen, then, that the objective (the sum of which is the whole external universe) necessarily becomes when thought, both the objective and subjective in one, we now turn to the other side of the question, and we ask whether the subjective (the sum of which is the whole mind of man) does not

also necessarily convert itself, when conceived, into the subjective and the objective in one. For the establishment of this point in the affirmative is necessary for the completion of our premises. But we have no fears about the result; for certainly a simple reference made by any one to his own consciousness will satisfy him that, as he could not think of light without thinking of seeing, or of sound without thinking of hearing, so now he cannot conceive seeing without conceiving light, or hearing without conceiving sound. Starting with light and sound, we found that these, the objective parts of perception, became, when construed to thought, both subjective and objective in one; so, now, starting with seeing and hearing, we find that each of these, the subjective parts of perception, become both subjective and objective when conceived. For, let us make the attempt as often as we will, we shall find that it is impossible to think of seeing without thinking of light, or of hearing without thinking of sound. Vision is thought through the thought of light, and hearing through the thought of sound, and they can be thought in no other manner, and these two are conceived not as two but as one.

But is there no such thing as a faculty of seeing, and a faculty of hearing, which can be thought independently of light and sound? By thinking of these faculties, are we not enabled to think of hearing and seeing without thinking of sound and light? A great deal, certainly, has been said and written about

such faculties; but they are mere metaphysical chimeras of a most deceptive character, and it is high time that they should be blotted from the pages of speculation. If, in talking of these faculties, we merely meant to say that man is *able* to see and hear, we should find no fault with them. But they impose upon us by deceiving us into the notion that we can think what it is not possible for us to think, namely, perceptions without their objects—vision without light, and hearing without sound. Consider, for example, what is meant by the faculty of hearing. There is meant by it—is there not?—a power or capacity of hearing, which remains dormant and inert until excited by the presence of sound; and which, while existing in that state, can be conceived without any conception being formed of its object. But, in thinking this faculty, are we not obliged to think it as something which *would be* excited by sound, if sound were present to arouse it; and in order to think of what is embodied in the words, "would be excited by sound," are we not constrained to think sound itself, and to think it in the very same moment, and in the very same thought, in which we think the faculty that apprehends it? In other words, in order to think the faculty, are we not forced to have recourse to the notion of the very object which we professed to have left out of our account in framing our conception of the faculty? Most assuredly, the faculty and the object exist in an ideal unity, which cannot be dissolved by any exertion of thought.

Again, perhaps you will maintain that the faculty of hearing may be thought of as something which exists *anterior* to the existence or application of sound; and that, being thought of as such, it must be conceived independently of all conception of its object, sound being, *ex hypothesi*, not yet *in rerum natura*. But let any one attempt to frame a conception of such an existence, and he will discover that it is possible for him to do so only by thinking back in union with that existence, the very sound which he pretended was not yet in thought or in being. Therefore, in this and every other case in which we commence by thinking the subjective of any perception, we necessarily blend with it the objective of that perception in one indivisible thought. It is both of these together which form a conceivability. Each of them, singly, is but half a thought, or, in other words, is no thought at all; is an abstraction, which may be uttered, but which certainly cannot be conceived.

We have now completed the construction of our premises. One or two condensed sentences will show the reader the exact position in which we stand. Our intercourse with the external universe was the given whole with which we had to deal. The older philosophies divided this given whole into the external universe on the one hand, and our perceptions of it on the other; but they were never able to show how these two, the objective and the subjective, could

again be understood to coalesce. Like magicians with but half the powers of sorcery, they had spoken the dissolving spell which severed man's mind from the universe, but they were unable to articulate the binding word which again might bring them into union. It was reserved for the speculation of a later day to utter this word. And this it did by admitting *in limine* the distinction; but, at the same time, by showing that *each* of the divided members again resolves itself into *both* the factors, into which the original whole was separated; and that in this way the distinction undoes itself, while the subjective and the objective, each of them becoming both of them in one thought, are thus restored to their original indissoluble unity. An illustration will make this plain. In treating of mind and matter and their connection, the old philosophy is like a chemistry which resolves a neutral salt into an acid and an alkali, and is then unable to show how these two separate existences may be brought together. The new philosophy is like a chemistry which admits, at the outset, the analysis of the former chemistry, but which then shows that the acid is again *both* an acid and an alkali *in one;* and that the alkali is again *both* an alkali and an acid *in one:* in other words, that instead of having, as we supposed, a separate acid and a separate alkali under our hand, we have merely two neutral salts instead of one. The new philosophy then shows that the question respecting perception answers itself in this way, that there is no occasion for

thought to explain how that may be united into one, which no effort of thought is able to put asunder into two.

By appealing to the facts of our intelligence, then, we have found that, whenever we try to think what we heretofore imagined to be the purely objective part of any perception, we are forced, by an invincible law of our nature, to think the subjective part of the perception along with it; and to think these two not as two, but as constituting one thought. And we have also found that, whenever we try to think what we heretofore imagined to be the purely subjective part of any perception, we are forced by the same law of our nature, to think the objective part of the perception along with it; and to think these two, not as two, but as constituting one thought. Therefore the objective, which hitherto, through a delusion of thought, had been considered as that which excluded the subjective from its sphere, was found to embrace and comprehend the subjective, and to be nothing and inconceivable without it; while the subjective, which hitherto, through the same delusion of thought, had been considered as that which excluded the objective from its sphere, was found to embrace and comprehend the objective, and to be nothing and inconceivable without it. We have now reached the very *acme* of our speculation, and shall proceed to point out the very singular change which this discovery brings about, with regard to the question with which we commenced these remarks, the question

concerning the intercourse between man and the external universe.

What was hitherto considered the objective, was the whole external universe; and what was hitherto considered the subjective, was the whole percipient power, or, in other words, the whole mind of man. But we have found that this objective, or the whole external universe, cannot become a thought at all, unless we blend and identify with it the subjective, or the whole mind of man. And we have also found that this subjective, or the whole mind of man, cannot become a thought at all, unless we blend and identify with it the objective, or the whole external universe. So that, instead of the question as it originally stood, What is the nature of the connection which subsists between the mind of man *and* the external world? in other words, between the subjective and the objective of perception? the question becomes this, and into this form it is forced by the laws of the very thought which thinks it, What is the nature of the connection which subsists between the mind of man *plus* the external universe on the one hand, AND the mind of man *plus* the external universe on the other? Or differently expressed, What is the connection between mind-and-matter (in one), and mind-and-matter (in one)? Or differently still, What is the connection between the subjective subject-object and the objective subject-object?

This latter, then, is the question really asked. This is the form into which the original question is changed,

by the very laws and nature of thought. We used no violence with the question, we made no effort to displace it, that we might bring forward the new question in its room; we merely thought it, and this is the shape which it necessarily assumed. In this new form the question is still the same as the one originally asked; the same, and yet how different!

But though this is the question really asked, it is not the one which the asker really wished or expected to get an answer to. No; what he wished to get explained was the nature of the connection between what was heretofore considered the subjective, and what was heretofore considered the objective part of perception. Now, touching this point, the following is the only explanation which it is possible to give him. Unless we are able to think two things *as two* and separated from each other, it is vain and unreasonable to ask how they can become one. Unless we are able to hold the subjective and the objective apart in thought, we cannot be in a position to inquire into the nature of their connection. But we have shown that it is not possible for us, by any effort of thought, to hold the subjective and the objective apart; that the moment the subjective is thought, it becomes both the subjective and the objective in one; and that the moment the objective is thought, it becomes both the subjective and the objective in one; and that, however often we may repeat the attempt to separate them, the result is invariably the same; each of the terms, mistakenly supposed to be but a member of

one whole, is again found to be itself that very whole. Therefore we see that it is impossible for us to get ourselves into a position from which we might inquire into the nature of the connection between mind and matter, because it is not possible for thought to construe, intelligibly to itself, the ideal disconnection which must necessarily be presupposed as preceding such an inquiry. It must not be supposed, however, that this inability to separate the subject and object of perception argues any weakness on the part of human thought. Here reason merely obeys her own laws; and the just conclusion is, that these two are not really two, but are, in truth, fundamentally and originally one.

Let us add, too, that when we use the words "connection between," we imply that there are two things to be connected. But here there are not two things, but only one. Let us again have recourse to our old illustration of the neutral salt. Our hypothesis (for the purpose of explaining the present question) is, with regard to this substance, that its analysis, repeated as often as it may be, invariably gives us, not an alkali *and* an acid, but what turns out to be an acid-alkali (an indivisible unit), when we examine what we imagined to be the pure acid; and also what turns out to be an acid-alkali (an indivisible unit), when we examine what we imagined to be the pure alkali; so that, supposing we should inquire into the connection between the acid and the alkali, the question would either be, What is the connection

between an acid-alkali on the one hand, and an acid-alkali on the other? in other words, What is the connection between two neutral salts? or it would be this absurd one, What is the connection *between one* thing, the indivisible acid-alkali? In the same way, with respect to the question in hand. There is not a subjective *and* objective before us, but there is what we find to be an indivisible subjective-objective, when we commence by regarding what we imagined to be the pure subjective; and there is what we find to be an indivisible subjective-objective also, when we commence by regarding what we imagined to be the pure objective; so that the question respecting the nature of the connection between the subjective and the objective comes to be either this, What is the nature of the connection between two subjective-objectives? (but that is not the question to which an answer was wished), or else this, What is the nature of the connection *between one* thing, one thing which no effort of thought can construe as really two? Surely no one but an Irishman would think of asking, or expecting an answer to, such a question.

Now, with regard to the question in its new shape, it is obvious that it requires no answer; and that no answer given to it would be explanatory of any real difficulty. For, as in chemistry, no purpose would be gained; no new truth would be evolved by our explaining the connection between two neutral salts, except an observed increase of bulk in one neutral

salt; so in explaining the connection between two subject-objects (*i. e.*, between mind-and-matter *and* mind-and-matter), no new truth could be elicited, no difficulty whatever would be solved, the *quantum* before us would be merely increased. Some allowance must be made for the imperfection of the above illustration, but we think that it may serve to indicate our meaning. The true state of the case, however, is that there are not really two subject-objects before us, but only one viewed under two different aspects. The subject-object viewed subjectively, is the whole mind of man, not without an external universe along with it, but with an external universe necessarily given in the very giving, in the very conception of that mind. In this case all external nature is *our* nature, is the necessary integration of man. The subject-object viewed objectively, is the whole external universe, not without mind along with it, but with mind necessarily given in the very giving, in the very conception of that external universe. In this case *our* nature is external nature, is the necessary integration of the universe. Beginning with the subjective subject-object (mind), we find that its very central and intelligible essence is to have an external world as one with it; beginning with the objective subject-object (the external world), we find that its very central and intelligible essence is to have a mind as one with it. He who can maintain his equilibrium between these two opposite views without falling over either into the one

(which conducts to idealism) or into the other (which conducts to materialism), possesses the gift of genuine speculative insight.

One important result of this view of the question is, that it demolishes for ever that explanation of perception which is founded on the relation of cause and effect. Because it has been shown that the cause, that is, the object, cannot be conceived at all unless the effect, that is, the perception, be already conceived in inseparable union with it. Therefore, when we say that the object is the cause of our perception, we merely say that that which, when thought, becomes one with our perception, is the cause of our perception. In other words, we are guilty of the glaring *petitio principii* of maintaining that our perceptions of objects are the causes of our perceptions of objects.

Another important result of the new philosophy is the finishing stroke which it gives to the old systems of dogmatic Realism and dogmatic Idealism. The former of these maintains that an outward world exists, independent of our perceptions of it. The latter maintains that no such world exists, and that we are cognisant *merely* of our own perceptions. But this new doctrine shows that these systems are investigating a problem which cannot possibly be answered either in the affirmative or the negative; not on account of the limited nature of the human faculties, but because the question itself is an irrational and unintelligible one. For if we say, with

dogmatic Realism, that an outward world does exist independent of our perception of it, this implies that we are able to separate, in thought, external objects and our perceptions of them. But such a separation we have shown to be impossible and inconceivable. And if, on the other hand, we say, with dogmatic Idealism, that an outward world does *not* exist independent of our perceptions of it, and that we are conscious *only* of these perceptions, this involves us in exactly the same perplexity. Because to think that there is no outward independent world, is nothing more than to think an outward independent world *away*, but to think an independent world *away*, we must first of all think it; but to think an outward independent world at all, is to be able to make the distinction which we have shown it is impossible for us to make, the distinction, namely, between objects and our perceptions of them. Therefore this question touching the reality or non-reality of an external world cannot be answered, not because it is unanswerable, but because it is unaskable.

We now take leave of a subject which we not only have not exhausted, but into the body and soul of which we do not pretend to have entered. We have confined our discussion to the settlement of the preliminaries of one great question. We think, however, that we have indicated the true foundations upon which modern philosophy must build, that we have described the vital crisis in which speculative thought is at present labouring, while old things are

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passing away, and all things are becoming new. This form of the truth is frail and perishable, and will quickly be forgotten; but the truth itself which it embodies is permanent as the soul of man, and will endure for ever. We hope, in conclusion, that some allowance will be made for this sincere, though perhaps feeble, endeavour to catch the dawning rays which are now heralding the sunrise of a new era of science, the era of genuine speculation.

BERKELEY AND IDEALISM

BERKELEY AND IDEALISM.[1]

Among all philosophers, ancient or modern, we are acquainted with none who presents fewer vulnerable points than Bishop Berkeley. His language, it is true, has sometimes the appearance of paradox; but there is nothing paradoxical in his thoughts, and time has proved the adamantine solidity of his principles. With less sophistry than the simplest, and with more subtlety than the acutest of his contemporaries, the very perfection of his powers prevented him from being appreciated by the age in which he lived. The philosophy of that period was just sufficiently tinctured with common sense to pass current with the vulgar, while the common sense of the period was just sufficiently coloured by philosophy to find acceptance among the learned. But Berkeley,

[1] 'A Review of Berkeley's Theory of Vision, designed to show the unsoundness of that celebrated speculation.' By Samuel Bailey, author of 'Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions,' &c. London: Ridgway. 1842.

ingenious beyond the ingenuities of philosophy, and unsophisticated beyond the artlessness of common sense, saw that there was no sincerity in the terms of this partial and unstable compromise; that the popular opinions, which gave currency and credence to the theories of the day, were not the unadulterated convictions of the natural understanding; and that the theories of the day, which professed to give enlightenment to the popular opinions, were not the genuine offspring of the speculative reason. In endeavouring to construct a system in which this spurious coalition should be exposed, and in which our natural convictions and our speculative conclusions should be more firmly and enduringly reconciled, he necessarily offended both parties, even when he appeared to be giving way to the opposite prejudices of each. He overstepped the predilections both of the learned and the unlearned. His extreme subtlety was a stumbling-block in the path of the philosophers; and his extreme simplicity was more than the advocates of common sense were inclined to bargain for.

But the history of philosophy repairs any injustice which may be done to philosophy itself; and the doctrines of Berkeley, incomplete as they appear when viewed as the isolated tenets of an individual, and short as they no doubt fell, in his hands, of their proper and ultimate expression, acquire a fuller and a profounder significance when studied in connection with the speculations which have since followed in their train. The great problems of human-

ity have no room to work themselves out within the limits of an individual mind. Time alone weaves a canvas wide enough to do justice to their true proportions; and a few broad strokes is all that the genius of any one man, however gifted, is permitted to add to the mighty and illimitable work. It is therefore no reproach to Berkeley to say that he left his labours incomplete; that he was frequently misunderstood, that his reasonings fell short of their aim, and that he perhaps failed to carry with him the unreserved and permanent convictions of any one of his contemporaries. The subsequent progress of philosophy shows how much the science of man is indebted to his researches. He certainly was the first to stamp the indelible impress of his powerful understanding on those principles of our nature, which, since his time, have brightened into imperishable truths in the light of genuine speculation. His genius was the first to swell the current of that mighty stream of tendency towards which all modern meditation flows, the great gulf-stream of Absolute Idealism.

The peculiar endowment by which Berkeley was distinguished, far beyond his predecessors and contemporaries, and far beyond almost every philosopher who has succeeded him, was the eye he had *for facts*, and the singular pertinacity with which he refused to be dislodged from his hold upon them. The fact, the whole fact, and nothing but the fact, was the clamorous and incessant demand of his intellect, in

whatever direction it exercised itself. Nothing else, and nothing less, could satisfy his intellectual cravings. No man ever delighted less to expatiate in the regions of the occult, the abstract, the impalpable, the fanciful, and the unknown. His heart and soul clung with inseparable tenacity to the concrete realities of the universe; and with an eye uninfluenced by spurious theories, and unperverted by false knowledge, he saw directly into the very life of things. Hence he was a speculator in the truest sense of the word; for speculation is not the art of devising ingenious hypotheses, or of drawing subtle conclusions, or of plausibly manœuvring abstractions. Strictly and properly speaking, it is the power of seeing true facts, and of *unseeing* false ones; a simple enough accomplishment to all appearance, but nevertheless one which, considered in its application to the study of human nature, is probably the rarest, and, at any rate, has been the least successfully cultivated, of all the endowments of intelligence.

What a rare and transcendent gift this faculty is, and how highly Berkeley was endowed with it, will be made more especially apparent when we come to speak of his great discoveries on the subject of vision. In the meantime, we shall take a survey of those broader and more fully developed doctrines of Idealism to which his speculations on the eye were but the tentative herald or preliminary stepping-stone.

People who have no turn for philosophic research

are apt to imagine that discussions on the subject of matter are carried on for the purpose of proving something, either *pro* or *con*, concerning the existence of this disputed entity. No wonder, then, that they should regard the study of philosophy as a most frivolous and inane pursuit. But we must be permitted to remark that these discussions have no such object in view. Matter and its existence is a question about which they have no direct concern. They are entirely subservient to the far greater end of making us acquainted with our own nature. This is their sole and single aim; and if such knowledge could be obtained by any other means, these investigations would certainly never have encumbered the pages of legitimate inquiry. But it is not so to be obtained. The laws of thought can be discovered only by vexing, in all its bearings, the problem respecting the existence of matter. Therefore, to those interested in these laws, we need make no further apology for disturbing the dust which has gathered over the researches on this subject of our country's most profound, but most misrepresented, philosopher.

Berkeley is usually said to have denied the existence of matter; and in this allegation there is something which is true, combined with a great deal more that is false. But what *is* matter? *That* is matter, said Dr Johnson, once upon a time, kicking his foot against a stone; a rather peremptory explanation, but, at the same time, one for which Berkeley, to use the Doctor's own language, would have *hugged* him.

The great Idealist certainly never denied the existence of matter in the sense in which Johnson understood it. As the touched, the seen, the heard, the smelled, and the tasted, he admitted and maintained its existence as readily and completely as the most illiterate and unsophisticated of mankind.

In what sense, then, was it that Berkeley denied the existence of matter? He denied it not in the sense in which the multitude understood it, but solely in the sense in which *philosophers*[1] understood and explained it. And what was it that philosophers understood by matter? They understood by it an occult something which, in itself, is *not* touched, *not* seen, *not* heard, *not* smelled, and *not* tasted; a phantom-world lying behind the visible and tangible universe, and which, though constituting in their estimation the sum and substance of all reality, is yet never itself brought within the sphere or apprehension of the senses. Thus, under the direction of a misguided imagination, they fancied that the sensible qualities which we perceive in things were copies of other occult qualities of which we have no perception, and that the whole sensible world was the unsubstantial representation of another and real world, hidden entirely from observation, and inaccessible to all our faculties.

Now it was against this metaphysical phantom of

[1] Berkeley's Works: 'Of the Principles of Human Knowledge,' sec. 35, 37, 56. First Dialogue, vol. i. pp. 110, 111. Second Dialogue, vol. i. p. 159. Third Dialogue, vol. i. p. 199, 222. Ed. 1820.

the brain, this crotchet-world of philosophers, and against it alone, that all the attacks of Berkeley were directed. The doctrine that the realities of things were not made for man, and that he must rest satisfied with their mere appearances, was regarded, and rightly regarded by him, as the parent of scepticism,[1] with all her desolating train. He saw that philosophy, in giving up the reality immediately within her grasp, in favour of a reality supposed to be less delusive, which lay beyond the limits of experience, resembled the dog in the fable, who, carrying a piece of meat across a river, let the substance slip from his jaws, while, with foolish greed, he snatched at its shadow in the stream. The dog lost his dinner, and philosophy let go her secure hold upon the truth. He therefore sided with the vulgar, who recognise no distinction between the reality and the appearance of objects, and, repudiating the baseless hypothesis of a world existing unknown and unperceived, he resolutely maintained that what are called the sensible shows of things are in truth the very things themselves.

The precise point of this polemic between Berkeley and the philosophers, is so admirably stated in the writings of David Hume, that we feel we cannot do justice to the subject without quoting his simple and perspicuous words; premising, however, that the arch-sceptic had his own good reasons for not doing full justice to his great forerunner. Nothing indeed

[1] 'Principles of Human Knowledge,' sec. 86, 87.

was further from his intention than the wish that the world should know the side which, in this controversy, Berkeley had so warmly espoused. Had he furnished this information, he would have frustrated the whole scope of his own observations.

"Men," says Hume, "are carried by a natural instinct or prepossession to repose faith in their senses. When they follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always suppose the *very images* presented to the senses *to be* the external objects, and never entertain any suspicion that the one are nothing but representations of the other. But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us that nothing can ever be present to the mind *but an image or perception.* So far, then, we are necessitated by reasoning to contradict or depart from the primary instincts of nature, and to embrace a new system with regard to the evidence of our senses. But here philosophy finds herself extremely embarrassed, when she would justify this new system, and obviate the cavils and objections of the sceptics. She can no longer plead the infallible and irresistible instinct of nature, for that led us to a quite different system, which is acknowledged fallible and even erroneous. And to justify this pretended philosophical system by a chain of clear and convincing argument, or even any appearance of argument, exceeds the power of all human capacity." Then follows the famous sceptical dilemma which was

never, before or since, so clearly and forcibly put. "Do you," he continues (firstly), "follow the instinct and propensities of nature in assenting to the veracity of sense? But these lead you to believe that the *very perception or sensible image is the external object.*" (Then, secondly), "Do you *disclaim this principle* in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are *only representations* of something external? You here depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove that the perceptions are connected with any external objects."[1]

Now, when a man constructs a dilemma, it is well that he should see that both of its horns are in a condition to gore to the quick any luckless opponent who may throw himself upon either of their points. But Hume had only tried the firmness and sharpness of the second horn of this dilemma; and certainly its power of punishing had been amply proved by the mercilessness with which it had lacerated, during every epoch, the body of speculative science. But he had left untried the temper of the other horn. In the triumph of his overweening scepticism, he forgot to examine this alternative antler, no doubt considering its aspect too menacing to be encountered even by

[1] Hume's Philosophical Works, vol. iv. pp. 177, 178, 179. Ed. 1826. We have abridged the passage, but have altered none of Hume's expressions.

the most foolhardy assailant. But the horn was far less formidable than it looked. Berkeley had already thrown himself upon it, and though he did not find it to be exactly a cushion of down, he was not one whit damaged in the encounter. "*I* follow," says he, embracing the first of the alternatives, "*I* follow the instincts and prepossessions of nature. *I* assent to the veracity of sense, and *I* believe that the very perception or sensible image *is* the external object, and on no account whatever will I consent 'to disclaim this principle.' Your philosophy, your more rational opinions, your system of representation, your reasonings which, you say, necessitate me to depart from my primary instincts, all these I give, without reservation, to the winds. And now, *what do you make of me?*"[1] And if he had answered

[1] *Vide* Berkeley's Works, vol. i. pp. 182, 200, 203.—If the anachronism were no objection, a very happy and appropriate motto for Berkeley's works would be—

"Spernit *Humum* fugiente penna."
—Horace, Od. iii. 2, 24.

David Hume, however, was a very great man—great as a historian, as every one admits; but greater still as a philosopher; for it is impossible to calculate what a blank, but for him, the whole speculative science of Europe for the last seventy years would have been. If the reader wishes to see the character of his writings, and the scope of the sceptical philosophy fairly appreciated, we beg to refer him to an article in the 'Edinburgh Review' (Vol. LII. p. 196 *et seq.*, Art. "Philosophy of Perception"), written by Sir William Hamilton, and which, in our opinion, contains more condensed thought and more condensed learning than are to be found in any similar number of pages in our language, on any subject whatever. It gives us great pleasure to see that the writings of this distinguished philosopher, extracted

thus, as he would undoubtedly have done had he been alive, for such a reply is in harmony with the whole spirit of his philosophy, we do not, indeed, see what Hume, with all his subtle dialect, could have made of him. But the champion of common sense, he alone who could have foiled the prince of sceptics at his own weapons, was dead,[1] and the cause had fallen into the hands of Dr Reid, a far easier customer, who, when he could not avoid both horns of the dilemma, preferred to encounter the second, as apparently the less mischievous of the two.

The first great point, then, on which Berkeley differed from the ordinary philosophical doctrine, and sided with the vulgar, is that he contended, with the whole force of his intellect, for the inviolable identity of objects and the appearances of objects. The external world *in itself*, and the external world in relation *to us*, was a philosophic distinction which he refused to recognise. In his creed, the substantive and the phenomenal were one. And, though he has

from the 'Edinburgh Review,' have been translated into French (Paris, 1840) by M. Peisse, a very competent translator, who has prefixed to the work an introduction of his own, not unworthy of the profound disquisitions that follow.

[1] *Was dead.* This is not precisely true, for Hume's 'Treatise of Human Nature,' from which the above extract is taken, was published in 1739, and Berkeley did not die until 1753. But we explain it by saying that Hume's work fell dead-born from the press, and did not attract any degree of attention until long after its publication; and when at length, after a lapse of many years, the proper time for answering it arrived, on account of the general notoriety which it had suddenly obtained, that then Berkeley was no more.

been accused of sacrificing the substance to the shadow, and though he still continues to be charged, by every philosophical writer, with reducing all things to ideas in the mind, he was guilty of no such absurdity, at least when interpreted by the spirit, if not by the letter of his speculations. Nay, the very letter of his philosophy, in general, forestalls, and bears him up against, all the cavils of his opponents. His own words, in answer to these allegations, are the following. "No," says he, addressing his antagonist Hylas, who is advocating the common opinion of philosophers, and pressing against him the objections we have spoken of, "No, I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather *ideas* into *things;* since those immediate objects of perception, which, according to you, are only appearances of things, *I* take to be the real things themselves."

"Things!" rejoins Hylas; "you may pretend what you please; but it is certain you leave us nothing but the empty forms of things, the outside of which only strikes the senses."

"What you," answers Berkeley, "what *you* call the empty forms and outside of things, seem to *me* the very things themselves. . . . We both, therefore, agree in this, that we perceive only sensible forms; but herein we differ, you will have them to be *empty appearances,* I, *real beings.* In short, you do *not* trust your senses, *I do.*"[1]

So far, then, there does not appear to be much

[1] Berkeley's Works, vol. i. p. 201. Ed. 1820.

justice in the ordinary allegation, that Berkeley discredited the testimony of the senses, and denied the existence of the material universe. He merely denied the distinction between things and their appearances, and maintained that the thing *was* the appearance, and that the appearance *was* the thing. But this averment brings us into the very thick of the difficulties of the question. For does it not imply that the external world exists *only* in so far as it is perceived, that its *esse*, as Berkeley says, is *percipi*; that its existence is its being perceived, and that, if it were not perceived, it would not exist? At first sight the averment certainly does imply something very like all this; therefore, we must now be extremely cautious how we proceed.

We have already remarked that Berkeley, in vindicating the cause of common sense, frequently appeared to overshoot the mark, and to give vent to opinions which somewhat staggered even the simplest of the vulgar, and seemed less reconcilable with the obvious sentiments of nature than the philosophical doctrines themselves which they were brought forward to supplant. And the opinion now stated is the most startling of these tenets, and one which, to all appearance, is calculated rather to endamage than to help the cause which it is intended to support. But, in advancing it, Berkeley knew perfectly well what he was about; and though he is far from having fenced it with all the requisite explanations, and though he did not succeed in putting it in a

very clear light, or in giving it an adequate and ultimate form of expression, or in obviating all the cavils and strong objections to which it was exposed, or in sounding the depths of its almost unfathomable significance; still he felt, with the instinct of a prophet, that it was a stronghold of impregnable truth, and that in resting on it he was treading on a firm footing of fact which could never be swept away. Time, and the labours of his successors, have done for him what the span of one man's life—and span too, we may say, of one man's intellect, capacious as his undoubtedly was—prevented him doing for himself.

We shall admit, then, that Berkeley holds that matter has no existence independently of mind, that mind, if entirely removed, would involve in its downfall the absolute annihilation of matter. And admitting this, we think, at the same time, that we can afford a perfectly satisfactory explanation of so strange and difficult a paradox, and resolve a knot which Berkeley was the first to loosen, but which he certainly did not explicitly untie. The question is, Supposing ourselves away or annihilated, would the external world continue to exist as heretofore, or would it vanish into nonentity? But the terms of this question involve a preliminary question, which must first of all be disposed of. Mark what these terms are; they are comprised in the words, "*supposing ourselves away or annihilated.*" But *can* we suppose ourselves away or annihilated? If we

can, then we promise to proceed at once to give a categorical answer to the question just put. But if we cannot, then the prime condition of the question not being purified, the question itself has not been intelligibly asked; and therefore it cannot expect to receive a rational or intelligible answer. Should this be found to be the case, it will be obvious that we have been imposing upon ourselves, and have only mistakenly imagined ourselves to be asking a question which in truth we are *not* asking.

Can we, then, conceive ourselves removed or annihilated? is this thought a possible or conceivable supposition? Let us try it by the test of experience, by hypothetically answering the original question, *in the first place*, in the affirmative, and by saying that, although we conceive ourselves and all percipient beings annihilated, still the great universe of matter would maintain its place as firmly and as faithfully as before. We believe, then, that were there no eye actually present to behold them, the sky would be as bright, and the grass as green, as if they were gazed upon by ten million witnesses; that, though there were no ear present to hear them, the thunder would roar as loudly, and the sea sound as tempestuously as before; and that the firm-set earth, though now deserted by man, would remain as solid as when she resisted the pressure of all the generations of her children. But do we not see that, in holding this belief, we have violated, at the very outset, the essential conditions of our question?

We bound ourselves to annihilate the percipient in thought, to keep him ideally excluded from the scene, and having done this, we professed ourselves ready to believe and maintain that the universe would preserve its place and discharge its functions precisely the same as heretofore. But in thinking of the bright sky, and of the green grass, and of the loud thunder, and of the solid earth, we have *not* kept him excluded from the scene, but have brought back in thought the very percipient being whom we supposed, but most erroneously supposed, we had abstracted from his place in the creation. For what is this brightness and this greenness but an ideal vision, which cannot be thought of unless man's eyesight be incarnated with it in one inseparable conception? Nature herself, we may say, has so *beaten up together* sight and colour, that man's faculty of abstraction is utterly powerless to dissolve the charmed union. The two (supposed) elements are not two, but only one, for they cannot be separated in thought even by the craft of the subtlest analysis. It is God's synthesis, and man cannot analyse it. And further, what is the loud thunder, and what is the sounding sea, without the ideal restoration of the hearing being whom we professed to have thought of as annihilated? And finally, what is the solidity of the rocks and mountains but that which is conceived to respond to the touch and tread of some human percipient, ideally restored to traverse their unyielding and everlasting heights?

Perhaps the reader may here imagine that we are imposing a quibble both on ourselves and him, and that though we may not be able to conceive ourselves *ideally* removed, yet that we are perfectly able to conceive ourselves *actually* removed out of the universe, leaving its existence unaltered and entire; but a small degree of reflection may satisfy him that this distinction will not help him in the least. For, what is this universe which the reader, after conceiving himself, as he thinks, *actually* away from it, has left behind him unmutilated and entire? We ask him to tell us something about it. But when he attempts to do so, he will invariably find the constitution of his nature to be such that, instead of being able to tell us anything about *it*, he is compelled to revert to a description of his own human perceptions of it, perceptions which, however, ought to be left altogether out of the account; for what he is bound to describe to us is the universe itself, abstracted from all those impressions of it which were supposed to be non-existent. But this is what it is impossible for him to describe. A man declares that if he were annihilated the universe would still exist. But what universe would still exist? The bright, the green, the solid, the sapid, the odoriferous, the extended, and the figured universe would still exist. Certainly it would. But this catalogue comprises the series of your perceptions of the universe, and this is not what we want; this is precisely what you undertook *not* to give us. In mixing up the

thought of these perceptions with the universe, professedly thought to exist independently of them, you have transgressed the stipulated terms of the question, the conclusion from which is that, in supposing yourself annihilated, you did *not* suppose yourself annihilated, you took yourself back into being in the very same breath in which you puffed yourself away into nonentity.

We must here beg to guard ourselves most particularly against the imputation of having said that, in thinking of the external universe, man thinks *only* of his own perceptions of it; or that, when he has it actually present before him, he is conscious *only* of the impressions which it makes upon him. This is a doctrine very commonly espoused by the idealistic writers. It is a tempting trap into which they have all been too prone to fall; and Berkeley himself, and a man as great as he, Fichte, have not altogether escaped the snare. But it cuts up the very roots of genuine speculative idealism, and controverts the first and strongest principle on which it rests. This principle, we may remind the reader, is that the thing *is* the appearance, and that the appearance *is* the thing; that the object *is* our perception of it, and that our perception of it *is* the object; in short, that these two are convertible ideas, or, more properly speaking, are one and the same idea. But this use of the word *only* implies that we possess a faculty of abstraction, in virtue of which we are able to distinguish between objects

and our perceptions of objects, between things and the appearances of things, a doctrine which, if admitted (and admit it we must, if we use the word *only* in the application alluded to above), would leave this as the distinction between realism and idealism, that whereas the former separates objects from our perceptions of them for the purpose of *preserving* the objects, the latter separates the two for the purpose of *annihilating* the objects. And the truth is, that this is precisely the distinction between spurious realism and spurious idealism. They both found upon the assumed capability of making this abstraction, only they differ, as we have said, herein, that the one makes it in order to preserve the objects, and the other in order to destroy them. But genuine idealism, looking only to the fact, and instructed by the unadulterated dictates of common sense, denies altogether the capability of making the abstraction, denies that we can separate in thought objects and perceptions *at all;* and hence this system has nothing whatever to do either with the preservation or with the destruction of the material universe; and hence, too, it is identical, in its length, and in its breadth, and in its whole significance, with genuine unperverted realism, which just as stoutly refuses to acknowledge the operation of this pretended faculty. Let us beware, then, of maintaining that man, in his intercourse with the external universe, has *only* his own perceptions or impressions to deal with. It was this unwary aver-

ment which gave rise to the systems, on the one hand, of subjective idealism, with all its hampering absurdities; and, on the other hand, of hypothetical realism, with all its unwarrantable and unsatisfying conclusions.

To return to our question. It seems certain, then, that the question, Would matter exist if man were annihilated? cannot be intelligibly asked, when we consider it as answered in the affirmative, because it is clear that its terms cannot be complied with. Conceiving the universe to remain entire, we cannot conceive ourselves as abstracted or removed from its sphere. We think ourselves back, in the very moment in which we think ourselves away.

But, *in the second place,* suppose that we attempt to answer the question in the negative, and to maintain that the material universe would no longer exist if we and all percipient beings were annihilated; how will this hypothetical conclusion help us out of the difficulty which hampers the very enunciation of the problem? We are aware that this is the favourite conclusion of idealism as commonly understood, and it is a conclusion not altogether uncountenanced by the reasonings of Berkeley himself. But still the form of idealism which espouses any such conclusion is unguarded and shortsighted in the extreme. The ampler and more wary system refuses to have anything to do with it; for this system sees that, when the question is attempted to be answered in the negative, the conditions of its statement are not

one whit more faithfully discharged than they were when a reply was supposed to be given to it in the affirmative. For let us try the point. Let us say that, man being annihilated, there would no longer be any external universe; that is to say, that there would be universal colourlessness, universal silence, universal impalpability, universal tastelessness, and so forth. But universal colourlessness, universal silence, universal impalpability, universal tastelessness, and so forth, are just as much phenomena requiring, in thought, the presence of an ideal percipient endowed with sight and hearing and taste and touch, as their more positive opposites were phenomena requiring such a percipient. Non-existence itself is a phenomenon requiring a percipient present to apprehend it, just as much as existence is. No external world is no more no external world without an ideal percipient, than an external world is an external world without an ideal percipient. Therefore, in saying that there would be no external world if man were annihilated, we involve ourselves in precisely the same incapacity of rationally enunciating the question as we did in the former case. We are compelled to bring back in thought our very percipient selves, whom we declared we had conceived of as annihilated. In neither case can we adhere to the terms of the question; in neither case can we construe it intelligibly to our own minds; and therefore the question is unanswerable, not because it cannot be answered, but because it cannot be asked.

Now for the great truth to which these observations are the precursor. We have already taken occasion to remark that discussions of the kind we are engaged in, are carried on, not for the sake of any conclusion we may arrive at with respect to the existence or the non-existence of the material universe, but solely for the sake of the laws of human thought which may be evolved in the course of the research. Now, the conclusion to which we are led by the train of our present speculation is this, that no question and no proposition whatever can for a moment be entertained which involves the supposition of our annihilation. It is an irreversible law of human thought, that no such idea can be construed to the mind by any effort of the understanding, or rationally articulated by any power of language. We cannot, and we do not think it; we only *think that we think it.* And upon the basis of this law, and upon it alone, independently of revelation, rests the great doctrine of our immortality. The fear of death is a salutary fear, and the thought of death is a salutary thought, not because we can really think the thought or really entertain the fear, but only because we *imagine* that we can do so. This imagination of ours (we say it with the deepest reverence) is a gracious imposition practised upon us by the Author of our nature, for the wisest and most benevolent of purposes. We *appear* to ourselves to be able to realise the thought and the fear, and this it is which drives us back so irresistibly into the busy press of

life, and weds us so passionately to its rosy forms; we *are* not able to realise the thought or the fear, and this it is which makes us secretly to rejoice "in the sublime attractions of the grave." Woe to us, if we could indeed think of death! In the real thought of it we should be already dead, but in the mere illusive imagination of the thought we are already an immortal race. We have nothing to wait for; eternity is even now within us, and time, with all its vexing troubles, is no more.[1]

But to return to Berkeley. What then is the precise position in which he has left the question respecting man and the material universe? He maintains, as we have said, that matter depends entirely for its existence upon mind. And in this opinion we cordially agree with him. But we must be allowed to widen very amply the basis of his principle, otherwise, on account of the doctrine thus professed, we feel well assured that our friends would be disposed to call our sanity in question. Berkeley's doctrine amounts to this, that there are trees, for instance, and houses in the world, because they are either seen, and so forth, or thought of *as seen*, and so forth. But here his groundwork is far too narrow, for it seems to imply this, that there would be no trees and no houses *unless* they were seen, or thought of as seen. It is therefore exposed to strong

[1] Wordsworth's little poem, entitled 'We are Seven,' illustrates this great law of human thought—the natural inconceivability of death; and hence, simple as its character may be, it is rooted in the most profound and recondite psychological truth.

objections and misconstructions. The realist may laugh it to scorn by saying, "Then, I suppose, there are no trees and no houses when there is no man's mind either seeing or thinking of them!" But broaden the basis of the idealistic principle, and see how innocuous this objection falls to the ground; affirm that in the case of *every* phenomenon, that is, even in the case of the *phenomenon of the absence of all phenomena*, a subject-mind must be thought of as incarnated with the phenomenon, and the cavil is at once obviated and disarmed. The realist expects the idealist, in virtue of his principle, taken in its narrower significance, to admit that when the percipient neither sees, nor thinks of seeing, trees and houses, there would be no such thing as these objects. But the idealist, instructed by his principle in its wider significance, replies, "No, my good sir; no-trees and no-houses (*i.e.*, space empty of trees and houses) is a phenomenon, just as much as trees and houses themselves are phenomena; and as such it can no more exist without being seen or thought of as seen than any other phenomenon can. Therefore, if I were to admit that, in the total absence and oblivion of the percipient there would be no-trees and no-houses in a particular place, I should be guilty of the very error I am most anxious to avoid, and which it is the aim of my whole system to guard people against committing; I should merely be substituting *other* phenomena in lieu of those which had disappeared; I should merely be placing the phenomenon of

no-object in the room of the phenomenon of object, and, in maintaining (as you seem to expect I should) that the former might exist without being seen or thought of as seen, while the latter might not so exist, I should be giving a direct contradiction to my whole speculation: I should be chargeable with holding that *some* phenomena are independent and irrespective of a percipient mind either really or ideally present to them, and that *others* are not; whereas my great doctrine is, that *no* phenomena, not even, as I have said, the phenomenon of the absence of all phenomena, are thus independent or irrespective." It appears to us that Berkeley's principle requires to be enlarged in some such terms as these; and being so, we think that it is then proof against all cavils and objections whatsoever. It is perfectly true that the existence of matter depends entirely on the presence, that is, either the real or the ideal presence, of a conscious mind. But it does not follow from this that there would be *no-matter* if no such conscious mind were present or thought of as present, because *no-matter* depends just as much upon the real or the ideal presence of a conscious mind. Thus are spiked all the cannon of false realism; thus all her trenches are obliterated, all her supplies cut off, and all her resources rendered unserviceable. This, too, we may add, is the flank of false idealism turned, and her forces driven from their ground, while absolute real idealism, or the complete conciliation of common sense and philo-

sophy, remains in triumphant possession of the field.

Now we think that this mode of meeting the question respecting mind and matter, and of clearing its difficulties, is infinitely preferable to that resorted to by some philosophers, in which they make a distinction between what they call the *primary* and what they call the *secondary* qualities of matter; holding that the latter are purely subjective affections, or impressions existing only in ourselves; and that the former are purely objective elements, constituting the very existence of things. As this is a very prevalent and powerfully supported opinion, we cannot pass it by without some notice. But in our exposure of its futility we shall be very brief. All the secondary qualities, colours, sounds, tastes, smells, heat, hardness, everything, in short, which is an *affection of sense*, may be generalised at one sweep into *our mere* knowledge of things. But the primary qualities, which are usually restricted to extension and figure, and which constitute, it is said, the objective or real essence of things, and which are entirely independent of us, into what shall they be generalised? Into what but into this? into the *knowledge* of something, which exists in things over and above *our mere* knowledge of things. It is plain enough that we cannot generalise them into pure objective existence in itself; we can only generalise them into a *knowledge* of pure objective existence. But such a knowledge, that is to say,

a knowledge of something existing in things, over and above our *mere* knowledge of them, is not one whit less *our* knowledge, and is not one whit more *their* existence, than the other more subjective knowledge designated by the word *mere*. Our knowledge of extension and figure is just as little these real qualities themselves, as our affection of colour is objective colour itself. Just as little we say, and just as much. You (we suppose ourselves addressing an imaginary antagonist), you hold that our knowledge of the secondary qualities is not these qualities themselves; but we ask you, Is, then, our knowledge of the primary qualities these qualities themselves? This you will scarcely maintain; but perhaps you will say, Take away the affection of colour, and the colour no longer exists; and we retort upon you, Take away the knowledge of extension, and the extension no longer exists. This you will peremptorily deny, and we deny it just as peremptorily; but why do both of us deny it? Just because both of us have subreptitiously restored the knowledge of extension in denying that extension itself would be annihilated. The knowledge of extension *is* extension, and extension *is* the knowledge of extension. Perhaps, in continuation, you will say, we have our own ideas, the secondary qualities are in truth our own ideas; but that besides these we have an idea of something existing externally to us which is *not an idea*, and that this something forms the aggregate of the primary quali-

ties. Admitted. But is this idea of something which is not an idea, in any degree *less an idea* than the other ideas spoken of? We should like to be informed in what respect it is so. Depend upon it, the primary qualities must be held to stand on precisely the same footing as the secondary, in so far as they give us any information respecting real objective existences. In accepting the one class the mind may be passive, and in accepting the other class she may be active; but that distinction will not bring us one hair's-breadth nearer to our mark. If the one class is subjective, so is the other; if the one class is objective, so is the other; and the conciliating truth is, that both classes are at once subjective *and* objective. In fine, we thus break the neck of the distinction. There is a world as it exists in relation *to us:* true. And there is the same world as it exists *in itself*, and in non-relation to us: true also. But the world as it exists in relation to us, is just *one* relation in which the world exists in relation to us; and the world as it exists in itself, and in non-relation to us, is just *another* relation in which the world exists in relation to us.

Some readers may perhaps imagine that in making this strong statement we are denying the real objective existence, the primary qualities, the *noumena*, as they are sometimes called, of things. But we are doing no such thing. Such a denial would lead us at once into the clueless labyrinths of subjective idealism, which is a system we altogether repudiate.

All that we deny is *the distinction* between the primary and the secondary qualities, between the noumena and the phenomena; and we deny this distinction, because we deny the existence of the faculty (the faculty of abstraction) by means of which we are supposed to be capable of making it. This certainly is no denial, but rather an affirmation, of the primary qualities of real objective existence, and it places us upon the secure and impregnable ground of real objective idealism, a system in which knowledge and existence are identical and convertible ideas.

We shall now proceed to make a few remarks on the work which stands at the head of the present article, Mr Bailey's 'Review of Berkeley's Theory of Vision,' in which he endeavours "to show the unsoundness of that celebrated speculation."

Mr Bailey is favourably known to the literary portion of the community as the author of some ingenious 'Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions,' and he is doubtless a very clever man. But in the work before us, we must say that he has undertaken a task far beyond his powers, and that he has most signally failed, not because these powers are in themselves feeble, but because they have been misdirected against a monument—*ære perennius*—of solid and everlasting truth. The ability displayed in the execution of his work is immeasurably greater than the success with which it has been crowned.

Therefore, when we say that, in our opinion, Mr

Bailey's work has been anything but successful in its main object, we can at the same time conscientiously recommend a careful perusal of it to those who are interested in the studies of which it treats. Its chief merit appears to us to consist in this, that it indicates with sufficient clearness the difference between the entire views advocated by Berkeley himself on the subject of vision, and the partial views which it has suited the purposes or the ability of his more timid but less cautious followers to adopt. We shall immediately have occasion to speak of the respects in which the disciples have deserted the principles of the master; but let us first of all state the precise question at issue. There is not much fault to be found with the terms in which Mr Bailey has stated it, and therefore we cannot do better than make use of his words.

"Outness," says he, p. 13, "distance, real magnitude, and real figure, are not perceived (according to Berkeley's theory) immediately by sight, but, *in the first place*, by the sense of feeling or touch; and it is from experience alone that our visual sensations come to suggest to us these exclusively tangible properties. We, in fact, see *originally* nothing but various coloured appearances, which are felt as internal sensations; and we learn that they are external, and also what distances, real magnitudes, and real figures these coloured appearances indicate, just as we learn to interpret the meaning of the written characters of a language. Thus a being gifted with

sight, but destitute of the sense of touch, would have no perception of outness, distance, real magnitude, and real figure. Such is Berkeley's doctrine stated in the most general terms."

We beg the reader particularly to notice that the distance and outness here spoken of are the distance and outness of an object from the eye of the beholder; for Mr Bailey imagines, as we shall have occasion to show, that Berkeley holds that another species of outness, namely, the outness of one visible thing from other visible things, is not immediately perceived by sight. This latter opinion, however, is certainly not maintained by Berkeley, and the idea that it is so is, we think, the origin of the greater part of Mr Bailey's mistakes. The only other remark which we think it necessary to make on this exposition is, that we slightly object to the words which we have marked in italics, "*in the first place*," for they seem to imply that outness, &c., are perceived by sight in the *second* or in the *last* place. But Berkeley holds—and in this opinion we agree with him—that they are never perceived *at all* by the sense of *sight*, properly so called. The same objection applies to the word "*originally*," where it is said that we "see originally nothing but various coloured appearances," for it seems to imply that *ultimately* we come to *see more* than various coloured appearances. But this, following Berkeley's footsteps, we deny that we ever do. In other respects we think that the statement is perfectly correct and unobjectionable.

As a further statement and abstract of the theory, Mr Bailey proceeds to quote Berkeley's own words, in which he says "that distance or outness" (*i.e.*, outness from the eye) "is neither immediately of itself perceived by sight, nor yet apprehended and judged of by lines and angles, or anything that hath a necessary connection with it; but that it is only *suggested* to our thoughts by certain visible ideas and sensations attending vision, which, in their own nature, have no manner of similitude or relation either with distance or things placed at a distance. But, by a connection taught us by experience, they (viz., *visible ideas and visual sensations*) come to signify and suggest them (viz., *distance, and things placed at a distance*) to us after the same manner that words of any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for. Insomuch that a man born blind, and afterwards made to see, would not at first sight think the things he saw to be without his mind, or at any distance from him." Such is an outline of the theory which Mr Bailey undertakes to controvert.

In laying the groundwork of his objections, he first of all proceeds—and we think this the most valuable observation in his book—to point out the distinction between two separate opinions which may be entertained with regard to the outness of visible objects. The one opinion is, that sight is unable to determine that visible objects are external, or at any distance *at all* from the eye: the other opinion is, that sight, though gifted with the capacity of determining that

all visible objects are at *some* distance from the eye, is yet unable to determine the relative distances at which they stand towards it and towards one another. In the words of Mr Bailey, "Whether objects are seen to be external, or at *some* distance, is one question altogether distinct from the inquiry—whether objects are seen by the unassisted vision to be at *different* distances from the percipient." He then adds, "Yet Berkeley uniformly assumes them to be the same, or at least takes it for granted that they are to be determined by the same arguments." This is true enough in one sense, but Mr Bailey should have considered that if Berkeley did not make the discrimination, it was because he conceived that the opinion which maintained the absolute non-externality of visible objects (*i.e.*, of objects in relation to the organ of sight) was the only question properly at issue. The remark, however, is valuable, because Berkeley's followers, Reid, Stewart, and others, have supposed that the other question was the one to be grappled with; and, accordingly, they have not ventured beyond maintaining that the eye is unable to judge of the *different degrees* of distance at which objects may be placed from it. But the thoroughgoing opinion is the true one, and the followers have deserted their leader only to err, or to discover truths of no scientific value or significance whatever.

Let us now consider the general object which Berkeley had in view, and determine the proper point of sight from which his "theory of vision" should be

regarded. We have already remarked that it was but the stepping-stone or prelude to those maturer and more extended doctrines of idealism in which his genius afterwards expatiated, and which have made his name famous throughout every corner of the philosophic world; and which we have endeavoured to do justice to in the preceding pages, giving a more enlarged and unobjectionable construction to their principle, and clearing, we think, at least some of the difficulties which beset his statement of it. His theory of vision may be called an essay on the idealism of the eye, and of the eye alone. It is idealism restricted to the consideration of this sense, and is the first attempt that ever was made to embody a systematic and purely speculative critique of the facts of seeing. We use the words *purely speculative* in contradistinction from geometrical and physiological critiques of the same sense; of which there were abundance in all languages, but which, proceeding on mathematical or anatomical *data*, which are entirely *tactual*, had, in Berkeley's opinion, nothing whatever to do with the science of *optics*, properly so called. Optics, as hitherto treated, that is to say, as established on mathematical principles, appeared to him to be a false science *of vision;* for this reason, that the blind were found to be just as capable of understanding and appreciating it, as those were who could see. Hence he concluded, and most justly, that the true facts of sight had been left out of the estimate, because these were, and necessarily

must be, facts which no blind person could form any conception of. He accordingly determined to construct, or at least to pave the way towards the construction of, a truer theory of vision, in which these —the proper and peculiar facts of the sense—should be taken exclusively into account: and hence, passing from the mathematical and physiological method, he took up a different, and what we have called a purely speculative ground—a ground which cannot be rendered intelligible or conceivable to the blind, inasmuch as they are deficient in the sense which alone furnishes the *data* that are to be dealt with. The test by which Berkeley tried optical science was, Can the blind be brought to understand, or to form any conception of it? If they can, then the science *must* be false, for it ought to be a science of experiences from which they are entirely debarred. We should bear in mind, then, first of all, that his object in constructing his theory of vision was, leaving all geometrical and anatomical considerations out of the question, to apprehend the proper and peculiar facts of *sight*—the facts, the whole facts, and *nothing but* the facts, of that particular and isolated sense.

Now we think that Mr Bailey's leading error consists in his not having remarked the unswerving devotedness with which Berkeley follows out this aim; and hence, having failed to appreciate the singleness and unrelaxing perseverance of his purpose, he has consequently failed to appreciate the great success which has attended his endeavours. He has not

duly attended or done justice to the pertinacity with which Berkeley adheres to the facts of vision cut off from all the other knowledge of which our other senses are the inlets. In studying the science of vision, the eye of his mind has not been "single"; and hence his mind has not been "full of light." He does not himself appear to have experimentally verified the pure facts of the virgin eye as yet unwedded to the touch. He has not formed to himself a clear conception of the absolute distinction between these two senses and their respective objects—a distinction upon the clear apprehension of which the whole intelligibility of Berkeley's assertions and reasonings depends.

In proof of what we aver, let us turn to the consideration of one fact which Berkeley has largely insisted on as the fundamental fact of the science. Colour, says the Bishop, is the proper and only object of vision, and the *outness* of this object (*i.e.*, its outness from the eye) is *not* perceived by sight. Upon which Mr Bailey, disputing the truth of the latter fact, remarks,—"On turning to Berkeley's essay, we find literally no arguments which specifically apply to this question; nothing but bare assertion repeated in various phrases." This is undoubtedly too true—and perhaps Berkeley is to be condemned for having left his assertion so destitute of the support of reasoning. But he saw that he had stated a fact which he himself had verified, and perhaps he did not think it necessary to prove it to those who had eyes to see it

for themselves; perhaps he was unable to prove it. But, at any rate, Mr Bailey's complaint shows that he is deficient in that speculative sense which enables a man to see that to be a fact which is a fact, and to explicate its reason, even when no *rationale* of it has been given by him who originally promulgated it. This reason we shall now endeavour to supply. Let us ask, then, What do we mean when we say that a colour is *seen* to be external? We mean that it is seen to be external to *some other colour* which is before us. Thus we say that white is external to black, because we see it to be so. It is *only* when we can make a comparison between two or more colours that we can say that they are seen to be external—*i.e.*, external to each other. But if there were no colour but one before us, not being able to make any comparison, we should be unable by sight to form any judgment at all about its outness, or to say that we *saw* it to be out of anything. For what would it *be seen* to be out of? Out of the eye or the mind, you say. But you do not see the colour of the eye or of the mind—and therefore you have no ground whatever afforded you on which, instructed by the sense of sight, you can form your judgment. You have no other colour with which to compare it, and therefore, as a comparison with other colours is necessary before you can say that any one of them is *seen* to be external, you cannot predicate visible outness of it at all. Nor does it make any difference how numerous soever the colours before you may be. You can predicate

outness of them all in relation to each other; but you can predicate nothing of the sort with regard to any of them in relation to your eye or to your mind, for you have no colour of your eye or mind before you with which you can compare them, and *out* of which, in virtue of that comparison, you can say that they *visibly* exist. Doubtless, if you saw the colour of your own eye, you could then say that other visible objects, that is, other colours, were seen to be external to it. But, as you never see this, you have nothing left for it but even now to accept the fact as Berkeley laid it down, coupled with the reasoning by which we have endeavoured to explain and expiscate it. But the *touch!* Does not the touch enable us to form a judgment with respect to the outness of objects from the eye? Undoubtedly it does — as Berkeley everywhere contends. But the only question at present at issue is, Does the sight? — and the *fact* established beyond all question by the foregoing reasoning is, that it *does not.*

What makes people so reluctant and unwilling to accept this fact is, that they suppose we are requiring them to believe that visible objects, that is, colours, are not seen to be external to their own visible bodies; that, for instance, a colour, at the other end of the room, is not seen to be external to their hand, or the point of their own nose. They think that when such a colour is said not to be seen to be external to the eye, that we are maintaining that they must see it to be in close proximity to their own visible nose

or eyebrows. But, in truth, we are maintaining no position so completely at variance with the fact, and we are requiring of them no such extravagant and impossible belief. As well might they conceive that we are inclined to maintain that the chairs are not seen to be external to the table. Now, on the contrary, we hold it to be an undeniable fact (and so does Berkeley), that all visible objects are seen to be external, and at a distance from one another; that objects at the end of the street, or at the end of the great ranges of astronomy, are all seen to be very far removed from the visible features of our own faces; but we deny that these objects, and our own noses among the number, are seen to be external, or at any distance at all from our own sight; simply for this reason, that our sight is unable to see itself. How can we *see* a thing to be at any distance whatsoever from a thing which we *don't* see? Suppose a person were privately to bury a guinea somewhere, and then, pointing to St Paul's, were to ask a friend, How far is my guinea buried from that cathedral? What judgment could the person so interrogated form—what answer could he give? obviously none. The guinea might be buried under St Paul's foundation—it might be buried at Timbuctoo. There are no *data* furnished, from which a judgment may be formed, and a reply given. In the same way, with regard to sight and its objects; the requisite *data* for a judgment are not supplied to this sense. One *datum* is given, the visible object; but the other necessary

datum is withheld, namely, the visibleness of the organ itself. Therefore, by sight, we can form no judgment at all with respect to the distance at which objects may be placed from the organ; or perhaps it would be more proper to say, that we do form an obscure judgment, to the effect that all visible objects lie within the sphere of the eye; and that where the object is, there also is the organ which apprehends it. Or, to repeat the proof in somewhat different words, we affirm, that before sight can judge of the distance of objects from itself, or that they are distant at all, it must first *localise* both itself and the object. But it can only localise these two by seeing them, for sight can do nothing except by seeing. But it cannot see both of them; it can only see one of them. Therefore, it cannot localise both of them, and hence the conclusion is driven irresistibly home, that it can form no judgment that they are in any degree distant from one another.

Touching this point Mr Bailey puts forth an averment, which really makes us blush for the speculative capacity of our country. Speaking of the case of the young man who was couched by Cheselden, he remarks, in support of his own doctrine, that visible objects are seen to be external to the sight; and in commenting on the young man's statement, that "he thought all objects whatever touched his eyes as what he felt did his skin," he remarks, we say, upon this, that it clearly proves "visible objects appeared external *even* to his body, *to say nothing of*

his mind." External *even* to his body! Surely Mr Bailey did not expect that the young man was to perceive visible things to be *in* his visible body. Surely he does not think that the hands of Berkeley's argument would have been strengthened by any such preposterous revelation. Surely he is not such a crude speculator as to imagine that the mind is *in* the body, like the brain, the liver, or the lungs; and that to bear out Berkeley's theory, it was necessary that the visible universe, of which the visible body is a part, should be seen to be in this mind internal again in its turn to the visible body. Truly this is ravelling the hank of thought with a vengeance.

Berkeley's doctrine with regard to the outness of visible objects, we would state to be this: All these objects are directly seen to be external to each other, but none of them are seen or can be seen, for the reason above given, to be external to the eye itself. He holds that the knowledge that they are external to the eye—that they possess a real and tangible outness independent of the sight—is entirely brought about by the operation of another sense—the sense of touch. He further maintains that the tactual sensations having been repeatedly experienced along with the visual sensations, which yield no such judgment, these visual sensations come at length of themselves, and in the absence of the tactual impressions, to suggest objects as external to the eye, that is, as endowed with real and tangible outness; and so perfect is the association, that the seer seems to originate out of

his own native powers, a knowledge for which he is wholly indebted to his brother the toucher.

Now Mr Bailey views the doctrine in a totally different light. According to him Berkeley's doctrine is, that not only the tangible outness of objects, or their distance from the eye, is not immediately perceived by sight, but that not even their visible outness or their distance from one another is so perceived. He thinks that, according to Berkeley, the latter kind of outness is *suggested* by certain "internal feelings" —Heaven knows what they are!—no less than the former. He does not see that this "internal feeling," as he calls it, is itself the very sensation of visible outness as above explained. He seems to think that, according to Berkeley, the eye does not even see visible things to be out of one another—out of our visible bodies for example; but that the disintrication of them is accomplished by a process of suggestion. No wonder that he made dreadful havoc with the Bishop's doctrine of association. The following is his statement of that doctrine:—

"Outness is not immediately perceived by sight, but only suggested to our thoughts by certain visible ideas and sensations attending vision. Berkeley (he continues) thus in fact represents the visual perception of objects as external, to be an instance of the association of ideas. If, however, he had clearly analysed the process in question, he would have perceived the fallacy into which he had fallen. It is impossible that the law of mind, by which one thing

suggests another, should produce any such effect as the one ascribed to it. Suppose we have an internal feeling A, which has never been attended with any sensation or perception of outness, and that it is experienced at the same time with the external sensation B. After A and B have been thus experienced together, they will, according to the law of association, suggest each other. When the internal feeling occurs, it will bring to mind the external one, and *vice versa*. But this is all. Let there be a thousand repetitions of the internal feeling with the external sensation, and all that can be effected will be, that the one will invariably suggest the other. Berkeley's theory, however, demands more than this. He maintains that because the internal feeling has been found to be accompanied by the external one, it will, when experienced alone, not only suggest the external sensation, but absolutely be regarded as external itself, or rather be converted into the perception of an external object. It may be asserted, without hesitation, that there is nothing in the whole operations of the human mind analogous to such a process."

There certainly *is* nothing in the mental operations analogous to such a process, and just as little is there anything in the whole writings of Berkeley analogous to such a doctrine. Throughout this statement, the fallacy and the mistake are entirely on the side of Mr Bailey. The "outness" which he here declares Berkeley to hold *as suggested*, he evidently imagines to be *visible* outness: whereas Berkeley distinctly

holds that visible outness is never *suggested* by sight at all, or by any "visible ideas or sensations attending vision," and that it is only *tangible* outness which is so suggested. "Sight" (says Berkeley, Works, vol. i. 147) "doth not *suggest* or in any way inform us that the *visible* object we immediately perceive exists *at a distance*." What Berkeley maintains is, that vision with its accompanying sensations suggests to us another kind of outness and of objects which are invisible, and which always remain invisible, but which may be perceived by touch, provided we go through the process necessary for such a perception. He admits the immediate and unsuggested sensation of visible outness in the sense explained above—that all visible things are directly seen to be external to our visible bodies, only denying (and we think we have assigned good grounds for this denial) that any of them *are seen* to be external to our own *invisible* sight. He maintains that this direct sensation of visible outness comes through experience to suggest the perception of a different, namely, of a tangible and invisible, outness. He asserts (we shall here adopt Mr Bailey's language, with some slight variation giving *our* view of the case), that in consequence of there having been a thousand repetitions of the sensation of visible outness with the sensation of tangible outness, the one will invariably suggest the other. And his theory demands no more than this. He never maintains that because the sensation of visible outness—already explained, we beg the reader to keep

in mind, as the sensation of visible objects as external to one another, but not as external to the sense perceiving them—he never maintains that because this sensation has been found to be accompanied by the sensation of tangible outness, that it will, when experienced alone, not only suggest the tangible outness, but absolutely be regarded as tangible itself, or be converted into the perception of a tangible object. He never, we say, maintains anything like this, as Mr Bailey represents him to do. It may therefore be asserted with hesitation, that there is nothing in the whole history of philosophical criticism analogous to the blunder of his reviewer. Nothing is easier than to answer a disputant when we confute, as his, a theory of our making.

Berkeley informs us, that visual sensation, that is, the direct perception of the outness of visible things with regard to one another, having been frequently accompanied with sensations of their tactual outness and tactual magnitudes, comes at length, through the law of association, to suggest to us that they are external to the eye, although we never see them to be so; and to suggest this to us, of course as the word suggestion implies, in the absence of the tactual sensations. Thus the visual sensations which, in the absence of the tactual sensations, call up the tactual sensations, resemble a language, the words of which, in the absence of things, call up the ideas of things. Thus the word rose, in the absence of a rose, suggests the idea of that flower; and thus a visible rose, not

seen as external to the eye, does, in the absence of a tangible or touched rose, suggest a tangible or touched rose as an object external to the eye. "But," says Mr Bailey, "this comparison completely fails. To make it tally, we must suppose that the audible name, by suggesting the visible flower, becomes itself a visible object." What! does he then suppose that Berkeley holds that the visible flower, by suggesting the tangible flower, becomes itself a tangible object? To make Mr Bailey's objection tell, Berkeley must be represented as holding this monstrous opinion, which he most assuredly never did.

Our limits prevent us from following either Berkeley or his reviewer through the further details of this speculation. But we think that we have pointed out with sufficient distinctness Mr Bailey's fundamental blunder, upon which the whole of his supposed refutation of Berkeley is built, and which consists in this: that he conceives the Bishop to maintain that the perception of visible outness, or the distance of objects among themselves, is as much the result of suggestion as the knowledge of tangible outness, or the distance of objects from the organ of sight. He seems to think Berkeley's doctrine to be this: that our visual sensations are mere internal feelings, in which there is originally and directly no kind of outness at all involved, not even the outness of one visible thing from another visible thing; and that this outness is in some way or other suggested to the mind by these internal feelings. "But," says he,

"Berkeley's theory demands more than this; for the internal feeling not only suggests the idea of the external object, but by doing so suggests the idea, or, if I may use figure, infuses the perception of *its own* externality." And he cannot understand how this result should be produced by any process of association. But neither does Berkeley's theory demand that it should, for this "internal feeling" is itself, as we have already remarked, the direct perception of visible outness—that is to say, the outness of objects in relation, for instance, to our own visible bodies—and so far there is no suggestion at all in the case, nor any occasion for any suggestion. Suggestion comes into play when we judge that, over and above the outness of objects viewed in relation to themselves and our visible bodies, there is another kind of outness connected with these objects, namely, their outness in relation to the organ itself which perceives them; and this suggestion takes place only after we have learned, through the experience of touch, to localise that organ. Having thus indicated the leading mistake which lies at the root of Mr Bailey's attempted refutation, we shall bid adieu both to him and Berkeley, and shall conclude by hazarding one or two speculations of our own, in support of the conclusions of the latter.

How do we come to judge that objects are external to the eye as distinguished from our perception, that they are external to one another, and how do we come to judge that they possess a real magnitude

quite different from their visible magnitude? These are the two fundamental questions of the Berkeleian optics; and in endeavouring to answer them, we must go to work experimentally, and strive to apprehend the virgin facts of seeing, uncombined with any other facts we may have become acquainted with from other sources. Let us suppose, then, that we are merely an eye, which, however, as it is not yet either tangible or localised, we shall call the soul, the seer. Let this seer be provided with a due complement of objects, which are mere colours in the form of houses, clouds, rivers, woods, and mountains. Everything is excluded but sight and colours. Nothing but pure seeing is the order of the day. Now, here it is obvious that the seer must pronounce itself or its organ to be precisely commensurate in extent with the things seen. It may either suppose the diameter of the landscape to be conformed to the size of its diameter, or it may suppose its diameter conformed to the size of the landscape. It is quite immaterial which it does, but one or other of these judgments it must form. The seer and the seen must be pronounced to be coextensive with one another. No judgment to a contrary effect, no judgment that the organ is infinitely disproportioned to its objects, is as yet possible. Well, we shall suppose that these objects keep shifting up and down within the sphere of the organ, growing larger and smaller, fainter and brighter in colour, and so forth. Still no new result takes place: there is still nothing

but simple seeing. Until at length *one particular* bifurcated phenomenon, with black extremities at one end and lateral appendages, each of them terminating in a somewhat broad instrument, with five points of rather a pinky hue, begins to stir. Ha! what's this? This is something new; this is something very different from *seeing*. One of the objects within the sight, one of our own visual phenomena has evolved, by all that's wonderful! a new set of sensations entirely different from anything connected with vision. We will call them muscular sensations. As this is the only one of all the visual phenomena which has evolved these new sensations, the attention of the seer is naturally directed to its operations. Let us then attend to it particularly. It moves into close proximity with other visual objects, and here another new and startling series of sensations ensues, sensations which our seer never found to arise when any of the other visual phenomena came together. We will call these our sensations of touch. The attention is now directed more particularly than ever to the proceedings of this bifurcated phenomenon. It raises one of the aforesaid lateral appendages, and with one of the points in which it terminates, it feels its way over the other portions of its surface. Certain portions of this touched surface are not visible; but the seer, by calling into play the muscular sensations, that is, by moving the upper part of this phenomenon, can bring many of them within its sphere, and hence the seer concludes that all of the

felt portions would become visible, were no limit put to these movements and muscular sensations. Very well. This point, which occupies an infinitely small space among the visual phenomena, continues its manipulating progress, until it at length happens to rest upon a very sensitive and orbed surface, about its own size, situated in the upper part of the bifurcated object. And now what ensues? Speaking out of the information and experience which we have as yet acquired, we should naturally say that merely this can ensue; that if the point (let us now call it our finger) and the orbed surface on which it rests are out of the sphere of sight, the seer has nothing to do with it—that it is simply a case of touch: or if the finger and the surface are within the sphere of sight, that then the finger will merely hide from our view a surface coextensive with itself, as it does in other similar instances; and that, in either case, all the other objects of sight will be left as visible and entire as ever. But no; neither of these two results is what ensues. What then does ensue? This astounding and almost inconceivable result ensues, that the *whole* visual phenomena are suddenly obliterated as completely as if they had never been. One very small visible point, performing certain operations within the eye, and coming in contact with a certain surface as small as itself, and which must also be conceived as lying within the eye, not only obliterates that small surface, but extinguishes a whole landscape which is visibly many million

times larger than itself. If this result were not the fact, it would be altogether incredible. From this moment, then, a new world is revealed to us, in which we find that, instead of the man and all visible objects being in the eye, the eye is in the man; and that these objects being visibly external to the bifurcated phenomenon, whose operations we have been superintending, and which we shall now call *ourselves*, they must consequently be external (although even yet they are never visibly so) to the eye also. The seer, the great eye, within which we supposed all this to be transacted, breaks, as it were, and falls away; while the little surface to which the forefinger was applied, and which it covered, becomes, and from this time henceforward continues to be, our true eye. Thus, by a very singular process, do we find ourselves, as it were, within our own eye, a procedure which is rescued from absurdity by this consideration, that our eye itself, our tangible eye, is also found within the primary eye, as we may call it, which latter eye falling away when the experience of touch commences, the man and the universe which surrounds him start forth into their true place as external to the seer, and the new secondary eye, revealed by touch, becoming localised, shrinks into its true proportions, now very limited when tactually compared with the objects which fall under its inspection. And all this magical creation — all our knowledge that objects are out of the eye, and that the size of this organ bears an infinitely small pro-

portion to the real magnitude of objects—all this is the work of the touch, and of the touch alone.[1]

Perhaps the following consideration may help the reader to understand how the sight becomes instructed by the touch. Our natural visual judgment undoubtedly is, as we have said, that the eye and the landscape which it sees are precisely coextensive with each other; and the natural conclusion must be, that whatever surface is sufficient to cover the one, must be sufficient to cover the other also. But is this found to be the case? By no means. You lay your finger on your eye, and it completely covers it. You then lay the same finger on the landscape, and it does not cover, perhaps, the hundred millionth part of its surface. Thus are the judgments and conclusions of the eye corrected and refuted by the experience of the finger, until, at length, the eye actually believes that it sees things to be larger than itself; a total mistake, however, on its part, as Berkeley was the first to show; for the object which it seems to see as greatly larger than itself, is only *suggested* by another object which is always smaller than itself. The small visible object suggests the thought of a large tangible object, and the latter it is which chiefly occupies the mind; but

[1] It may, perhaps, be thought that all this information might be acquired by the simple act of closing our eyelids. But here the tactual sensations are so faint that we might be doubtful whether the veil was drawn over our eye or over the face of things. Our limits prevent us from stating other objections to which this explanation is exposed.

still it is never seen, it is merely suggested by the other object which alone is presented to the vision.

By looking through a pair of spectacles, any one may convince himself of the impossibility of our seeing the real and tangible magnitude of things, or of our seeing anything which exceeds the expansion of the retina. A lofty tower, you will say, exceeds the expansion of the retina, certainly a tangible, a *suggested* tower, does so: but does a visible, a seen tower, ever do so? Make the experiment, good reader, and you will find that it never does. Look, then, at this tower from a small distance, through a pair of spectacles, which form a sort of projected retina, not much, if at all, larger than your real retina. At first sight you will probably say that it looks about a hundred feet high, and, at any rate, that you see it to be infinitely larger than your own eye. But look again, attending in some degree to the size of your spectacle glasses, and you shall see that it does not stretch across one half, or perhaps one fourth, of their diameter. And if a fairy pencil, as Adam Smith supposes, were to come between your eye and the glass, the picture sketched by it thereon, answering in the exactest conformity to the dimensions of the tower you see, would be an image, probably not the third of an inch high, or the hundredth part of an inch broad. This is certainly not what you seem to see, but this is certainly what you *do* see. These are the dimensions into which your lofty tower has shrunk. Now is this tower, seen to be

one-third of an inch high, and very much smaller than the retina, represented by the spectacles—is this tower another tower, seen to be a hundred feet high, and infinitely larger than the retina, and existing out of the mind *in rerum natura?* or is not the latter tower merely *suggested* by the former ideal one, in consequence of the great disparity which touch, and touch alone, has proved to exist between the thing seeing and the thing seen? Unquestionably the latter view of the matter is the true one; seen objects are always ideal, and always remain ideal; they have no existence *in rerum natura.* They merely suggest other objects of a real, or at least of a tangible kind, with which they have no necessary, but merely an arbitrary connection, established by custom and experience. So much upon the idealism of the eye.

In conclusion, we wish to hazard one remark on the subject of inverted images depicted on the retina. External objects, we are told, are represented on the retina in an inverted position, or with their upper parts pointing downwards. Now, in one sense this may be true, but in another sense it appears to us to be unanswerably false. Every visible object must be conceived as made up of a great number of *minima visibilia,* or smallest visible points. From each of these a cone of rays proceeds, with its base falling on the pupil of the eye. Here the rays are refracted by the humours so as to form other cones, the apices of which are projected on the retina. The cones of rays proceeding from the upper *minima visibilia* of

the object are refracted into foci on the lower part of the retina, while those coming from the lower *minima* of the object are refracted into foci on the upper part of the retina. So far the matter is perfectly demonstrable; so far we have an image on the retina, the lower parts of which correspond with the upper parts of the object. But what kind of image is it, what is the nature of the inversion which here takes place? We answer that it is an image in which not one single *minimum* is *in itself* reversed, but in which all the *minima* are transposed merely in relation *to one another*. The inversion regards merely the relative position of the *minima*, and not the *minima* themselves. Thus, the upward part of each *minimum* in the object must also point upwards in the image on the retina. For what principle is there in optics or in geometry, in physiology or in the humours of the eye, to reverse it? We do not see how opticians can dispute this fact, except by saying that these *minima* have *no* extension, and consequently have neither an *up* nor a *down;* but that is a position which we think they will hardly venture to maintain. We can make our meaning perfectly plain by the following illustrative diagram —In the lines of figures,

A	B	C
1	9	6
2	ϛ	5
3	ɬ	4
4	ε	3
5	ƨ	2
6	I	1

let the line A be a string of six beads, each of which is a *minimum visibile*, or smallest point from which a cone of rays can come. Now, the ordinary optical doctrine, as we understand it, is, that this string of beads A falls upon the retina in an image in the form of the row of figures B; that is to say, in an image in which the bead 1 is thrown with its head downwards on the retina, and all the other beads in the same way with their heads downwards. Now, on the contrary, it appears to us demonstrable, that the beads A must fall upon the retina in an image in the form of the row of figures C; that is to say, in an image in which each particular bead or *minimum* lies with its head upwards upon the retina. In the annexed scheme our meaning, and the difference between the two views, are made perfectly plain; and it is evident, that if the object were reduced to only one *minimum*—the bead 2, for instance—there would be no inversion, but a perfectly erect image of it thrown upon the retina.

Now, there are just five different ways in which the fact we have now stated may be viewed. It is either a fact notoriously announced in all or in most optical works; and if it is so, we are surprised (though our reading has not been very extensive in that way) that we should never have come across it. Or else it is a fact so familiar to all optical writers, and so obvious and commonplace in itself, that they never have thought it necessary or worth their while to announce it. But if this be the case,

we cannot agree with them; we think that it is a fact as recondite and as worthy of being stated as many others that are emphatically insisted on in the science. Or else, though neither notorious nor familiar, it may have been stated by some one or by some few optical writers. If so, we should thank any one who would be kind enough to refer us to the works in which it is to be found. Or else, fourthly, it is a false fact, and admits of being demonstrably disproved. If so, we should like to see it done. Or else, lastly, it is true, and a new, and a demonstrable fact; and if so, we now call upon all optical writers, from this time henceforward, to adopt it. We do not pretend to decide which of these views is the true one. We look to Dr Brewster for a reply; for neither his, nor any other man's *rationale* of the inverted images, appears to us to be at all complete or satisfactorily made out without its admission.

MR BAILEY'S REPLY TO AN ARTICLE IN BLACKWOOD'S MAGAZINE

MR BAILEY'S REPLY TO AN ARTICLE IN BLACKWOOD'S MAGAZINE.

We have just been favoured with a pamphlet from Mr Bailey, entitled 'A Letter to a Philosopher, in Reply to some Recent Attempts to Vindicate Berkeley's Theory of Vision, and in further Elucidation of its Unsoundness.' Our article on Mr Bailey's review of Berkeley's theory, which appeared in 'Blackwood's Magazine' of June 1842, was one of these attempts. Had the author merely attacked or controverted our animadversions on his book, we should probably have left the question to its fate, and not have reverted to a subject, the discussion of which, even in the first instance, may have been deemed out of place in a journal not expressly philosophical. There is, in general, little to be gained by protracting such controversies. But, as Mr Bailey accuses us, in the present instance, of having misrepresented his views, we must be allowed to exculpate ourselves from the charge of having dealt, even with

unintentional unfairness, towards one whose opinions, however much we may dissent from them, are certainly entitled to high respect and a candid examination, as the convictions of an able and zealous inquirer after truth.

In our strictures on Mr Bailey's work, we remarked, that he had represented Berkeley as holding that the eye is not directly and originally cognisant of the outness of objects in relation to each other, or of what we would call their reciprocal outness ; in other words, we stated that, according to Mr Bailey, Berkeley must be regarded as denying to the eye the original intuition of space, either in length, breadth, or solid depth. It was, however, only in reference to one of his arguments, and to one particular division of his subject, that we laid this representation to his charge. Throughout the other parts of his discussion, we by no means intended to say that such was the view he took of the Berkeleian theory. Nor are we aware of having made any statement to that effect. If we did, we now take the opportunity of remarking, that we restrict our allegation, as we believe we formerly restricted it, to the single argument and distinction just mentioned, and hereafter to be explained.

In his reply, Mr Bailey disavows the impeachment *in toto*. He declares that he never imputed to Berkeley the doctrine, that the eye is not directly percipient of space in the two dimensions of length and breadth. "The perception of this kind of dis-

tance," says he, "never formed the subject of controversy with any one. . . . . That we see extension in two dimensions is admitted by all."—('Letter,' p. 10.) If it can be shown that the doctrine which is here stated to be admitted by all philosophers, is yet expressly controverted by the two metaphysicians whom Mr Bailey appears to have studied most assiduously, it is, at any rate, possible that he may have overlooked, in his own writings, the expression of an opinion which has escaped his penetration in theirs. To convince himself, then, how much he is mistaken in supposing that the visual intuition of longitudinal and lateral extension is admitted by all philosophers, he has but to turn to the works of Dr Brown and the elder Mill. In arguing that we have no immediate perception of visible figure, Dr Brown not only virtually, but expressly, asserts that the sight has no perception of extension in any of its dimensions. Not to multiply quotations, the following will, no doubt, be received as sufficient:—"They (*i.e.*, philosophers) have—*I think without sufficient reason*—universally supposed that the superficial extension of *length and breadth* becomes known to us by sight originally."[1] Dr Brown then proceeds to argue, with what success we are not at present considering, that our knowledge of extension and figure is derived from another source than the sense of sight.

Mr James Mill, an author whom Mr Bailey fre-

[1] Brown's 'Lectures,' Lecture xxviii.

quently quotes with approbation, and in confirmation of his own views, is equally explicit. He maintains, in the plainest terms, that the eye has no intuition of space, or of the reciprocal outness of visible objects. "Philosophy," says he, "has ascertained that we derive nothing from the eye whatever but sensations of colour; that the idea of extension [he means in its three dimensions] is derived from sensations not in the eye, but in the muscular part of our frame."[1] Thus, contrary to what Mr Bailey affirms, these two philosophers limit the office of vision to the perception of mere colour or difference of colour, denying to the eye the original perception of extension in any dimension whatever. In their estimation, the intuition of space is no more involved in our perception of different colours than it is involved in our perception of different smells or different sounds. Dr Brown's doctrine, in which Mr Mill seems to concur, is, that the perception of superficial extension no more results from a certain expanse of the optic nerve being affected by a variety of colours than it results from a certain expanse of the olfactory nerve being affected by a variety of odours.[2] So much

[1] Mill's 'Analysis,' vol. i. p. 73.

[2] This reasoning of Dr Brown's is founded upon an assumed analogy between the structure of the optic nerve, and the structure of the olfactory nerves and other sensitive nerves, and is completely disproved by the physiological observations of Treviranus, who has shown that no such analogy exists: that the ends of the nervous fibres in the retina, being elevated into distinct separate *papillæ*, enable us to perceive the extension and discriminate the position of visible bodies; while the nerves of the other senses, being less

for Mr Bailey's assertion, that *all* philosophers admit the perception of extension in two dimensions.

But, of course, our main business is with the expression of his own opinion. In rebutting our charge, he maintains that "the visibility of angular distance (that is, of extension laterally) is assumed, by implication, as part of Berkeley's doctrine, in *almost* every chapter of my book."—('Letter,' p. 13.) That word *almost* is a provident saving clause; for we undertake to show that not only is the very reverse assumed, by implication, as part of Berkeley's doctrine, in the *single* chapter to which we confined our remarks, but that, in another part of his work, it is expressly avowed as the only alternative by which, in the author's opinion, Berkeley's consistency can be preserved.

At the outset of his inquiry, Mr Bailey divides his discussion into two branches: first, Whether objects are originally seen to be external, or at *any* distance at all from the sight; and, secondly, Supposing it admitted that they are seen to be external, or at *some* distance from the sight, whether they are all seen in the same plane, or equally near. It was to the former of these questions that we exclusively

delicately defined, are not fitted to furnish us with any such perception, or to aid us in making any such discrimination. See 'Müller's Physiology,' translated by W. Baly, M.D., vol. ii. pp. 1073, 1074. Although the application of Treviranus's discovery to the refutation of Dr Brown's reasoning is our own, we may remark, in justice to an eminent philosopher, that it was Sir William Hamilton who first directed our attention to the *fact* as established by that great physiologist.

confined our remarks;[1] and it was in reference to it, and to an important argument evolved by Mr Bailey in the course of its discussion, that we charged him with fathering on Berkeley the doctrine which he now disavows as his interpretation of the Bishop's opinion. He further disputes the relevancy of the question about our perception of lateral extension, and maintains that distance in a direction from the percipient, or what we should call protensive distance, is the only matter in dispute; and that it is a misconception of the scope of Berkeley's essay to imagine otherwise. The relevancy of the question shall be disposed of afterwards. In the meantime, the question at issue is, Can the allegation which we have laid to Mr Bailey's charge be proved to be the fact, or not?

In discussing the first of the two questions, it was quite possible for Mr Bailey to have represented Berkeley as holding, that visible objects, though not seen to be external to the sight, were yet seen to be out of each other, or laterally extended within

[1] Mr Bailey seems disposed to carp at us for having confined our remarks to this first question, and for not having given a more complete review of his book. But the reason why we cut short our critique is obvious; for if it be proved, as we believe it can, that objects are originally seen at *no distance whatever* from the sight, it becomes quite superfluous to inquire what appearance they would present if originally seen at *some* distance from the sight. The way in which we disposed of the first question, however imperfect our treatment of it may have been, necessarily prevented us from entering upon the second; and our review, with all its deficiencies, was thus a complete review of his book, though not a review of his complete book.

the organism or the mind. But Mr Bailey makes no such representation of the theory, and the whole argument which pervades the chapter in which the first question is discussed, is founded on the negation of any such extension. All visible extension, he tells us, must, in his opinion, be either plane or solid. Now he will scarcely maintain that he regarded Berkeley as holding that we perceive solid extension within the organism of the eye. Neither does he admit that, according to Berkeley, and in reference to this first question, plane extension is perceived within the organism of the eye. For when he proceeds to the discussion of the *second* of the two questions, he remarks that "we must, *at this stage* of the argument, consider the theory under examination, as representing that we see all things *originally in the same plane;*"[1] obviously implying that he had not *as yet* considered the theory as representing that we see things originally in the same plane: in other words, plainly admitting that, in his treatment of the first question, he had not regarded the theory as representing that we see things originally under the category of extension at all.

But if any more direct evidence on this point were wanted, it is to be found in the section of his work which treats of "the perception of figure." In the chapter in which he discusses the first of the two questions, he constantly speaks of Berkeley's

[1] 'Review of Berkeley's Theory,' p. 35.

theory as representing that "our visual sensations, or what we ultimately term visible objects, are originally mere internal feelings." The expression *mere internal feelings*, however, is ambiguous; for, as we have said, it might still imply that Mr Bailey viewed the theory as representing that there was an extension, or reciprocal outness of objects within the retina. But this doubt is entirely removed by a passage in the section alluded to, which proves that, in Mr Bailey's estimation, these mere internal feelings not only involve no such extension, but that there would be an inconsistency in supposing they did. In this section he brings forward Berkeley's assertion, "that neither solid nor plane figures are immediate objects of sight." He then quotes a passage in which the Bishop begs the reader not to stickle too much "about this or that phrase, or manner of expression, but candidly to collect his meaning from the whole sum and tenor of his discourse." And then Mr Bailey goes on to say, "Endeavouring, in the spirit here recommended, to collect the author's meaning when he affirms that the figures we see are neither plane nor solid, it appears to me to be *a part or consequence* of his doctrine already examined, which asserts that visible objects are only internal feelings."[1] We can now be at no loss to understand what Mr Bailey means, and conceives Berkeley to mean, by the expression "mere internal feelings." He evidently means feelings in which no kind of

[1] 'Review of Berkeley's Theory,' p. 136.

extension whatever is involved: for, in the next page, he informs us that all visual extension, or extended figure, "*must* be apprehended as either plane or solid, and that it is impossible even to conceive it otherwise." Consequently, if the figures we see are, as Berkeley says, apprehended neither as plane nor as solid, Mr Bailey, entertaining the notions he does on the subject of extension, *must* regard him as holding that they cannot be apprehended as extended at all; and accordingly such is the express representation he gives of the theory in the passage just quoted, where he says that "the doctrine of Berkeley, which affirms that the figures we see are neither plane nor solid [that is, are extended in *no* direction, according to Mr Bailey's ideas of extension], appears to him to be *a part* of the doctrine which asserts that visible objects are only internal feelings." Now if that be not teaching, in the plainest terms, that, according to Berkeley, no species of extension is implied in the internal feelings of vision, we know not what language means, and any one thought may be identical with its very opposite.

Here we might let the subject drop, having, as we conceive, said quite enough to prove the truth of our allegation that, in reference to the first question discussed, in which our original visual sensations are represented by Berkeley to be mere internal feelings, Mr Bailey understood and stated those feelings to signify sensations in which no perception of extension whatever was involved. However, as Mr

Bailey further remarks that, "although Berkeley's doctrine about visible figures being neither plane nor solid, is thus consistent with his assertion that they are internal feelings, it is in itself contradictory,"[1] we shall contribute a few remarks to show that while, on the one hand, the negation of extension is not required to vindicate the consistency of Berkeley's assertion, that visible objects are internal feelings, neither, on the other hand, is there any contradiction in Berkeley's holding that objects are not seen either as planes or as solids, and are yet apprehended as extended. Mr Bailey alleges that we are "far more successful in involving ourselves in subtle speculations of our own, than in faithfully guiding our readers through the theories of other philosophers." Perhaps in the present case we shall be able to thread a labyrinth where our reviewer has lost his clue, and, in spite of the apparent contradiction by which Mr Bailey has been gravelled, we shall, perhaps, be more successful than he in "collecting Berkeley's meaning from the whole sum and tenor of his discourse."

First, with regard to the contradiction charged upon the Bishop. When we open our eyes, what do we behold? We behold points—*minima visibilia*—out of one another. Do we see these points to be in the same plane? Certainly not. If they are in the same plane, we learn this from a very different experience from that of sight. Again, do we see these

[1] 'Review of Berkeley's Theory,' p. 137.

points to be *not* in the same plane? Certainly not. If the points are not in the same plane, we learn this too from a very different experience than that of sight. All that we see is, that the points are out of one another; and this simply implies the perception of extension, without implying the perception either of plane or of solid extension. Thus, by the observation of a very obvious fact, which, however, Mr Bailey has overlooked, is Berkeley's assertion that visible objects are apprehended as extended, and yet not apprehended either as planes or solids, relieved from every appearance of contradiction.

It must, however, be admitted that Mr Bailey has much to justify him in his opinion that extension must be apprehended either as plane or as solid. None of Berkeley's followers, we believe, have ever dreamt of conceiving it otherwise; and, finding in their master's work the negation of solid extension specially insisted on, they leapt to the conclusion that the Bishop admitted the original perception of plane extension. But Berkeley makes no such admission. He places the perception of plane extension on precisely the same footing with that of solid extension. "We see planes," says he, "in the same way that we see solids."[1] And the wisdom of the averment is obvious; for the affirmation of plane extension involves the negation of solid extension, but this negation involves the conception (visually derived) of solid extension; but the admis-

[1] Essay, § 158.

sion of that conception, so derived, would be fatal to the Berkeleian theory. Therefore its author wisely avoids the danger by holding that in vision we have merely the perception of what the Germans would call the *Auseinanderseyn*, that is, the *asunderness*, of things—a perception which implies no judgment as to whether the things are secerned in plane or in protensive space.

With regard to the supposition that, in order to preserve Berkeley's consistency, it was necessary for him to teach that our visual sensations (colours namely), being internal feelings, could involve the perception neither of plane nor of solid extension—that is to say, of no extension at all, according to Mr Bailey's ideas—we shall merely remark that there appears to us to be no inconsistency in holding, as Berkeley does, that these colours, though originally internal to the sight, are nevertheless perceived as extended among themselves.

We shall now say a few words on the *relevancy* of the question, for Mr Bailey denies that this question concerning the reciprocal outness of visible objects ought to form any element in the controversy. We shall show, however, that one of his most important arguments depends entirely on the view that may be taken of this question; and that while the argument alluded to would be utterly fatal to Berkeley's theory, if the perception of reciprocal outness were denied, it is perfectly harmless if the perception in question be admitted.

Mr Bailey's fundamental and reiterated objection to Berkeley's theory is, that it requires us to hold that conceptions or past impressions derived from one sense (the touch) are not merely recalled when another sense (the sight) executes its functions, but are themselves absolutely converted into the present intuitions of that other sense. In his own words ('Review,' p. 69), the theory is said to require "a transmutation of the conceptions derived from touch into the perceptions of sight." "According to Berkeley," says he ('Review,' p. 22), "an internal feeling (*i.e.*, a visual sensation) and an external sensation (*i.e.*, a tactual sensation) having been experienced at the same time: the internal feeling, when it afterwards occurs, not only suggests the idea, but, by doing so, suggests the idea, or, if I may use the figure, infuses the perception of its own externality. Berkeley thus attributes to suggestion an effect contrary to its nature, which, as in the case of language, is simply to revive in our conception what has been previously perceived by the sense."

Now, this objection would be altogether insurmountable if it were true, or if it were a part of Berkeley's doctrine, that the sight has no original intuition of space or of the reciprocal outness of its objects—in other words, of colours out of colours; for it being admitted that the sight has ultimately such a perception, it would be incumbent on the Berkeleian to show how conceptions derived from another sense, or how perceptions belonging to

another sense, could be converted into that perception. We agree with Mr Bailey in thinking that no process of association could effect this conversion; that if we did not originally see colours to be out of each other, and the points of the same colour to be out of each other, we could never so see them; and that his argument, when thus based on the negation of all original visual extension, and on the supposition that the touch is the sole organ of every species of externality, would remain invulnerable.

But, with the admission of the visual intuition of space, the objection vanishes, and the argument is shorn of all its strength. This admission relieves the theory from the necessity of maintaining that conceptions derived from touch are transmuted into the perceptions of sight. It attributes to the sight all that ever truly belongs to it—namely, the perception of colours out of one another; it provides the visual intuitions with an externality of their own, and the theory never demands that they should acquire any other; and it leaves to these visual intuitions the office of merely suggesting to the mind tactual impressions, with which they have been invariably associated in place. We say *in place;* and it will be found that there is no contradiction in our saying so when we shall have shown that it is the touch, and not the sight, which establishes a protensive interval between the organ and the sensations of vision.

Visible extension, then, or the perception of colours

external to colours, being admitted, Mr Bailey's argument, if he still adheres to it, must be presented to us in this form. He must maintain that the theory requires that the objects of touch should not only be suggested by the visual objects with which they have been associated, but that they should actually be *seen*. And then he must maintain that no power of association can enable us to see an object which can only be touched—a position which, certainly, no one will controvert. The simple answer to all which is, that we never do see tangible objects, that the theory never requires we should, and that no power of association is necessary to account for a phenomenon which never takes place.

We cannot help thinking that not a little of the misconception on this subject which prevails in the writings of Mr Bailey, and, we may add, of many other philosophers, originates in the supposition that we identify vision with the eye in the mere act of seeing, and in their taking it for granted that sight of itself informs us that we possess such an organ as the eye. Of course, if we suppose that we know instinctively, or intuitively, from the mere act of seeing, that the eye is the organ of vision, that it forms a part of the body we behold, and is located in the head, it requires no conjurer to prove that we *must* have an instinctive or intuitive knowledge of visible things as larger than that organ, and, consequently, as external to it. In this case, no process of association is necessary to account for our knowledge of the

distance of objects. That knowledge must be directly given in the very function and exercise of vision, as every one will admit, without going to the expense of an octavo volume to have it proved.

But we hold that no truth in mental philosophy is more incontestable than this, that the sight originally, and of itself, furnishes us with no knowledge of the eye, as we *now* know that organ to exist. It does not inform us that we have an eye at all. And here we may hazard an observation, which, simple as it is, appears to us to be new, and not unimportant in aiding us to unravel the mysteries of sensation; which observation is, that, in no case whatever, does any sense inform us of the existence of its appropriate organ, or of the relation which subsists between that organ and its objects, but that the interposition of some other sense[1] is invariably required to give us this information. This truth, which we believe holds good with regard to all the senses, is most strikingly exemplified in the case of vision, as we shall now endeavour to illustrate.

Let us begin by supposing that man is a mere "power of seeing." Under this supposition, we must

[1] It would not be difficult to show, that as, on the one hand, *distance* is not involved in the original intuitions of sight, so, on the other hand, *proximity* is not involved in the original intuitions of touch; but that, while it is the touch which establishes an interval between the organ and the objects of sight, it is the sight which establishes *no* interval between the organ and the objects of touch. Sight thus pays back every fraction of the debt it has incurred to its brother sense. This is an interesting subject, but we can only glance at it here.

hold that the periphery of vision is one and the same with the periphery of visible space; and the two peripheries being identical, of course whatever objects lie within the sphere of the one must lie within the sphere of the other also. Perhaps, strictly speaking, it is wrong to say that these objects are apprehended as internal to the sight; for the conception of internality implies the conception of externality, and neither of these conceptions can, as yet, be realised. But it is obvious what the expression *internal* means; and it is unobjectionable, when understood to signify that the Seeing Power, the Seeing Act, and the Seen Things, coexist in a synthesis in which there is no interval or discrimination. For, suppose that we know instinctively that the seen things occupy a locality separate from the sight. But that implies that we instinctively know that the sight occupies a locality separate from them. But such a supposition is a falling back upon the notion just reprobated, that the mere act of seeing can indicate its own organ, or can localise the visual phenomena in the eye—a position which, we presume, no philosopher will be hardy enough to maintain, when called upon to do so, broadly and unequivocally. The conclusion, therefore, is irresistible, that, in mere vision, the sight and its objects cling together in a union or synthesis, which no function of that sense, and no knowledge imparted to us by it (and, according to the supposition, we have, as yet, no other knowledge), can enable us to discriminate or dissolve. Where the seeing is,

there is the thing seen; and where the thing seen is, there is the seeing of it.

But man is not a mere seeing animal. He has other senses besides: He has, for example, the sense of touch, and one of the most important offices which this sense performs, is to break up the identity of cohesion which subsists between sight and its objects. And how? We answer, by teaching us to associate *vision in general*, or the abstract *condition* regulating our visual impressions, with the presence of the small tangible body we call the eye, and *vision in particular*, or the individual sensations of vision (*i.e.*, colours), with the presence of immeasurably larger bodies revealed to us by touch, and tangibly external to the tangible eye. Sight, as we have said, does not inform us that its sensations are situated in the eye: it does not inform us that we have an eye at all. Neither does touch inform us that our visual sensations are located in the eye. It does not lead us to associate with the eye any of the visual phenomena or operations *in the first instance*. If it did, it would, *firstly*, either be impossible for it *afterwards* to induce us to associate them with the presence of tangible bodies distant and different from the eye: or, *secondly*, such an association would merely give birth to the abstract knowledge or conclusion, that these bodies were in one place, while the sensations suggesting them were felt to be associated with something in another place; colour would not be seen—as it is—incarnated with body: or, *thirdly*, we should be compelled to

postulate for the eye, as many philosophers have done, in our opinion, most unwarrantably, "a faculty of projection,"[1] by which it might dissolve the association between itself and its sensations, throwing off the latter in the form of colours over the surface of things, and reversing the old Epicurean doctrine that perception is kept up by a transit to the sensorium of the ghosts or *simulacra* of things,

> "Quæ, quasi membranæ, summo de corpore rerum
> Dereptæ, volitant ultro citroque per auras."[2]

It is difficult to say whether the hypothesis of "cast-off films" is more absurd when we make the films come from things to us as spectral effluxes, or go from us to them in the semblance of colours.

But according to the present view no such incomprehensible faculty, no such crude and untenable hypothesis is required. *Before* the touch has informed us that we have an eye, *before* it has led us to associate anything visual with the eye, it has *already* taught us to associate in place the sensations of vision (colours) with the presence of tangible objects which are not the eye. Therefore, when the touch discovers the eye, and induces us to associate vision in some way with it, it cannot be the particular sensations of vision called colours which it leads us to associate with that organ; for these have been

[1] We observe that even Müller speaks of the "faculty of projection" as if he sanctioned and adopted the hypothesis.—See 'Physiology,' vol. ii. p. 1167.

[2] Lucretius, iv. 31.

already associated with something very different. If it be not colours, then what is it that the touch compels us to associate with the eye? We answer that it is the abstract *condition* of impressions as the general law on which all seeing depends, but as quite distinct from the particular visual sensations apprehended in virtue of the observance of that law.

Nor is it at all difficult to understand how this general condition comes to be associated with the eye, and how the particular visual sensations come to be associated with something distant from the eye: and further, how this association of the condition with one thing, and of the sensations with another thing (an association established by the touch and not by the sight), dissolves the primary synthesis of seeing and colours. It is to be observed that there are two stages in the process by which this secernment is brought about—*First,* the stage in which the visual phenomena are associated with things different from the organ of vision, the very existence of which is as yet unknown. Let us suppose, then, the function of sight to be in operation. We behold a visible object —a particular colour. Let the touch now come into play. We feel a tangible object—say a book. Now from the mere fact of the visible and the tangible object being seen and felt together, we could not associate them in place; for it is quite possible that the tangible object may admit of being withdrawn, and yet the visible object remain: and if so, no association of the two in place can be established. But this

is a point that can only be determined by experience; and what says that wise instructor? We withdraw the tangible object. The visible object, too, disappears: it leaves its place. We replace the tangible object — the visible object reappears *in statu quo*. There is no occasion to vary the experiment. If we find that the visible object invariably leaves its place when the tangible object leaves its, and that the one invariably comes back when the other returns, we have brought forward quite enough to establish an inevitable association in place between the two. The two places are henceforth regarded not as two, but as one and the same.

By the aid of the touch, then, we have associated the visual phenomena with things which are *not* the organ of vision; and well it is for us that we have done so betimes, and before we were aware of the eye's existence. Had the eye been indicated to us in the mere act of seeing, had we become apprised of its existence *before* we had associated our visual sensations with the tangible objects constituting the material universe, the probability, nay the certainty, is that we would have associated them with this eye, and that then it would have been as impossible for us to break up the association between colours and the organ, as it now is for us to dissolve the union between colours and material things. In which case we should have remained blind, or as bad as blind; brightness would have been in the eye when it ought to have been in the sun; greenness would

have been in the retina when it ought to have been in the grass. A most wise provision of nature it certainly is, by which our visual sensations are disposed of in the right way before we obtain any knowledge of the eye. And most wisely has nature seconded her own scheme by obscuring all the sources from which that knowledge might be derived. The light eyelids—the effortless muscular apparatus performing its ministrations so gently as to be almost unfelt—the tactual sensations so imperceptible when the eye is left to its own motions, so keen when it is invaded by an exploring finger, and so anxious to avoid all contact by which the existence of the organ might be betrayed. All these are so many means adopted by nature to keep back from the infant seer all knowledge of his own eye—a knowledge which, if developed prematurely, would have perverted the functions, if not rendered nugatory the very existence, of the organ.

But, *secondly*, we have to consider the stage of the process in which vision is in some way associated with an object which is *not* any of the things with which the visual sensations are connected. It is clear that the process is not completed — that our task, which is to dissolve the primary synthesis of vision and its phenomena, is but half executed, unless such an object be found. For though we have associated the visual sensations (colours) with something different from themselves, still vision clings to them without a hair's-breadth of interval, and pursues

them whithersoever they go. As far, then, as we have yet gone, it cannot be said that our vision is felt or known to be distanced from the fixed stars even by the diameter of a grain of sand. The synthesis of sight and colour is not yet discriminated. How, then, is the interval interposed? We answer, by the discovery of a tangible object in a different place from any of the tangible objects associated with colour; and then by associating, in some way or other, the operations of vision with this object. Such an object is discovered in the eye. Now, as has frequently been said, we cannot associate colours or the visual sensations with this eye; for these have been already disposed of otherwise. What, then, do we associate with it—and how? We find, upon experiment, that our apprehension of the various visual sensations depends on the presence and particular location of this small tangible body. We find that the whole array of visual phenomena disappear when it is tactually covered, that they reappear when it is reopened, and so forth. Thus we come in some way to associate vision with it — not as colour, however, not as visual sensation. We regard the organ and its dispositions merely as a general condition regulating the apprehension of the visual sensations, and no more.

Thus, by attending to the two associations that occur,—the association (in place) of visual sensations with tangible bodies that *are not* the eye; and the association (in place) of vision with a small tangible

body that *is* the eye—the eye regarded as the condition on which the apprehension of these sensations depends; by attending to these, we can understand how a protensive interval comes to be recognised between the organ and its objects. By means of the touch, we have associated the sensations of vision with tangible bodies in one place, and the apprehension of these sensations with a tangible body in another place. It is, therefore, impossible for the sight to dissolve these associations, and bring the sensations out of the one place where they are felt, into the other place where the *condition* of their apprehension resides. The sight is, therefore, compelled to leave the sensations where they are, and the apprehension of them where it is; and to recognise the two as sundered from each other—the sensations as separated from the organ, which they truly are. Thus it is that we would explain the origin of the perception of distance by the eye; believing firmly that the sight would never have discerned this distance without the mediation of the touch.

Rightly to understand the foregoing reasoning—indeed, to advance a single step in the true philosophy of sensation—we must divest ourselves of the prejudice instilled into us by a false physiology, that what we call our organism, or, in plain words, our body, is necessarily *the seat* of our sensations. That all our sensations come to be associated *in some way* with this body, and that some of them even come to be associated with it *in place*, is undeniable;

but so far is it from being true that they are all essentially implicated or incorporated with it, and cannot exist at a distance from it, that we have a direct proof to the contrary in our sensations of vision; and until the physiologist can prove (what has never yet been proven) an *a priori* necessity that our sensations must be where our bodies are, and an *a priori* absurdity in the contrary supposition, he must excuse us for resolutely standing by the fact as we find it.

This is a view which admits of much discussion, and we would gladly expatiate upon the subject, did time and space permit; but we must content ourselves with winding up the present observations with the accompanying diagram, which we think explains our view beyond the possibility of a mistake.



Let A be the original synthesis, or indiscrimination of vision and its sensations — of light and colours. Let *á* be the visual sensations locally associated by means of the touch with the tangible bodies C *before* vision is in any way associated with B—before, indeed, we have any knowledge of the existence of B. Then let *a*, the general condition on which the sensations, *after a time*, are found to depend, and in virtue of which they are apprehended, be locally associated with B—the eye discovered by means of the touch—and we have before us what we cannot help regarding as a complete *rationale* of the

whole phenomena and mysteries of vision. Now, the great difference between this view of the subject and the views of it that have been taken by *every* other philosopher, consists in this, that whereas their explanations invariably implicated the visual sensations *á* with B from the very first, thereby rendering it either impossible for them to be afterwards associated with C, or possible only in virtue of some very extravagant hypothesis — our explanation, on the contrary, proceeding on a simple observation of the facts, and never implicating the sensations *á* with B at all, but associating them with C *a primordiis*, merely leaving to be associated with B, *a*, a certain general condition that must be complied with, in order that the sensation *á* may be apprehended,—in this way, we say, our explanation contrives to steer clear both of the impossibility and the hypothesis.

We would just add by way of postscript to this article — which, perhaps, ought itself to have been only a postscript—that with regard to Mr Bailey's allegation of our having plagiarised one of his arguments, merely turning the coat of it outside in, we can assure him that he is labouring under a mistake. In our former paper, we remarked that we could not see things to be *out* of the sight, because we could not see the sight itself. Mr Bailey alleges that this argument is borrowed from him, being a mere reversal of his reasoning, that we cannot see things to be *in* the sight, because we cannot see both the sight and the things. That our argument might very

naturally have been suggested by his, we admit. But it was not so. We had either overlooked the passage in his book, or it was clean out of our mind when we were pondering our own speculations. It did not suggest our argument, either nearly or remotely. Had it done so, we should certainly have noticed it, and should probably have handled both Mr Bailey's reasoning and our own to better purpose in consequence. If, notwithstanding this disclaimer, he still thinks that appearances are against us, we cannot mend his faith, but can merely repeat, that the fact is as we have stated it.

A SPECULATION ON THE SENSES

A SPECULATION ON THE SENSES.

How can that which is a purely subjective affection —in other words, which is dependent upon us as a mere modification of our sentient nature—acquire, nevertheless, such a distinct objective reality, as shall compel us to acknowledge it as an independent creation, the permanent existence of which is beyond the control of all that we can either do or think? Such is the form to which all the questions of speculation may be ultimately reduced. And all the solutions which have hitherto been propounded as answers to the problem, may be generalised into these two: either consciousness is able to transcend, or go beyond itself; or else the whole pomp, and pageantry, and magnificence, which we miscall the external universe, are nothing but our mental phantasmagoria, nothing but states of our poor, finite, subjective selves.

But it has been asked again and again, in reference to these two solutions, Can a man overstep the

limits of himself—of his own consciousness? If he can, then says the querist, the reality of the external world is indeed guaranteed; but what an insoluble, inextricable contradiction is here—that a man should overstep the limits of the very nature which is *his*, just because he cannot overstep it! And if he cannot, then says the same querist, then is the external universe an empty name—a mere unmeaning sound; and our most inveterate convictions are all dissipated like dreams.

Astute reasoner! the dilemma is very just, and is very formidable; and upon the one or other of its horns has been transfixed every adventurer that has hitherto gone forth on the knight-errantry of speculation. Every man who lays claim to a direct knowledge of something different from himself, perishes impaled on the contradiction involved in the assumption, that consciousness can transcend itself: and every man who disclaims such knowledge, expires in the vacuum of idealism, where nothing grows but the dependent and transitory productions of a delusive and constantly shifting consciousness.

But is there no other way in which the question can be resolved? We think that there is. In the following demonstration, we think that we can vindicate the objective reality of things—(a vindication which, we would remark by the way, is of no value whatever, in so far as that objective reality is concerned, but only as being instrumental to the ascertainment of the laws which regulate the whole

process of sensation)—we think that we can accomplish this, without, on the one hand, forcing consciousness to overstep itself, and on the other hand, without reducing that reality to the delusive impressions of an understanding born but to deceive. Whatever the defects of our proposed demonstration may be, we flatter ourselves that the dilemma just noticed as so fatal to every other solution will be utterly powerless when brought to bear against it: and we conceive, that the point of a third alternative must be sharpened by the controversialist who would bring us to the dust. It is a new argument, and will require a new answer. We moreover pledge ourselves that, abstruse as the subject is, both the question and our attempted solution of it shall be presented to the reader in such a shape as shall *compel* him to understand them.

Our pioneer shall be a very plain and palpable illustration. Let A be a circle, containing within it X Y Z.



X Y and Z lie within the circle; and the question is, by what art or artifice—we might almost say by what sorcery—can they be transplanted out of it, without at the same time being made to overpass the limits of the sphere? There are just four conceivable answers to this question—answers illustrative of three great schools of philosophy, and of a fourth which is now fighting for existence.

1. One man will meet the difficulty boldly, and say—"X Y and Z certainly lie within the circle, but I believe they lie without it. *How* this should be, I know not. I merely state what I conceive to be the fact. The *modus operandi* is beyond my comprehension." This man's answer is contradictory, and will never do.

2. Another man will deny the possibility of the transference—"X Y and Z," he will say, "are generated within the circle in obedience to its own laws. They form part and parcel of the sphere; and every endeavour to regard them as endowed with an extrinsic existence, must end in the discomfiture of him who makes the attempt." This man declines giving any answer to the problem. We ask him *how* X Y and Z can be projected beyond the circle without transgressing its limits; and he answers that they never are, and never can be so projected.

3. A third man will postulate as the cause of X Y Z a transcendent X Y Z—that is, a cause lying external to the sphere; and by referring the former to the latter, he will obtain for X Y Z, not certainly

a real externality, which is the thing wanted, but a *quasi-externality*, with which, as the best that is to be had, he will in all probability rest contented. "X Y and Z," he will say, "are projected, *as it were*, out of the circle." This answer leaves the question as much unsolved as ever. Or,

4. A fourth man (and we beg the reader's attention to this man's answer, for it forms the fulcrum or cardinal point on which our whole demonstration turns)—a fourth man will say, "If the circle could only be brought *within itself*, so—

then the difficulty would disappear—the problem would be completely solved. X Y Z must now of necessity fall as extrinsic to the circle A; and this, too (which is the material part of the solution), without the limits of the circle A being overstepped."

Perhaps this may appear very like quibbling; perhaps it may be regarded as a very absurd solution—a very shallow evasion of the difficulty.

Nevertheless, shallow or quibbling as it may seem, we venture to predict, that when the breath of life shall have been breathed into the bones of the above dead illustration, this last answer will be found to afford a most exact picture and explanation of the matter we have to deal with. Let our illustration, then, stand forth as a living process. The large circle A we shall call our whole sphere of sense, in so far as it deals with objective existence; and X Y Z shall be certain sensations of colour, figure, weight, hardness, and so forth, comprehended within it. The question then is, How can these sensations, without being ejected from the sphere of sense within which they lie, assume the status and the character of real independent existences? How can they be objects, and yet remain sensations?

Nothing will be lost on the score of distinctness, if we retrace, in the living sense, the footprints we have already trod in explicating the inanimate illustration. Neither will any harm be done, should we employ very much the same phraseology. We answer, then, that here, too, there are just four conceivable ways in which this question can be met.

1. The man of common sense (so called), who aspires to be somewhat of a philosopher, will face the question boldly, and will say, "I feel that colour and hardness, for instance, lie entirely within the sphere of sense, and are mere modifications of my subjective nature. At the same time I feel that colour and hardness constitute a real object, which

exists out of the sphere of sense independently of me and all my modifications. *How* this should be I know not, I merely state the fact as I imagine myself to find it. The *modus* is beyond my comprehension." This man belongs to the school of Natural Realists. If he merely affirmed or postulated a miracle in what he uttered, we should have little to say against him (for the whole process of sensation is indeed miraculous). But he postulates more than a miracle—he postulates a contradiction, in the very contemplation of which our reason is unhinged.

2. Another man will deny that our sensations ever transcend the sphere of sense, or attain a real objective existence. "Colour, hardness, figure, and so forth," he will say, "are generated within the sphere of sense in obedience to its own original laws. They form integral parts of the sphere; and he who endeavours to construe them to his own mind as embodied in extrinsic independent existences must for ever be foiled in the attempt." This man declines giving any answer to the problem. We ask, *How* can our sensations be embodied in distinct permanent realities? And he replies, That they never are and never can be so embodied. This man is an Idealist, or, as we would term him (to distinguish him from another species about to be mentioned of the same genus), an *Acosmical* Idealist; that is, an Idealist who absolutely denies the existence of an independent material world.

3. A third man will postulate as the cause of our sensations of hardness, colour, &c., a transcendent something, of which he knows nothing except that he feigns and fables it as lying external to the sphere of sense: and then, by referring our sensations to this unknown cause, he will obtain for them, not certainly the externality desiderated, but a *quasi-externality*, which he palms off upon himself and us as the best that can be supplied. This man is a *Cosmothetical* Idealist; that is, an Idealist who postulates an external universe as the unknown cause of certain modifications we are conscious of within ourselves, and which, according to his view, we never really get beyond. This species of speculator is the commonest, but he is the least trustworthy of any; and his fallacies are all the more dangerous by reason of the air of plausibility with which they are invested. From first to last he represents us as the dupes of our own perfidious nature. By some inexplicable process of association he refers certain known effects to certain unknown causes, and would thus explain to us how these effects (our sensations) come to assume, *as it were*, the character of external objects. But we know not "as it were." Away with such shuffling phraseology. There is nothing either of reference, or of inference, or of quasi-truthfulness in our apprehension of the material universe. It is ours with a certainty which laughs to scorn all the deductions of logic and all the props of hypothesis. What we wish to know is, *how* our subjective affec-

tions can *be*, not *as it were*, but in God's truth and in the strict, literal, earnest, and unambiguous sense of the words, real independent, objective existences. This is what the cosmothetical idealist never can explain and never attempts to explain.

4. We now come to the answer which the reader who has followed us thus far will be prepared to find us putting forward as by far the most important of any, and as containing in fact the very kernel of the solution. A fourth man will say, "If the whole sphere of sense could only be withdrawn *inwards*, could be made to fall somewhere *within itself*, then the whole difficulty would disappear and the problem would be solved at once. The sensations which existed previous to this retraction or withdrawal, would then of necessity fall without the sphere of sense (see our second diagram), and in doing so they would necessarily assume a totally different aspect from that of sensations. They would be real independent objects, and (what is the important part of the demonstration) they would acquire this *status* without overstepping by a hair's-breadth the primary limits of the sphere. Were such phraseology allowable, we should say that the sphere has *understepped* itself, and in doing so has left its former contents high and dry, and stamped with all the marks which can characterise objective existences."

Now the reader will please to remark, that we are very far from desiring him to accept this last solution at our bidding. Our method, we trust, is any-

thing but dogmatical. We merely say, that *if* this can be shown to be the case, then the demonstration which we are in the course of unfolding will hardly fail to recommend itself to his acceptance. Whether or not it is the case can only be established by an appeal to our experience.

We ask, then, Does experience inform us, or does she not, that the sphere of sense falls within, and very considerably within, itself? But here it will be asked, What meaning do we attach to the expression, that sense falls within its own sphere? These words, then, we must first of all explain. Everything which is apprehended as a sensation—such as colour, figure, hardness, and so forth—falls within the sentient sphere. To be a sensation, and to fall within the sphere of sense, are identical and convertible terms. When, therefore, it is asked, Does the sphere of sense ever fall within itself? this is equivalent to asking, Do the senses themselves ever become sensations? Is that which apprehends sensations ever itself apprehended as a sensation? Can the senses be seized on within the limits of the very circle which they prescribe? If they cannot, then it must be admitted that the sphere of sense never falls within itself, and consequently that an objective reality—*i. e.*, a reality extrinsic to that sphere—can never be predicated or secured for any part of its contents. But we conceive that only one rational answer can be returned to this question. Does not experience teach us, that much if not the whole of

our sentient nature becomes itself in turn a series of sensations? Does not the sight—that power which contains the whole visible space, and embraces distances which no astronomer can compute—does it not abjure its high prerogative, and take rank within the sphere of sense—itself a sensation—when revealed to us in the solid atom we call the eye? Here it is the touch which brings the sight within, and very far within, the sphere of vision. But somewhat less directly, and by the aid of the imagination, the sight operates the same introtraction (pardon the coinage) upon itself. It ebbs inwards, so to speak, from all the contents that were given in what may be called its primary sphere. It represents itself, in its organ, as a minute visual sensation, out of, and beyond which, are left lying the great range of all its other sensations. By imagining the sight as a sensation of colour, we diminish it to a speck within the sphere of its own sensations; and as we now regard the sense as for ever enclosed within this small embrasure, all the other sensations which were its, previous to our discovery of the organ, and which are its still, are built up into a world of objective existence, *necessarily* external to the sight, and altogether out of its control. All sensations of colour are necessarily out of one another. Surely, then, when the sight is subsumed under the category of colour—as it unquestionably is whenever we think of the eye—surely all other colours must, of necessity, assume a position external to it; and what more is wanting to

constitute that real objective universe of light and glory in which our hearts rejoice?

We can, perhaps, make this matter still plainer by reverting to our old illustration. Our first exposition of the question was designed to exhibit a general view of the case, through the medium of a dead symbolical figure. This proved nothing, though we imagine that it illustrated much. Our second exposition exhibited the illustration in its application to the living sphere of sensation *in general;* and this proved little. But we conceive that therein was foreshadowed a certain procedure, which, if it can be shown from experience to be the actual procedure of sensation *in detail*, will prove all that we are desirous of establishing. We now, then, descend to a more systematic exposition of the process which (so far as *our* experience goes, and we beg to refer the reader to his own) seems to be involved in the operation of seeing. We dwell chiefly upon the sense of sight, because it is mainly through its ministrations that a real objective universe is given to us. Let the circle A be the whole circuit of vision. We may begin by calling it the eye, the retina, or what we will. Let it be provided with the ordinary complement of sensations—the colours X Y Z. Now, we admit that these sensations cannot be extruded beyond the periphery of vision; and yet we maintain that, unless they be made to fall on the outside of that periphery, they cannot become real objects. How is this difficulty—this contradiction—to be overcome? Nature

overcomes it, by a contrivance as simple as it is beautiful. In the operation of seeing, admitting the canvas or background of our picture to be a retina, or what we will, with a multiplicity of colours depicted upon it, we maintain that we cannot stop here, and that we never do stop here. We invariably go on (such is the inevitable law of our nature) to complete the picture—that is to say, we fill in our own eye as a colour within the very picture which our eye contains—we fill it in as a sensation within the other sensations which occupy the rest of the field; and in doing so, we of necessity, by the same law, turn these sensations out of the eye; and they thus, by the same necessity, assume the rank of independent objective existences. We describe the circumference infinitely within the circumference; and hence all that lies on the outside of the intaken circle comes before us stamped with the impress of real objective truth. We fill in the eye greatly within the sphere of sight (or within the eye itself, if we insist on calling the primary sphere by this name), and the eye thus filled in is the only eye we know anything at all about, either from the experience of sight or of touch. *How* this operation is accomplished, is a subject of but secondary moment; whether it be brought about by the touch, by the eye itself, or by the imagination, is a question which might admit of much discussion; but it is one of very subordinate interest. The *fact* is the main thing—the fact that the operation *is* accomplished in

one way or another—the fact that the sense comes before itself (if not directly, yet virtually) as *one* of its own sensations—*that* is the principal point to be attended to; and we apprehend that this fact is now placed beyond the reach of controversy.

To put the case in another light. The following considerations may serve to remove certain untoward difficulties in metaphysics and optics, which beset the path, not only of the uninitiated, but even of the professors of the sciences.

We are assured by optical metaphysicians, or metaphysical opticians, that, in the operations of vision, we never get beyond the eye itself, or the representations that are depicted therein. We see nothing, they tell us, but what is delineated within the eye. Now, the way in which a plain man should meet this statement is this—he should ask the metaphysician *what* eye he refers to. Do you allude, sir, to an eye which belongs to my visible body, and forms a small part of the same; or do you allude to an eye which does not belong to my visible body, and which constitutes no portion thereof? If the metaphysician should say that he refers to an eye of the latter description, then the plain man's answer should be—that he has no experience of any such eye—that he cannot conceive it—that he knows nothing at all about it—and that the only eye which he ever thinks or speaks of, is the eye appertaining to, and situated within, the phenomenon which he calls his visible body. Is *this*, then, the eye which the metaphysi-

cian refers to, and which he tells us we never get beyond? If it be—why, then, the very admission that this eye is a part of the visible body (and what else can we conceive the eye to be?) proves that we *must* get beyond it. Even supposing that the whole operation were transacted within the eye, and that the visible body were nowhere but within the eye, still the eye which we invariably and inevitably fill in as belonging to the visible body (and no other eye is ever thought of or spoken of by us),—*this* eye, we say, must necessarily exclude the visible body, and all other visible things, from its sphere. Or, can the eye (always conceived of as a visible thing among other visible things) again contain the very phenomenon (*i. e.*, the visible body) within which it is itself contained? Surely no one will maintain a position of such unparalleled absurdity as that.

The science of optics, in so far as it maintains, according to certain physiological principles, that in the operation of seeing we never get beyond the representations within the eye, is founded on the assumption that the visible body has no visible eye belonging to it. Whereas we maintain that the only eye that we have—the only eye we can form any conception of—is the visible eye that belongs to the visible body, as a part does to a whole; whether this eye be originally revealed to us by the touch, by the sight, by the reason, or by the imagination. We maintain that to affirm we never get beyond this eye in the

exercise of vision, is equivalent to asserting that a part is larger than the whole, of which it is only a part—is equivalent to asserting that Y, which is contained between X and Z, is nevertheless of larger compass than X and Z, and comprehends them both. The fallacy we conceive to be this, that the visible body can be contained within the eye, without the eye of the visible body also being contained therein. But this is a procedure which no law either of thought or imagination will tolerate. If we turn the visible body, and all visible things, into the eye, we must turn the eye of the visible body also into the eye; a process which, of course, again turns the visible body, and all visible things, *out* of the eye. And thus the procedure eternally defeats itself. Thus the very law which appears to annihilate, or render impossible, the objective existence of visible things, as creations independent of the eye—this very law, when carried into effect with a thoroughgoing consistency, vindicates and establishes that objective existence, with a logical force, an iron necessity, which no physiological paradox can countervail.

We have now probably said enough to convince the attentive reader that the sense of sight, when brought under its own notice as a sensation, either directly, or through the ministry of the touch, or of the imagination (as it is when revealed to us in its organ), falls very far, falls almost infinitely within its own sphere. Sight, revealing itself as a sense, spreads over a span commensurate with the diameter

of the whole visible space; sight, revealing itself as a sensation, dwindles to a speck of almost unappreciable insignificance when compared with the other phenomena which fall within the visual ken. This speck is the organ, and the organ is the sentient circumference drawn inwards, far within itself, according to a law which (however unconscious we may be of its operation) presides over every act and exercise of vision; a law which, while it contracts the sentient sphere, throws, at the same time, into necessary objectivity every phenomenon that falls external to the diminished circle. This is the law, in virtue of which, subjective visual sensations are real visible objects. The moment the sight becomes one of its own sensations, it is restricted in a peculiar manner to that particular sensation. It now falls, as we have said, within its own sphere. Now, nothing more was wanting to make the other visual sensations real independent existences, for, *quà* sensations, they are all originally independent of each other, and the sense itself being now a sensation, they must now also be independent of it.

We now pass on to the consideration of the sense of touch.

Here precisely the same process is gone through which was observed to take place in the case of vision. The same law manifests itself here, and the same inevitable consequence follows, namely, that sensations are things, that subjective affections are objective realities. The sensation of hardness (softness, be it

observed, is only an inferior degree of hardness, and therefore the latter word is the proper generic term to be employed)—the sensation of hardness forms the contents of this sense. Hardness, we will say, is originally a purely subjective affection. The question then is, How can this affection, without being thrust forth into a fictitious, transcendent, and incomprehensible universe, assume, nevertheless, a distinct, objective reality, and be (not as it were, but in language of the most unequivocating truth) a permanent existence altogether independent of the sense? We answer, that this can take place only provided the sense of touch can be brought under our notice *as itself hard*. If this can be shown to take place, then (as all sensations which are presented to us in space necessarily exclude one another, are reciprocally *out* of each other), all other instances of hardness must of necessity fall as extrinsic to that particular hardness which the sense reveals to us as its own; and, consequently, all these other instances of hardness will start into being as things endowed with a permanent and independent substance.

Now, what is the verdict of experience on the subject. The direct and unequivocal verdict of experience is, that the touch reveals itself to us as one of its own sensations. In the finger-points more particularly, and generally all over the surface of the body, the touch manifests itself not only as that which apprehends hardness, but as that which is itself hard. The sense of touch vested in one of its own sensa-

tions (our tangible bodies, namely) is the sense of touch brought within its own sphere. It comes before itself as *one* sensation of hardness. Consequently all its *other* sensations of hardness are necessarily excluded from this particular hardness; and falling beyond it, they are, by the same consequence, built up into a world of objective reality, of permanent substance, altogether independent of the sense, self-betrayed as a sensation of hardness.

But here, it may be asked, if the senses are thus reduced to the rank of sensations, if they come under our observation as themselves sensations, must we not regard them but as parts of the subjective sphere; and though the other portions of the sphere may be extrinsic to these sensations, still, must not the contents of the sphere, taken as a whole, be considered as entirely subjective, *i.e*, as merely *ours*, and consequently must not real objective existence be still as far beyond our grasp as ever? We answer, No; by no means. Such a query implies a total oversight of all that experience proves to be the fact with regard to this matter. It implies that the senses have *not* been reduced to the rank of sensations, that they have *not* been brought under our cognisance as themselves sensations, and that they have yet to be brought there. It implies that vision has not been revealed to us as a sensation of colour in the phenomenon, the eye; and that touch has not been revealed to us as a sensation of hardness in the phenomenon, the finger. It implies, in short, that it is

not the sense itself which has been revealed to us in the one case as coloured, and in the other case as hard, but that it is something else which has been thus revealed to us. But it may still be asked, How do we know that we are not deceiving ourselves? How can it be proved that it is the senses, and not something else, which have come before us under the guise of certain sensations? That these sensations are the senses themselves, and nothing but the senses, may be proved in the following manner:—

We bring the matter to the test of actual experiment. We make certain experiments *seriatim* upon each of the items that lie within the sentient sphere, and we note the effect which each experiment has upon that portion of the contents which is not meddled with. In the exercise of vision, for example, we remove a book, and no change is produced in our perception of a house; a cloud disappears, yet our apprehension of the sea and the mountains, and all other visible things, is the same as ever. We continue our experiments until our test happens to be applied to one particular phenomenon which lies, if not directly, yet virtually, within the sphere of vision. We remove or veil this small visual phenomenon, and a totally different effect is produced from those that took place when any of the other visual phenomena were removed or veiled. The whole landscape is obliterated. We restore this phenomenon, the whole landscape reappears; we adjust this

phenomenon differently, the whole landscape becomes differently adjusted. From these experiments we find that this phenomenon is by no means an ordinary sensation, but that it differs from all other sensations in this, that it is the sense itself appearing in the form of a sensation. These experiments prove that it is the sense itself, and nothing else, which reveals itself to us in the particular phenomenon, the eye. If experience informed us that the particular adjustment of some other visual phenomenon (a book, for instance) were essential to our apprehension of all the other phenomena, we should, in the same way, be compelled to regard this book as our sense of sight manifested in one of its own sensations. The book would be to us what the eye now is; it would be our bodily organ: and no *a priori* reason can be shown why this might not have been the case. All that we can say is, that such is not the finding of experience. Experience points out the eye, and the eye alone, as the visual sensation essential to our apprehension of all our other sensations of vision, and we come at last to regard this sensation as the sense itself. Inveterate association leads us to regard the eye not merely as the organ, but actually as the sense of vision. We find from experience how much depends upon its possession, and we lay claim to it as a part of ourselves with an emphasis that will not be gainsaid.

An interesting enough subject of speculation would be, an inquiry into the gradual steps by which each

man is led to *appropriate* his own body. No man's body is given him absolutely, indefeasibly, and at once, *ex dono Dei*. It is no unearned hereditary patrimony. It is held by no *a priori* title on the part of the possessor. The credentials by which its tenure is secured to him are purely of an *a posteriori* character; and a certain course of experience must be gone through before the body can become his. The man acquires it, as he does originally all other property, in a certain formal and legalised manner. Originally, and in the strict legal as well as metaphysical idea of them, all bodies, living as well as dead, human no less than brute, are mere *waifs*, the property of the first finder. But the law, founding on sound metaphysical principles, very properly makes a distinction here between two kinds of finding. To entitle a person to claim a human body as his own, it is not enough that he should find it in the same way in which he finds his other sensations, namely, as impressions which interfere not with the manifestations of each other. This is not enough, even though, in the case supposed, the person should be the first finder. A subsequent finder would have the preference if able to show that the particular sensations manifested as this human body were essential to his apprehension of all his other sensations whatsoever. It is this latter species of finding—the finding, namely, of certain sensations as the essential condition on which the apprehension of all other sensations depends—it is this finding alone

which gives each man a paramount and indisputable title to that "treasure trove" which he calls his own body. Now, it is only after going through a considerable course of experience and experiment, that we can ascertain what the particular sensations are upon which all our other sensations are dependent. And therefore were we not right in saying that a man's body is not given to him directly and at once, but that he takes a certain time, and must go through a certain process, to acquire it?

The conclusion which we would deduce from the whole of the foregoing remarks is, that the great law of *living*[1] sensation, the *rationale* of sensation as a *living* process, is this, that the senses are not merely *presentative, i.e.*, they not only bring sensations before us, but that they are *self-presentative, i.e.*, they, moreover, bring themselves before us as sensations. But for this law we should never get beyond our mere subjective modifications; but, in virtue of it, we necessarily get beyond them; for the results of the law are—1st, that we, the subject, restrict ourselves to, or identify ourselves with, the senses, not as displayed in their

[1] We say *living*, because every attempt hitherto made to explain sensation has been founded on certain appearances manifested in the *dead* subject. By inspecting a dead carcass we shall never discover the principle of life; by inspecting a dead eye or a camera obscura, we shall never discover the principle of vision. Yet, though there is no seeing in a dead eye, or in a camera obscura, optics deal exclusively with such inanimate materials; and hence the student who studies them will do well to remember, that optics are the science of vision, with the *fact* of vision left entirely out of the consideration.

primary sphere (the large circle A), but as falling within their own ken as sensations, in their secondary sphere (the small circle A). This smaller sphere is our own bodily frame, and does not each individual look upon himself as vested in his own bodily frame? And, 2dly, it is a necessary consequence of this investment or restriction, that every sensation which lies beyond the sphere of the senses, viewed as sensations (*i.e.*, which lies beyond the body), must be, in the most unequivocal sense of the words, a real independent object. If the reader wants a name to characterise this system, he may call it the system of *Absolute or Thoroughgoing presentationism*.

REID AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE

REID AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE.[1]

ALTHOUGH Dr Reid does not stand in the very highest rank of philosophers, this incomparable edition of his works goes far to redress his deficiencies, and to render his writings, taken in connection with the editorial commentaries, a most engaging and profitable study. It is probable that the book derives much of its excellence from the very imperfections of the textual author. Had Reid been a more learned man he might have failed to elicit the unparalleled erudition of his editor; had he been a clearer and closer thinker, Sir William Hamilton's vigorous logic and speculative acuteness would probably have found a narrower field for their display. On the whole, we cannot wish that Reid had been either more erudite

[1] 'The Works of Thomas Reid, D.D.' Edited by Sir William Hamilton, Bart., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. With Copious Notes and Supplementary Dissertations by the Editor. Edinburgh: Maclachlan, Stewart, & Co. 1846.

or more perspicacious, so pointed and felicitous is the style in which his errors are corrected, his thoughts reduced to greater precision, his ambiguities pointed out and cleared up, and his whole system set in its most advantageous light, by his admiring though by no means idolatrous editor.

Besides being a model of editorship, this single volume is, in so far as philosophy and the history of philosophical opinion are concerned, of itself a literature. We must add, however, that Sir William Hamilton's dissertations, though abundant, are not yet completed. Yet, in spite of this drawback, the work is one which ought to wipe away effectually from our country the reproach of imperfect learning and shallow speculation; for in depth of thought, and extent and accuracy of knowledge, the editor's own contributions are of themselves sufficient to bring up our national philosophy (which had fallen somewhat into arrear) to a level with that of the most scientific countries in Europe.

In the remarks that are to follow, we shall confine ourselves to a critique of the philosophy of Dr Reid, and of its collateral topics. Sir William Hamilton's dissertations are too elaborate and important to be discussed, unless in an article, or series of articles, devoted exclusively to themselves. Should we appear in aught to press the philosophy of common sense too hard, we conceive that our strictures are, to a considerable extent, borne out by the admissions of Sir William Hamilton himself, in regard to the

tenets of the founder of the school. And should some of our shafts glance off against the editor's own opinions, he has only himself to blame for it. If we see a fatal flaw in the constitution of all, and consequently of his, psychology, it was his writings that first opened our eyes to it. So lucidly has he explained certain philosophical doctrines, that they cannot stop at the point to which he has carried them. They must be rolled forward into a new development which perhaps may be at variance with the old one, where he tarries. But his powerful arm first set the stone in motion, and he must be content to let it travel whithersoever it may. He has taught those who study him *to think*, and he must stand the consequences, whether they think in unison with himself or not. We conceive, however, that even those who differ from him most, would readily own, that to his instructive disquisitions they were indebted for at least one half of all that they know of philosophy.

In entering on an examination of the system of Dr Reid, we must ask first of all, what is the great problem about which philosophers in all ages have busied themselves most, and which consequently must have engaged, and did engage, a large share of the attention of the champion of Common Sense? We must also state the *fact* which gives rise to the problem of philosophy.

The perception of a material universe, as it is the most prominent fact of cognition, so has it given rise to the problem which has been most agitated by

philosophers. This question does not relate to the existence of the fact. The existence of the perception of matter is admitted on all hands. It refers to the nature, or origin, or constitution of the fact. Is the perception of matter simple and indivisible, or is it composite and divisible? Is it the ultimate, or is it only the penultimate, *datum* of cognition? Is it a relation constituted by the concurrence of a mental or subjective, and a material or objective element; or do we impose upon ourselves in regarding it as such? Is it a state or modification of the human mind? Is it an effect that can be distinguished from its cause? Is it an event consequent on the presence of real antecedent objects? These interrogations are somewhat varied in their form, but each of them embodies the whole point at issue, each of them contains the cardinal question of philosophy. The perception of matter is the admitted fact. The *character* of this fact, that is the point which speculation undertakes to canvass, and endeavours to decipher.

Another form in which the question may be put is this: We all believe in the existence of matter, but what *kind* of matter do we believe in the existence of? matter *per se*, or matter *cum perceptione?* If the former, this implies that the given fact (the perception of matter) is compound and submits to analysis; if the latter, this implies that it is simple and defies partition.

Opposite answers to this question are returned by psychology and metaphysic. In the estimation of

metaphysic, the perception of matter is the absolutely elementary in cognition, the *ne plus ultra* of thought. Reason cannot get beyond, or behind it. It has no pedigree. It admits of no analysis. It is not a relation constituted by the coalescence of an objective and a subjective element. It is not a state or modification of the human mind. It is not an effect which can be distinguished from its cause. It is not brought about by the presence of antecedent realities. It is positively the FIRST, with no forerunner. The perception-of-matter is one mental word, of which the verbal words are mere syllables. We impose upon ourselves, and we also falsify the fact, if we take any other view of it than this. Thus speaks metaphysic, though perhaps not always with an unfaltering voice.

Psychology, or the science of the human mind, teaches a very different doctrine. According to this science, the perception of matter is a secondary and composite truth. It admits of being analysed into a subjective and an objective element, a mental modification called perception on the one hand, and matter *per se* on the other. It is an effect induced by real objects. It is not the first *datum* of intelligence. It has matter itself for its antecedent. Such, in very general terms, is the explanation of the perception of matter which psychology proposes.

Psychology and metaphysic are thus radically opposed to each other in their solutions of the highest problem of speculation. Stated concisely, the differ-

ence between them is this:—psychology regards the perception of matter as susceptible of analytic treatment, and travels, or endeavours to travel, beyond the given fact; metaphysic stops short in the given fact, and there makes a stand, declaring it to be an indissoluble unity. Psychology holds her analysis to be an analysis of things. Metaphysic holds the psychological analysis to be an analysis of sounds, and nothing more. These observations exhibit, in their loftiest generalisation, the two counter doctrines on the subject of perception. We now propose to follow them into their details, for the purpose both of eliciting the truth and of arriving at a correct judgment in regard to the reformation which Dr Reid is supposed to have effected in this department of philosophy.

The psychological or analytic doctrine is the first which we shall discuss, on account of its connection with the investigations of Dr Reid, in regard to whom we may state, beforehand, our conclusion and its grounds, which are these:—that Reid broke down in his philosophy, both polemical and positive, because he assumed the psychological and not the metaphysical doctrine of perception as the basis of his arguments. He did not regard the perception of matter as absolutely primary and simple; but in common with all psychologists, he conceived that it admitted of being resolved into a mental condition and a material reality; and the consequence was, that he fell into the very errors which it was the professed

business of his life to denounce and exterminate. How this catastrophe came about we shall endeavour shortly to explain.

Reid's leading design was to overthrow scepticism and idealism. In furtherance of this intention, he proposed to himself the accomplishment of two subsidiary ends,—the refutation of what is called the ideal or representative theory of perception, and the substitution of a doctrine of intuitive perception in its room. He takes, and he usually gets, credit for having accomplished both of these objects. But if it be true that the representative theory is but the inevitable development of the doctrine which treats the perception of matter analytically, and if it be true that Reid adopts this latter doctrine, it is obvious that his claims cannot be admitted without a very considerable deduction. That both of these things are true may be established, we think, beyond the possibility of a doubt.

In the first place, then, we have to show that the theory of a representative perception (which Reid is supposed to have overthrown) is identical with the doctrine which treats the perception of matter analytically; and, in the second, we have to show that Reid himself followed the analytic or psychological procedure in his treatment of this fact, and founded upon the analysis his own doctrine of perception.

First, The representative theory is that doctrine of perception which teaches that, in our intercourse with the external universe, we are not immediately

cognisant of real objects themselves, but only of certain mental transcripts or images of them, which, in the language of the different philosophical schools, were termed ideas, representations, phantasms, or species. According to this doctrine we are cognisant of real things, not in and through themselves, but in and through these species or representations. The representations are the immediate or proximate, the real things are the mediate or remote, objects of the mind. The existence of the former is a matter of knowledge, the existence of the latter is merely a matter of belief.

To understand this theory, we must construe its nomenclature into the language of the present day. What, then, is the modern synonym for the "ideas," "representations," "phantasms," and "species," which the theory in question declares to be vicarious of real objects? There cannot be a doubt that the word *perception* is that synonym. So that the representative theory, when fairly interpreted, amounts simply to this, that the mind is immediately cognisant, not of real objects themselves, but *only of its own perceptions of real objects*. To accuse the representationist of maintaining a doctrine more repugnant to common sense than this, or in any way different from it, would be both erroneous and unjust. The golden rule of philosophical criticism is to give every system the benefit of the most favourable interpretation which it admits of.

This, then, is the true version of representationism,

namely, that our perceptions of material things, and not material things *per se*, are the proximate objects of our consciousness when we hold intercourse with the external universe.

Now, this is a doctrine which inevitably emerges the instant that the analysis of the perception of matter is set on foot and admitted. When a philosopher divides, or imagines that he divides, the perception of matter into two things, perception *and* matter, holding the former to be a state of his own mind, and the latter to be no such state; he does, in that analysis, and without saying one other word, avow himself to be a thoroughgoing representationist. For his analysis declares that, in perception, the mind has an immediate or proximate, and a mediate or remote object. Its perception of matter is the proximate object, the object of its consciousness; matter itself, the material existence, is the remote object—the object of its belief. But such a doctrine is representationism, in the strictest sense of the word. It is the very essence and definition of the representative theory to recognise, in perception, a remote as well as a proximate object of the mind. Every system which does this is necessarily a representative system. The doctrine which treats the perception of matter analytically does this; therefore the analytic or psychological doctrine is identical with the representative theory. Both hold that the perceptive process involves two objects, an immediate and a mediate; and nothing more is required to establish their

perfect identity. The analysis of the fact which we call the perception of matter, is unquestionably the groundwork and pervading principle of the theory of a representative perception, whatever form of expression this scheme may at any time have assumed.

Secondly, Did Dr Reid go to work analytically in his treatment of the perception of matter? Undoubtedly he did. He followed the ordinary psychological practice. He regarded the *datum* as divisible into perception and matter. The perception he held to be an act, if not a modification of our minds; the matter he regarded as something which existed out of the mind and irrespective of all perception. Right or wrong, he resolved, or conceived that he had resolved, the perception of matter into its constituent elements, these being a mental operation on the one hand and a material existence on the other. In short, however ambiguous many of Dr Reid's principles may be, there can be no doubt that he founded his doctrine of perception on an analysis of the given fact with which he had to deal. He says, indeed, but little about this analysis, so completely does he take it for granted. He accepted, as a thing of course, the notorious distinction between the perception of matter and matter itself; and, in doing so, he merely followed the example of all preceding psychologists.

These two points being established—*first*, that the theory of representationism necessarily arises out of an analysis of the perception of matter; and, *secondly*,

that Reid analysed or accepted the analysis of this fact—it follows as a necessary consequence that Reid, so far from having overthrown the representative theory, was himself a representationist. His analysis gave him more than he bargained for. He wished to obtain only one, that is, only a proximate object in perception; but his analysis necessarily gave him two: it gave him a remote as well as a proximate object. The mental mode or operation which he calls the perception of matter, and which he distinguishes from matter itself, this, in his philosophy, is the proximate object of consciousness, and is precisely equivalent to the species, phantasms, and representations of the older psychology; the real existence, matter itself, which he distinguishes from the perception of it, this is the remote object of the mind, and is precisely equivalent to the mediate or represented object of the older psychology. He and the representationists, moreover, agree in holding that the latter is the object of belief rather than of knowledge.

The merits of Dr Reid, then, as a reformer of philosophy, amount in our opinion to this: he was among the first[1] to *say* and to *write* that the repre-

[1] *Among the first.* He was not *the* first. Berkeley had preceded him in denouncing most unequivocally the whole theory of representationism. The reason why Berkeley does not get the credit of this is, because his performance is even more explicit and cogent than his promise. He made no phrase about refuting the theory, he simply refuted it. Reid *said* the business, but Berkeley *did* it. The two greatest and most unaccountable blunders in

sentative theory of perception was false and erroneous, and was the fountainhead of scepticism and idealism. But this admission of his merits must be accompanied by the qualification that he adopted, as the basis of his philosophy, a principle which rendered nugatory all his protestations. It is of no use to disclaim a conclusion if we accept the premises which inevitably lead to it. Dr Reid disclaimed the representative theory, but he embraced its premises, and thus he virtually ratified the conclusions of the very system which he clamorously denounced. In his language he is opposed to representationism, but in his doctrine he lends it the strongest support by accepting as the foundation of his philosophy an analysis of the perception of matter.

In regard to the *second* end which Dr Reid is supposed to have overtaken — the establishment of a doctrine of intuitive as opposed to a doctrine of representative perception — it is unnecessary to say much. If we have proved him to be a representationist, he cannot be held to be an intuitionist. Indeed, a doctrine of intuitive perception is a sheer impossibility upon his principles. A doctrine of intuition implies that the mind in perceiving matter has only one, namely, a proximate object. But the

the whole history of philosophy are probably Reid's allegations that Berkeley was a representationist, and that he was an idealist; understanding by the word *idealist*, one who denies the existence of a real external universe. From every page of his writings, it is obvious that Berkeley was neither the one of these nor the other, even in the remotest degree.

analysis of the perception of matter always yields, as its result, a remote as well as a proximate object. The proximate object is the perception, the remote object is the reality. And thus the analysis of the given fact necessarily renders abortive every endeavour to construct a doctrine of intuitive perception. The attempt *must* end in representationism. The only basis for a doctrine of intuitive perception which will never give way, is a resolute forbearance from all analysis of the fact. Do not tamper with it, and you are safe.

Such is the judgment which we are reluctantly compelled to pronounce on the philosophy of Dr Reid in reference to its two cardinal claims, the refutation of the ideal theory, and the establishment of a truer doctrine—a doctrine of intuitive perception. In neither of these undertakings do we think that he has succeeded, and we have exhibited the grounds of our opinion. We do not blame him for this: he simply missed his way at the outset. Representationism could not possibly be avoided, neither could intuitionism be possibly fallen in with, on the analytic road which he took.

But we have not yet done with the consideration of the psychological or analytic doctrine of perception. We proceed to examine the entanglements in which reason gets involved when she accepts the perception of matter not in its natural and indissoluble unity, but as analysed by philosophers into a mental and a material factor. We have still an eye

to Dr Reid. He came to the rescue of reason, how did it fare with him in the struggle?

The analysis so often referred to affords a starting-point, as has been shown, to representationism: it is also the tap-root of scepticism and idealism. These four things hang together in an inevitable sequence. Scepticism and idealism dog representationism, and representationism dogs the analysis of the perception of matter, just as obstinately as substance is dogged by shadow. More explicitly stated, the order in which they move is this: The analysis divides the perception of matter into perception and matter—two separate things. Upon this, representationism declares, that the perception is the proximate, and that the matter is the remote, object of the mind. Then scepticism declares, that the existence of the matter which has been separated from the perception is problematical, because it is not the direct object of consciousness, and is consequently hypothetical. And, last of all, idealism takes up the ball and declares, that this hypothetical matter is not only problematical, but that it is non-existent. These are the perplexities which rise up to embarrass reason whenever she is weak enough to accept from philosophers their analysis of the perception of matter. They are only the just punishment of her infatuated facility. But what has Reid done to extricate reason from her embarrassments?

We must remember that Reid commenced with analysis, and that consequently he embraced repre-

sentationism, in its spirit, if not positively in its letter. But how did he evade the fangs of scepticism and idealism, to say nothing of destroying, these sleuth-hounds which on this road were sure to be down upon his track the moment they got wind of him? We put the question in a less figurative form: When scepticism and idealism doubted or denied the independent existence of matter, how did Reid vindicate it? He faced about and appealed boldly to our instinctive and irresistible *belief* in its independent existence.

The crisis of the strife centres in this appeal. In itself, the appeal is perfectly competent and legitimate. But it may be met, on the part of the sceptic and idealist, by two modes of tactic. The one tactic is weak, and gives an easy triumph to Dr Reid: the other is more formidable, and, in our opinion, lays him prostrate.

The first Sceptical Tactic.—In answer to Dr Reid's appeal, the sceptic or idealist may say, "Doubtless we have a belief in the independent existence of matter; but this belief is not to be trusted. It is an insufficient guarantee for that which it avouches. It does not follow that a thing is true because we instinctively believe it to be true. It does not follow that matter exists because we cannot but believe it to exist. You must prove its existence by a better argument than mere belief." This mode of meeting the appeal we hold to be pure trifling. We join issue with Dr Reid in maintaining that our nature is not

rooted in delusion, and that the primitive convictions of common sense must be accepted as infallible. If the sceptic admits that we *have* a natural belief in the independent existence of matter, there is an end to him: Dr Reid's victory is secure. This first tactic is a feeble and mistaken manœuvre.

The second Sceptical Tactic.—This position is not so easily turned. The stronghold of the sceptic and idealist is this: they deny the primitive belief to which Dr Reid appeals to be *the fact.* It is not true, they say, that any man believes in the independent existence of matter. And this is perfectly obvious the moment that it is explained. Matter in its *independent* existence, matter *per se*, is matter disengaged in thought from all perception of it present or remembered. Now, does any man believe in the existence of such matter? Unquestionably not. No man by any possibility can. What the matter is which man really believes in shall be explained when we come to speak of the metaphysical solution of the problem, perhaps sooner. Meanwhile we remark that Dr Reid's appeal to the conviction of common sense in favour of the existence of matter *per se*, is rebutted, and in our opinion triumphantly, by the denial on the part of scepticism and idealism that any such belief exists. Scepticism and idealism not only deny the independent existence of matter, but they deny that any man believes in the independent existence of matter. And in this denial they are most indubitably right. For observe what such a belief requires

as its condition. A man must disengage in thought, a tree, for instance, from the thought of all perception of it, and then he must believe in its existence thus disengaged. If he has not disengaged, in his mind, the tree from its perception (from its present perception, if the tree be before him; from its remembered perception, if it be not before him), he cannot believe in the existence of the tree disengaged from its perception; for the tree is *not* disengaged from its perception. But unless he believes in the existence of the tree disengaged from its perception, he does not believe in the independent existence of the tree, in the existence of the tree *per se*. Now, can the mind by any effort effect this disengagement? The thing is an absolute impossibility. The condition on which the belief hinges cannot be purified, and consequently the belief itself cannot be entertained.

People have, then, *no belief* in the independent existence of matter; that is, in the existence of matter entirely denuded of perception. This point being proved, what becomes of Dr Reid's appeal to *this belief* in support of matter's independent existence? It has not only no force, it has no meaning. This second tactic is invincible. Scepticism and idealism are perfectly in the right when they refuse to accept as the guarantee of independent matter a belief which itself has no manner of existence. How can they be vanquished by an appeal to a nonentity?

A question may here be raised. If the belief in

question be not the fact, what has hitherto prevented scepticism from putting a final extinguisher on Reid's appeal by *proving* that no such belief exists? A very sufficient reason has prevented scepticism from doing this, from explicitly extinguishing the appeal. There is a division of labour in speculation as well as in other pursuits. It is the sceptic's business simply to deny the existence of the belief: it is no part of his business to exhibit the grounds of his denial. *We* have explained these grounds; but were the sceptic to do this, he would be travelling out of his vocation. Observe how the case stands. The reason why matter *per se* is not and cannot be believed in, is because it is impossible for thought to disengage matter from perception, and consequently it is impossible for thought to believe in the disengaged existence of matter. The matter to be believed in is not disengaged from the perception, consequently it cannot be believed to be disengaged from the perception. But unless it be believed to be disengaged from the perception, it cannot be believed to exist *per se*. In short, as we have already said, the impossibility of complying with the *condition* of the belief is the ground on which the sceptic denies the *existence* of the belief. But the sceptic is himself debarred from producing these grounds. Why? Because their exhibition would be tantamount to a rejection of the principle which he has *accepted* at the hands of the orthodox and dogmatic psychologist. That principle is the analysis so often spoken of—

the separation, namely, of the perception of matter into perception and matter *per se*. The sceptic accepts this analysis. His business is simply to *accept*, not to discover or scrutinise principles. Having accepted the analysis, he then denies that any belief attaches to the existence of matter *per se*. In this he is quite right. But he cannot, consistently with his calling, exhibit the ground of his denial; for this ground is, as we have shown, the impossibility of performing the analysis, of effecting the requisite disengagement. But the sceptic has accepted the analysis, has admitted the disengagement. He therefore cannot now retract: and he has no wish to retract. His special mission, his only object, is to confound the principle which he has accepted by means of the reaction of its consequences. The inevitable consequence which ensues when the analysis of the perception of matter is admitted is the extinction of all belief in the existence of matter. The analysis gives us a kind of matter to believe in to which no belief corresponds. The sceptic is content with pronouncing this to be the fact without going into its reason. It is not his business to correct, by a direct exposure, the error of the principle which the dogmatist lays down, and which he accepts. The analysis is the psychologist's affair; let *him* look to it. Were the sceptic to make it his, he would emerge from the sceptical crisis, and pass into a new stage of speculation. He, indeed, subverts it indirectly by a *reductio ad absurdum*. But he does not *say* that he

subverts it; he leaves the orthodox proposer of the principle to find that out.

Reid totally misconceived the nature of scepticism and idealism in their bearings on this problem. He regarded them as habits of thought, as dispositions of mind peculiar to certain individuals of vexatious character and unsound principles, instead of viewing them as catholic eras in the development of all genuine speculative thinking. In his eyes they were subjective crotchets limited to some, and not objective crises common to all who think. He made *personal* matters of them, a thing not to be endured. For instance, in dealing with Hume, he conceived that the scepticism which confronted him in the pages of that great genius was *Hume's* scepticism, and was not the scepticism of human nature at large —was not his own scepticism just as much as it was Hume's. *His* soul, so he thought, was free from the obnoxious flaw, merely because *his* anatomy, shallower than Hume's, refused to lay it bare. With such views it was impossible for Reid to eliminate scepticism and idealism from philosophy. These foes are the foes of each man's own house and heart, and nothing can be made of them if we attack them in the person of another. Ultimately and fairly to get rid of them, a man must first of all thoroughly digest them, and take them up into the vital circulation of his own reason. The only way of putting them back is by carrying them forward.

From having never properly secreted scepticism

and idealism in his own mind, Reid fell into the commission of one of the gravest errors of which a philosopher can be guilty. He falsified the fact in regard to our primitive beliefs, a thing which the obnoxious systems against which he was fighting never did. He conceived that scepticism and idealism called in question a fact which was countenanced by a natural belief; accordingly, he confronted their denial with the allegation that the disputed fact, the existence of matter *per se*, was guaranteed by a primitive conviction of our nature. But this fact receives no support from any such source. There is no belief in the whole repository of the mind which can be fitted on to the existence of matter denuded of all perception. Therefore, in maintaining the contrary, Reid falsified the fact in regard to our primitive convictions, in regard to those principles of common sense which he professed to follow as his guide. This was a serious slip. The rash step which he here took plunged him into a much deeper error than that of the sceptic or idealist. They err[1] in common with him in accepting as their starting-point the analysis of the perception of matter. He errs, by himself, in maintaining that there is a belief where no belief exists.

But do not scepticism and idealism doubt matter's

[1] *They err.* This, however, can scarcely be called an error. It is the business of the sceptic at least to accept the principles generally recognised, and to develop their conclusions, however absurd or revolting. If the principles are false to begin with, that is no fault of his, but of those at whose hands he received them.

existence *altogether*, or deny to it *any* kind of existence? Certainly they do; and in harmony with the principle from which they start they must do this. The *only* kind of matter which the analysis of the perception of matter yields, is matter *per se*. The existence of such matter is, as we have shown, altogether uncountenanced either by consciousness or belief. But there is no other kind of matter in the field. We must, therefore, either believe in the existence of matter *per se*, or we must believe in the existence of *no* matter whatever. We do not, and we cannot, believe in the existence of matter *per se;* therefore we cannot believe in the existence of matter at all. This is not satisfactory, but it is closely consequential.

But why not, it may be said, why not cut the knot, and set the question at rest, by admitting at once that every man *does*, popularly speaking, believe in the existence of matter, and that he practically walks in the light of that belief during every moment of his life? This observation tempts us into a digression, and we shall yield to the temptation. The problem of perception admits of being treated in *three* several ways: *first*, we may ignore it altogether, we may refuse to entertain it at all; or, *secondly*, we may discuss it in the manner just proposed, we may lay it down as gospel that every man does believe in the existence of matter, and acts at all times upon this conviction, and we may expatiate diffusely over these smooth truths; or, *thirdly*, we may follow and

contemplate the subtle and often perplexed windings which reason takes in working her way through the problem—a problem which, though apparently clearer than the noonday sun, is really darker than the mysteries of Erebus. In short, we may *speculate* the problem. In grappling with it we may trust ourselves to the mighty current of *thinking*, with all its whirling eddies, certain that, if our thinking be genuine objective thinking, which deals with nothing but *ascertained* facts, it will bring us at last into the haven of truth. We now propose to consider which of these modes of treating the problem is the best; we shall begin by making a few remarks upon the *second*, for it was this which brought us to a stand, and seduced us into the present digression.

It is, no doubt, perfectly true that we all believe in the existence of matter, and that we all act up to this belief. The truth that "each of us exists;" the truth that "each of us is the same person to-day that he was yesterday;" the truth that "a material universe exists, and that we believe in its existence;" all these are most important truths, most important things to know. It is difficult to see how we could get on without this knowledge. Yet they are not worth one straw in communication. And why not? Just for the same reason that atmospheric air, though absolutely indispensable to our existence, has no value whatever in exchange; this reason being that we can get, and have already got, both the air and the truths in unlimited abundance for

nothing, and thanks to no man. It is not its *importance,* then, which confers upon truth its value in communication. The value of truth is measured by precisely the same standard which determines the value of wealth. This standard is in neither case the importance of the article; it is always its difficulty of attainment, its cost of production. Has *labour* been expended on its formation or acquisition: then the article, if a material commodity, has a value in exchange; if a truth, it has a value in communication. Has no labour been bestowed upon it, and has Nature herself furnished it to every human being in overflowing abundance: then the thing is altogether destitute of exchange-value, whether it be an article of matter or of mind; no man can, without impertinence, transmit or convey such a commodity to his neighbour. If this be the law on the subject (and we conceive that it must be so ruled) it settles the question as to the *second* mode of dealing with the problem of perception. It establishes the point that this method of treating the problem is not to be permitted.

The *first* and *third* modes of dealing with our problem remain to be considered. The first mode ignores the problem altogether; it refuses to have anything to do with it. Perhaps this mode is the best of the three. We will not say that it is not: it is at any rate preferable to the second. But once admit that philosophy is a legitimate occupation, and this mode must be set aside, for it is a negation of all philosophy. Everything depends upon this admis-

sion. But the admission is, we conceive, a point which has been already and long ago decided. Men must and will philosophise. That being the case, the only alternative left is, that we should discuss the highest problem of philosophy in the terms of the *third* mode proposed. We have called this the speculative method, which means nothing more than that we should expend upon the investigation the uttermost toil and application of thought; and that we should estimate the truths which we arrive at, not by the scale of their importance, but by the scale of their difficulty of attainment, of their cost of production. *Labour*, we repeat it, is the standard which measures the value of truth as well as the value of wealth.

A still more cogent argument in favour of the strictly speculative treatment of the problem is this. The problem of perception may be said to be a *reversed* problem. What are the means in every other problem are in *this* problem the end; and what is the end in every other problem is in this problem the means. In every other problem the solution of the problem is the end desiderated: the means are the thinking requisite for its solution. But here the case is inverted. In *our* problem the desiderated solution is the means; the end is the development, or, we should rather say, the creation of speculative thought, a kind of thought different altogether from ordinary popular thinking. "Oh! then," some one will perhaps exclaim, "after all, the whole question

about perception resolves it into a *mere gymnastic* of the mind." Good sir, do you know what you are saying? Do *you* think that the mind itself is anything except a mere gymnastic of the mind? If you do, you are most deplorably mistaken. Most assuredly the mind only *is* what the mind *does*. The existence of thought is the exercise of thought. Now if this be true, there is the strongest possible reason for treating the problem after a purely speculative fashion. The problem and its desired solution, these are only the means which enable a new species of thinking (and that the very highest), viz., speculative thinking, to deploy into existence. This deployment is the end. But how can this end be attained if we check the speculative evolution in its first movements, by throwing ourselves into the arms of the *apparently* Common Sense convictions of Dr Reid? We use the word "apparently," because, in reference to this problem, the apparently Common Sense convictions of Dr Reid are not the *really* Common Sense convictions of mankind. These latter can only be got at through the severest discipline of speculation.

Our final answer, then, to the question which led us into this digression is this: It is quite true that the material world exists; it is quite true that we believe in this existence, and always act in conformity with our faith. Whole books may be written in confirmation of these truths. They may be published and paraded in a manner which apparently

settles the entire problem of perception. And yet this is not the right way to go to work. It settles nothing but what all men, women, and children have already settled. The truths thus formally substantiated were produced without an effort; every one has already got from Nature at least as much of them as he cares to have; and therefore, whatever their importance may be, they cannot, with any sort of propriety, be made the subjects of conveyance from man to man. We must either leave the problem altogether alone (a thing, however, which we should have thought of sooner), or we must adopt the speculative treatment. The argument, moreover, contained in the preceding paragraph, appears to render this treatment imperative; and accordingly we now return to it, after our somewhat lengthened digression.

We must take up the thread of our discourse at the point where we dropped it. The crisis to which the discussion had conducted us was this: that the existence of matter could not be believed in *at all*. The psychological analysis necessarily lands us in this conclusion: for the psychological analysis gives us, for matter, nothing but matter *per se*. But matter *per se* is what no man does or can believe in. We are reluctant to reiterate the proof; but it is this: to believe in the existence of matter *per se* is to believe in the existence of matter liberated from perception; but we cannot believe in the existence of matter liberated from perception, for no power

of thinking will liberate matter from perception; therefore we cannot believe in the existence of matter *per se*. This argument admits of being exhibited in a still more forcible form. We commence with an illustration. If a man believes that a thing exists as one thing, he cannot believe that this same thing exists as another thing. For instance, if a man believes that a tree exists as a tree, he cannot believe that it exists as a house. Apply this to the subject in hand. If a man believes that matter exists as a thing *not* disengaged from perception, he cannot believe that it exists as a thing *disengaged* from perception. Now, there cannot be a doubt that the *only* kind of matter in which man believes is matter *not* disengaged from perception. He therefore cannot believe in matter *disengaged* from perception. His mind is already preoccupied by the belief that matter is *this one thing*, and, therefore, he cannot believe that it is *that other thing*. His faith is, in this instance, forestalled, just as much as his faith is forestalled from believing that a tree is a house, when he already believes that it is a tree.

There are two very good reasons, then, why we cannot believe in the existence of matter at all, if we accept as our starting-point the psychological analysis. This analysis gives us, for matter, matter *per se*. But matter *per se* cannot be believed in: 1st, because the condition on which the belief depends cannot be complied with; and, 2dly, because the matter which we *already* believe in is something

quite different from matter *per se*. In trying to believe in the existence of matter *per se*, we always find that we are believing in the existence of *something else*, namely, in the existence of matter *cum perceptione*. But it is not to the psychological analysis that we are indebted for this matter, which is something else than matter *per se*. The psychological analysis does its best to annihilate it. It gives us nothing but matter *per se*, a thing which neither is nor can be believed in. We are thus prevented from believing in the existence of *any* kind of matter. In a word, the psychological analysis of the perception of matter necessarily converts all those who embrace it into sceptics or idealists.

In this predicament what shall we do? Shall we abandon the analysis as a treacherous principle, or shall we, with Dr Reid, make one more stand in its defence? In order that the analysis may have fair play we shall give it another chance, by quoting Mr Stewart's exposition of Reid's doctrine, which must be regarded as a perfectly faithful representation. "Dr Reid," says Mr Stewart, "was the first person who had courage to lay completely aside all the common *hypothetical* language concerning perception, and to exhibit *the difficulty*, in all its magnitude, by a plain *statement of the fact*. To what, then, it may be asked, does this statement amount? Merely to this: that the mind is so formed that certain impressions produced on our organs of sense, by external objects, are *followed* by corresponding sensations,

and that these sensations (which have no more resemblance to the qualities of matter, than the words of a language have to the things they denote) are *followed* by a perception of the existence and qualities of the bodies by which the impressions are made; that all the steps of this process are equally incomprehensible."[1] There are at least two points which are well worthy of being attended to in this quotation. *First*, Mr Stewart says that Reid "exhibited the difficulty of the problem of perception, in all its magnitude, by a plain statement of fact." What does that mean? It means this: that Reid stated, indeed, the fact correctly, namely, *that* external objects give rise to sensations and perceptions, but that still his statement did not penetrate to the heart of the business, but, by his own admission, left the difficulty undiminished. What difficulty? The difficulty as to *how* external objects give rise to sensations and perceptions. Reid did not undertake to settle that point—a wise declinature, in the estimation of Mr Stewart. Now Mr Stewart, understanding, as he did, the philosophy of causation, ought to have known that every difficulty as to *how* one thing gives rise to another, is purely a difficulty of the mind's creation, and not of nature's making, and is, therefore, no difficulty at all. Let us explain this. A man says he knows *that* fire explodes gunpowder; but he does not know *how* or by what means it does this. Suppose, then, he finds out the

[1] 'Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind,' part I. ch. i.

means, he is still just where he was; he must again ask how or by what means these discovered means explode the gunpowder; and so on *ad infinitum.* Now the mind may quibble with itself for ever, and *make* what difficulties it pleases in this way; but there is no *real* difficulty in the case. In considering any sequence, we always know the *how* or the means as soon as we know the *that* or the fact. These means may be more proximate or more remote means, but they are invariably given either proximately or remotely along with and in the fact. As soon as we know *that* fire explodes gunpowder, we know *how* fire explodes gunpowder; for fire is itself the means which explodes gunpowder, the *how* by which it is ignited. In the same way, *if* we knew that matter gave rise to perception, there would be no difficulty as to *how* it did so. Matter would be itself the means which gave rise to perception. We conceive, therefore, that Mr Stewart did not consider what he was saying when he affirmed that Reid's plain statement of facts exhibited *the difficulty* in all its magnitude. If Reid's statement *be* a statement of fact, all difficulty vanishes, the question of perception is relieved from every species of perplexity. If it *be* the fact that perception is consequent on the presence of matter, Reid must be admitted to have explained, to the satisfaction of all mankind, *how* perception is brought about. Matter is itself the means by which it is brought about.

Secondly, then, Is it the fact that matter gives

rise to perception? That is the question. Is it the fact that these two things stand to each other in the relation of antecedent and consequent? Reid's "plain statement of fact," as reported by Mr Stewart, maintains that they do. Reid lays it down as a fact, that perceptions *follow* sensations, that sensations *follow* certain impressions made on our organs of sense by external objects, which stand first in the series. The sequence, then, is this: 1*st*, Real external objects; 2*d*, Impressions made on our organs of sense; 3*d*, Sensations; 4*th*, Perceptions. It will simplify the discussion if we leave out of account Nos. 2 and 3, limiting ourselves to the statement that real objects precede perceptions. This is declared to be a fact, of course an *observed* fact; for a fact can with no sort of propriety be called a fact, unless some person or other has *observed* it. Reid "laid completely aside all the common *hypothetical* language concerning perception." His plain statement (so says Mr Stewart) contains nothing but facts, facts established, of course, by observation. It is a fact of observation, then, according to Reid, that real objects precede perceptions; that perceptions follow when real objects are present. Now, when a man proclaims as fact such a sequence as this, what must he first of all have done? He must have observed the antecedent *before* it was followed by the consequent; he must have observed the cause out of combination with effect; otherwise his statement is a pure hypothesis or fiction. For instance, when a

man says that a shower of rain (No. 1) is followed by a refreshed vegetation (No. 2), he must have observed both No. 1 and No. 2, and he must have observed them as two separate things. Had he never observed anything but No. 2 (the refreshed vegetation), he might form what conjectures he pleased in regard to its antecedent, but he never could lay it down *as an observed fact*, that this antecedent was a shower of rain. In the same way, when a man affirms it to be a fact of observation (as Dr Reid does, according to Stewart), that material objects are *followed* by perceptions, it is absolutely necessary for the credit of his statement that he should have observed this to be the case; that he should have observed material objects before they were followed by perceptions; that he should have observed the antecedent separate from the consequent: otherwise his statement, instead of being complimented as a plain statement of fact, must be condemned as a tortuous statement of hypothesis. Unless he has observed No. 1 and No. 2 in sequence, he is not entitled to declare that this is an observed sequence. Now, did Reid, or did any man, ever observe matter anterior to his perception of it? Had Reid a faculty which enabled him to catch matter before it had passed into perception? Did he ever observe it, as Hudibras says, "undressed"? Mr Stewart implies that he had such a faculty. But the notion is preposterous. No man can observe matter prior to his perception of it; for his observation of it

presupposes his perception of it. Our observation of matter *begins* absolutely with the perception of it. Observation always gives the perception of matter as the *first* term in the series, and not matter itself. To pretend (as Reid and Stewart do) that observation can go behind perception, and lay hold of matter before it has given rise to perception, this is too ludicrous a doctrine to be even mentioned; and we should not have alluded to it, but for the countenance which it has received from the two great apostles of common sense.

This last bold attempt, then, on the part of Reid and Stewart (for Stewart adopts the doctrine which he reports) to prop their tottering analysis on direct observation and experience, must be pronounced a failure. Reid's "plain statement of fact" is not a *true* statement of *observed* fact; it is a vicious statement of *conjectured* fact. Observation depones to the existence of the perception of matter as the first *datum* with which it has to deal, but it depones to the existence of nothing anterior to this.

But will not abstract thinking bear out the analysis by yielding to us matter *per se* as a legitimate inference of reason? No; it will do nothing of the kind. To make good this inference, observe what abstract thinking must do. It must bring under the notice of the mind matter *per se* (No. 1) as something which is *not* the perception of it (No. 2); but whenever thought tries to bring No. 1 under the notice of the mind, it is No. 2 (or the perception of matter)

which invariably comes. We may ring for No. 1, but No. 2 always answers the bell. We may labour to construe a tree *per se* to the mind, but what we always *do* construe to the mind is the perception of a tree. What we want is No. 1, but what we always get is No. 2. To unravel the thing explicitly, the manner in which we impose upon ourselves is this As explanatory of the perceptive process, we construe to our minds *two number twos*, and one of these we *call* No. 1. For example, we have the perception of a tree (No. 2); we wish to think the tree itself (No. 1) as that which gives rise to the perception. But this No. 1 is merely No. 2 over again. *It* is thought of as the perception of a tree, *i.e.*, as No. 2. We *call* it the tree itself, or No. 1; but we *think* it as the perception of the tree, or as No. 2. The first or explanatory term (the matter *per se*) is merely a repetition in thought (though called by a different name) of the second term, the term to be explained, viz., the perception of matter. Abstract thinking, then, equally with direct observation, refuses to lend any support to the analysis; for a thing cannot be said to be analysed when it is merely multiplied or repeated, which is all that abstract thinking does in regard to the perception of matter. The matter *per se*, which abstract thinking supposes that it separates from the perception of matter, is merely an iteration of the perception of matter.

Our conclusion therefore is, that the analysis of the perception of matter into the two things, perception

and matter (the ordinary psychological principle), must, on all accounts, be abandoned. It is both treacherous and impracticable.

Before proceeding to consider the metaphysical solution of the problem, we shall gather up into a few sentences the reasonings which in the preceding discussion are diffused over a considerable surface. The ordinary, or psychological doctrine of perception, reposes upon an analysis of the perception of matter into two separate things, a modification of our minds (the one thing) consequent on the presence of matter *per se*, which is the other thing. This analysis inevitably leads to a theory of representative perception, because it yields as its result a proximate and a remote object. It is the essence of representationism to recognise both of these as instrumental in perception. But representationism leads to scepticism, for it is possible that the remote or real object (matter *per se*), not being an object of consciousness, may not be instrumental in the process. Scepticism doubts its instrumentality, and, doubting its instrumentality, it of course doubts its existence; for not being an object of consciousness, its existence is only postulated in order to account for something which *is* an object of consciousness, viz., perception. If, therefore, we doubt that matter has any hand in bringing about perception, we, of course, doubt the existence of matter. This scepticism does. Idealism denies its instrumentality and existence. In these circumstances what does Dr Reid do? He admits that matter

per se is not an object of consciousness; but he endeavours to save its existence by an appeal to our natural and irresistible belief in its existence. But scepticism and idealism doubt and deny the existence of matter *per se*, not merely because it is no object of consciousness, but, moreover, because it is no object of belief. And in this they are perfectly right. It *is* no object of belief. Dr Reid's appeal, therefore, goes for nothing. He has put into the witness-box a nonentity. And scepticism and idealism are at any rate for the present reprieved. But do not scepticism and idealism go still further in their denial? do they not extend it from a denial in the existence of matter *per se*, to a denial in the existence of matter altogether? Yes, and they must do this. They can only deal with the matter which the psychological analysis affords. The only kind of matter which the psychological analysis affords is matter *per se*, and it affords this as all matter whatsoever. Therefore, in denying the existence of matter *per se*, scepticism and idealism must deny the existence of matter out and out. This, then, is the legitimate *terminus* to which the accepted analysis conducts us. We are all, as we at present stand, either sceptics or idealists, every man of us. Shall the analysis, then, be given up? Not if it can be substantiated by any good plea; for *truth* must be accepted, be the consequences what they may. Can the analysis, then, be made good either by observation or by reasoning, the only competent authorities, now that belief has been de-

clared *hors de combat?* Stewart says that Reid made it good by means of direct observation; but the claim is too ridiculous to be listened to for a single instant. We have also shown that reasoning is incompetent to make out and support the analysis; and therefore our conclusion is, that it falls to the ground as a thing altogether impracticable as well as false, and that the attempt to re-establish it ought never, on any account, to be renewed.

We have dwelt so long on the exposition of the psychological or analytic solution of the problem of perception, that we have but little space to spare for the discussion of the metaphysical doctrine. We shall unfold it as briefly as we can.

The principle of the metaphysical doctrine is precisely the opposite of the principle of the psychological doctrine. The one attempts an analysis; the other forbears from all analysis of the given fact, the perception of matter. And why does metaphysic make no attempt to dissect this fact? Simply because the thing cannot be done. The fact yields not to the solvent of thought: it yields not to the solvent of observation: it yields not to the solvent of belief, for man has no belief in the existence of matter from which perception (present and remembered) has been withdrawn. An impotence of the mind does indeed apparently resolve the supposed synthesis; but essential thinking exposes the imposition, restores

the divided elements to their pristine integrity, and extinguishes the theory which would explain the *datum* by means of the concurrence of a subjective or mental, and an objective or material factor. The convicted weakness of psychology is thus the root which gives strength to metaphysic. The failure of psychology affords to metaphysic a foundation of adamant. And perhaps no better or more comprehensive description of the object of metaphysical or speculative philosophy could be given than this: that it is a science which exists, and has at all times existed, chiefly for the purpose of exposing the vanity and confounding the pretensions of what is called the "science of the human mind." The turning-round of thought from psychology to metaphysic is the true interpretation of the Platonic conversion of the soul from ignorance to knowledge, from mere opinion to certainty and satisfaction: in other words, from a discipline in which the thinking is only *apparent*, to a discipline in which the thinking is *real*. Ordinary observation does not reveal to us the real but only the apparent revolutions of the celestial orbs. We must call astronomy to our aid if we would reach the truth. In the same way ordinary or psychological thinking may show us the apparent movements of thought, but it is powerless to decipher the real figures described in that mightier than planetary scheme. Metaphysic alone can teach us to read aright the intellectual skies. Psychology regards the universe of thought from the

Ptolemaic point of view, making man, as this system made the earth, the centre of the whole: metaphysic regards it from the Copernican point of view, making God, as this scheme makes the sun, the regulating principle of all. The difference is as great between "the science of the human mind" and metaphysic as it is between the Ptolemaic and the Copernican astronomy, and it is very much of the same kind.

But the opposition between psychology and metaphysic, which we would at present confine ourselves to the consideration of, is this: the psychological blindness consists in supposing that the analysis so often referred to is practicable, and has been made out: the metaphysical insight consists in seeing that the analysis is null and impracticable. The superiority of metaphysic, then, does not consist in doing or in attempting more than psychology. It consists in seeing that psychology proposes to execute the impossible (a thing which psychology does not herself see, but persists in attempting); and it consists, moreover, in refraining from this audacious attempt, and in adopting a humbler, a less adventurous, and a more circumspect method. Metaphysic (viewed in its ideal character) aims at nothing but what it can fully overtake. It is quite a mistake to imagine that this science proposes to carry a man beyond the length of his tether. The psychologist, indeed, launches the mind into imaginary spheres; but metaphysic binds it down to the fact, and there

sternly bids it to abide. *That* is the profession of the metaphysician considered in his beau-ideal. That, too, is the practice (making allowance for the infirmities incident to humanity, and which prevent the ideal from ever being perfectly realised), the practice of all the true astronomers of thought, from Plato down to Schelling and Hegel. If these philosophers accomplish more than the psychologist, it is only because they attempt much less.

In taking up the problem of perception, all that metaphysic demands is the *whole* given fact. That is her only postulate, and it is undoubtedly a stipulation which she is justly entitled to make. Now, what is in this case the *whole* given fact? When we perceive an object, what is the whole given fact before us? In stating it we must not consult elegance of expression; the whole given fact is this: "We apprehend the perception of an object." The fact before us is comprehended wholly in that statement, but in nothing short of it. Now, does metaphysic give no countenance to an analysis of this fact? That is a new question, a question on which we have not yet touched. Observe, the fact which metaphysic declares to be absolutely unsusceptible of analysis is "the perception of matter." But the fact which we are now considering is a totally different fact; it is *our apprehension of* the perception of matter, and it does not follow that metaphysic will also declare this fact to be ultimate and indecompoundable. Were metaphysic to do this it would

reduce us to the condition of subjective or egoistic idealism; but metaphysic is not so absurd. It denies the divisibility of the one fact, but it does itself divide the other. And it is perfectly competent for metaphysic to do this, inasmuch as "our apprehension of the perception of matter" is a different fact from "the perception of matter itself." The former is, in the estimation of metaphysic, susceptible of analysis, the latter is not. Metaphysic thus escapes the imputation of leading us into subjective idealism. This will become more apparent as we proceed.

"Our apprehension of the perception of matter;" this, then, is the whole given fact with which metaphysic has to deal. And this fact metaphysic proceeds to analyse into a subjective and an objective factor, giving to the human mind that part of the *datum* which belongs to the human mind, and withholding from the human mind that part of the *datum* to which it has no proper or exclusive claim. But at what point in the *datum* does metaphysic insert the dissecting-knife, or introduce the solvent which is to effect the proposed dualisation? At a very different point from that at which psychology insinuates her "ineffectual fire." Psychology cuts down between perception and matter, making the former subjective and the latter objective. Metaphysic cuts down between "our apprehension" and "the perception of matter;" making the latter, "the perception of matter," totally objective, and the

former, "our apprehension," alone subjective. Admitting, then, that the total fact we have to deal with is this, "our apprehension of the perception of matter," the difference of treatment which this fact experiences at the hand of psychology and metaphysic is this: they both divide the fact; but psychology divides it as follows: "Our apprehension of the perception of," that is the subjective part of the *datum*, the part that belongs to the human mind; "Matter *per se*" is the objective part of the *datum*, the part of the *datum* which exists independently of the human mind. Metaphysic divides it at a different point, "our apprehension of": this, according to metaphysic, is the subjective part of the process, it is all which can with any propriety be attributed to the human mind: "the perception of matter," this is the objective part of the *datum*, the part of it which exists independently of the human mind, and to the possession of which the human mind has no proper claim, no title at all.

Before explaining what the grounds are which authorise metaphysic in making a division so different from the psychological division of the fact which they both discuss, we shall make a few remarks for the purpose of extirpating, if possible, any lingering prejudice which may still lurk in the reader's mind in favour of the psychological partition.

According to metaphysic, the perception of matter is not the whole given fact with which we have to deal in working out this problem (it is not the whole

given fact; for, as we have said, our apprehension of, or participation in, the perception of matter, this is the whole given fact); but the perception of matter is the *whole objective* part of the given fact. But it will perhaps be asked, Are there not here two given facts? Does not the perception of matter imply two *data?* Is not the perception one given fact, and is not the matter itself another given fact, and are not these two facts perfectly distinct from one another? No; it is the false analysis of psychologists which we have already exposed that deceives us. But there is another circumstance which perhaps contributes more than anything else to assist and perpetuate our delusion. This is the construction of language. We shall take this opportunity to put the student of philosophy upon his guard against its misleading tendency.

People imagine that because two (or rather three) words are employed to denote the fact (the perception of matter), that therefore there are two separate facts and thoughts corresponding to these separate words. But it is a great mistake to suppose that the analysis of facts and thoughts necessarily runs parallel with the analysis of sounds. Man, as Homer says, is μέροψ, or a word-divider; and he often carries this propensity so far as to divide words where there is no corresponding division of thoughts or of things. This is a very convenient practice in so far as the ordinary business of life is concerned, for it

saves much circumlocution, much expenditure of sound. But it runs the risk of making great havoc with scientific thinking; and there cannot be a doubt that it has helped to confirm psychology in its worst errors, by leading the unwary thinker to suppose that he has got before him a complete fact or thought, when he has merely got before him a complete word. There are whole words which, taken by themselves, have no thoughts or things corresponding to them, any more than there are thoughts and things corresponding to each of the separate syllables of which these words are composed. The words "perception" and "matter" are cases in point. These words have no meaning, they have neither facts nor thoughts corresponding to them when taken out of correlation to each other. The word "perception" must be supplemented (mentally at least) by the words "of matter," before it has any kind of sense, before it denotes anything that exists; and in like manner the word "matter" must be mentally supplemented by the words "perception of," before it has any kind of sense, or denotes any real existence. The psychologist would think it absurd if any one were to maintain that there is one separate existence in nature corresponding to the syllable *mat-*, and another separate existence corresponding to the syllable *ter*, the component syllables of the word "matter." In the estimation of the metaphysician it is just as ridiculous to suppose that there is an existing fact or modification in us corresponding to the three syllables

perception, and a fact or existence in nature corresponding to the two syllables *matter*. The word "perception" is merely part of a word which, for convenience sake, is allowed to represent the whole word; and so is the word "matter." The word "perception-of-matter" is always the one total word, the word to the mind, and the existence which this word denotes is a totally objective existence.

But in these remarks we are reiterating (we hope, however, that we are also enforcing) our previous arguments. No power of the mind can divide into two facts, or two existences, or two thoughts, that one prominent fact which stands forth in its integrity as the perception-of-matter. Despite, then, the misleading construction of language, despite the plausible artifices of psychology, we must just accept this fact as we find it; that is, we must accept it indissoluble and entire, and we must keep it indissoluble and entire. We have seen what psychology brought us to by tampering with it, under the pretence of a spurious, because impracticable analysis.

We proceed to exhibit the grounds upon which the metaphysician claims for the perception of matter a totally objective existence. The question may be stated thus: Where are we to place this *datum? in* our minds or *out* of our minds? We cannot place part of it in our own minds and part of it out of our minds, for it has been proved to be not subject to partition. Wherever we place it, then, there must we place it whole and undivided. Has the percep-

tion of matter, then, its proper location in the human mind, or has it not? Does its existence depend upon our existence, or has it a being altogether independent of us?

Now that, and that alone, is the point to decide which our natural belief should be appealed to; but Dr Reid did not see this. His appeal to the conviction of common sense was premature. He appealed to this belief without allowing scepticism and idealism to run their full course; without allowing them to confound the psychological analysis, and thus bring us back to a better condition by compelling us to accept the fact, not as given in the spurious analysis of man, but as given in the eternal synthesis of God. The consequence was, that Reid's appeal came to naught. Instead of interrogating our belief as to the objective existence of the perception of matter (the proper question), the question which he brought under its notice was the objective existence of matter *per se*, matter *minus* perception. Now, matter *per se*, or *minus* perception, is a thing which no belief will countenance. Reid, however, could not admit this. Having appealed to the belief, he was compelled to distort its evidence in his own favour, and to force it, in spite of itself, to bear testimony to the fact which he wished it to establish. Thus Dr Reid's appeal not only came to naught, but, being premature, it drove him, as has been said and shown, to falsify the primitive convictions of our nature. Scepticism must indeed be terrible when it could

thus hurry an honest man into a philosophical falsehood.

The question, then, which we have to refer to our natural belief, and abide the answer whatever it may be, is this: Is the perception of matter (taken in its integrity, as it must be taken), is it a modification of the human mind, or is it not? We answer unhesitatingly for ourselves, that *our* belief is that it is not. This "confession of faith" saves us from the imputation of subjective idealism, and we care not what other kind of idealism we are charged with. We can think of no sort of evidence to prove that the perception of matter is a modification of the human mind, or that the human mind is its proper and exclusive abode; and all our belief sets in towards the opposite conclusion. Our primitive conviction, when we do nothing to pervert it, is, that the perception of matter is not, either wholly or in part, a condition of the human soul; is not bounded in any direction by the narrow limits of our intellectual span; but that it "dwells apart," a mighty and independent system, a city fitted up and upheld by the everlasting God. Who told us that we were placed in a world composed of matter, which gives rise to our subsequent internal perceptions of it, and not that we were let down at once into a universe composed of external perceptions of matter, that were there beforehand and from all eternity, and in which we, the creatures of a day, are merely allowed to participate by the gracious Power to whom they really appertain? We, perversely phi-

losophising, told ourselves the former of these alternatives; but our better nature, the convictions that we have received from God Himself, assure us that the latter of them is the truth. The latter is by far the simpler, as well as by far the sublimer doctrine. But it is not on the authority either of its simplicity or its sublimity that we venture to propound it; it is on account of its perfect consonance, both with the primitive convictions of our unsophisticated common sense, and with the more delicate and complex evidence of our speculative reason.

When a man consults his own nature in an impartial spirit, he inevitably finds that his genuine belief in the existence of matter is not a belief in the independent existence of matter *per se*, but it is a belief in the independent existence of the perception of matter which he is for the time participating in. The very last thing which he naturally believes in is, that the perception is a state of his own mind, and that the matter is something different from it, and exists apart *in naturâ rerum*. He may *say* that he believes this, but he never does really believe it. At any rate he believes, in the *first* place, that they exist *together*, wherever they exist. The perception which a man has of a sheet of paper does not come before him as something distinct from the sheet of paper itself. The two are identical, they are indivisible; they are not two, but one. The only question then is, Whether the perception of a sheet of paper (taken as it must be in its indissoluble totality) is a state of the man's

own mind, or is no such state. And, in settlement of this question, there cannot be a doubt that he believes, in the *second* place, that the perception of a sheet of paper is not a modification of his own mind, but is an objective thing which exists altogether independent of him, and one which would still exist, although he and all other created beings were annihilated. All that he believes to be his (or subjective) is *his participation in* the perception of this object. In a word, it is the perception of matter, and not matter *per se*, which is the *kind* of matter in the independent and permanent existence of which man rests and reposes his belief. There is no truth or satisfaction to be found in any other doctrine.

This metaphysical theory of perception is a doctrine of pure intuitionism: it steers clear of all the perplexities of representationism; for it gives us in perception only one, that is, only a proximate object; this object is the perception of matter, and this is one indivisible object. It is not, and cannot be, split into a proximate and a remote object. The doctrine, therefore, is proof against all the cavils of scepticism. We may add, that the entire objectivity of this *datum* (which the metaphysical doctrine proclaims) makes it proof against the imputation of idealism, at least of every species of absurd or objectionable idealism.

But what are these objective perceptions of matter, and to whom do they belong? This question leads us to speak of the circumstance which renders the

metaphysical doctrine of perception so truly valuable. This doctrine is valuable chiefly on account of the indestructible foundation which it affords to the *a priori* argument in favour of the existence of God. The substance of the argument is this: Matter is the perception of matter. The perception of matter does not belong to man; it is no state of the human mind, man merely participates in it. But it must belong to some mind, for perceptions without an intelligence in which they inhere are inconceivable and contradictory. They must therefore be the property of the Divine mind; states of the everlasting intellect; *ideas* of the Lord and Ruler of all things, and which come before us as *realities,* so forcibly do they contrast themselves with the evanescent and irregular ideas of our feeble understandings. We must, however, beware, above all things, of regarding these Divine ideas as *mere* ideas. An idea, as usually understood, is that from which all reality has been abstracted; but the perception of matter is a Divine idea, from which the reality has not been abstracted, and from which it cannot be abstracted.

But what, it will be asked, what becomes of the senses if this doctrine be admitted? What is their use and office? Just the same as before, only with this difference, that whereas the psychological doctrine teaches that the exercise of the senses is the condition upon which we are permitted to apprehend objective material things, the metaphysical doctrine teaches that the exercise of the senses is

the condition upon which we are permitted to apprehend or participate in the objective perception of material things. There is no real difficulty in the question just raised; and therefore, with this explanatory hint, we leave it, our space being exhausted.

Anticipations of this doctrine are to be found in the writings of every great metaphysician, of every man that ever speculated. It is announced in the speculations of Malebranche, still more explicitly in those of Berkeley; but though it forms the substance of their systems, from foundation-stone to pinnacle, it is not proclaimed with sufficiently unequivocal distinctness by either of these two great philosophers. Malebranche made the perception of matter totally objective, and vested the perception in the Divine mind, as we do. But he erred in this respect: having made the perception of matter altogether objective, he analysed it in its objectivity into perception (*idée*) and matter *per se*. We should rather say that he attempted to do this; and of course he failed, for the thing, as we have shown, is absolutely impossible. Berkeley made no such attempt. He regarded the perception of matter as not only totally objective, but as absolutely indivisible; and therefore we are disposed to regard him as the greatest metaphysician of his own country (we do not mean Ireland; but England, Scotland, and Ireland), at the very least.

When this elaborate edition of Reid's Works shall be completed, shall have received its last consummate polish from the hand of its accomplished

editor, we promise to review the many important topics (partly philosophical and partly physiological) which Sir William Hamilton has discussed in a manner which is worthy of his own great reputation, and which renders all compliment superfluous. We are assured that the philosophical public is waiting with anxious impatience for the completion of these discussions. In the meantime, we heartily recommend the volume to the student of philosophy, as one of the most important works which our higher literature contains, and as one from which he will derive equal gratification and instruction, whether he agrees with its contents or not.

MISCELLANEOUS LECTURES

INTRODUCTORY LECTURE,

NOVEMBER 1856.

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1. You scarcely require to be told that the world is imbued with a pretty strong prejudice against metaphysics. Go where we will, we find that the very term is a word of bad omen, a synonym for subtle trifling, an abbreviated expression for the unprofitable, the perplexing, the indefinite, the uncertain, and the incomprehensible.

2. This prejudice, it must be admitted, is by no means unfounded. Looking to the past and the present state of metaphysical literature, we behold, certainly, a most bewildering prospect. In selecting our own opinions amid such conflicting testimonies, by what principle of choice shall we be directed? We look in vain for a conductor in whom implicit reliance can be placed. The more one reads, the more confused does one become; the farther one sails, the farther one seems to recede from the wished-for

haven. We seem engaged with an inquiry which has neither beginning, middle, nor end; we are embarked on an illimitable ocean which welters with unappeasable controversies; we are gazing on an infinite battle-field, raging with interminable strife. Instead of being what it professes to be, a science which is to settle everything, this science seems to unfix the very foundations of the rational soul, and of the solid universe. Doctrines rise up against doctrines, opinions overwhelm opinions, "velut unda supervenit undam," so that this science which gives itself out as the science of the immutable, seems itself to be the most mutable of things; whence, not without reason, has it been said that the words which St Peter spake to the lying wife of Ananias may be fitly applied to each philosophy as they successively come upon the field, "Behold, the feet of them which have buried thy husband are at the door, and shall carry thee out."

3. Is then the cultivation of metaphysics to abandoned in disgust or in despair? Great proficients in the physical sciences, wedded to their own objects and captivated with their own methods, have proscribed it as a vain and illegitimate and unprofitable pursuit. But such a prohibition is founded on an entire miscalculation of the capacities, the aspirations, and the demands of the human soul. To suppose that the light of metaphysics—fitful or lurid or bewildering as it may too often be—can ever be extinguished, is to suppose that man has ceased to have

a thinking mind. As long as man thinks, this light must burn. The deep river of speculative thought, with all its devious windings, with all its perilous shoals, whirlpools, and cataracts, will flow on for ever; and he must be a rustic, a barbarian indeed, who would loiter on its banks in the vain expectation of beholding the mighty flood at length run dry.

> "Rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis, at ille
> Labitur et labetur in omne volubilis ævum."

4. The indestructible vitality of metaphysical science I hold to be a settled point, in spite of the discouraging appearance which both its past and its present condition may present. It is a spirit which cannot be put down, because it has its origin in an intellectual craving which cannot be repressed. And let people decry the science as they may, of this we may be assured, that they know it in their secret hearts to be the most essential and the most ethereal manifestation of mental power which the human intellect can exhibit.

5. Nevertheless, the picture which I have just drawn of the unsatisfactory state of this science is not overcharged, and therefore much must be done in the way of reducing its chaotic elements to order and precision, if metaphysics are to take the lead—nay, if they are ever to hold their place—among the themes of academical instruction. Above all things, it is incumbent on the cultivator and expounder of

this science to have formed and to be able to exhibit a distinct conception of the business which it takes in hand, the work it has to do, the end or object at which it aims. For very much of the confusion which besets the science is attributable to indistinct notions on this most essential point. Before a man can hit any mark, he must at any rate see and keep steadily in view the point at which he aims. This, however, has been but rarely done in the science of which we have to treat. It is also necessary that the cultivator and expounder of this science should lay down a clear and distinct method, and should adhere to it consistently. And thus by exhibiting a definite conception of the end at which the science aims, and of the method by which that end is to be reached, the expositor of metaphysics will be at any rate intelligible, if not convincing; and if he cannot altogether avoid error, he will at least avoid what is worse, obscurity and confusion.

6. In the 'Institutes of Metaphysic,' which I shall use to some extent as a text-book in this class, I have endeavoured to contribute some small aid to the attainment of these important ends, clearness and precision in metaphysical thinking, and lucidity of order in the exhibition of metaphysical problems. I have endeavoured to arrange the problems in such a way that the science may have a beginning, middle, and conclusion; to arrange them, in short, in such an order that the successive demonstrations may be based on

those which precede, and may serve as a basis to those which are to follow. In particular, I have endeavoured to present a distinct conception of what, in my opinion at least, is the proper vocation of metaphysical philosophy. (See Introduction, § 39, p. 32.) As my opinion as to the proper vocation and business of philosophy happens to differ considerably from that generally entertained by the philosophers of this country, I shall take this opportunity of bringing forward some of the grounds on which I venture to think that philosophy is properly the rectifier, and not the ratifier, as our common-sense philosophers believe her to be, of the deliverances of ordinary opinion. I shall endeavour to show you that in standing forth as the corrective of ordinary thinking, philosophy merely follows the analogy of all the other sciences. But reserving for subsequent discussion the details embraced in these Institutes, I shall take this opportunity of laying before you certain very general but fundamental views which I venture to entertain in regard to philosophy or metaphysics (for I use these as convertible terms), and from the exposition of which you will distinctly perceive in what respect my system stands contrasted more particularly with the antecedent philosophy which has been generally taught in this country.

7. I commence by requesting your attention to a distinction which may be said to be at the root of all science, the distinction between the *real* and the

apparent; or, as it may be otherwise expressed, between the *hidden* and the *obvious.* By the *apparent* and *obvious* I mean such facts as lie upon the very surface of things, such phenomena as come before us of their own accord, and require no effort on our part to apprehend them. By the *real* and the *hidden* I mean such facts as are not of this obtrusive character, such truths as do not force themselves spontaneously on our observation, but are to be reached and disclosed only by means of an intellectual effort. All science, I say, in the sense of inquiry or higher knowledge, proceeds upon this distinction, because it is plain that science in the sense of inquiry is not required to bring before us the *apparent* and the *obvious,* objects or facts of this character being already sufficiently patent without any investigation. Science, therefore, in the proper sense of the word, is directed exclusively upon the real or the hidden; and it takes notice of the apparent and the obvious only that it may pass beyond them into the regions where truth or reality abides. In Platonic Greek, *δόξα,* or opinion, is the term by which the faculty of the apparent is designated, while *ἐπιστήμη* designates the faculty by which the real is apprehended.

8. The whole scheme of the natural universe affords illustrations of this distinction between the real and the apparent, on which all science proceeds. If a man, by looking up to the starry heavens, were able, by that mere inspection, to determine the dis-

tances and magnitudes and courses of the planetary orbs, he would require no science to instruct him. He discerns, however, only what is apparent, and this discernment does not disclose to him what is real. To discover this, he must put forth an intellectual effort; he must inquire, he must have recourse to astronomy; and astronomy will teach him that what is real in the stupendous spectacle before him is very different from what is apparent. This science, therefore, is founded on a distinction between the real and the apparent, between the obvious and the hidden. *It*, the ἐπιστήμη of the heavens, deals with the real; man's ordinary observation of the celestial luminaries, his δόξα, deals only with the apparent. Deny this distinction and you extinguish the science. In like manner, chemistry is a science, inasmuch as it treats of the real as distinguished from the apparent. If no distinction existed, or if no distinction were to be made between the apparent and the real, in other words, if the apparent and the real were identical or coincident, there could be no such science as chemistry, for, in that case, the internal structure and composition of bodies would be disclosed to our most superficial observation, and no science would be required to teach us the elements of which they are composed. But here, too, the apparent is not the real. A superficial glance at natural objects discloses to us the obvious, apparent; but science, inquiry, investigation, these are required to lay before us the hidden real facts of nature with which chemistry deals.

9. The same distinction could very easily be shown to be the foundation of every other science. All the physical sciences have this in common, that they are researches into what is real as distinguished from what is apparent, that is, from what lies exposed and obvious on the very surface of things. Perhaps, however, I have said enough to render intelligible the distinction of which I have been speaking. Let me just repeat, that upon whatever object our attention may be directed, no science of that object is possible unless we admit in regard to the object in question, whatever it may be, a distinction between the apparent and the real, the obvious and the hidden; for, as I have already remarked, if the apparent and the real are identical, no science or research is necessary to instruct us in the nature of the object which we may be considering. And let me add this, too, that while science brings before us the real, it at the same time corrects or sets aside the apparent. Astronomy, in teaching us that the earth revolves round the sun, corrects or dislodges the apparent fact of natural observation that the sun revolves round the earth.

10. This distinction between real and apparent, then, being understood, I have now to show you for what purpose I have brought it under your notice, and how it may enable you to understand the position which my system of metaphysics occupies, or professes to occupy, in relation to our antecedent

systems of philosophy. We have seen that in the natural world there is a wide discrepancy between the real and the apparent, and that the physical sciences, paying but little heed to the apparent, and placing no trust in it, press forward to the ascertainment of the real. We have now to ask, Does this same distinction, this same discrepancy between what is real and what is merely apparent, hold good in the world of mind as well as in the world of matter? The answer to this question is important. Because if this distinction between the real and apparent does not hold good in the world of mind, if there be no difference between what we really think and what we only apparently think, between what we really know and what we apparently know, if there be no discrepancy between apparent thinking and real thinking, between apparent knowing and real knowing, there can be no science of metaphysics, no research into the nature of knowledge, because no such science or research would be required, just as no astronomy would be required if there were no difference between the real and the apparent movements and magnitudes of the stars. While, on the other hand, if in the world of thought there be the same relative difference between the real and the apparent which prevails in the natural universe, a science, the science of metaphysics, will be required to bring before us the facts of our own real thinking, and to correct and displace the facts of our own mere apparent thinking.

11. This, then, I say, is the question, Does the distinction between the real and the apparent hold good in the world of mind just as it holds good in the world of matter? In other words, Does our apparent thinking, our apparent consciousness, present phenomena which are just as little worthy of being trusted or accepted as true and final, as the apparent heavens are admitted to present phenomena of this character, phenomena which astronomy cannot accept as ultimate and true, but which that science sets aside? And, on the other hand, are there real truths of thought which, lying behind or beyond these mere apparent truths, may be reached by means of science, just as the truths of the starry skies are reached by means of astronomy? In answer to this question our antecedent philosophers have said, that in the world of mind the apparent and the real are coincident and identical; that the deliverances of our ordinary consciousness are to be accepted as true and ultimate. They have said that philosophy is not the corrector, but is rather the confirmer of these deliverances. I, on the other hand, assert that the distinction between the apparent and the real, the obvious and the ultimate, obtains in the world of thought no less than in the world of things. I hold that philosophy exists for the purpose of correcting and not for the purpose of confirming the deliverances of ordinary thinking; and, in maintaining this opinion, I set myself against ordinary thinking no farther than all the other sciences do. It is the

business of all science to displace the apparent and to establish the real; and, in doing this, speculative philosophy merely follows the example and analogy of her brethren.

This, I say, is the distinction on which is founded the science of metaphysics, as I endeavour to inculcate them. While, on the other hand, I venture to say that our antecedent Scottish philosophy recognises no such distinction; or rather virtually denies that any such discrepancy exists. It accepts as true and real and ultimate the deliverances of our mere apparent thinking, without considering whether there is not a real thinking at the back of this apparent thinking, by which all its decisions might be altered or reversed. In a word, I hold that the real operations of our minds are just as little apparent on the surface of our ordinary consciousness as the real revolutions of the heavenly bodies are apparent to the eye of the ordinary and uninstructed observer. While, on the contrary, our antecedent philosophy is of opinion that our apparent is our real thinking, or that there is no real thinking carried on in the human mind of a character totally different from the apparent thinking which is there transacted. It is on this ground that our antecedent philosophy lays claim to the title of common sense; an appellation which may be conceded to it, if by common sense is meant only the deliverance of our apparent thinking.

INTRODUCTORY LECTURE,

NOVEMBER 1857.

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1. One of the topics touched upon in the Introduction to the 'Institutes of Metaphysic' is the necessity of philosophy being reasoned, the obligation which is incumbent on its teacher to exhibit his views in a demonstrative and systematic form. I now propose to offer a few remarks by way of illustration, enlargement, and enforcement of this truth; because the longer I reflect upon it, the more am I convinced of the stringency of the obligation referred to. I am prompted to make these observations on account of the hostility which the attempt to reduce speculative science to precision and exactitude frequently calls forth. I venture to oppose the prejudice which holds that truth can scarcely be made to square with logic, that sublime knowledge is incompatible with rigorous method, that profound thought sets at defiance the formulæ of lucid order; and opposing myself to this prejudice, I shall attempt

to show you that the true ends of tuition can only be fulfilled by means of a course of instruction which brings knowledge into harmony with system, and exhibits thought in the light and symmetry of demonstration.

2. The aim of all education is twofold: it is twofold whether looked at on the side of him that teaches or on the side of him that learns; that is, on the part of the student, *one* aim is the acquisition of knowledge, the *other* aim is the development and exercise and cultivation of his intellectual powers. His aim is thus double or twofold: he aims at the attainment of truth, he aims also at getting his capacities of thought called forth, trained, and disciplined. In the same way on the part of the teacher the end or aim of education is twofold: he also has a double function to discharge; he has to aim at the communication of knowledge, and he has moreover to aim at the cultivation and exercise of the faculties of those whom he endeavours to instruct.

3. Another mode in which the distinction may be put is this. Every intellectual pursuit is to be regarded as at once a science and a discipline. These words are indeed little more than two forms of expression for the same thing, and as such they are sometimes used convertibly in our own and in other languages, yet they are not absolutely synonymous. The

term science rather indicates that end of intellectual endeavour which centres in the possession of knowledge; the term discipline rather points to that *other* end of intellectual endeavour which centres in the evolution and exercise of reason and reflection. Every intellectual pursuit has thus two sides, a theoretical and a practical. Viewed on its theoretical side, it consists of a body of knowledge, and may properly be called a science; viewed on its practical side, it is a means of unfolding, training, and exercising the mind, of educing its latent capacities of thought (as the very word education indicates), and as such, it is properly called a discipline. This is what is meant by saying that instruction is or ought to be both theoretical and practical. It ought to be theoretical, because its business is to impart knowledge; it ought to be practical, because its business is to exercise and strengthen the mind. You will thus perceive (and I make this remark parenthetically), that practical teaching, in the sense in which I have explained it—and I believe this is the proper view to take of it—is something very different from what is usually understood by that expression. Practical teaching is generally regarded as the communication of a knowledge which may be useful to us in the daily concerns of life, in our professional pursuits, and in the ordinary intercourse of society. Far be it from me to disparage the importance of such knowledge; but the teaching which imparts it is rather *theoretical* than *practical*. Practical teaching, I again

say, is that which looks not so much to the conveyance of knowledge as to the growth and culture of the faculties by which that knowledge is received.

4. These, then, are the two inseparable ends which all properly directed education keeps in view. It does not aim at either, to the exclusion or prejudice of the other. But if it gives a preference to either, it rather aims at overtaking the end by which the mind is disciplined, than the end by which the mind is stored. It endeavours to be theoretical, that is, to impart knowledge; but it labours above all things to be practical, that is, to discipline the faculties. Hence it is that mathematics and the dead languages occupy so early and so prominent a place in our systems of academical instruction. Valuable as these are as an acquisition, they are still more valuable as a training; they are to be regarded rather as practical than as theoretical instruments of tuition. If you were all to awaken suddenly some fine morning and to find yourselves expert mathematicians and accomplished scholars without having made any effort to become so, you would have lost the best part of the benefit which these studies are fitted to convey. Your minds might be filled with knowledge, but your own faculties and your powers of attention, of judgment, of comparison, of generalisation, and of reason, would be in abeyance.

5. The case I have just put is a fanciful and some-

what extreme supposition. It is certain, however, that knowledge may be acquired under conditions which cultivate in very different degrees the powers of the acquirer; in other words, it is certain that one man may acquire knowledge, and in the attainment may find his whole intellectual being enlightened and invigorated, while another man may possess the same knowledge without receiving a corresponding benefit in the way of mental improvement. Thus, for example, the man who might acquire a knowledge of the Latin language, as he does that of his mother tongue, by associating in early life with those who spoke it, would not, by means of that acquisition, have his powers cultivated in an equal degree with those of the man who amid alien influences had learned that language by dint of systematic and persevering study; the former individual might have a more fluent command over the language in its practical usage, but the latter would have a far deeper and more rational insight into the universal structure and mechanism of speech. His faculties have been aroused and strengthened by the difficulties they had overcome; those of the other, who had imbibed the language instinctively without an effort from the society that surrounded him, lie dormant and inert, or at least the acquirement of the Latin tongue has not contributed to their development. Again, a large amount of the mere facts of physical science may be known by the superficial smatterer no less than by the profound mathematician. Yet, by what

a different tenure in the two cases are these truths held! How different is the mental training which their possession evinces, the enlightenment by which they are accompanied! In the one case they are lifeless and isolated facts without unity or coherence; in the other case they constitute an organic whole, they are rooted in central principles, evolved by elaborate calculation, linked together by intelligible affinities, and illuminated by the light of reason.

6. If it be true, then, that the end of education is twofold, this, *a fortiori*, must be true in regard to philosophy, the highest instrument of education; and accordingly the teacher of philosophy has to consider what the proper means are by which the twofold aim of science may be overtaken and its double function performed. He has to consider what these means are, and he has, moreover, to carry them into execution. In regard to the one end, that which consists in the communication of truth or knowledge, it is obvious that this is to be attained simply by the statement of truth, or of what the instructor believes to be such. In regard to the other end, that which consists in the development and cultivation of the student's intelligence (the practical part of the teacher's aim), it is almost equally obvious that this is to be overtaken only by the exhibition of truth in a systematic order and in a reasoned form; or, to express this shortly, the exposition of truth is the means by which the mind is stored, the exhibition of system is

the means by which the mind is disciplined. And hence philosophy, a philosophy which would overtake both of these ends, as all philosophy should, and which would at once fill and discipline the mind, must be a scheme of systematised truth. And as system is merely another name for reason, it is thus the duty of all speculative philosophy—of that discipline whose business it is to fulfil the highest demands of education, and to teach the student that hardest of all lessons both to teach and to learn, namely, how to think—it is the duty of this science to be from first to last a consistent scheme of methodised and reasoned knowledge.

7. There is an old Greek saying, Πολυμαθία νοῦν οὐ διδάσκει, that is, much learning or multifarious knowledge does not truly educate the intellect. What more is required? This additional element is required, that our knowledge be reduced to system; that it be strictly methodised. If knowledge is the light of the soul, system is the light of knowledge. Indeed, it is not going too far to affirm that truth is intelligible—intelligible to its possessor—only in so far as it is amenable to the forms of reason; and it is certain that he can make it intelligible to others only in proportion to the success with which he can evolve it in an unbroken series out of the principles from which it springs. So far is truth from being repugnant to logic, I hold that this is the vesture in which she most delights to clothe herself. She

shrinks not from dialectic, that is the very element in which she lives; and she rejoices in the symmetry of demonstration. It is only by presenting knowledge in the form of reason that the teacher can expect to elicit and train the reason of those whom he addresses. Reason in one man listens to nothing except reason in another; thought, genuine thought, in one mind, responds only to the call of genuine thought in another mind. But thoughts, in order to be genuine, in order to have root, must coexist in a vital and organic unity, and not as a tissue of floating fragmentary opinions. And hence it is that it is only by means of the exhibition of systematic thinking on the part of the teacher that lessons of thinking can be taught to those whom he instructs.

8. I do not say that the teacher of philosophy will always succeed in setting to work the minds of his students by showing them in a methodical and concatenated order the workings of his own reason; but when that method fails I certainly know of no other which can succeed, of no other by which the study of metaphysics may be made a practical discipline and a means of developing and cultivating the intelligence of the student. This assuredly is not to be effected by mapping out the human mind into a set of independent faculties, and exhibiting in a desultory manner the facts of an empirical and unsystematic psychology. Such teaching is at the best merely theoretical. It is not discipline: it contributes no-

thing to the practical development of the student's intellectual life. I have said that truth, strictly speaking, is intelligible only when deduced from principles, and presented in a rigorously reasoned form. I say this more particularly in regard to metaphysical truth. I limit my assertion to the truth with which philosophy has to deal; and while I maintain that the regeneration of metaphysical science can be expected only from the importation of demonstration into its processes, I affirm, likewise, that its hitherto unsatisfactory characters, its impotent condition, and the disrepute into which it has fallen, are in a large measure attributable to the unreasoned form, the unsystematic procedure which it has adopted. On this latter topic, the unsettled state of metaphysics, I now propose to say a few words, with an eye to the conclusion that a better condition of things can be looked for only when Reason and the light and the force of pure thinking have been brought to bear more vigorously and perseveringly than has ever yet been done in the cultivation of this science.

LECTURE,

APRIL 1858.

1. PHILOSOPHY is of course the subject of which the history of philosophy treats. It is obvious, therefore, that before we can reanimate and verify, as proposed, the philosophical systems of the past, we must, first of all, have formed a distinct idea in regard to what philosophy itself is. It is not by means of a man's ordinary thinking, but by means of his philosophical thinking, that the verification spoken of can be effected. You might carry the old systems home to your ordinary consciousness, you might attempt to infuse your ordinary consciousness into them, you might do this for ever, and you would not obtain one particle of insight either into them or into their grounds. Your popular everyday consciousness will not help you here; you must have established a philosophical consciousness; in other words, you must know what philosophy itself is. When you have a right and clear idea of this, you can then go

to work to some purpose. Assuming your philosophy to be true, as I am of course entitled to do, inasmuch as I have supposed your idea of it to be right, you can now breathe into the old systems the breath of your living thoughts, and the old bones will come to life; for in all genuine speculative thinking there is the closest intercommunion, if people would but see it, between the living and the dead. Pythagoras will be no longer remote, and it will seem but yesterday since Parmenides threw off the garb of his mortality. Plato will speak to you like a familiar friend; his ideas, so far from being unintelligible, will now come before us as the only intelligibilities in the heaven above or in the earth beneath or in the waters under the earth; and Aristotle's hard technicalities, dry and uninteresting no longer, will be found fertile with the germs of the profoundest and most inexhaustible speculative knowledge. To repeat this in one word—to apply the rule rightly, you must have a correct and clear conception of philosophy itself. In order to deal effectually with the history of philosophy, in order to derive any benefit from it as students, and in order to confer any benefit on it as historians, we must, first of all, be philosophers ourselves.

2. This is a new position. We have hitherto been considering the history of philosophy, and the rule by which we must be guided either in studying or in writing it. The consideration of these points has

brought us to this conclusion, that to do either of these things effectually we must, in the first place, be philosophers ourselves, or, at any rate, must have a clear and correct idea of what philosophy itself is. This, I say, is a new position, for it raises the new question, But what is philosophy? How shall we go to work in order to obtain a clear conception of it? How shall we set about the acquisition of a philosophical as distinguished from a common consciousness? Here, too, I shall merely offer a few hints, for I think that by this time you ought to have formed for yourselves a pretty distinct conception of what philosophy is in its means and in its ends.

3. To obtain a distinct idea of philosophy let us ask, first of all, What is its converse? If we can get hold of the opposite or counter idea, this will help us to grasp the conception we are in quest of. The converse of philosophy is opinion. You frequently hear the expression "philosophical opinions" made use of. That is altogether a misnomer; strictly speaking, it is a contradiction. There are no opinions in philosophy properly so called. For what are opinions? Opinions are optional thoughts, arbitrary excogitations, thoughts which we may entertain or not, just as we please. We may maintain an opinion, we may also maintain its converse; at least, it is not impossible to maintain the converse of any opinion that may be formed, for that is precisely what is meant by an opinion; it is a thought which we can

help thinking, and in the place of which we may, by possibility at least, entertain the opposite thought. To define opinion almost in one word, I should say that opinions are thoughts which we can help thinking.

4. Philosophy is the converse of opinion: philosophy therefore consists essentially of thoughts which we *cannot* help thinking; I say *essentially*, for such is the imperfection of our faculties, the limited extent of our knowledge, and the waste condition of our reason, which, looking to mankind generally, is very far from having received the culture of which it is susceptible; such, I say, is the actual state of things that opinion enters to a greater or smaller extent into the composition of philosophy. But it is present there as the accident, not as the essence. Opinions, or thoughts which a man can help thinking, have no business in philosophy. They are there under protest and only by sufferance, only until their places can be occupied by something better: occupied, that is, by thoughts which we cannot help thinking; for just as I have defined opinions as thoughts which we can help thinking, so I now define philosophy as that which is made up of thoughts which we cannot help thinking, necessary thoughts in short, the ground elements of reason.

5. Philosophy, then, is the embodiment and exposition of necessary thought, of thoughts which a man

cannot help thinking, of processes which the mind cannot help performing in the exercise of its intelligent functions; and that is the only correct conception of it which we can form. It is this in its essence, although, as I have said, it may accidentally embrace alien and illegitimate materials. Such, I conceive, is the correct general idea of philosophy, and he who entertains it knows generally *what* philosophy is. But this idea requires a good deal of explanation, for although a correct idea, it is by no means a clear one as yet. I now take a new step in advance. I proceed to clear up this idea of philosophy.

6. What may occur to you at the outset is this: if philosophy consists of thoughts which a man cannot help thinking, surely it can be no such very difficult pursuit. So you would naturally think, but in thinking so you would be mistaken. The thoughts which we cannot help thinking are precisely those which it is most difficult to lay hold of and bring to light. You are aware of the doctrine in the Institutes in which the effect of familiarity in deadening our intellectual insight is described and illustrated; also that the first in nature is the last in science. I need not therefore at present insist upon that consideration. Suffice it to say, that whatever we are most familiar with we take the least notice of. Hence the thoughts which we cannot help thinking never attract our attention; in our ordinary moods they never rise into distinct consciousness, they are there all the

while, but they are present as though they were absent, and it often requires a severe intellectual strain before we can make ourselves cognisant of them. Indeed it may be assumed that the whole efforts of speculation, from the earliest times until now, have been directed to the single end of bringing men to think, to think clearly that which at no moment of their lives are they able to avoid thinking; and how difficult this task is, how laborious this process, is proved by the fact that this end has as yet been very imperfectly overtaken. It may appear a paradox, but it is not really one; it is undeniable truth to say this, that Plato and all great philosophers have existed for the purpose of teaching people to think what not one man in a million has as yet succeeded in thinking, but what nevertheless every man necessarily thinks in the very exercise of his powers as an intelligent being.

7. But I am still dealing, you will think, too much with generalities. Let us get to something like specialty, to some definite and particular illustration of the foregoing position. Well, what you want, I suppose, is this, that I should place distinctly before you one of those necessary and inevitable thoughts which men cannot help thinking, and which scarcely any man has as yet been able to think clearly or in the right way. I shall do so, but I shall begin by placing before you an opinion, or set of opinions, on a particular point, in order that by the contrast you may

afterwards perceive more clearly what the necessary, the unavoidable, the philosophical thought on that same point is. Let me ask, then, what your opinion is in regard to the mind? This that people call mind may be taken as a common and fair subject of opinion, and opinions differ in regard to it. One man is of opinion that it is a sort of vapour; another man is of opinion that it is a kind of fire; another man's opinion is that it is a species of attenuated matter different both from vapour and fire; the opinion of a fourth is that it is a material substance, nature unknown; a fifth thinks that it is immaterial, a spiritual substance, nature also unknown, altogether different from matter, and so on. These are all so many different opinions, and in all these opinions there is not one particle of thinking. It may be that the man who supposes that the mind is immaterial or spiritual is more in the right than the others. But still his judgment is a mere opinion. He might have thought otherwise. It rests on no necessary grounds. It is not a thought which we cannot help thinking. If this opinion has a place in philosophy, it is there without any legitimate title. It is only accidentally, and not essentially philosophical.

8. Let us now consider what thought, necessary thought, declares in regard to the mind. Let us consider the case of a genuine speculator, of one who thinks and who does not form opinions in regard to the mind. Of course we put aside this word "mind,"

together with all its synonyms. No man will ever get at any idea who begins with a word. He must first get hold of the idea, and then he must see that a word is required to express it. This is the bane of all philosophical thinking, that we first take hold of certain words and then we attach certain ideas to them. No good can come of that procedure; indeed, infinite mischief has already proceeded out of it. We must first grasp the idea as a necessary truth, or thought we cannot help having, and then we must attach to it the word, for of course every idea must be fixed and expressed in words. Let us take the case, then, of this speculator. He may have lived two thousand years ago, or two months ago, or he may be living at the present moment; for time and the fashions of different times have no influence here, all necessary thoughts are the same at all times and in all places. He casts his eyes upon the universe, and he sees perpetual changes going on; at one moment he sees one thing, at the next moment he sees a different thing, and the same may be affirmed in regard to all his other senses and their intimations. Change, in short, forces itself on all sides upon his notice. He obtains the idea of change without any difficulty, and to this idea he attaches a word which expresses it; he calls it change: change, change prevails everywhere, that is the order of the day. To this speculator all objects are in a state of change; even those which appear in themselves to be permanent are in this state so far as they are his

perceptions, because at any moment they may cease to be his perceptions, and he receives or may receive different impressions. His perceptions are or may be incessantly changing; all his thoughts are or may be incessantly changing. In short, he is cognisant at first of *nothing but change*. He is inclined to generalise that observation, and to maintain that change is the essence of the universe. After a time, however, he considers, and he asks himself the question, But *is* there nothing but change? In other words, does the observer of the changes change just as much as the objects of his observation change? Is there at every moment a new observer as well as a new observed? This consideration causes the speculator to pause. No, says he, there is not, there cannot be a new observer for every new thing observed. If there were, no observation, no knowledge, no consciousness, could take place. The speculator sees that, if he, the observer, were changed into a different observer with every change that took place in his perception, that all thoughts, all cognition, all perception, would be rendered impossible and absurd. In other words, he sees that the wildest contradiction is involved in the supposition that every time the object is changed he (the subject, as we nowadays call it) is also changed; that a different *he* came into the field with every new presentation. And hence there is forced upon him this necessary thought, this thought which he cannot help thinking, and which we may divide into two thoughts: *first*, that change

is *not* the only thing of which he is cognisant, as he heretofore supposed; and, *secondly*, that there is a permanent of which he is cognisant amid all the vicissitudes that surround him, whereof he is cognisant through sense. These are the two thoughts which he now entertains, and which he cannot help entertaining. He must think change as one of the elements of his consciousness, otherwise there would be an absolute uniformity in his perceptions, which would be equivalent to his having no perceptions at all; he must think permanence as the other element of his consciousness, otherwise there would be an absolute diversity (a new subject for every new object), which also would be tantamount to no consciousness at all.

9. Now you have got hold of an idea, an idea opposed to that idea which we call change; as the converse of this idea, you have got hold of the conception of a permanent, an immutable, a universal, an identical amid all changes; this idea must have a word attached to it; and, accordingly, to this idea you attach the word mind. By this process you have been enabled to get hold of the idea before you had recourse to the word; of course you were acquainted with the word before we went through the process, but we did not avail ourselves of that acquaintance in order to assist us to the idea; no, we got hold of the idea independently of the word, and now the word has for us a meaning. It has a

meaning, because it expresses a necessary thought: the thought of the permanent and universal, as opposed to the fluctuating and particular. The word mind, then, is the word which gives expression to the thought of the permanent and universal, just as the word matter gives expression to the thought of the changeable and particular. These two ideas are directly antagonistic; it is impossible to regard the one as convertible with the other, although, at the same time, they are absolutely indivisible; wherever change is thought there is also thought permanence conversely. It is impossible to regard mind and matter as the same, unless we regard change and not-change as the same, or permanence and non-permanence as the same. It is impossible to regard matter as everything, as the whole, unless we hold that change is everything, and that there is no permanence anywhere; it is impossible to regard mind as everything, as the whole, unless we hold that permanence is everything, and that there is no diversity anywhere; but it is impossible to think that there is nothing but change, it is impossible to think that there is nothing but permanence. We must hold that there is both change and permanence; in other words, we must hold that there is both matter and mind as the two distinct elements of the universe. These are thoughts which we cannot help thinking, and in this way, and only in this way, do we obtain an intelligible distinction between mind and matter; not, however, as two distinct substances,

but only as two distinct elements of one substance, and no distinction can be more absolute and complete than this. Now, all those opinions about mind being vapour or fire, this or that, may be given to the winds. It is nothing but the universal and permanent, and no other character can be assigned without destroying the very idea of it.

10. One word in conclusion. The illustration now laid before you may be regarded as an exposition in outline of the whole philosophy of ancient Greece. There cannot be a doubt that the early Greek philosophers reached the idea of mind through the process described. It was because the idea of something permanent was a thought which they could not help thinking that they gave expression to this thought in the word which signifies mind. It was because the idea of something changing or changeable was a thought that they could not help thinking that they gave expression to this thought in the word which signifies matter. The early Greek philosophy was occupied entirely in the adjustment and clearing up of these ideas; and these ideas of mind on the one hand and of matter on the other, were felt to be ideas which men could not help thinking, inasmuch as the idea of a permanent on the one hand, and of a mutable on the other, of one and many, are ideas which we cannot help thinking. But the further prosecution of this subject I must reserve until a future occasion.

INTRODUCTORY LECTURE,

NOVEMBER 1861.

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1. In this lecture I propose to consider a subject which lies at the very threshold of moral philosophy, and which may therefore form an appropriate theme for a general and introductory address. The topic to which I refer is the relation of ethics to psychology; in other words, the relation of moral philosophy to that more extensive study known as the science of the human mind. This latter science, psychology namely, is a department of philosophy on which all or most of you have already, I believe, bestowed some attention, and in which you have made some progress. What we have now to consider is, how this science stands related to the department of philosophy, which is the province of study treated of in this class. The complete illustration of this connection would require a wide survey of philosophy, both in itself and in its history; but enough may now be said to make intelligible to you the

more general bearings of the relation, and at any rate its discussion may serve to break the ground in such a way as to suit it for our future more detailed operations. In considering this subject, what I wish to bring before you is this: that ethics must always have their roots in psychology; that as our psychology is, so must our ethics be (that is, if we preserve any consistency in our reasoning); that a confused or imperfect or erroneous psychology must always issue in a confused or imperfect or erroneous moral theory; and that a correct moral theory is only to be reached through a correct psychological system.

2. To trace this connection, I must first of all speak of psychology, and of the principal problem with which psychology has to deal. The main problem of psychology is that concerning the nature and origin of our knowledge. More explicitly stated, the question is this: What cognitions or elements of cognition are native to the mind itself, and what cognitions or elements of cognition are imparted to it from without? Or stated perhaps still more distinctly, it is this: In the formation of our knowledge, that is, in our apprehensions of the things around us, what ingredients belong to, and are supplied by, the mind, and what ingredients are contributed by foreign and external causes?

3. Now, two very extreme answers, two answers widely opposed to each other, may be conceived to

be returned to this question. We may suppose the one answer to be that our knowledge is wholly, or almost wholly, due to the mind itself; that none, or, at any rate, very few of the ingredients of cognition are derived from foreign sources. And conversely we may suppose the other answer to be, that all, or nearly all, the elements of cognition are derived from foreign sources, and that none, or scarcely any, of them are native products of the mind. I have laid down these two answers in an extreme form, in order that you may the better understand them. The one solution is, that the mind originates all, or nearly all, its knowledge from within, and derives almost nothing *ab extra*. The other solution is, that the mind derives all, or nearly all, its knowledge, *ab extra*, and originates scarcely anything from within.

4. These two solutions, which I have advanced by way of supposition, have found plenty of upholders, as we know from the history of philosophy—upholders not perhaps in quite the extreme forms in which I have expressed them, but in forms certainly approaching very near to these extremes. Indeed these two answers may be said to divide the psychological world into the two most general divisions which it presents. The party which tends towards the one extreme consists of those who advocate the psychology of *innate ideas*. The party which approaches, and I think we may say sometimes reaches, the other extreme, consists of those who advocate

the psychology of *sensation.* These are the two poles, and they stand widely asunder, of the psychological world; the doctrine of innate ideas on the one hand, and the doctrine of sensation on the other hand. You will understand how widely apart these doctrines are placed if you will bear in mind the extremes which I have stated, extremes which they approach if they do not exactly reach. The extreme doctrine of innate ideas allows nothing to foreign sources, but finds the origin of all cognition in the mind itself; the extreme doctrine of sensation allows nothing to the mind itself, but finds the origin of all cognition in foreign sources. That antithesis may enable you to keep in mind and to understand generally the character and tendency of the two great psychological schemes which I say have divided the philosophical world. It may here occur to you that a third alternative is possible as a solution of the problem respecting the origin of our knowledge, and that this third solution is the truest and most natural of any. Why, you will ask, why may we not combine into one the two solutions just given, and thus obtain the most correct and the most tenable explanation? Why may we not say that our knowledge is due neither entirely to the mind itself, nor entirely to the action of external things, but that it is the joint result of both these constituents? Now there can be no doubt that the true answer to the problem does lie somewhere in this middle alternative. But there is a difficulty in ad-

justing the terms of the compromise, a difficulty on which I shall not touch at present, further than by saying that in connection with this solution the question arises, Which of the two constituents, the mental or the material, is the more important and essential to the process? Some inquirers will make the one set of elements the more essential, others will make the other set of elements the more essential. The one contribution or the other will be regarded as of preponderant or exclusive, or overwhelming importance; and thus we are again brought to the two alternatives spoken of, and are led either to adopt the doctrine which represents innate ideas as the essential groundwork of our knowledge, or we adopt the other doctrine, that our sensations, induced by external causes, are the basis and origin of our cognitions. At any rate, in order to simplify the discussion, I leave out of account at present that third or middle alternative, which aims at conciliating the two solutions, and I confine my remarks to the two extreme answers on which I have touched.

5. I go on, then, to speak of the psychology of innate ideas, and of the ethics to which this system gives rise. This system contends that there are cognitions, or (at least) elements of cognition in the mind prior to its intercourse with external things, and that these mental elements are far more essential to our completed knowledge of objects than aught that is supplied to us by these objects themselves; that

they are in fact the "light of all our seeing;" that without them all our knowledge would be a blank, and all our experience impossible. And that, therefore, we may truly affirm that our cognitions, in all their essential qualities, are originated from within, and are native to the mind itself. Such, stated very briefly, is the doctrine of innate ideas.

6. The innate ideas for which this system contends are otherwise called *a priori* cognitions, or *a priori* elements of cognitions. They are thus distinguished from any elements which may be supplied to us from without, and which are called *a posteriori*. The latter are also termed *empirical*, as depending on outward experience; while the others are held to exist independently of all outward experience, although this may be and is required to elicit them into manifestation. Among the innate or *a priori* ideas are to be ranked the conceptions of Being, of number, of space, of time, of cause, of substance, of resemblance, of difference. I do not profess to give you a complete list. But remove these conceptions, say the advocates of this psychology, and no knowledge of any kind would be possible; they are the groundwork and conditions and essential constituents of all cognition. Nor if they were removed could they by any possibility be supplied to the mind from without; because the mind could not receive them unless it already had them. They are the conditions under which all knowledge is received into the mind;

and therefore they cannot themselves be received into the mind; for in order to receive themselves they must be already there to render their own reception possible. The inevitable and irresistible inference is, that they *are* already there, or, if not these ideas, that at any rate something innate and *a priori* is already in the mind, and that the mind has within it cognitions or elements of cognition which are not imparted to it from any foreign quarter. Such, stated very briefly, is the ground on which the psychology of innate ideas rests, the reasoning by which it is supported.

7. That there is much truth in this doctrine of innate ideas, when rightly understood and expounded, I firmly believe. I cannot pause at present to attempt its complete explanation and adjustment. The following hint must suffice. In speaking of innate ideas, I have called them indifferently "cognitions" or "elements of cognition." But in attempting to establish a right doctrine on this subject, these two expressions, "cognitions" and "elements of cognition," would require to be most signally and accurately distinguished. If the innate ideas be represented as mere elements of cognition, a perfectly correct and intelligible and impregnable psychology of innate ideas may, I conceive, be set on foot. But if the innate ideas be regarded as cognition, that is, as completed cognitions, nothing but an untrue doctrine, a doctrine of the most unintelligible and most bewildering character, can emerge. I may add that it

is under the latter expression, the expression of "cognitions," that the doctrine has been usually expounded by philosophers. They have treated the innate ideas as cognitions, of course completed cognitions; and hence they have failed, I think, to construct a true or intelligible theory in regard to them.

8. In consequence of this mistake, the neglect, viz., to discriminate between cognitions and mere elements of cognition, the psychology of innate ideas has come to us in a very crude state, in a very imperfect and untenable form, a form which was sure to provoke, and which did provoke, a reaction in favour of the other extreme, I mean the psychology of sensation. The advocates of innate ideas were held to have magnified to an undue extent the inborn principles of knowledge, to have multiplied without careful investigation the native properties of the mind; to have allowed, in short, far too much, in the formation of knowledge, to man's original and internal nature, and far too little to his outward experience. The system, as it stood, was felt to be crude and insufficient. Its doom was sealed for a time at least, and it is generally believed to have expired under the assault of the English philosopher Locke.

9. But we have now to ask, What kind of ethics might we naturally expect to germinate from this system of psychology? The answer is, that we might naturally expect the doctrine of innate ideas

to give birth to a system of innate or intuitive morality. And such we find to be the case. In the history of philosophy the one of these theories is closely affiliated to the other.

10. The ethical system, which springs from the doctrine of innate ideas, is the hypothesis which contends for an innate moral faculty, an instinctive perception of the difference between right and wrong, a natural sense of justice and injustice, an original conscience which teaches us to govern our passions, and prompts us to do to others as we would that they should do unto us. This system of ethics maintains that we have from nature social affections which lead us into friendly fellowship with our kind, and incline us to consult the interests of others, no less than private feelings, which excite us to promote our own personal advantage. It holds that we grow up to be the moral agents that we are through an innate sense of duty, which at once approves of our conduct when we do right, and disapproves of it when we do wrong. It allows but little influence to the varied circumstances which operate upon us from without. It finds our moral sentiments not to be the result of any foreign agencies, but the spontaneous produce of our own internal constitution.

11. Our unreflective judgment is rather in favour of this hypothesis. When we look, with a not very critical eye, at the ongoings of human life, we are apt

to think that people have grown up of *their own accord* to be what they are. We do not, indeed, go so far as to suppose that a man who from his infancy had lived in solitude would, either in his moral or intellectual manifestations, bear any close resemblance to ourselves. Still, I think that we naturally tend to approximate to such a supposition. We entertain a half-conscious impression that we and our friends should have been tolerably like what we now are, and should have demeaned ourselves very much as we now do, even though the external agencies to which we have been subject had not been brought to bear upon us. In a word, it appears to the unthoughtful observer as if our manners, our morals, our social sentiments, our modes of thought, and ways of life, came to us from nature, and were part and parcel of our original selves.

12. The doctrine of an innate morality, which is founded on the doctrine of innate ideas, thus seems to be still further reinforced by the natural sentiments of mankind. But whatever support it may receive from this quarter, or from the psychology on which it rests, it is an hypothesis which must be pronounced highly unsatisfactory in any form in which it has hitherto appeared. I do not say that the doctrine is in the main, or in itself, untrue. I am quite of a contrary opinion. I believe that, like the psychological doctrine of innate ideas, this doctrine, under due limitations and accompanied by proper

explanations, is substantially correct. Man's morality is rooted in his innermost nature. It grows necessarily out of his very reason, but it is certainly moulded into what it is by the form and pressure of the society in which he lives, and by the force of the circumstances which surround him. These alter considerably his primitive nature, and engraft new shoots on the original stock of his being. Example, education, traditional usages, prescriptive customs, the approbation and disapprobation of our fellow-men, all these are foreign agencies, and they exert such a potent influence on each of us, and so shape and modify our original dispositions, as to render it in the highest degree difficult to determine accurately what are the native or primary, and what the acquired or secondary elements in our moral constitution. And we learn nothing from being told that our conscience or sense of duty, our sentiments in regard to right and wrong, our obligation to pursue one course of conduct and to avoid another course, are ultimate principles which admit of no further analysis or explanation. Even if this were true, it would teach us nothing. But it is not true. It is not true that conscience operates like an instinct; it is not true that we distinguish instinctively between the right and the wrong, as we do between the pleasurable and the painful; it is not true that our social feelings arise, as our selfish ones do, without the intervention of any antecedent principle. Above all, the advocates of an innate morality have failed to note the very import-

ant part which thought or reason plays in the construction of our moral sentiments. They have not explained or comprehended the exact nature of thought, this being indeed rather a psychological than a moral research, and one which has been left very much in arrear by the psychology of innate ideas. The consequence is that the ethics which uphold an innate morality have inherited all the crudeness of the psychology on which they are founded, and exhibit that crudeness in a still more conspicuous aspect.

13. I pass on to the second topic of the discussion, viz., to consider the psychology of sensation, and the ethics which arise out of it. This system is a recoil from the doctrine of innate ideas. Just as the latter scheme tends to enlarge as widely as possible the sphere of innate cognition, and to attach to it the utmost importance, so the former proceeds on the principle of limiting this sphere to its narrowest dimensions, or of exploding it altogether. It allows to the mind no original furnishing at all, except a power of receptivity. The name of this receptive and entirely passive capacity is sensation. Outward things conveying impressions to the senses in particular, and to the nervous organism generally, are the source and origin of all our ideas. The mind is at first an absolute blank, and contributes no elements of its own to the formation of its cognitions. It originates nothing from within, but receives all its

knowledge from without. All knowledge and all ideas are ultimately resolvable into sensations. Thoughts and conceptions are merely faint and transformed sensations.

14. Such is sensationalism in its most extreme form as propounded by some of the French metaphysicians of the last century. Locke, by admitting reflection as well as sensation to be a source of our ideas, had previously taught a modified form of this doctrine. But still, even in Locke's system, reflection holds a subordinate place, and sensation is with him the chief and dominant, if not the sole original capacity of the human mind.

15. Before proceeding to consider the ethics which arise out of this system, we must examine carefully the nature of sensation. We must investigate and ascertain its character as a psychological phenomenon before we can judge of it as the basis of an ethical hypothesis. The characteristics of sensation are twofold. *First*, it is either pleasurable or painful; *secondly*, it is individual or particular. On the first of these points little requires to be said. Some degree of pleasure or of pain is involved in all our sensations. It may be thought that some of them are neutral or indifferent. But this indifference seems either to be a mixture of pleasure and pain in which these balance each other, or else it is a state of ease and tranquillity brought about in some other way.

But in whatever way the tranquillity which looks like indifference is brought about, it is still a pleasurable condition. Or if the state of apparent indifference be a state of *ennui* and satiety, in that case it is a condition of pain. A sensation which was absolutely indifferent to us would be no sensation; it would not be felt at all. All sensations then, even those which seem to be indifferent, involve either pleasure or pain as their constant and inseparable ingredient.

16. Sensation, and the capacity of receiving it, being, according to this psychology, the only original quality or endowment of our nature; and sensation being always an expression either of pleasure or of pain, and the sensational capacity being a susceptibility of these feelings, it follows that pleasure and pain, and a susceptibility thereof, form originally the whole staple and essence of our constitution.

17. The second characteristic of sensation is, that it is strictly individual or particular. This characteristic of sensation is very important, but it is less obvious and has been less noticed than the other. Indeed, I am not aware that it has been noticed at all by any psychological observer. But it is a quality of sensation which it is very necessary to keep in view, if we would understand in their true form the ethics which have their origin in the psychology of sensation. By the neglect to note and signalise this characteristic of sensation, the true aspect of the

sensational ethics has been disguised and obscured. All sensation then, I repeat, is individual and particular. By this I mean that each sensation is precisely the single sensation which it is, and any group or series of sensations is precisely that single group or series of sensations, and not anything more. A sensation has no general or indefinite compass. Hence no sensation, and no series of sensations, can ever carry the being who experiences them out of and beyond himself. He is tied down by sensation and confined exclusively to himself. Particular pleasures and pains are experienced, there the matter begins and ends; not a hair's-breadth beyond his own sentient states can the creature experiencing the sensations travel. His condition is one of utter and entire isolation. No sensations, transform them as we may, can ever transport a being beyond the limits of itself, nothing can do that but thought: and thought, as different from sensation, has no place in this psychology. If you are not quite satisfied with this statement, consider the matter in this way: I cannot *feel* your pleasures and your pains, nor can you feel mine. Each of us can only feel his own; and therefore if sensation be all in all it is absolutely impossible for us to pay the slightest heed to the pains and pleasures of one another. To do that we should require actually to experience each other's sensations. But this we cannot do. If I am wounded I feel pain, but you feel none; while if you are wounded you feel pain, but I don't. Your pain is to me absolutely

nothing, just as mine is absolutely nothing to you; absolutely nothing, that is, on the supposition that we are merely sensational creatures, that sensation, and sensation alone, is what we have been originally endowed with. The whole animated universe may be riotous with enjoyment, or may be plunged in the most agonising torment; but all this is nothing to the separate individuals who compose it. Each of them can be occupied with nothing but its own sensations. None of them can transcend its own particular feelings, because no creature can *feel* any pains or any pleasures except its own. So much in explanation of what I mean by saying that all sensation is necessarily individual or particular.

18. I have now to speak of the ethics which are founded on the psychology of sensation. It will conduce to distinctness if we regard these ethics as twofold. There is, *first*, a very simple system which arises when we keep in view the particularity of sensation as I have just explained it to you; and there is, *secondly*, a very confused system which arises when we lose sight, as the sensational psychologists did, of the fact referred to. We shall confine our attention at present to the first of these ethical systems. It is, as I have said, extremely simple and intelligible, and although exceedingly defective in point of truth, nothing can be more perfect than the logical consistency with the psychological principles on which it is founded. The ethical system in its simplest form which arises

out of the sensational psychology is that which is now to engage our attention.

19. By ethics are meant generally those principles and practical rules of conduct which move and guide us in the pursuit of that which we esteem to be right and good, and in the avoidance of that which we esteem to be wrong and evil. Now to a mere sensational creature (and such the sensational psychology represents man to be), what alone can be esteemed good and right? Obviously nothing, except its own sensational pleasure. And what alone to such a being can be esteemed evil and wrong? Obviously nothing, except its own sensational pain. The sole end of its existence, the sole rule and principle of its conduct, must therefore be the attainment of sensual enjoyment, and the avoidance of sensual suffering; for pleasure naturally allures, and pain naturally repels the whole animated creation, and here there is no principle to counteract in any degree the allurement and the repulsion. Here the only duty, the only obligation, is to enjoy. Here sensational happiness is equivalent to an approving conscience, while a disapproving conscience is identical with sensational misery. And here, too, our own pleasures and pains must be pursued and shunned by each of us in total disregard of the claims and feelings of our fellow-men. These necessarily go for nothing, for, as I have shown you, *our* sensations (and we are supposed to have nothing but sensations), *our* sensations can give us

no sense of *theirs*, no sense of their felicity or wretchedness. In such a case it is each man for himself and his own interests, not because he dislikes the happiness and desires the misery of his fellows, but because he has, and can have, absolutely no perception of them. He has a perception only of his own weal and of his own woe. The one of these he courts, and the other he wards off under the irresistible compulsion of his nature. And this nature, the only nature which he has, assures him that he is doing right in pursuing the one at all hazards, and wrong in failing at all hazards to eschew the other.

20. It is obvious that these ethics are scarcely entitled to the name of a *moral* scheme; and it cannot be maintained for a moment that they are applicable to man in his rational maturity. But it is only because man is not a mere sensational creature that they are not applicable to him. Admit with the sensational psychologists that he is this, and these certainly are the only ethics adapted to his condition. They stand in a relation of perfect consistency with the psychology which is their groundwork.

21. Yet, untrue as these ethics are in the main, they present one side on which we may, perhaps, win from them some degree of truth. Let us suppose that man is *at first* a mere sensational creature, and that his reason and other qualities, although original, do not show themselves until a later period in his

career; on that supposition I conceive that these ethics would apply to man, would, indeed, be the only rule and motive of his actions in his early condition, and prior to the development of these subsequent manifestations. Now this is by no means an absurd or untrue supposition; on the contrary, it is certain that man is sensitive to pleasure and pain before his reason comes into play. In such circumstances I hold that these selfish ethics are the only true, the only possible ethics of his condition. There can be no objection to our making man *commence* his career as a mere sensational creature, provided we allow due weight and authority to the principles, no less original, which he afterwards develops. This is the position taken up by the celebrated philosopher Hobbes. He regards sensation as man's earliest manifestation; and this fact, for a fact it certainly is, seems to me to justify some of his apparently paradoxical opinions. For instance Hobbes asserts that man's natural condition is a state of mutual warfare and aggression, and this assertion has drawn down upon his head a large measure of obloquy and indignation. But it is precisely equivalent to saying that man's natural condition is a state of susceptibility to pleasure and to pain; because this susceptibility, if unchecked by any other principle, will necessarily strive after a monopoly of enjoyment, and this struggle will necessarily bring people into collision with each other. If, therefore, by our natural condition, Hobbes means our early and sensational condi-

tion, it appears to me that a good ground of defence may be obtained for his averment that the natural and primitive state of mankind is a *bellum omnium contra omnes.* Hobbes's error lay in his not paying sufficient regard to the provision I just mentioned. He does not allow due weight to the principles which man develops subsequently to his sensational manifestations.

22. On the whole, then, we may conclude that the sensational ethics in the simple form in which we have been viewing them, are true in regard to man in his early and mere sensational state. This truth, however, must be admitted to be rather ideal than real, for, except in early infancy, it is only in the abstract or ideally that we regard man as a merely sensational being. Reason soon comes into play, and then the ethics of sensation lose their truth and cease to be applicable to his nature.

LECTURE ON IMAGINATION.

1847.

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1. Before entering on the consideration of the representative faculty, or what is usually termed imagination, I shall in to-day's lecture discuss a somewhat singular opinion advanced by Mr Stewart regarding this faculty, and which such of you as are acquainted with his works must be familiar with, and may have been puzzled by. I allude to his opinion that "the exercise of the Imagination (I use his own words) is always accompanied with a belief that the objects of the imagination exist." I propose to consider how far this doctrine is consistent with truth, and to what extent and upon what grounds it may be rationally vindicated. I shall first refer to the passage in which Mr Stewart propounds his opinion. He commences by stating the counter-opinion of Dr Reid, who holds that "imagination is attended with *no* belief in the existence of its object." ('Elements,' i. 140-43.) Mr Stewart is at some pains to illustrate his opinion

by pointing out a variety of ocular deceptions, in which, although we know that we are imposed upon by the appearances of things, we may nevertheless be said to *believe* for the moment that the things are as they *appear*. But he has merely illustrated his opinion, he has not attempted to vindicate or establish it upon rational grounds, or to explain it by means of any law of our intelligence. These grounds and this law I shall now endeavour to lay before you; for Mr Stewart's opinion, singular and somewhat paradoxical though it be, appears to me to be founded in truth, and to be susceptible of a satisfactory explanation. I think that Dr Reid's opinion may also be justified; in short, that the doctrines of the two philosophers on this point may be reconciled with one another by means of the principle which I am about to point out to you.

2. In proceeding to point out to you the grounds on which I think the soundness of this opinion may be upheld, I commence by remarking that there is a particular circumstance connected with the exercise of Perception and of Imagination to which your attention must be directed. This circumstance I would call the law of contrast between perception and imagination, and between the objects of perception and the objects of imagination. This law may be either present or absent when these faculties are at work. When this law is present, and when the imagination is at work, then I hold with Dr Reid

that the objects of the imagination are accompanied with no belief in their reality; for we believe these objects to be unreal, we pronounce them to be unreal by means of the comparison which we draw between them and the more permanent and real objects of perception. In this case, that is to say, when the law of contrast is supposed to be present, or when comparison between perceived objects and imagined objects is drawn, Dr Reid is quite right in holding that imagination is attended with no belief in the existence of its object. But this law of contrast is not always present; far from it, it is sometimes, it is frequently, perhaps it is in most cases, absent when the imagination is at work; in which case I hold that its objects, not being contrasted or in any way compared with those of perception, are accompanied at any rate with no disbelief in their existence. And being accompanied with no disbelief in their existence, I think we may go a step further, and say with Mr Stewart that these objects, the objects of the imagination, are accompanied with a belief, momentary though it be, of their existence. It appears to me that though the belief may not be of an express or positive character, still there is a tacit and virtual belief in the real existence of these imaginary objects when the law which I have called that of contrast between perception and imagination is not in force.

3. To illustrate more fully the effect which the

absence of this law would have in bringing about a belief in the reality of the objects of the imagination, let us suppose two cases in which this law must necessarily be absent. To suppose two such cases, we must conceive two individuals, the one of whom possesses imagination to the entire exclusion of perception, and the other perception to the entire exclusion of imagination. Let us suppose that the one man has the faculty of external perception, but is totally destitute of the faculty of imagination, or of the power of forming representations of objects not actually present to his senses. No imaginary form, we shall say, ever crossed or ever can cross this person's brain. And let us suppose that the other man has the faculty of imagination vigorously developed; that he lives in a reverie of vivid pictures, but is altogether devoid of the external senses. The phantasmagorias of the imagination are his, but he is cut off by an impassable barrier from all communication with what we call real things.

It is obvious that these two faculties being, according to our supposition, the property of different individuals, no contrast or comparison can be instituted between them and their respective objects. Here the law of contrast must necessarily be absent. Now, this law being absent, I am of opinion that the man of imagination would hold *his* world to be just as real as the man of perception would hold his to be. Neither of them would have any disbelief in the existence of the objects before them; and where no

disbelief dwells, I conceive that a vital, though it may be an obscure belief, is always present.

In the first place, then, let us consider more particularly the case of the man limited to perception; and for simplicity's sake, let us suppose him limited to the perceptions of sight. An object is before him, St Paul's Cathedral; he sees it. Now, suppose we ask him whether he believes in the existence of this object, whether he believes it to be real? To this query it is plain that he could return no answer which would properly meet the question. For before a man can say that he believes a thing to be real, he must be able to conceive something unreal; but this is what the person under consideration is, according to the supposition, unable to do. But, nevertheless, his very perplexity and his inability to understand and answer the question as *we* could answer it, would prove that he virtually believed in the existence of the object with a most unhesitating faith. He would say simply: There St Paul's is; I see it. If you choose to call that statement a belief on my part that it is a real object, I have no objection to your doing so, only it appears to me to be a circuitous mode of stating a very simple truth. I hold that this man's belief would be all the more vital and profound because he would not, properly speaking, know what belief meant.

4. In the second place, I now turn to the man whom we supposed to be living exclusively in the

world of imagination, and I address myself to him with a view of ascertaining what kind or degree of faith he must necessarily attach to the reality of the pictures that come before him. We shall suppose that these representations are very vivid, but that in the formation of them he does not exert any power of will; that they come and go like images in a dream or in a waking reverie, independently of all control. We shall suppose then, as in the former case, that a representation of St Paul's Cathedral arises before this man's imagination, and that the question, Do you believe that this object is a real object, that it really exists? is put to him. The man would be perplexed just as much as the other individual was, and his answer would be of precisely the same character. He would not, strictly speaking, know what belief meant, because he would have no notion of unbelief, the law of contrast between the real and the unreal, between imagination and perception, being altogether absent from his mind. But he would simply say, There the object is, I have it vividly before me, I apprehend it distinctly; and in speaking thus he would show that he had just as little doubt, and just as vital a belief in the existence of the object, as the other man had who was limited to the exercise of external perception.

5. In both of these cases, then, the belief in the real existence of the objects would be unhesitating and profound. The man of perception

could not disbelieve the existence of the objects of sense, because, never having had any of the less substantial objects of the imagination before him, having no conception of these, he could not be betrayed into the scepticism of thinking that the object before him might possibly be no more real than they, and hence, not being able to disbelieve the existence of the objects of sense, indeed not being able to form any conception of disbelief, he would necessarily believe in their existence.

Again, the man of imagination could not disbelieve the existence of the objects of his one faculty, because, never having had any of the more substantial objects of sense before him, never having contrasted or compared the objects of imagination with those of sense, he could not be betrayed into the scepticism of thinking that the objects of the imagination were unreal and precarious, while those of sense were real and permanent; and hence, not being able to disbelieve the existence of the objects of the imagination, not being able any more than the other man to form any conception of disbelief, he would necessarily believe in the existence of the objects of the imagination, just as his neighbour believed in the existence of the objects of perception.

6. Now, the same thing which we have supposed to take place in two separate minds, may take place in one mind. We supposed one mind endowed with perception alone, and another mind endowed with

imagination alone, and no contrast between the objects of these two faculties being upon such a supposition possible, our conclusion was that the objects in both cases would be believed by those two minds to stand on a footing of equality in regard to their real existence. Now, let us suppose that these two faculties, perception and imagination, are possessed by one and the same mind, and that the law of contrast is absent or inoperative, that no comparison takes place, and I maintain that the result will be precisely the same as it was in the case of the two separate minds. The objects of imagination will stand on the same footing with the objects of perception in regard to our belief in their existence. When we actually see an object, and do not contrast this object even in the remotest manner with some imaginary object, we cannot, strictly speaking, be said either to believe or disbelieve in its existence; but we certainly do *virtually*, though perhaps not very consciously, believe, and vitally believe, in its existence. In the same way, when we are plunged in a reverie, and a succession of objects, *i.e.*, visionary pictures, arises before our imagination, which we do not contrast even by the remotest implication with any of the objects of sense, we cannot, strictly speaking, be said either to believe or disbelieve in their existence; but I agree with Mr Stewart in holding that we do virtually, though not very consciously, believe in their existence, and they are really present to our minds. For if the law of contrast between perception

and imagination be entirely inoperative, as it often is, it is certain that we have no positive or conscious disbelief in the existence of these objects; and, having no disbelief in their reality, I think we are entitled to say, without stretching the doctrine too far, that we actually believe in their existence, and in their real presence to the mind, though this belief is but momentary, and is constantly broken in upon by the operation of the law of contrast between perception and imagination. You will of course find it impossible to verify the truth of this doctrine by setting yourselves voluntarily to call up imaginary scenes, and then by appealing to your consciousness to ascertain whether you believe in their reality or not. Such an attempt would necessarily defeat itself, because, in endeavouring to banish all contrast between the objects of sense and the objects of imagination, you would of necessity call into play the very law of contrast which you were desirous of suspending. But let me ask you whether, even when you have been sitting in this room, imaginary pictures of your own homes and friends have not sometimes arisen before you? and let me further ask you, whether your minds were then impressed with a distinct disbelief in the reality of these scenes? You will perhaps say that had you been *asked* whether you believed the scenes to be real, you would at once have answered, No; of course you would, because the spell of your reverie would have been broken, the law of contrast would have come

into instantaneous operation, you would have contrasted the objects of sense with those of the imagination, and out of the comparison you would have affirmed the former to be real, the latter unreal. But the question is, Were you distinctly sensible of the unreality, did you disbelieve in the real presence of the objects when the objects were flitting before your mental eye? If I may judge from my own experience, I think your answer must be that you entertained no disbelief in the presence and reality of the objects. I hope, indeed, that in this room you have seldom indulged in such reveries; but in spots better fitted for your day-dreams, by your own firesides, on the banks of a running stream, have you never lived for a time in an imaginary landscape and among imaginary faces, entertaining at the same time no clear disbelief in the reality of such scenes? If you have yielded yourselves up to such trains of thought, and if you have not been impressed every instant with a conviction of their unreality, with a belief in the non-existence of all that came before you, then I conceive that you had a virtual and a vital, though not a very distinct or conscious, belief in the existence and in the reality of the objects in the contemplation of which you were absorbed.

7. I think, then, in conclusion, that you must become converts to Mr Stewart's opinion that the exercise of the imagination is in certain circumstances, and under certain conditions, accompanied with the

belief that its objects exist. Mr Stewart says that the exercise of the imagination is always accompanied with this belief. But it appears to me that this is the case only when there is a total suspension of all contrast between perception and imagination. You cannot bring about this suspension by any voluntary effort, but I think you may without difficulty catch yourselves in cases where it has been spontaneously suspended; those cases, I mean, which are called Reverie. Then ask yourselves whether, when you were plunged in your reverie, you positively disbelieved in the existence of the objects that were passing before you. If you find, as I think you will find, that you did not positively disbelieve in that existence, then you must virtually have believed in it. This is what I understand Mr Stewart to contend for; and I think that his somewhat singular opinion may be explained and upheld in a satisfactory manner by means of the absence or suspension of the law of contrast between perception and imagination, a law the presence of which destroys our waking dreams, and teaches us that the world of perception is more real than the world of imagination. We may sum up these observations, then, by remarking that both of our philosophers are right in their opinions on this subject, although their opinions are opposed to each other; that Mr Stewart appears to be right in maintaining that imagined objects are always believed to have a real existence, that is, they are always believed to have a real existence so

long as they are not in any way contrasted or compared with perceived objects; and that Dr Reid is also right in maintaining that imagined objects are never believed to have a real existence, that is, they are never believed to have a real existence when we compare or contrast them, even in the slightest degree, with perceived objects. It is in this way that I would reconcile the opinions of the two philosophers respecting the belief which the one of them attaches, and the other of them denies, to the existence of imaginary objects.

LECTURE ON IMAGINATION.

1848.

POETICAL composition is usually and rightly regarded as the intellectual province over which the imagination more particularly presides. The possession of this faculty is essential to the enjoyment as well as to the production of poetry. When developed in a high degree, it renders him who is gifted with it a poet, while it enables those who possess it in a lower degree to appreciate and relish the strains which they could not have themselves composed.

Now, in order to reach some decisive principle by which we may determine when the imagination is exercised properly and when it is exercised perversely, I must raise a somewhat singular question, a question which you may at first sight regard as extravagant. But, perhaps, with a little patience we may be led by our question to find what we want, viz., a standard which shall decide between the right and the wrong employment of the imagination as it displays itself

in poetical creation. Looking at poetry, then, in its abstract and absolute character, looking at what we may call the spirit of poetry as it exists, not incarnated in this or that particular composition, but as a genial power which enlightens the intellect and the heart both of the poet himself and of those who listen to his strains; looking at poetry under this point of view, I ask, putting the question in the form of a bold, brief, and strong antithesis, Does man make poetry, or does poetry make man? Is the human mind the original source to which poetry may be traced as to its fountainhead? or is not rather poetry itself the fountainhead from whence flow the eternal waters which invigorate and purify, and in some measure constitute our souls? Does the human mind fabricate for itself the idea of the beautiful and the idea of the sublime? or do not rather these ideas fashion and fabricate the human mind? Does man derive his poetical inspiration from himself? or does he derive himself as a poet from the everlasting poetry of Him who has sown the sky with stars and the earth with flowers, who is Himself the substance of the true, the beautiful, and the good?

This question may appear mystical and obscure. Let me then explain myself by a reference to a still more general question, a question in regard to the fundamental nature of the human mind itself. All the accounts that can be rendered as to the nature of the human mind may be generalised into the two following theories: they may rather be said to generalise

themselves, before the survey of the reflective student, into the two following theories. The first theory holds that the human mind is something, the *creation* of which is finished when a man is born. The mind, according to this theory, may be said to be thrown off complete, in so far as its existence is concerned, at the birth of the individual. It is, moreover, supposed to be endowed with certain faculties by means of which it subsequently acquires all its knowledge. This knowledge, however, is not viewed as the staple of the mind's existence; it is not regarded as itself the mind, but as an adventitious acquisition which the mind might or might not have possessed. The mind, *quâ* existent, is supposed to be as much a mind whether it be invested with this knowledge or not, just as a man is as much an existing man whether he be clothed or naked. This theory, in short, distinguishes between the existence of the mind and the knowledge appertaining to the mind. It gives the preference and the priority to the existence. The knowledge it regards as a secondary and posterior formation. The mind is as much an existing mind without this knowledge as it is with it. The mind of a savage, according to this doctrine, is as much an *existing* mind as the mind of a Newton, a Milton, or a Chalmers. The theory thus shortly described may be termed the psychological theory of the human mind. We may remark farther, that this theory, in estimating the relation between the mind and its knowledge, regards the mind as the steady and the

permanent; its knowledge as the temporary and the fluctuating. It teaches that the mind is the moulder of knowledge, and not that knowledge is the moulder of the mind.

Opposed to this doctrine stands what we would call the genuine metaphysical theory of the human mind. According to this theory, knowledge is not the accident and appendage, it is the essence and the existence of the mind. This doctrine is precisely the reverse of the preceding one. There our mental existence, our intellectual constitution, is laid down as the basis of knowledge; here knowledge is laid down as the basis of our mental existence, as the maker, under God, of our mental constitution. I am convinced that such among you as may intend to hereafter prosecute your speculative researches in a profound and zealous spirit, and to study philosophy both in itself and in its history,—I am convinced that you must build your labours upon the distinction now brought before you.

Whichever of the theories you may yourselves adopt, it is essential to the prosecution of your philosophical studies that you should be made aware of the existence of the distinction between them. The one of these theories regards knowledge or ideas as the essence of the mind; the other of them regards the mind as something which may exist destitute of all knowledge or ideas. The former we may call the metaphysical, the latter the psychological theory of the mind. This distinction lies at the very root of philosophy, and by

keeping it in view we obtain a clue which enables us to understand and appreciate the aim and the works of true speculative thinkers, from Plato downwards. We mistake the views of these philosophers if we suppose that they regarded knowledge as the offspring of the human mind, or ideas as its modifications; on the contrary, they regarded the mind as the offspring of an objective knowledge, a knowledge which existed prior to its existence. They held that ideas moulded and modified the mind, not that it moulded or modified them. For myself, I am disposed to adopt the second of these theories, for if we once accept the psychological theory, we shall never be able completely to eradicate either from our own minds or from those of others the sophistry and the scepticism which for ages have bewildered the world. But the metaphysical theory carries us triumphant over every difficulty.

As an illustration of the difference between the two theories, and of the mode in which sophistry and scepticism are overthrown by the one theory while they are all-powerful against the other, let me appeal to the well-known distinction between right and wrong. You have a mind, says the sophist, a mind to begin with, and this mind of yours makes the distinction between right and wrong. But it does not follow that a distinction which your mind makes is an embodiment of absolute, necessary, and immutable truth. The distinction between right and wrong is doubtless a distinction *for you*. But

it does not follow that right and wrong are absolutely and in themselves distinct. In short, you cannot conclude an objective and divine, and absolutely true distinction from the existence of a mere subjective and human distinction. It is thus that the sceptic has in all ages endeavoured to confound moral distinctions. And the terms of the psychological theory afford us no grounds upon which his argument may be successfully resisted and answered. But what is the answer? The answer is this: I have, properly speaking, no mind to begin with. I have no mind *before* the distinction between right and wrong is revealed to me. My mind exists subsequently to this revelation. At any rate, I acquire my mind, if not after, yet in the very act which brings before me the distinction. The distinction exists, it exists as an immutable institution of God *prior* to the existence of our minds. And it is the knowledge of this distinction which forms the prime constituent, not of our mental acquisitions, but of our mental existence. Extinguish in a man's mind the distinction between good and evil, and you not merely extinguish his mind's knowledge, you extinguish a large portion, if not the whole, of his mind's existence. I shall have occasion to dwell more fully on this doctrine hereafter. Meanwhile I would just request any one who is not altogether satisfied with our views to consider, and to consider well, what he means by the mind acquiring a knowledge of the distinction between good and evil; and

then to ask himself candidly this question, Whether a knowledge of this distinction be not in his estimation essential to the very existence of the mind which he yet endeavours to suppose in existence previous to the knowledge in question? I hold that a mind which has no knowledge of the distinction between right and wrong, is not a mind at all in any intelligible sense. I hold that it is the knowledge of the distinction which makes the mind, and not the mind which makes the distinction and the knowledge of the distinction. Now this doctrine affords a complete answer to the sceptic's cavils against the immutable truth of moral distinctions. Our mind, says the sceptic, makes the distinction between right and wrong; we have therefore no decisive guarantee for the absolute truth of the distinction; it depends on the existence of our minds. It cannot be shown to have an objective and independent validity. I answer, No; it is, on the contrary, the distinction, God's distinction, between right and wrong which makes our minds, which converts blind instincts into rational aims; the objective validity, the immutable truth of the distinction, is therefore indefeasibly guaranteed. The existence of our minds depends on and follows the existence of the distinction. The existence of the distinction is thus secured as an absolute and invariable, an inflexible truth. *It* is the prior, the steady, the permanent, and the independent. We are the posterior, the plastic, and the fluctuating. And our fluctuations cease, that is, our

minds exist with a veritable existence, just in proportion as we accommodate ourselves to the standard distinction; while, on the contrary, our fluctuations increase, our minds lose their very existence, just in proportion as we endeavour to accommodate to ourselves the standard difference between right and wrong. That is the foundation, I conceive, on which all true ethical theory must be based.

But without attempting to develop these views in a detailed form at present, I would merely remark, that the doctrine of the human mind which I am disposed to adopt is this, expressed briefly and antithetically it is this: It is not man's mind which puts him in possession of knowledge, but it is knowledge which puts him in possession of a mind. Instead of making mind the radical, and knowledge and ideas the derivative, as is usually done, I would make knowledge and ideas the radical, and mind the derivative. In making knowledge and ideas the basis and the constituent of the mind, we are dealing with facts of the existence of which we are assured, we are keeping within the limits of a prudent and circumspect induction. But in making mind the basis and upholder of knowledge, we are dealing with we know not what, a phantom, an abstraction, which not only eludes our research, but which leads us astray into a wilderness thickly set with sceptical snares and sophistical pitfalls.

Taking our stand, then, on the general doctrine that knowledge under the Divine appointment is the

maker and upholder of the human mind, and repudiating the converse doctrine, which views knowledge as altogether subordinate to the mind; maintaining that man acquires his mind by means of knowledge, and not his knowledge by means of mind; we now return to the consideration of poetry, and we ask what view are we to take of that access of intellectual power which is termed poetical inspiration? of those ideas of beauty and sublimity which are the pillars of poetical art? It is obvious that, in harmony with the preceding remarks, we must regard this inspiration and these ideas as that which produces the poetical mind, as that which engenders the inspiration and the ideas. The ideas of the beautiful and the sublime, these are the prior elements. The poetical mind is a subsequent and derivative formation. The inspiration proceeds not from the man himself, it comes from a higher and more authoritative source. The man himself owes his existence as a poet unto it; it does not owe its existence unto him. We therefore reply, in answer to our original question, that it is poetry which makes the man, and not the man who makes poetry.

Should the critic here interfere, and tell us that this is an extravagant and untenable doctrine, we reply that at any rate we have Homer, the father of the epic, and Milton, his illustrious compeer, on our side of the question. If Homer regarded himself as the original source of his own poetry, what intelligible sense can be attached to his invocation, Μῆνιν

ἄειδε θεά (Sing, O goddess, the wrath)? I insist upon taking these words literally, and they certainly indicate that "the blind old man of Scio's rocky isle" regarded himself as the mere mouthpiece which was to give utterance in immortal strains to the inspiration that came from a higher quarter and took possession of his soul. Then what shall we say to the more elaborate invocation with which Milton opens up to us the sublimities of 'Paradise Lost'? If the poet be not a hypocrite and a deceiver (and who has ever dared to bring forward such a charge?), this invocation is clearly an acknowledgment that it is not to himself that he looks for the inspiration which is to support him in the accomplishment of his great enterprise.

"Of Man's first disobedience, and the fruit
Of that forbidden tree whose mortal taste
Brought death into the world, and all our woe,
With loss of Eden, till one greater Man
Restore us, and regain the blissful seat,
Sing, heavenly Muse, that on the secret top
Of Oreb, or of Sinai, didst inspire
That shepherd, who first taught the chosen seed,
In the beginning how the Heavens and Earth
Rose out of Chaos. Or, if Sion hill
Delight thee more, and Siloa's brook, that flowed
Fast by the oracle of God; I thence
Invoke thy aid to my adventurous song,
That with no middle flight intends to soar
Above the Aonian mount while it pursues
Things unattempted yet in prose or rhyme.
And chiefly Thou, O Spirit that dost prefer
Before all temples the upright heart and pure,
Instruct me, for Thou know'st; Thou from the first
Wast present, and with mighty wings outspread,
Dove-like, sat'st brooding on the vast abyss,

> And mad'st it pregnant: What in me is dark,
> Illumine; what is low, raise and support;
> That to the height of this great argument
> I may assert eternal Providence,
> And justify the ways of God to men."

Having thus explained our doctrine, and having seen it corroborated by the testimony of the greatest of poets, I proceed to consider what ground or criterion this doctrine affords us for determining where the poet exercises his imagination properly, and where he exercises it perversely. If the poet's inspiration be a divine derivative, if his ideas of beauty and sublimity be not the indigenous produce of his own mind; but if his mind be, on the contrary, a product resulting from these ideas, does not this impose upon his imagination a stringent obligation to keep aloof all the promptings of his mere subjective carnal nature while exercising his lofty art? If he be the high priest of nature, if God has anointed him with power, what right has he to carry forth into that service the pictures of a sensual soul, or the passions of a fleshly heart? The poet sins against the genius he is endowed with whenever he allows the subjective current of licentious feeling to overflow the boundaries of his objective inspiration. It is not, however, necessary that the feelings should be licentious or immoral to render them amenable to condemnation. That no doubt aggravates the perversion; but it is at all times a most dangerous thing for a poet to draw upon mere subjective feeling for the purpose of giving zest to his descriptions. The feelings to

which the poet gives utterance may be altogether unobjectionable in themselves, and yet their introduction may have the effect of ruining his poetry in the estimation of all competent judges. So delicate a thing is poetical composition, that a poet is almost sure to mar the effect of his best creations whenever he attempts to mix up mere subjective feeling with the objective ideas of beauty and sublimity which are imparting their own tenderness and their own grandeur to his compositions. As an instance of this, let me read to you the following passage from Lord Byron, descriptive of the Cataract of Velino:—

"The roar of waters!—from the headlong height
Velino cleaves the wave-worn precipice;
The fall of waters! rapid as the light
The flashing mass foams shaking the abyss;
The hell of waters! where they howl and hiss,
And boil in endless torture; while the sweat
Of their great agony, wrung out from this
Their Phlegethon, curls round the rocks of jet
That guard the gulf around, in pitiless horror set,

"And mounts in spray the skies, and thence again
Returns in an unceasing shower, which round,
With its unemptied cloud of gentle rain,
Is an eternal April to the ground,
Making it all one emerald:—how profound
The gulf! and how the giant element
From rock to rock leaps with delirious bound,
Crushing the cliffs, which, downward worn and rent
With his fierce footsteps, yield in chasms a fearful vent.

"To the broad column which rolls on, and shows
More like the fountain of an infant sea
Torn from the womb of mountains by the throes
Of a new world, than only thus to be
Parent of rivers, which flow gushingly,
With many windings, through the vale:—Look back!

Lo! where it comes like an eternity,
As if to sweep down all things in its track,
Charming the eye with dread,—a matchless cataract,

"Horribly beautiful! but on the verge,
From side to side, beneath the glittering morn,
An Iris sits, amidst the infernal surge,
Like Hope upon a deathbed, and unworn
Its steady dyes, while all around is torn
By the distracted waters, bears serene
Its brilliant hues with all their beams unshorn:
Resembling, 'mid the torture of the scene,
Love watching Madness with unalterable mien."

The two similitudes to which I object in this description are, first, the iris or rainbow, which is represented as sitting amidst the infernal surges *like Hope upon a deathbed.* Let us consider this resemblance. There is certainly no fault to be found with it on the score of its morality; it is calculated to be solemn and impressive. But it appears to me to be incongruous and out of place. There is no analogy or similitude between the scene here presented to our imagination and the picture of hope upon a deathbed. The agitation of these distracted waters is the agitation of overpowering life, and not the trouble of death either still or convulsed. Hope upon a deathbed is no doubt a radiant crown, whether it encircles the dying brows of him whose last hour has struck, or the foreheads of his weeping friends; but that is a peaceful though a mournful scene, it is a picture bearing no resemblance to this frenzied flood; or if it be not a peaceful scene, if the passions of anguish, like those tumultuous waters, boil up around this bed

of death, then the poet's similitude is lost, for, unlike the steady Iris to which he likens her, Hope will in these circumstances, for a time at least, be extinguished in despair.

Nor do I think that the poet is more happy in his efforts where he again speaks of this Iris

> "Resembling, 'mid the torture of the scene,
> Love watching Madness with unalterable mien."

I object to this similitude on the same grounds on which I objected to the former one. This Iris does not resemble Love watching Madness with unalterable mien: no two things were ever more unlike. Our feelings, mine at least, revolt against the association. The poet has here attempted to stimulate himself and us to entertain feelings which the situation does not of itself suggest. These similitudes are not rooted in genuine inspiration. Their beauty is a spurious beauty: they are specimens of the false sublime. Here the poet has trusted to the earthly and not to the celestial impulse.

The exercise of Lord Byron's imagination is, to my mind, stained throughout with vices of this nature. His best passages are often sullied with mortal stains, because he refused to acknowledge the obligations due to the genius of which he was the depository. Listen to his voice amid the thunderstorm:—

> "The sky is changed! and such a change! O Night
> And storm and darkness, ye are wondrous strong,
> Yet lovely in your strength, as is the light
> Of a dark eye in woman."

"*As is the light of a dark eye in woman!*" Oh

that *that* had been away! We can all admire dark eyes in woman, but we do not want to be called upon to admire them *now*. Here we are, in the heart of a thunderstorm among the mountains; the Alps are wild with obstreperous enjoyment, sympathy with the exultation of the hills, glee triumphant over terror, and terror bounding buoyant on the waves of glee. These are the ruling spirits of the time. What have woman's eyes to do with a scene like this?

The true poet's motto must ever be, "Odi profanum vulgus et arceo." But in assuming this badge he merely dissevers himself from the tastes of the licentious multitude. He links himself all the closer to our essential and universal humanity, and his success, however limited his popularity may be for a time, is ultimately secure.

LETTER TO SIR W. HAMILTON

(Not Sent).

St Andrews, 18*th Oct.* 1851.

My dear Sir William,—There is an ambiguity or inconsistency in your doctrine of "presentative knowledge" which I have often intended to speak to you about, and request an explanation of. You say, Reid, p. 805, "In a presentative or immediate cognition there is *one sole object.*" What is this one sole object? Our organism, you answer. From which it of course follows that everything beyond our organism is a *mediate* object of cognition. This is indeed expressly admitted. "The primary qualities of things external to our organism we do not perceive—*i.e.*, *immediately know*," p. 881. And yet, in the face of that statement, I read, p. 810, "The *primary qualities of matter or body, now and here*—that is, in proximate relation to our organs—are objects of immediate cognition to the natural realists." These two statements are absolutely contradictory and irreconcilable. Of course, the primary qualities, when "in proximate

relation to our organs," are "external to our organism," and are, therefore, according to passage in p. 881, *not* immediately known; and yet, according to passage in p. 810, they *are* "objects of immediate cognition to the natural realist." Does not this require some amendment? The truth is, that your distinction of presentative and representative knowledge is no distinction at all, both species of cognition being equally presentative and equally representative. Both in perception and in imagination the sole immediate object is our own organism; the only difference being that in perception the immediate object refers to, or implies, a present external object not immediately *known;* while in imagination the immediate object refers to, or implies, an absent external object *not immediately known.* Is not that your doctrine? What, then, becomes of the distinction between presentation and representation, between perception and imagination, if in both cases both a near and a remote object are or may be involved? You expressly state that the sole immediate object in perception is the organism; all that lies beyond is mediate. The organism is also the sole immediate object in imagination; all that lies beyond is mediate. How, then, can these two powers be discriminated as presentative (immediate) and representative (mediate)?

The argument by which you find an immediate non-ego in the organism I do not meddle with at present. But it seems to me that this argument, if sound, would be sufficient to establish your natural

realism, without complicating the case with the distinction of presentative and representative knowledge, a distinction which seems to me to be untenable as you put it, and which, at any rate, requires some *redding up* at your hands. It is also very misleading; for I believe that unwary readers of Note B may be of opinion that you advocate an immediate knowledge of external objects beyond the organism, and are thus a champion of common sense.

BIOGRAPHY OF SCHELLING.

JOSEPH FRIEDRICH WILHELM SCHELLING, one of the most celebrated and productive philosophers of Germany, was born at Leonberg in Würtemberg in 1775. He was the son of a country clergyman. Such was the precocity of his genius, that he entered the University of Tübingen in his fifteenth year. Here he formed a close intimacy with Hegel, afterwards his great rival in philosophy, although, in principle, their systems are very much alike. At the age of seventeen, with the view of taking the highest honours in philosophy, he published a Latin dissertation on 'The Origin of Evil as laid down in the third chapter of Genesis.' He remained at Tübingen until 1795, when he published an inaugural dissertation in theology, entitled 'On Marcion, the corrector of the Pauline Epistles.' He then went to Leipsic, where he resided for a short time as tutor to the Baron von Riedesel. From Leipsic he went to the University of Jena, where he studied medicine and philosophy; the latter under Fichte, the presid-

ing genius of the place—a man whose heroic character raises him as high among the patriots, as his speculative power does among the philosophers of his country. Schelling became Fichte's devoted disciple, and in 1798 he succeeded him as professor of philosophy at Jena. Here he lectured with great applause until 1803, when he was invited to fill the chair of philosophy at Wurzburg. Having been ennobled by the King of Bavaria, he removed to Munich in 1807, and remained there until 1841. During part of this time he discharged the duties of a professor in the University of Munich (founded in 1827), and after Jacobi's death he was appointed president of the Academy of Sciences. He resided for some time at Erlangen, where he delivered a course of lectures. In 1841 he was summoned to the University of Berlin to lecture against Hegelianism, which was then carrying everything before it. If Hegel's reign is over, it cannot be affirmed that Schelling had much share in deposing him. His lectures were generally regarded as a failure. They combined with the obscurity of his earlier writings a higher degree of prolixity and mysticism. Schelling's latter years seem to have been spent in retirement. He died in 1854. No life of him, on any extended scale, has as yet appeared. In his 'Biographia Literaria' (first published in 1817), Coleridge embodied large extracts from the writings of Schelling, without any sufficient acknowledgment. —(See 'Blackwood's Magazine,' March 1840.) This, however, should be attributed rather to forgetfulness

or carelessness, than to wilful plagiarism on the part of the English poet.[1]

Schelling's writings may be classified as belonging to five periods. To the first period, 1795-96, belong —'On the possibility of a Form of Philosophy in general;' 'On the *Ego* as the Principle of Philosophy, or on the unconditioned in human knowledge;' 'Explanations of the Idealism involved in the Theory of Knowledge;' 'Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism. In these writings he adheres closely to Fichte, who welcomed him as his best expositor. Later in life their relations were less amicable. In the second period, 1797-1801, appeared—'Ideas towards a Philosophy of Nature' (second edition, 1802); 'On the World-Soul;' 'First Sketch of a System of the Philosophy of Nature;' 'Journal of Speculative Physics;' 'System of Transcendental Idealism.' During both of these periods, he also contributed largely to the 'Philosophical Journal' of Fichte and Niethammer. In the second period he devoted himself more to the study of nature, and less to the exposition of Fichte. The third period, 1801-1803, gave birth to 'Exposition of my System of Philosophy;' 'Bruno, a dialogue on the divine and natural principle of things;' 'Lectures on the Method of Academical Study;' 'New Journal

[1] In the article referred to, on "The Plagiarisms of S. T. Coleridge," Mr Ferrier gives full and accurate details of a question possessing not indeed a purely philosophical, but a very remarkable psychological interest. Schelling himself expresses in his lectures a view nearly coincident with that taken by Mr Ferrier in this passage.

of Speculative Physics.' In the fourth period, 1804-1809, he published a Treatise on 'Philosophy and Religion;' 'A Statement of the True Relation of the Philosophy of Nature to the Improved Doctrine of Fichte;' 'On the Relation of the Real and the Ideal;' 'Philosophical Inquiries concerning the Nature of Human Freedom;' 'Philosophical Writings,' first volume. This latter publication (of 1809) was designed to contain all Schelling's already published works, with the addition, it may be supposed, of many new ones. But it stopped at the first volume, and contains only a portion of the compositions enumerated above. The fifth period extended from 1809 to 1854. During this long period, Schelling's literary activity, which hitherto had been so prolific, was comparatively in abeyance. That his pen was still busy his posthumous works testify; but whether it was that he was discouraged by the reception which his collected writings had met with, or that he had misgivings respecting the validity of his system, or that he was silently labouring to give it greater finish and completeness, his published contributions to science during this period of forty-five years were very small and far between. Of these the most important was a 'Critical Preface' to Beckers's translation into German of a work by the French philosopher Cousin. From this preface, the following extract on the obscurity of the German philosophers is curious and memorable. It shows how a man's eyes may be open to faults in others, which he either does not see

in himself, or seeing, does not choose or is unable to amend. "The philosophers of Germany," says Schelling, "have been for so long in the habit of philosophising merely among themselves, that by degrees their thoughts and language have become further and further removed, even in Germany, from the understanding of general readers; and at length the degree of this remoteness from common intelligibility has come almost to be regarded as the measure of philosophic proficiency. Examples of this we hardly require to adduce. As families who abandon the intercourse of their fellow-men acquire, in addition to other disagreeable peculiarities, certain peculiar modes of expression intelligible only to themselves; so have the German philosophers made themselves remarkable for forms of thought and expression which are unintelligible to all the world besides. The fact of their having been repeatedly unsuccessful in their attempts to spread the knowledge of the Kantian philosophy beyond Germany—though, indeed, it compelled them to abandon the hope of making themselves understood by the natives of other countries—yet it never led them to conclude that there was anything wrong either with their philosophy itself, or with their method of communicating it. On the contrary, the oftener and the more signally they failed in their endeavours to disseminate their highly cherished opinions, the stronger did their conviction become that philosophy was something which existed for themselves alone—not considering that to be

universally intelligible is the primary aim of every true philosophy—an aim which, though often missed, ought yet never to be lost sight of, and ought to be the ruling and guiding principle of every system. This does not imply that works of speculative thought are chiefly to be weighed in the critic's scales as mere exercises of style; but it does imply that a philosophy whose contents cannot be made intelligible to every well-educated people, and expressed in every cultivated language, cannot be the true and universal philosophy." Such were Schelling's words in 1834, in passing sentence on the speculations generally of his countrymen. Their severity is not greater than their truth. Would that Schelling and his compeers had profited more largely by the advice! Since Schelling's death in 1854 a complete edition of his writings has been published by his son. It is comprised in fourteen volumes, and contains many works now printed for the first time. Of these the principal are 'Historico-critical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mythology;' 'The Philosophy of Mythology;' 'The Philosophy of Revelation.' This vast theosophic system fills four large volumes.

In each of the four periods during which Schelling poured forth so many publications, his philosophy assumed a different phasis or aspect. It is not possible, within the limits of this sketch, to give any account of even the simplest of these varying and incomplete manifestations. The last and posthumous form in which the system has appeared, and in which

the reflective labours of his long life may be supposed to be summed up, is a work so wide in its range, so complicated in its details, and so mystical in its tone, that an intelligible analysis of it is a scarcely practicable achievement. It may be more instructive, as well as more practicable, to confine ourselves to a smaller field—to consider, namely, the main point at issue between Schelling and some of the leading philosophers of this country. Perhaps some light will be thrown on his philosophy, its drift and purpose will perhaps become apparent in our attempt, not indeed to settle, but to adjust the terms of this dispute.

It is admitted on all hands, that truth of one kind or another is the proper aim of philosophy. But there are two kinds of truth: truth as it exists *in itself*, and truth as it exists *in relation to us*. The first of these is called technically the *unconditioned;* the latter the *conditioned*. According to Schelling, unconditioned truth is the proper object of philosophy. According to his opponents (of whom Sir W. Hamilton may be cited as the most distinguished), conditioned truth is the only proper and possible object of philosophy (see Hamilton's Discussions, art. 'The Philosophy of the Unconditioned:' also page 643). Such is the precise and primary point at issue between the two philosophers.

We have now to state and examine the grounds on which each belligerent respectively supports his opinion. Hamilton's opinion is grounded on the as-

sumption that whatever man knows he knows only in relation, that is, only in relation to his own faculties of knowledge. He can, therefore, apprehend only relative or conditioned truth. The unconditioned (truth in itself) is beyond his grasp. But it is plain that this argument proves too much; it proves that the unconditioned truth is equally beyond the grasp of Omniscience; because it is surely manifest that omniscience can know things only in relation to itself; and therefore Omniscience is just as incompetent as man is to apprehend the unconditioned, if this must be apprehended out of all relation to intelligence. If that be the idea of the unconditioned, Schelling's conception of philosophy must be given up, and Hamilton's must be accepted. But the surrender of the one and the acceptance of the other involves the admission that the truth in itself cannot be known even by the Supreme reason. That is the *reductio* to which Hamilton's argument brings us.

To escape this conclusion, then, we must not understand the unconditioned as that which is exempt from all relation; we must view it as that which stands in some sort of relation to intelligence. Viewing it otherwise, we fall into the absurdity touched upon in the preceding paragraph.

If the truth in itself is not to be regarded as that which is placed out of all relation to intellect, it must, no less than the other kind of truth (the unconditioned), be regarded as that which stands in some sort of relation to intellect; so that the distinction

between truth unconditioned and truth conditioned thus resolves itself into the distinction between truth in relation to intelligence simply (ἁπλῶς), and truth in relation to *our* intelligence. And the point of the controversy now comes before us in this shape:—Can man apprehend the truth as it exists in relation to pure intelligence—to intelligence considered simply as such? or can he apprehend the truth only as it exists in relation to *his* intelligence, considered as a peculiar kind or mode of intellect? Now, although it is not clear that Schelling and his opponents have ever joined issue explicitly on this question, it is undoubtedly the question properly in dispute between them. Schelling argues in favour of the former alternative. He holds that philosophy is the pursuit of truth as it stands related to pure intellect, *i. e.*, to intellect considered universally, and as not modified in any particular way: he holds that man is competent to the attainment of such truth, and that such truth is absolute and unconditioned. The other party (among whom we venture to place Hamilton) maintains that philosophy is the pursuit of truth as it stands related to our minds considered as a particular kind or form of intelligence—that man can attain to no other truth than this, and that this truth is relative and conditioned.

These respective conclusions rest on grounds which have now to be considered as forming the ultimate stage in the adjustment of this controversy. Schelling's ground is that there is a common nature or

quality in all intelligence; that man, through his participation in this common nature, is, so far, a pure —that is, a non-particular or universal—intelligence, and hence is, so far, capable of cognising universal or unconditioned truth. That Schelling has worked out this doctrine explicitly, or even intelligibly, is not to be maintained. But "the intellectual intuition" which he ascribes to man is undoubtedly his expression for the mind considered as a pure intelligence, and as having something in common with all other intelligences, whether actual or possible. The "intellectual intuition" is opposed to the sensational intuition, the latter denoting that part of the mental economy which is more peculiarly man's own, or human. Schelling's opponents, on the other hand, must be prepared to hold and to show that there is no nature common to all intelligence—that the different orders of minds (supposing that there are such) have no point of unity or agreement—that their difference is absolute and complete. This is the only logical ground on which they can deny to the mind of man all cognisance of the unconditioned truth. Such seem to be the grounds on which the famous question respecting the philosophy of the unconditioned has to be debated. We have offered no opinion on the merits of the case. But the victory is Schelling's if he has succeeded in showing, or if it be admitted, that every intelligence has something in common, some point or points of resemblance, with every other intelligence

(for that is the fundamental question, the decision of which decides all); while again, his opponents must be pronounced triumphant if they have proved that intelligent natures differ from each other entirely, and have no point or principle in common. On both sides the terms of the dispute, as here adjusted, have been only partially adhered to. Schelling often loses himself in the unintelligible; his opponents have not seen the exact point of the problem: so that the "philosophy of the unconditioned" still calls for a patient and impartial reconsideration.

The philosophical character and influence of Schelling are well summed up by Mr Morell in the following remarks (see Modern German Philosophy; Manchester papers, 1856):—"The later phases of Schelling's philosophy," says Morell, "are chiefly characterised by unavailing attempts to reconcile the pantheistic stand-point which he first assumed, with the notion of a personal Deity, and with the fundamental dogmas of the catholic faith. In doing this he lost the freshness and charm of his first philosophic principles on the one hand, without solving the problem of religion, or satisfying the practical religious requirements of humanity on the other. He merely glided step by step into a strained, unintelligible mysticism, and, without acknowledging it, became a foe to all purely philosophic speculation, and a tacit abettor of an antique romanticism. The followers of Schelling formed two distinct schools. Those who

attached themselves to his Natur-philosophie (such as Oken, Steffens, Carus, and others) have really done good service in spiritualising the physical philosophy of the age, without running into any censurable extravagance; while those who started from Schelling's later mysticism, such as Schubert, Baader, and others of smaller dimensions still, have done little else than revel in a species of sentimental mysticism, sometimes of more elevated, and at others of a very mean and trifling character. But the influence of Schelling was not confined to Germany. His attempt to unite the process of the physical sciences in one affiliated line with the study of man, both in his individual constitution and historic development, has also had a very considerable result out of his own country. No one, for example, who compares the philosophic method of Schelling with the 'Philosophie positive' of Auguste Comte, can have the slightest hesitation as to the source from which the latter virtually sprang. The fundamental idea is, indeed, precisely the same as that of Schelling, with this difference only—that the idealistic language of the German speculator is here translated into the more ordinary language of physical science. That Comte borrowed his views from Schelling we can by no means affirm; but that the whole conception of the affiliation of the sciences in the order of their relative simplicity, and the expansion of the same law of development so as to include the exposition of human nature and the course of social progress, is all to be found there, no one in the

smallest degree acquainted with Schelling's writings can seriously doubt."

In the form of his head and the expression of his countenance Schelling is said to have resembled closely the busts of Socrates, and like him, too, to have been eloquent in conversation.

BIOGRAPHY OF HEGEL.

GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, the profoundest of German metaphysicians, was born at Stuttgart on the 27th August 1770. He could trace his descent through a long line of Carinthian and Swabian ancestors who had filled respectable places in the middle ranks of society, and some of whom, in the time of the Thirty Years' War, had suffered persecution and expatriation on account of their attachment to the Protestant cause. His father was superintendent of the ducal finances—a post, it may be supposed, of much trust and responsibility. The Swabian temperament—its gravity, straightforwardness, and perseverance—is said to have declared itself at an early period in the life and conversation of the future philosopher. While still in his teens he went by the nickname of "the old man." His school and college diaries, extracts from which have been published by his biographer Rosenkranz, attest the extent and variety of his studies. They afford evidence of indefatigable industry, of pains and

thoroughness, rather than of precocity of genius. Method and persistency were the characteristics of the youthful scholar, as they were of the mature metaphysician. At the University of Tübingen, to which he proceeded in 1788, he was a fellow-student with Schelling—a kindred spirit, who presented, too, some very decided points of contrast. For a time they lived together in the same room; and the intimacy thus commenced exercised from first to last marked influence, partly through sympathy and partly through rivalry, on the destinies of these two great thinkers. In later life they had their differences. "They stood aloof, the scars remaining;" and so wide, indeed, was the breach that, after Hegel's death, Schelling was summoned to Berlin to preach down the doctrines of his early friend, which were supposed to have become too dominant and exclusive—an enterprise which he attempted without much success. But in those early days at Tübingen, in the springtime of their youth, the identity of their aspirations (it was the era of the French Revolution, when politics were more engrossing even than philosophy) seems to have knit them together, as it afterwards did at Jena, in the closest intellectual fellowship. After completing his university course, Hegel accepted the office of tutor in a family in Switzerland, which he exchanged, some years afterwards, for a more agreeable appointment of the same kind at Frankfort. On the death of his father in 1799, the small patrimony which he in-

herited enabled him to proceed to Jena, and to establish himself there on a more independent footing. He gave lectures on philosophy as a private teacher (privat-docent) in the university. His friend Schelling, although some years his junior, had got the start of him, and was settled as a professor (extraordinary) in the same place. Goethe, Schiller, and Wieland, lived at Weimar, which was not far off, so that he was in contact with the most brilliant intellectual society which Germany at that time afforded. The genius of Schelling, as prolific as it was precocious, had by this time given to the world a series of profound philosophical disquisitions. At the age of nineteen he had shown a wonderful insight into the philosophy of Fichte, and had even carried it forward into a new development; and when Hegel now joined him he had just published his 'System of Transcendental Idealism.' Hegel had no pretensions to such pliancy of intellect and rapid power of composition; but he, too, was laying the foundations of a system, which, although identical in its groundwork, or nearly so, with that of Schelling, was intended to be far more rigorous and logical in its procedure. It was, indeed, in their method that the main difference between the two philosophers lay. Schelling was of opinion that the citadel of truth was to be carried by a *coup de main*, by a genial, "intellectual intuition." Hegel conceived that it was to be won only by slow sap and regular logical approaches.

Hegel remained at Jena until 1807, during which period he published a dissertation on 'The Difference between the Systems of Fichte and of Schelling;' edited, along with Schelling, a journal of philosophy; and delivered lectures on the history of philosophy, and on the phenomenology of the mind. In 1803 Schelling migrated to Würzburg, and after some interval Hegel was promoted to the chair which he had vacated. But the emoluments of an extraordinary professorship being inadequate to support him, he resigned the appointment, and removed to Bamberg, where he acted for a short time as the editor of a political journal. In 1808 Hegel was appointed to the office of rector in the gymnasium at Nürnberg. Here he married, and here he remained, giving elementary courses of instruction in philosophy and religion, until 1816, when he received a call to a philosophical professorship (ordinary) at Heidelberg. Two years afterwards he was summoned to fill the chair of philosophy in the University of Berlin, which had been vacant since the death of Fichte in 1814. Thus, although the events of Hegel's life were simple and monotonous, the scene of his labours was not a little varied. Stuttgart, Tübingen, Jena, Bamberg, Nürnberg, Heidelberg, and Berlin, these were the stages in his pilgrimage, and they are here recorded for the behoof of those who may care to know where a great philosopher has been domiciled. His appearance and demeanour as a lecturer are thus described by Rosenkranz: "Utterly careless about the graces of rhet-

oric, thoroughly real and absorbed in the business of the moment, ever pressing forwards, and often extremely dogmatic in his assertions, Hegel enchained his students by the intensity of his speculative power. His voice was in harmony with his eye. It was a great eye, but it looked inwards; and the momentary glances which it threw outwards seemed to issue from the very depths of idealism, and arrested the beholder like a spell. His accent was rather broad, and without sonorous ring; but through its apparent commonness there broke that lofty animation which the might of knowledge inspires, and which, in moments when the genius of humanity was adjuring the audience through his lips, left no hearer unmoved. In the sternness of his noble features there was something almost calculated to strike terror, had not the beholder been again propitiated by the gentleness and cordiality of the expression. A peculiar smile bore witness to the purest benevolence, but it was blended with something harsh, cutting, sorrowful, or rather ironical. His, in short, were the tragic lineaments of the philosopher, of the hero whose destiny it is to struggle with the riddle of the universe."

Hegel died at Berlin in 1831. He was cut off suddenly by cholera. The disease seems to have attacked his brain principally, and to have run a milder course than is usual with that formidable malady. The regulation which declared that all persons dying of cholera should be buried in a sepa-

rate churchyard, was relaxed, by high authority, in his favour. He was interred beside the grave of Fichte, in a churchyard near one of the principal gates of the city.

Soon after Hegel's death, an edition of his collected works was published by an association of his friends. This collection comprises his early philosophical treatises; the phenomenology of the mind; logic (metaphysic); the encyclopedia of science (embracing logic, the philosophy of nature, the philosophy of mind); the philosophy of law; the philosophy of history; æsthetics; the philosophy of religion; the history of philosophy; and miscellaneous writings—in all eighteen, or rather twenty-one volumes, for some of them are divided into parts, each of which is again equal to a volume. To give any account of writings so multifarious is here quite out of the question. It is not even possible, within the limits of this article, to go into any details respecting the Hegelian philosophy, strictly so called. A slight sketch of its groundwork and general scope is all that can be attempted. This, however, may be sufficient. To show clearly what the principle and aim of the system is, particularly as contrasted with the philosophy of this country, is what is now proposed, and this may, perhaps, afford some insight into the system itself, and form a better introduction to its study than could be obtained from any literal repetition of its peculiar forms of expression, or of its peculiar method of procedure.

This philosophy gives itself out as the philosophy of the "absolute." The meaning of this word "absolute," then, is what must, first of all, be determined. It is nowhere explained by the system, or by any of its opponents or defenders. It may, indeed, be said that Hegel's whole philosophy is nothing but an explanation of the "absolute." But a definition of one word extending over a score of volumes is very apt to evaporate before it can be apprehended. The following is shorter. "The absolute," truth absolute, is whatever is true for intellect considered *simply as intellect*, and not considered as this or as that *particular* intellect; it is truth for *all* intellect, and not merely truth for *some* intellect; in other words, "the absolute" is truth for *pure* intellect, and not truth for *modified* intellect. An illustration will help to make plain this somewhat abstract definition. Suppose five intellects, each of them modified by the possession of one, and only one, of our five senses. One man merely sees, another merely tastes, another merely smells, another merely hears, and another merely touches; and suppose an apple presented to these five individuals. Each of them would apprehend only *one sensation;* but while the *sensation* in each case would be different, the *one* in each case would not be different. The man who saw the apple would see *one* sight, the man who tasted it would experience *one* taste, the man who heard it (when struck) would hear *one* sound, and so in regard to the others. The sensations would be peculiar to each intellect;

each would have its own; but the "one" would be common to them all: it would be the same for all. Here, then, in this "one" we have an absolute truth, or at any rate a truth which may be accepted as an illustration of such. If there were no other intellects in the universe except these five, it would, in the strictest sense, be an absolute truth. Here the "one" presenting nothing but what is common and intelligible to all, is to be regarded as a truth of intellect simply —of *pure* intellect: the "one sensation" again presenting, in each case, something which is peculiar to each intellect, is to be regarded as a truth of *modified* intellect. Looking at the five cases, we say that, in each case, the "one sensation," in so far as it is *one*, is an absolute and universal truth; while, so far as it is *sensation*, it is a relative and particular truth. Such is the explanation of "the absolute;" and it seems not unintelligible if one will keep in view the illustration by which it is enforced. As a farther illustration, this remark may be subjoined. Again consider these five sensations. Each of them is a *peculiar* sensation; but at the same time each of them *is*. In so far as each of them *is*, a truth for pure intellect, an absolute and universal truth, emerges. In so far as each of them is *peculiar*, a relative and particular truth is presented. Here then we have "number" and "being," two important categories, set forth as specimens of the "absolute."

The analysis thus briefly illustrated is the main principle of the German philosophy in general, and

of the system of Hegel in particular. It is true that he nowhere expressly supplies this analysis, but it is implied in the whole tenor of his speculations. He rather proceeds prematurely to build up into a synthesis the elements of pure thought, which are the result of the analysis. Hence arises, in a great measure, his obscurity, which seems, in many places, to be absolutely impenetrable. Nevertheless, in spite of all its defects, his exposition of the dialectual movement by which the categories of reason evolve themselves, from lowest to highest, through a self-conversion into their opposites, is a work replete at once with the profoundest truth, and the most marvellous speculative sagacity. Retrospectively it affords a solution of the *antinomies* by which Kant succeeded in bewildering the reason of his contemporaries, and it extinguishes, by anticipation, the resurrection of these same sceptical perplexities which certain philosophers in this country have of late endeavoured to bring about.

But it is in the analysis referred to that the philosophy of Hegel, and of Germany in general, finds its most signal contrast in the philosophy of Great Britain. Of the analysis in question our philosophers have formed no just or adequate conception. Hence they have misconceived the nature of "the absolute," and have failed altogether in their attempts to refute the philosophy which expounds it. They have supposed that the question concerning "the absolute" was a question which referred to

the *quantity* or amount, and not one which referred merely to the *quality* or nature of knowledge and truth. They have thought that unless *all* knowledge was ours, a knowledge of "the absolute" could not be ours; in short, that a claim to a knowledge of "the absolute" was a claim to the possession of omniscience. This is a great misapprehension. "The absolute" has nothing to do with the extent, but only with the constitution of cognition. Wherever knowledge or thought is, even in its narrowest manifestation, there "the absolute" is known; because there something is apprehended by intellect simply, something which is intelligible, not merely to this or to that particular mind, but to reason universally. In any review of the question of "the absolute," our philosophers would do well to bear in mind, that not the range or compass, but only the nature or character of our thought has to be taken into account. That there are very serious difficulties to be contended with in establishing "a philosophy of the absolute" is not to be doubted, and it must also be admitted that the tendency of such a philosophy is towards the conclusion (whether satisfactory or not) that rational self-consciousness is the only ultimate and all-comprehensive reality—is the truth above all truth—is the primary groundwork as well as the crowning perfection of the universe. But this conclusion can neither be established nor gainsaid by any inquiry into the limitations of the human faculties. It can only be disposed of (whether

pro or *con*) by a thoroughgoing analysis, of which a faint indication has been given, which shall distinguish between the absolute and relative elements in our cognitions. This Kant attempted, but this Kant did not achieve; because in his system the absolute elements are given out as merely relative, which is equivalent to the assertion that there is no common nature in all intelligence; which again is equivalent to the paradoxical averment that intelligence has no nature or essence whatsoever. Hegel made the attempt in a far better and truer spirit. In his conception he is unquestionably right; but in its execution he has involved himself in labyrinthine mazes, to many of which no reader has ever found, or ever will find the clue. The life of Hegel has been written at large by his disciple Rosenkranz of Königsberg. He and Erdmann of Halle are, in the opinion of the present writer, the most intelligent expositors of Hegelianism. Of the heterodox deductions which some philosophers and theologians have perversely sought to deduce from the Hegelian doctrines, it is unnecessary to speak. For these neither the system itself nor its author are in any way responsible.

TRANSLATION.

THE following specimen of translation is from Deinhardstein's 'Bild der Danae.' The principal characters are the great painter, Salvator Rosa, and the surgeon, Bernardo Ravienna, not yet known as a painter, who has practised his art in secret and completed his picture of Danae, which obtains the enthusiastic admiration of Salvator, and the prize in the competition of the Painting Academy of St Carlo, thus securing to him the hand of his lady-love Laura, ward of Calmari, director of the Academy. The whole is rendered with remarkable spirit and fidelity, but the story might perhaps not have enough of interest for English readers to justify its being published entire.

Act I., Scene 4.

Sal. I did not think he would have closed with me.
Bring but the gold, and thou shalt be exposed
Till Florence wide shall ring with thy disgrace.
Thou thoughtest, didst thou, I would sell my birthright,
And tear for gold the laurel from my brow?
Old dotard! dealings such as thine would rob
The light of splendour, and the flower of bloom.
Think'st thou I came to Florence as a huckster—
Not as a painter lit by light from heaven?
I'll teach thee what it is to lay a hand,
Audacious and impure, on holy things.
Love thou would'st purchase—thou would'st purchase fame,
And painting's pleasures, shunning all its pains.
The rose thou wishest! thou shalt feel the thorn—
This is a bargain thou shalt long remember.

SALVATOR.

Das dacht' ich nicht, dass er's bezahlte.—Thor!
Bring' nur das Geld, ich will Dich wohl bedeuten,
Vor ganz Florenz sollst Du zu Schanden steh'n.
Du meinst, ich soll mein Vaterrecht verkaufen,
Um Geld den Lorbeer nehmen von dem Haupt;
Der Blume willst abhandeln Du ihr Blüh'n,
Dem Licht den Glanz;—glaubst Du, ich sei gekommen
Als Mäkler, nicht als Maler, nach Florenz,
Ich will Dir zeigen, was das heisst, die Hand
Mit frechem Dünkel an das Heil'ge legen.
Dir Liebe willst Du kaufen—und den Ruhm;
Die Künstlerlust, und ohne Künstlerschmerzen,
Willst Du die Rose—nimm den Dorn dazu;
Du sollst mir wohl an diesem Handel denken!

Act II., Scene 1.

Laura. To-day
Is fixed for the decision of the prizes.
Rav. To-day?
Lau. Yes! were you not aware of that?
Rav. How should I know it?
Lau. (sighing). Ay! too true—too true—
You are no painter.
Rav. Wherefore do you sigh?
Oh, Laura, Laura! does the painter's art
Engross so large a share of your esteem,
That but a secondary love is left
For a poor surgeon?
Lau. What you are to me,
Bernardo, you know well. Yet I confess
If you were but a painter, all my wishes
Would be fulfilled. I have a love for painters—
A love inhaled with the first air I breathed—
My father was devoted to the art
With all the zeal of an enthusiast.
He had himself some skill, and our whole house
Was filled with paintings by the greatest masters.
Thus in an atmosphere of grace and beauty
My infancy was spent—my playmates, pictures.
After my father's death my guardian took me;
And he, too, is possessed by the same passion.
Mewed up, secluded by his jealous care,
From all society of men, I still
Had friends about me, and these friends were still
The bright creations of the painter's hand.

A. II., S. 1.

LAURA. Es ist heut'
Die Preisvertheilung von San Carlo.
RAV. (wie verwundert). Heut'?
LAU. Das wisst Ihr nicht?
RAV. Wie sollt' Ich?
LAU. (seufzend). Freilich—freilich—
Ihr seid kein Maler.
RAV. Warum seufzt Ihr, Laura?
Seid Ihr der Maler-kunst so hold, dass Euch
Der schlichte Wundarzt wenig, gar nichts dünkt?
LAU. Ihr wisst, was Ihr mir seid; doch gern bekenn' ich,
Voll wär' mein Gluck, triebt Ihr die Kunst, Bernardo.
Ich bin den Malern gut, ich will's gesteh'n,
Doch ist's ein Wunder auch, nach meiner Weise?
Der Vater war der edlen Malerei
Fast schwärmerisch ergeben. Manches Bild
Von gutem Werthe hat er selbst gemalt,
Und kaufte viel von Bildern grosser Meister.
So war Ich denn von erster Jugend an
Den herrlichen Gestalten gegenüber.
Nach meines guten Vaters frühem Tod
Kam ich zum Oheim. Eine gleiche Lust
Zur Kunst lebt auch in ihm. Von Menschen fern,
Gehütet von des Oheims Eifersucht,
Bin ich wie unter Bildern aufgewachsen.

The tender Guido and the soft Romano,
The earnest Annibal, the pious Durer—
These were the dear companions of my youth,
And with their works my fondest thoughts are twined.
Methinks, Bernardo, if you were to try
You might become a painter; for so true
A feeling of the beautiful is yours,
And I have heard you speak respecting art
In terms so glowing, that I am sure you love it.
Now for my sake, do try. The laurel's green,
How well it would become these clustering locks!

RAV. (aside). Oh! heavenly rapture!

LAU. (leaning on his shoulder). Promise me you'll try?

RAV. If all goes well, I promise you I will.

LAU. Oh! that is charming! Now, ev'n now, methinks
I see you seated at your easel, with
Myself beside you, stealing, whilst I knit,
Admiring glances as your work proceeds.
I read your name already in the lists
Of glory—of myself I hear it said,
That is the wife of the illustrious Bernard—
Oh! what a dream of joy!

RAV. A dream indeed.

LAU. Which shall come true—if you'll but persevere.
No doubt the first steps will be difficult,
But practice in the end will make you perfect.

Der sanfte Guido, freundliche Romano,
Der fromme Dürer, ernste Annibal,
Sind mir Bekannte einer frühen Zeit
Und mahnen mich an meine Kinderjahre.
Ihr sprecht manchmal so Wahres von der Kunst,
So tief Empfund'nes, dass—man glauben muss,
Sie sei nicht fremd Euch;—so versucht Euch denn,
Ihr seid noch jung.—Er stünd' Euch gut, Bernardo,
Der grüne Lorbeer in dem braunen Haar.

RAV. (bei Seite). O himmlisches Entzücken!

LAU. (sich an seine Schulter lehnend). Ihr versprecht mir's?

RAV. (lächelnd). Ja, wenn's nur geht, versuchen will ich's wohl.

LAU. (in die Hände schlagend). O das ist herrlich! herrlich! Wenn Ihr dann
Vor Eurer Staffelei sitzt;—ich dabei,
Vom Strickzeug manchmal schielend auf das Bild,
Wenn Euer Name dann genannt wird unter
Den grossen Malern, und man sagen wird,
Das ist das Weib des herrlichen Bernardo,
Ich kann's nicht denken!

RAV. Wär's nur schon so weit.

LAU. 'S wird werden.—Habt nur Muth—Im Anfang freilich
Geht's nicht so leicht; allein die Fertigkeit
Erwirbt sich bald.

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LECTURES

ON

GREEK PHILOSOPHY

AND OTHER

PHILOSOPHICAL REMAINS

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